Raquel Ciuzelis v James Jones T/A the Pet Cemetery & Crematorium

[2015] FWC 1187

[2015] FWC 1187

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Raquel Ciuzelis
v
James Jones T/A The Pet Cemetery & Crematorium
(U2013/10511)

COMMISSIONER SIMPSON BRISBANE, 24 MARCH 2015

Determination of appropriate compensation remitted from Full Bench - Compensation appropriate - Application of Sprigg formula yields inadequate amount - Application of general discretion taking into account all of the circumstances of the case - Compensation ordered.

[1] On 15 August 2014 Deputy President Asbury issued a decision 1 finding the dismissal of Ms Raquel Ciuzelis (the Applicant) by Mr James Jones trading as The Pet Cemetery and Crematorium (the Respondent) was unfair and ordering compensation in the amount of $18,397.85 less taxation at the appropriate rate.

[2] The Respondent in the matter at first instance filed an appeal against the Deputy President’s decision. A Full Bench heard the appeal and issued a decision 2 on 22 January 2015 upholding the Deputy President’s decision that the dismissal was unfair, but granting permission to appeal and upholding the appeal on the limited basis of the award of compensation only.

[3] In accordance with paragraph 44 of the Full Bench decision it was determined that the appropriate course would have been for the parties to have been directed to the terms of s.392 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (“the Act”) and to invite submissions as to the various criterion set out in the section.

[4] In accordance with paragraph 45 of the Full Bench decision the issue of an appropriate remedy has been remitted to me for hearing and determination.

[5] A directions hearing was held on 4 February 2015. In the course of that hearing both parties were directed to the terms of s.392 and directions were issued for the filing of any statements and submissions regarding the criterion in s.392, with the matter to be heard on 20 February 2015.

[6] Section 392 of the Act reads as follows:

“392 Remedy—compensation

Compensation

(1) An order for the payment of compensation to a person must be an order that the person’s employer at the time of the dismissal pay compensation to the person in lieu of reinstatement.

Criteria for deciding amounts

(2) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (1), the FWC must take into account all the circumstances of the case including:

(a) the effect of the order on the viability of the employer’s enterprise; and

(b) the length of the person’s service with the employer; and

(c) the remuneration that the person would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if the person had not been dismissed; and

(d) the efforts of the person (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered by the person because of the dismissal; and

(e) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation; and

(f) the amount of any income reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation; and

(g) any other matter that the FWC considers relevant.

Misconduct reduces amount

(3) If the FWC is satisfied that misconduct of a person contributed to the employer’s decision to dismiss the person, the FWC must reduce the amount it would otherwise order under subsection (1) by an appropriate amount on account of the misconduct.

Shock, distress etc. disregarded

(4) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt, caused to the person by the manner of the person’s dismissal.

Compensation cap

(5) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not exceed the lesser of:

(a) the amount worked out under subsection (6); and

(b) half the amount of the high income threshold immediately before the dismissal.

Note: subsection 392(5) indexed to $66,500 from 1 July 2014

(6) The amount is the total of the following amounts:

(a) the total amount of remuneration:

(i) received by the person; or

(ii) to which the person was entitled;

(whichever is higher) for any period of employment with the employer during the 26 weeks immediately before the dismissal; and

(b) if the employee was on leave without pay or without full pay while so employed during any part of that period—the amount of remuneration taken to have been received by the employee for the period of leave in accordance with the regulations.”

Consideration

[7] The facts of this matter are somewhat novel in that they involve the loss of an opportunity for the Applicant to have transferred into employment with a new employer which in the ordinary course would have most likely occurred but for her termination just two weeks prior to the sale of the business. All other former employees of the Respondent that wished to transfer did transfer.

[8] At the time just prior to the Applicants dismissal, she was absent from the workplace due to an injury for a period of approximately one month. The Respondent [the Appellant for the purposes of the Appeal] accepted in the Appeal hearing that he did not put a case in the matter at first instance regarding the Applicants alleged poor work performance, 3 but instead relied primarily on the jurisdictional argument that her job was redundant.

