Rapid Legal Solutions Pty Ltd & Anor v State of Queensland

[2025] HCATrans 41

[2025] HCATrans 041

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B12 of 2025

B e t w e e n -

RAPID LEGAL SOLUTIONS PTY LTD

First Plaintiff

JOHN FRANCIS WINDRIDGE

Second Plaintiff

and

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

Defendant

BEECH‑JONES J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA AND BY VIDEO CONNECTION

ON THURSDAY, 12 JUNE 2025, AT 9.14 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

HIS HONOUR:   In accordance with the protocol for remote hearings, I will announce the appearances for the parties.

MR A.D. SCOTT, KC appears with MS G.F. PERRY and MS E.A. LYNCH for the plaintiffs.  (instructed by McGinness & Associates Lawyers)

MR G.J.D. DEL VILLAR, KC, Solicitor‑General of the State of Queensland, appears with MR K.J.E. BLORE for the defendant.  (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))

HIS HONOUR:   All right.  I have read everyone’s submissions and the pleadings carefully.  Mr Scott, is there anything you wish to say by way of supplement to what you have written on the question of remittal?

MR SCOTT:   No, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   Mr Solicitor?

MR DEL VILLAR:   We have sufficiently set out our position in the written submissions, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: All right. Thank you, both. The first plaintiff is incorporated. It is a law practice within the meaning of Schedule 2 of the Legal Profession Act2007 (Qld). The second plaintiff is an admitted legal practitioner. He is the director of the first plaintiff and its principal solicitor. On about 24 April 2025, the plaintiffs commenced proceedings in the original jurisdiction of this Court against the State of Queensland, seeking a declaration that Part 5B of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (“the MAI Act”) is invalid.

In the statement of claim, the plaintiffs plead that, on 25 October 2024, the Motor Accident Insurance Commission appointed an investigator, pursuant to section 87ZC of the MAI Act, to investigate the relevant affairs of the first plaintiff, on the basis of a suspicion that there had been a contravention of the so‑called “claim farming” provisions in Part 5AA of the MAI Act by the first plaintiff or an “associated person” of the first plaintiff. The statement of claim pleads that the second plaintiff is such a person.

The statement of claim identifies three particular features of Part 5B and the MAI Act. First, it notes that the appointed investigator is conferred with compulsive powers which can require the production of a document or the provision of an answer to a question, despite any claim for privilege against self‑incrimination or legal professional privilege: see section 87ZI(2).

Second, within Part 5B, sections 87ZQ and 87ZI(5) are said to proffer a limited use immunity where documents or answers are provided, which does not extend to any prosecution for an offence against the claim farming provisions.

Third, within Part 5B, it is pleaded that section 87ZM provides that a report of an investigator is admissible in a legal proceeding as evidence of the facts stated in the report.

Having regard to these matters, the statement of claim contends that Part 5B is inconsistent with Chapter III of the Constitution by impairing the integrity of State courts as repositories of federal jurisdiction.  Thus, the pleading seeks to rely on the decision of this Court in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 and the cases that have developed what was enunciated in that case.

The parties to the proceedings have filed competing applications for directions.  The plaintiffs seek to have the proceedings remain in this Court and to refer a special case to the Full Court.  The defendant, being the State of Queensland, seeks to have the proceedings remitted to the Supreme Court of that State.  Although the proceedings involve a constitutional challenge, and it is unlikely that there will be any facts in dispute, the defendant nevertheless submits that remittal is appropriate.  To that end, the defendant raised three related propositions.

First, the defendant contended the proceedings are, in effect, premature, because at the moment they concern challenges to powers conferred on the Executive, whereas Kable concerns – so the defendant says – only the impairment of the integrity of the courts.  The defendant says that, at the present, the jurisdiction of the State courts has not yet been invoked.

Second, the defendant submits that the plaintiffs seek the invalidation of the entirety of Part 5B, rather than challenging the validity of any particular provisions of that Part in their application to them.

Third, the defendant contends that the proceedings do not raise any novel constitutional issue, but instead involve the application of already established and accepted constitutional principles enacted in Kable and its progeny.  The function of applying those principles is something that the Supreme Court of Queensland is well able and adapted to perform.

In their comprehensive written submissions, the plaintiffs oppose remittal.  Although many points are traversed, so far as the basis upon which the defendant seeks remittal, the plaintiffs contended that they are now being subjected to an unconstitutional investigation, which is itself prejudice enough, and they “should not have to wait until they are at the door of a trial court to agitate the constitutional argument advanced.”

The capacity of this Court in its original jurisdiction to determine a constitutional challenge is one of its enduring strengths. The power of remittal conferred by section 44(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) exists to preserve and protect that capacity.

It ensures that the Court is not diverted from its principal functions by the need to have and determine matters in its original jurisdiction, which could – on reflection – properly be brought and determined in another Australian court.  It is beyond dispute that the power of remittal is available to be exercised in this case.  The Supreme Court of Queensland is clearly a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to the dispute.

The various aspects of Part 5B of the MAI Act of which the plaintiffs complain are, in substance – one way or another – concerned with the integrity and fairness of the process of any criminal trial or other legal proceedings that might ensue out of the investigation that is being conducted. It is true, as contended by the plaintiffs, that they are now the subject of an investigation under provisions of a statute which they say are constitutionally invalid. However, to vindicate that claim, they are not – if the proceedings are remitted – required to wait until they are at the door of a trial court.

Instead, they can proceed to vindicate that claim in the Supreme Court of Queensland.  That Court will be able to apply existing authority to determine the plaintiffs’ challenge.

To the extent that the resolution of the proceedings might involve an extension or development of existing principle, then the proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland will facilitate that development at least being identified and then being resolved through the usual appellate process.  However, what I do not think should occur at this stage is that the resources of this Court be occupied in respect of a challenge that appears to involve the application of existing principles, and – most importantly – is based on supposed impairments of the process of a fair trial or hearing when no such trial or hearing may ever occur.

Accordingly, I will order the remittal of the proceedings.  I make the following orders:

1.The matter be remitted to the Supreme Court of Queensland, pursuant to section 44(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

2.The matter continue in the Supreme Court of Queensland as if the steps in this Court were taken in the Supreme Court of Queensland.

3.The Registrar of this Court provide to the proper officer of the Supreme Court of Queensland copies of all documents filed in this Court.

4.The costs of the proceedings in this Court to date be costs in the Supreme Court of Queensland.

5.The costs in this Court, including the costs of any taking out of this order, be according to the scale applicable to proceedings in this Court and thereafter to the scale applicable in the Supreme Court of Queensland and in the discretion of that court.

Mr Scott, is there anything further?

MR SCOTT:   No, your Honour.  May it please.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes.  Mr Solicitor?

MR DEL VILLAR:   No, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   All right.  Thank you both for your assistance.  The Court will adjourn.

AT 9.25 AM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED