Rand and Rand

[2008] FamCA 281

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

RAND & RAND [2008] FamCA 281

FAMILY LAW – CONTEMPT - Contravention of Court order

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

The Marshall of the Court v Rutherford (1999) FLC 92-866
Australian Consolidated Press v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483
Abduramanoski (2005) FLC 93-215
K & J (2004) FLC 93-117
Myers & Myers (2004) FLC 93-291
Australian Meat Industry Employees Union v Minchinbury Station Pty Limited (1986) 66 ALR 557

APPLICANT WIFE: MS RAND

RESPONDENT HUSBAND: MR RAND

FILE NUMBER: SYF 2153 of 2001

DATE DELIVERED:  28 MARCH 2008

PLACE DELIVERED:  PARRAMATTA

PLACE HEARD: PARRAMATTA

JUDGMENT OF: COLLIER J

HEARING DATE:  12 November 2007

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: MR RICHARDSON S.C.

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Adrian Twigg & Co

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: MR MAIDEN S.C.

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Benjamin & Robinson

Orders

1. That in respect of the contempt of the orders of 10 January 2006 THE HUSBAND is to be forthwith imprisoned, to be held in prison until discharged by order of the Family Court of Australia, such sentence to commence immediately.

2. That in respect of the contempt of the orders of 24 October 2006 THE HUSBAND is to be forthwith imprisoned to be held in prison until four months from this date, such sentence to commence immediately.

3. That the two terms of imprisonment are to be served concurrently. 

4. That a warrant of commitment reflecting the orders of this Court issue forthwith.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Rand & Rand is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA

FILE NUMBER: SYF 2153 of 2001

MS RAND

Applicant

And

MR RAND

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and Background

1. On 25 June 2007 I found two contempts against the respondent husband proven.  I set out my reasons for those findings in a judgment delivered on 25 June 2007.  The matter was then stood over for sentence.  The matter came before me on 21 September 2007.  On that day and on the application of the respondent, and subject to orders made on that day for the filing of documents and payment of costs, the matter was adjourned.  The matter came before me again on 12 November 2007 and on that day I heard evidence from Daniel George Saad, solicitor, the respondent himself, and detailed and carefully reasoned submissions by senior counsel for each of the applicant and the respondent. 

2. When the matter commenced before me on 12 November 2007 a considerable period of time was taken in dealing with alleged breaches of my orders of 21 September by the respondent.  Senior counsel for the applicant raised the issue that a cheque had been forwarded by the respondent’s solicitors to the applicant’s solicitors in purported compliance with my order for the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs.  It was explained to me that the cheque was not the respondent’s cheque.  The cheque postdated to 12 November.  Additionally the letter which enclosed and forwarded that cheque (which became Exhibit A before me) purported to impose conditions on the applicant’s solicitors, or the applicant, dealing with the cheque.  A letter in reply from the applicant’s solicitors to the respondent’s solicitors became Exhibit B.

3. However, at the commencement of his submissions to me, learned counsel for the applicant indicated that, prior to the lunch adjournment a bank cheque had been provided in the sum of $7,370.  That was for the amount the subject of my order but made no allowance for interest for late payment.

4. An application was made on behalf of the respondent for leave to file and rely upon affidavits of the respondent and Mr Revek, solicitor.  Those documents had not been filed or served in accordance with my orders of 21 September 2007.  Specifically my order had been that if the documents sought to be relied upon were not filed and served by the close of business on 26 October 2007 they were only to be filed thereafter with leave of the Court.  Until the hearing was underway, no such leave was sought. 

5. There was then some difficulty in ascertaining precisely had happened with the affidavits and as to which registry they had indeed been filed in.

6. I permitted the respondent’s senior counsel to call Daniel George Saad, solicitor, to give evidence in respect of the failure to comply with orders as to the filing and service of the affidavits now sought to be relied upon.  