[9] Given the way the matter proceeded before the member at first instance the Deputy President was not aware at the time of the performance and conduct arguments that the Respondent presses for the purposes of dealing with the question of a compensation remedy. It is worth noting that it would have assisted the Deputy President, and may have averted the need for the current proceedings had the Respondent raised the alleged poor performance and conduct issues for the purposes of his case concerning whether the dismissal was unfair at first instance and prior to consideration of the question of remedy.

[10] In considering the criterion in s.392 no one consideration is paramount but regard must be had to each of them.

Section 392(2)(c)

[11] The formula set out in Sprigg v Pauls Licensed Festival Supermarket  4(the Sprigg Formula) is commonly used in working out an appropriate amount of compensation.

[12] In applying the Sprigg formula the first step is to estimate the remuneration that the employee would have received if they had not been dismissed. Lost remuneration is usually calculated by estimating how long the employee would have remained in employment but for the termination of their employment i.e the anticipated period of employment. In a Full Bench decision of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in Ellawala v Australian Postal Corporation  5the Full Bench said as follows:

“[33] the first step in this process - the assessment of the remuneration lost - is a necessary element in determining an amount to be ordered in lieu of reinstatement. Such an assessment is often difficult, but it must be done. As the Full Bench observed in Sprigg:

“...we acknowledge that there is a speculative element involved in all such assessments. We believe it is a necessary step by virtue of the requirement of s.170CH(7)(c). We accept that assessment of relative likelihoods is integral to most assessments of compensation or damages in courts of law.”

[13] The Applicant asserts that there is no evidence to suggest that the new employer Greencross would not have offered her employment had her name been on the list of transferring employees provided by the Respondent to the new employer Greencross. The Applicant said that there was no other employee to which Greencross did not make an offer of employment. The Applicant says that had she not been dismissed and had she been given the opportunity of employment with Greencross she would have continued in employment for a further 2.5 years and beyond based on the duration, performance and work skills in her period of employment with the Respondent. The Applicant states that the fact she has regained employment within the industry demonstrates the likelihood she would have remained in employment with Greencross.  6

Applicant’s performance, alleged complaint, invitation to leave voluntarily and alleged warning.

[14] The Respondent asserts the remuneration the Applicant would have earned at the new employer was zero if her employment record was known, and the Respondent asserts that he would have been duty bound to divulge information about the Applicant to the new employer.

[15] The Respondent relies on a statutory declaration made by Nola Murphy on 16 February 2015.  7 Ms Murphy was not available for cross examination. In the statutory declaration Nola Murphy states that she worked with the Applicant for a time in 2011/2012. Ms Murphy states she did not have a satisfactory relationship with the Applicant.

[16] Ms Murphy said in the statutory declaration that amongst other things the Applicant refused to perform her duties and would do nothing more than what she was doing when she first started. Ms Murphy claimed that there were many times that she had to take over some office work when she was doing her own paperwork because the Applicant was taking personal calls.

[17] The statutory declaration also stated that she observed the Applicant handle a complaint email from a client complaining about her phone behaviour, that the email was intended for Mr Jones, and that the Applicant replied to the email in Mr Jones name. Ms Murphy claims that the Applicant then deleted this email from the computer. Ms Murphy said that the Applicant was aware that she observed her do this, and that Ms Murphy says that she informed Mr Jones of this incident.

[18] The Applicant gave evidence responding to the allegations in Ms Murphy’s statutory declaration and disputing the various versions of the events as put in the statutory declaration by Ms Murphy. 8 On the issue of the complaint the Applicant gave a plausible explanation concerning the allegation put against her in Ms Murphy’s statutory declaration.9 Given that Ms Murphy was not available for cross examination at the hearing I am not prepared to accept it in preference to the explanations provided by the Applicant at the hearing.