7. Mr Saad gave evidence of his involvement with the legal practice, Benjamin & Robinson, conducted by a company B & R Legal Proprietary Limited.  Mr Saad’s assertion was that he was an employee of the company.  He gave evidence that the solicitor previously having carriage of the matter, Mr Duong, had left the firm on a date which he could not precisely identify.  As to his own involvement, he indicated that he commenced to read the file. He could not give a precise date when he did this.  At that time he recalled there were in existence affidavits of the husband and Mr Revek in draft form.  The witness gave evidence of a conference with Mr Maiden on a date which he cannot specifically recall and at which he did not take or make notes.  He assumed Mr Duong had made notes. 

8. He said that so far as he was aware his office had prepared draft affidavits for submission to Mr Maiden.  He said the husband had assisted in the preparation of his own affidavit. 

9. The witness was asked about the husband’s affidavit appearing to indicate that it was filed on behalf of W Holdings Pty Ltd.  Mr Saad could not satisfactorily explain this.  He said he thought that Mr Duong and Mr Revek had prepared the document, notwithstanding that the document on its face was said to have been prepared by a Mr Pipparides.  The witness indicated that there were finishing touches that Mr Pipparides provided in respect of the affidavit.  The witness was unable to say when he had spoken with Mr Maiden.  He was not able to say when he became aware of the requirement for filing but he conceded it was prior to the date fixed by my orders.

10. Mr Saad said this: 

    “I think it’s enough to say that I was aware and that I am responsible for the fact that the affidavits were filed late.  I was assisting with the preparation in the latter stages and I was certainly – I had carriage of the matter so I can’t resile from that position.”

11. He was asked did he regard solicitors working within the firm as his employed solicitors to which he replied:

    “Loosely speaking, yes.”

12. I found his evidence to be less than satisfactory.  His confusion as to the actual part played by various people in the preparation of these affidavits, his lack of file notes and his inability to be specific as to when he became aware of the existence of the orders of the 21 September 2007, and the requirements imposed by those orders, all demonstrated a lack of professional thoroughness.  It is to his credit that he accepts responsibility for the late filing of the documents.  That of itself is insufficient to overcome the deficiencies in his preparation for the hearing, and in his evidence in court. 

13. However, and for reasons given at the time, I allowed the two affidavits to be relied upon. 

14. The respondent then gave oral evidence.  He asserted he had no interest in any patent or process or anything remotely similar to NR Technology.

15. At the conclusion of his evidence in chief he confirmed, when asked by his counsel, that he would transfer, and do all things in his power to transfer to the wife or her nominee any interest that he may or may not have in law, equity or in any other way in respect of the processes that have been the subject of the court his answer was that he would do that absolutely.

16. He was then cross examined by Mr Richardson.  He indicated in answer to a question by Mr Richardson that Rowlands J had misunderstood the process.  He indicated that he believed he could only transfer something that he owned and said that if it ever became his property he would happily transfer it immediately.  He was further cross examined about a document signed by his uncle.  He gave evidence he did not recall another document signed by his uncle on 18 September 2007.  He indicated that Mr Duong had made a mistake in a document sworn on 20 September 2007.  He was asked about the renewal of a patent and he said he had no idea.  He was questioned concerning his earning since June 2007 and indicated they were about $3,000 or $2,000.  He denied that he had sought to arrange his affairs to his advantage. 

17. Those were the only witnesses called before me and I then heard submissions. 

18. Each of the parties’ legal representatives made detailed and forceful submissions to me.  Senior counsel for the applicant referred me to a number of authorities to which I will make specific reference later in these reasons for judgment.  It was put to me that a fine would be a waste of time.  It was further put to me that any form of suspended sentence or conditional sentence would do nothing to secure compliance with his Honour’s orders.  It was thus the applicant’s case that the only manner in which the respondent could be properly dealt with was the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment until such time as the respondent had purged his contempt.

19. Counsel for the respondent made it clear that in the absence of evidence of financial loss I would not sentence the husband to jail.  He made a comparison with a sentence of three months imposed in The Marshall of the Court v Rutherford[1] indicating that the sentence of three months imposed in that case was as a result of a far greater wrong-doing than in the present case.

    i)[1] (1999) FLC 92-866

The law to be applied.

1. Part XIIIB contains s. 112AP only.  Section 112AP is in the following terms:

   “Contempt

   (1)  Subject to subsection (1A), this section applies to a contempt of a court that:

   (a)  does not constitute a contravention of an order under this Act; or

   (b)  constitutes a contravention of an order under this Act and involves a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court.

   (1A)  This section does not apply to a contempt that constitutes a contravention of a maintenance order if the order has been complied with before the matter of the contravention comes before the court.

   (2)  In spite of any other law, a court having jurisdiction under this Act may punish a person for contempt of that court.

   (3)  The applicable Rules of Court may provide for practice and procedure as to charging with contempt and the hearing of the charge.

   (4)  Where a natural person is in contempt, the court may punish the contempt by committal to prison or fine or both.

   (5)  Where a corporation is in contempt, the court may punish the contempt by sequestration or fine or both.

   (6)  The court may make an order for:

   (a)  punishment on terms;

   (b)  suspension of punishment; or

   (c)  the giving of security for good behaviour.

   (7)  Where a person is committed to prison for a term for contempt, the court may order the person's discharge before the expiry of that term.

   (8)  To avoid doubt, the serving by a person of a period of imprisonment as a result of a contempt of a court arising out of a failure by the person to make a payment in respect of the maintenance of another person does not affect the first‑mentioned person's liability to make the payment.

   (9)  In this section:

   "order under this Act" means an order under this Act affecting children or an order under this Act within the meaning of Part XIIIA.”

1. It is clear that parliament intended that part XIIIB should form a complete code for dealing with contempts.

2. Mr Richardson referred me to the decision of Australian Consolidated Press v Morgan[2].  Particularly I was referred to the decision of Windeyer J and the passage appearing at the bottom of 498 and onwards. 

   ii)[2] (1965) 112 CLR 483

3. To my mind the relevant passage is this:

   “When contempt lies in disobedience of a court's order to do something, the contemnor may be imprisoned, until by doing what was ordered he purges his contempt.”

4. Mr Richardson, indeed, made reference particularly to the next passage where His Honour dealt with a contempt constituted by disobedience of an injunction. In that next passage His Honour spoke of a purging of contempt by apology, reparations for damage done and payment of costs. To my mind His Honour’s judgment clearly distinguished between the punishment that may be imposed for breach of an order and disobedience of an injunction not to do something.

5. However I am satisfied that his Honour’s comments provide some guidance and assistance in determining what can be done by a contemnor to purge his contempt. 

6. Clearly the husband has in this case not offered any apology.  Indeed he continues to maintain his innocence of any wrongdoing.  There has been no offer for reparation.  An amount was paid, eventually, for costs in accordance with my order of 21 September.  This amount related however to the costs of the applicant thrown away as a result of the adjournment granted on that day on the application of the respondent.  As such, the amount paid is not an amount of costs as contemplated by his Honour.

7. Mr Richardson also referred me to the reported decision of Abduramanoski[3]  in which the Full Court examined the issue and reviewed the authorities in relation to contempt.

   iii)[3] (2005) FLC 93-215

8. At paragraph 67 of Abduramanoski (supra) their Honours found that s. 112AP does not refer to the imposition of a sentence but to punishment.  Their Honours held that the general sentencing principles that apply in a court exercising criminal jurisdiction do not apply to matters under s.112AP. 

9. At paragraph 69 of Abduramanoski (supra) their Honours quoted with approval passages from the judgment of an earlier Full Court in K & J[4] which stated:

   Paragraph 68 (K & J): “In our view the fact that a person is found guilty of a contempt by reason of disobeying an order of this Court is not to be equated to a conviction of a criminal offence even where the conduct complain of constitutes both the offence and the contempt.