[19] Mr Jones said the Applicant was invited to leave her employment of her own accord. The Applicant accepted that this did occur and believed it was a few months before her dismissal. 10 The Applicant gave evidence this invitation was made in the context of her having a disagreement with Mr Jones about work processes which she believed were ‘unethical and immoral’.11

[20] There was also contested evidence concerning whether the Applicant continued to perform duties in connection with MYOB or whether they were moved to an accountant. This evidence was inconclusive and was of no particular assistance to me. 12

[21] There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the Applicant was warned or not. The Applicant states that at no time did she receive a formal warning of any kind or that her employment was at risk. 13 The Applicant claims there was no discussion of unhappiness with her performance or conduct, nor any discussion or performance improvement plan and no complaints or written warnings.

[22] The Applicant claims Mr Jones was more than happy with her performance and even enrolled her in an accounting course to take on more in her role. The Applicant attached to her statement, three letters from former employees of the Respondent Debra Kenny, Carlos Lora and Daniel Hardke each making favourable statements about the Applicant in her employment with Mr Jones. None of these three were called to give evidence and consequently carry minimal weight.

[23] Mr Jones claimed in his statement that the Applicant was warned in late 2012 about serious performance issues and should have been dismissed when poor performance continued. He repeated this claim in his oral evidence. 14 His evidence was somewhat unclear about this. He said he thought the meeting when the warning was given was at the same meeting where the Applicant was asked if she wished to leave, but he did not say this in his statement. Ms Murphy’s statutory declaration stated that she was aware that the Applicant was warned about complaints from clients, veterinary surgeons and staff concerning her bad phone manners. Again, because Ms Murphy was not available to be cross examined I do not intend to afford this the same weight as that of the Applicants evidence in her statement and at the hearing where she continued to deny any warning ever being given.

[24] Mr Jones claimed that early in 2013 the Applicant had for approximately two months refused to perform all her duties. Mr Jones claimed that the Applicant declared that she would only do “what she was doing on day one.” Mr Jones claims that he and the other staff were required to perform those duties. Mr Jones said that it is inconceivable that the Applicant can say that he was happy with her performance. Mr Jones also claimed that the Applicants confrontational nature prevented him from dealing with her dismissal immediately, and at this “critical time” the Applicant was on leave. Mr Jones said it was at this time that the offer from Greencross to buy the business came. Mr Jones said he did not seek to damage the Applicants chance of gaining employment elsewhere by dismissing her for all the reasons possible, but rather preferred to let her go quietly. 15

[25] Mr Jones claimed he intended that the Applicant was to be dismissed for continued poor performance once she had obtained a medical clearance to return to work. He said performance reviews and discussions were difficult or impossible because of the toxic atmosphere caused by her aggression. 16 The evidence is clear he never advised the Applicant of an intention to dismiss the Applicant on these grounds.

[26] I am inclined, where there is a contest between the evidence of the Applicant and the Respondent to prefer the evidence of the Applicant. I do this for two reasons. Firstly the Applicant’s evidence was more consistent, for example in regard to the issuing of a warning. Secondly because the Respondent’s evidence changed somewhat between the first instance hearing and the remittal hearing about the extent of Greencross’s knowledge concerning issues in connection with the Applicant. At first instance the position appeared to be that Greencross decided not to offer employment to the Applicant as she was not on a list of employees in active employment during the due diligence period. 17 18 In the remittal hearing this extended to include that Greencross was aware the Respondent was going to be dismissed for performance issues. 19

Would Greencross have employed the Applicant?

[27] Mr Jones said the following in his statement filed for the remittal hearing;

“Greencross was aware from one of the earliest meeting(sic) that the Applicant was to be dismissed for serious performance issues. This was a cordial meeting with a prospective purchaser of the business which did result within a very short time in an offer to purchase.”

[28] Mr Jones said that his memory (of the meeting) is identical to that of a broker Mr Tony Brown, a chartered accountant and proprietor of Supertrac, a brokerage firm who was present at the meetings. Mr Jones provided the Commission an email that he gave evidence was provided to him by Mr Tony Brown. The email, dated 2 February 2015 reads as follows:

“Hi Jim

Further to our recent discussion, I confirm that at one of the initial meetings with Greencross representatives, it was made known to them that one employee was unlikely to be recommended to be a transferring employee because of serious performance issues that you were dealing with.

I knew this was Rachel Ciuzelis, but I don’t think if her name was made known to Greencross representatives.

Regards,

Tony Brown

SUPERTRAC..”

[29] Mr Jones said that Greencross would not have employed the Applicant had she been proposed. Mr Jones also referred to the warranties section of the contract of sale and what he regarded as his obligations of disclosure regarding an employee who may be proposed as a transferring employee. I understood this was put by Mr Jones on the basis that while he had not specifically disclosed his concerns about the Applicant to Greencross because he did not identify her by name, had he not terminated her when he did, he felt he would have been obliged to advise Greencross about concerns he held regarding the Applicant in the event he did not terminate the Applicant himself. Alternatively Greencross would have concluded themselves that the Applicant was the employee Mr Jones had referred to at previous meetings but not identified by name. Mr Jones was consistent in his evidence that he never identified the Applicant to Greencross by name.  20

[30] Whilst Mr Brown was not called to give evidence, the evidence given by Mr Jones about Mr Browns attendance at a meeting with Greencross in combination with the tendering of the email which Mr Jones said was sent to him by Mr Brown is sufficient for me to be satisfied that the nature of communications involving Mr Jones, Mr Brown and Greencross at a meeting prior to the termination of the Applicant did occur as claimed.

[31] Given what is now known about communications involving Mr Jones, Mr Brown and Greencross prior to the sale contract concluding I am satisfied that it is unlikely the Applicant was ever going to be offered employment by Greencross regardless of whether she was terminated by Mr Jones prior to the transfer of the business. On that basis I conclude that the remuneration that the Applicant would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if she had not been dismissed would have been a further two weeks wages earned from working from 9 June 2014 to 20 June 2014, which would have amounted to $1,760.00.

[32] Following step two in the Sprigg formula, the Applicant was paid two weeks wages in lieu of notice on termination of employment, also equating to $1,760.00. No other deduction is made for any remuneration earned by the Applicant since their dismissal until the end of the anticipated period of employment.

[33] In assessing the impact of contingencies it is necessary for the Commission to exercise broad discretion and this involves considering both the favourable and unfavourable contingencies. I make no further deductions for contingencies.

[34] The Respondent never brought to the attention of Deputy President Asbury the nature of the discussions involving Mr Brown, Greencross and himself which explains Deputy President Asbury’s finding that the Applicant would have continued into employment with Greencross. Part of the Respondent’s response as to why he did not raise this evidence earlier included the following:

“I didn’t want the aggravation, of which there was plenty with regard to you, I did not want any more aggravation than was necessary. I just let it go quietly. So the first action, this action, was all to do with redundancy and the fact of poor performance wasn’t brought into it was poor - was just that I’m not a barrister and I didn’t think that was relevant.”  21

Section 392(2)(g)

[35] The Commission can consider any other factors that it deems relevant to the consideration of ordering compensation for an unfair dismissal. As previously stated the Full Bench upheld the Deputy Presidents finding that the dismissal was unfair.

[36] The Respondent raised the matter of a conversation he had with a Mr Hopp on 10 February 2015. He said Mr Hopp is the owner of a business ‘Pets in Peace’ where the Applicant had worked after her termination by Mr Jones. Mr Jones said he was advised by Mr Hopp, that the Applicant no longer worked for him, and Mr Jones claimed Mr Hopp had told him that while he did not want to be involved in the matter or make a statement, he did not have a favourable view of the Applicant’s performance as an employee during her employment with Mr Hopp. Mr Hopp was not called as a witness, and the Applicant contested this hearsay evidence of Mr Jones on this issue. I do not intend to afford this matter any weight in drawing a conclusion about the application.

[37] It is apparent from the evidence that the Respondent was set on his view that the Applicant should not transfer to employment with Greencross with the other employees of the Respondent (with the exception of the Respondents wife who Mr Jones said did not wish to transfer). It is noted that the Respondent himself was employed by Greencross after the transfer of ownership.

[38] In summary the Respondents case against an order for compensation is that whilst having been unsuccessful in his appeal against the finding that the dismissal was unfair, and incorrectly believing the Applicants role was redundant at the time of termination, he would have terminated the Applicant for performance and conduct reasons before the sale proceeded anyway and he had already indicated to Greencross issues with an employee, whilst not yet having been specifically required to identify the Applicant by name in the time leading up to his decision to termination the Applicant himself. In fact it was Mr Jones evidence that Greencross knew he was going to dismiss the Applicant for poor performance.

[39] The evidence shows the Respondent took two separate steps. Firstly, he foreshadowed to Greencross issues with the Applicants performance, which was a significant step toward preventing the prospect of a transfer of employment for her. Secondly, and only after Greencross had been made aware of concerns about “an employee” he took the separate step of terminating the Applicant before the sale date.

[40] Both steps occurred in circumstances where the evidence concerning the Applicants performance and conduct did not rise to a level that could objectively justify either of the two courses of action. This observation in regard to the second step is merely a reference to the finding upheld on appeal that the dismissal was unfair. There is no reasonable basis to conclude that it was likely a proper basis for dismissing the Applicant based on her performance or conduct may have arisen between 6 June and the sale date of 20 June.

[41] Whilst it is apparent the Respondent harboured adverse opinions about the Applicant for some considerable time, the evidence merely disclosed disagreements occurred between them and does not disclose performance or conduct issues on the part of the Applicant warranting the Respondent scuttling her potential future employment with the new owner along with the other employees. The Respondent now seeks to rely on the first step as a shield against an order for compensation, that shield being that Greencross would not have engaged the Applicant with or without his decision to terminate her because he had already, and would have continued to take measures to ensure Greencross did not employ the Applicant.

[42] In Smith v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd  22 a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission said as follows:

“[32] It seems to us that the amounts arrived at by the application of Sprigg in the present matter are manifestly inadequate for employees with the length of service of the Appellants, the circumstances of their dismissal and their poor prospects for future employment. This causes us to sound a warning in relation to the application of Sprigg. The guidelines laid down in Sprigg are refined in Ellawalla v Australian Postal Corporation are clearly designed to serve the proper and desirable purpose of fostering uniformity and consistency in decision-making by individual members of the Commission when assessing compensation pursuant to s.170CH(6). However, those guidelines are not a substitute for the words of the Act. By virtue of s.170CH(2), any remedy ordered by the Commission must be a remedy that the Commission considers “appropriate” having regard to all of the circumstances of the case including the matters set out in s.170CH(2). Section 170CH(6) confers a general discretion “if the Commission considers it appropriate in all of the circumstances of the case” to “make an order requiring the employer to pay the employee an amount ordered by Commission in lieu of reinstatement” subject to the Commission having regard “to all of the circumstances of the case including” the matters listed in s.170CH(7) - the same list of matters set out in s.170CH(2) - and subject also to the ‘cap’ provided for in s.170CH(8) and (9). If an application of the guidelines in Sprigg yields an amount which appears either clearly excessive or clearly inadequate, then the member should reassess any assumptions or intermediate conclusions made or reached in applying the guidelines so as to ensure that the level of compensation is in an amount that the member considers appropriate having regard “to all of the circumstances of the case” including the matters listed in s.170CH(7) and subject to the ‘cap’ provided for in s.170CH(8) and (9). In this context it should be borne in mind that the result yielded by an application of the Sprigg guidelines may vary depending upon the particular findings in relation to the various steps including, in particular, step one, which necessarily involves assessments as to future events that will often be problematic.”

[43] It is noted that the language found at s.170CH(2) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 “having regard to all of the circumstances of the case..”, as it was at the time of the decision in Smith v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd is similar to the language currently found at s.392(2) of the Act, “take into account all of the circumstances of the case...”. The decision in Smith v Moore Paragon Australia is authority for the proposition that the Commission retains a general discretion taking into account all of the circumstances of the case to make an order for compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

[44] The particular circumstances of this case justify a departure from the Sprigg formula on the basis that Sprigg yields an amount which appears clearly inadequate. Had Mr Jones not taken either of the two steps referred to above, and instead put the Applicants name forward in the same manner as the other employees I am satisfied the Applicant would have transferred just as all the other employees who wished to did.

[45] I have not been satisfied from the evidence of the existence of misconduct or poor performance providing a basis to reduce an estimated period of future employment, however the evidence is clear that the relationship between the Applicant and Mr Jones was under considerable strain, and included evidence of ongoing conflict between them. Given that the Applicant and Mr Jones would have both been employees of Greencross had the Applicant’s employment transferred then it is likely conflict between the two would continue forcing Greencross to address the conflict it had inherited. Further there is some evidence of disharmony between the Applicant and other former staff employed by the Respondent, such as Ms Murphy. This also persuades me in the context of employment in a small business where conflict is more amplified, of real risks to the Applicants likely length of time in ongoing employment with Greencross. I consider given the facts of this case that the Applicant would not have continued in employment with the new employer for more than another ten weeks.

[46] The two week period of employment that would have occurred with the Respondent before the transfer, but for her dismissal, should be added to the ten weeks totalling 12 weeks employment. I am not prepared to include in the compensation order an estimated figure for intermittent weekend work as claimed by the Applicant as the evidence is insufficient to do so.

Section 392(2)(a)

[47] It would appear on the facts of this case, and accepted by the parties at the directions hearing on 4 February 2014 that because the business was sold by the Respondent on 20 June 2013, s.392 (2)(a) is not relevant in this matter because it cannot be said that an order in favour of the Applicant could affect the viability of the enterprise when the Respondent was a sole trader who no longer operates the enterprise.

Section 392(2)(b)

[48] Secondly, in regard to section 392(2)(b) the Applicant commenced employment on 4 July 2011 and was dismissed on 6 June 2013, a period of just under two years. A period of service of just less than two years with a small business employer is not of itself a compelling basis to make a significant order for compensation.

Section 392(2)(d)

[49] I am satisfied that the Applicant has provided evidence of having made efforts to mitigate her loss and I make no deductions on this basis.

Section 392(2)(e)

[50] The evidence concerning the amount of any remuneration earned by the Applicant from employment between the dismissal and the making of an order for compensation does not provide a basis for a reduction in the amount I have determined as appropriate in this case. Mr Jones raised an issue about the Applicant having established another business but the evidence does not support a finding that the business was either operating or that the Applicant earned income from her own business in the relevant time.

Section 392(2)(f)

[51] The evidence concerning the amount of any income reasonably likely to be so earned by the Applicant between the making of an order for compensation and the actual compensation again does not provide a basis for a reduction in the amount I have determined as appropriate in this case.

Section 392(3)

[52] I am not satisfied that there is evidence of misconduct by the Applicant that contributed to the employer’s decision to dismiss her. No reduction will be made on that basis.

Conclusion

[53] Twelve weeks wages equates to $10,560.00. I deduct the amount of $1,760.00 being the notice paid arriving at a figure of $8,800.00. No deduction is made for Centrelink payments received by the Applicant as these payments applied to a time after the period of estimated employment with Greencross would have ended. The Applicant has also sought payment of superannuation applicable for the period. It is appropriate superannuation that would have been paid for the 12 week period also form part of the compensation order. The amount I have determined does not exceed the compensation cap. I have considered the impact of taxation, but prefer to determine compensation as a gross amount and leave taxation to determination.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

The Appellant: Mr J Jones in person

The Respondent: Ms R. Ciuzellis in person

Hearing details:

Brisbane

20 February 2015

 1   [2014] FWC 5566

 2   [2015] FWCFB 84

 3   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 79 and PN 280

 4 (1998) 88 IR21

 5   [2000] AIRC 1151

 6   Exhibit 1 Statement Ms Giuzelis dated 10.2.15 paragraph 1

 7   Exhibit 4 Statutory Declaration of Ms Murphy

 8   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 68 - 78

 9   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 63

 10   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 96

 11   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 104

 12   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 180 - 199

 13   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 57

 14   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 267

 15   Exhibit 3 Statement with attached email from Ms Gregory

 16   Exhibit 3 Statement

 17   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 298 - 300

 18   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 332 - 341

 19   Exhibit 3 Statement paragraph 3

 20   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 296

 21   Transcript 20 February 2015 PN 308

 22   [2004] AIRC 57

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