   Paragraph 69 (K & J): The reason is that the purposes of the criminal law are of necessity different from the purpose of the law of contempt and although the conduct in question may be identical, each branch of the law may regard its nature and gravity quite differently.”

   iv)[4] (2004) FLC 93-117

10. Their Honours in Abduramanoski (supra) then quoted further from K & J (Abduramanoski paragraph 69, K & J paragraph 71):

    “The purpose of the law of contempt is to require compliance with orders of the Court and to punish non-compliance where appropriate.  Conduct involving non-compliance with a court order may be of a much more serious nature for the purpose of the law of contempt than it is for the purpose of the criminal law and vice versa.”

11. Learned senior counsel for the application referred me to paragraph 41 of the judgment in Abduramanoski (supra).  There the Full Court quoted from the learned trial judges’ reasons for judgment in the following terms:

    “It was not a matter of simply not complying with orders.  This was a positive course of conduct by the husband designed to ensure that orders made by the Court would have no effect.”

12. I agree with the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that those words describe the situation that exists in this case concerning the respondent.

13. In Myers & Myers[5] the Full Court (indeed identically constituted to the Full Court that determined Abduramanoski (supra)) made reference to Australian Meat Industry Employees Union v Minchinbury Station Pty Limited[6].  Their Honours of the Full Court at paragraph 60 of their judgment quoted this passage from Australian Meat Industry Employees Union v Minchinbury Station Pty Limited:

    “Although the primary purpose in committing a defendant who disobeys an injunction is to enforce the injunction for the benefit of the plaintiff another purpose is to protect the effective administration of justice by demonstrating the Court’s orders will be enforced.”

    v)[5] (2006) FLC 93-291

    vi)[6] (1986) 66 ALR 557

14. Notwithstanding the quoted passage dealt with a defendant who had disobeyed an injunction, I am satisfied that the last part of that passage is of significance in this present case, and indeed is of particular importance as it clearly identifies a further purpose for punishment for contempt as being the protection of the effective administration of justice.  That must be an important consideration.  It is a clear indication that the Court will demonstrate that it will not lightly tolerate disobedience of its orders and will, where necessary, enforce those orders by the imposition of sanctions. 

15. At paragraph 40 of Abduramanoski their Honours referred to the trial judge having made reference to the principles enunciated in Tate v Tate (No 3) (2003) FLC ¶93-138. Further at paragraph 49 of Abduramanoski their Honours made further reference to Tate v Tate (No 3) quoting with approval paragraph 57 of the Tate v Tate (No 3) judgment:-

    “The principles underlying proceedings for contempt arising out of disobedience of order were recently review by the Full Court in Tate and Tate (No 3) (supra) at 78,299-78,300 as follows:

    “57.Normally, the purpose of contempt proceedings against a person for breach of such an order is to coerce them to comply with it. However, It is quite clear that another purpose of bringing proceedings for contempt against a person who has breached a non-monetary order of the court may be that of punishment. The purposes of imposing punishment would appear to reflect the need for individual and general deterrence and retribution for the party’s failure to comply with the order. Retribution is called for because it is essential to the proper working of the court system that court orders are obeyed. If they are defied or ignored, the whole system of dispute resolution by litigation breaks down. While there are other means of dispute resolution available, in the final analysis a citizen has the right to approach a court to determine a dispute and the court has a duty to do so.”

16. It is significant that their Honours in this passage refer to the need for both individual and general deterrence as well as retribution for the parties’ failure to comply. Further, it is made clear that retribution is called for as it is essential that court orders be obeyed.

17. In paragraph 64 of Abduramanoski their Honours made it clear that in the case before them the primary aim of the proceedings was clearly punitive. Further, their Honours found that this was an appropriate aim, at least in circumstances where there had been a flagrant defiance of court orders. Their Honours then went on to quote Borry & Lowe The Law of Contempt (3rd edition) page 629 as follows:

    “Blatant and aggravated contempt particularly when repeated by a person who has clearly been warned as to the possible consequences of defying an order will quote properly attract an immediate custodial sentence as a mark both of the gravity of the contempt and the Court’s disapproval and to deter continuers and other who might be tempted to breach such an order.”

18. At paragraph 62 of Abduramanoski their Honours made reference to the work “Sentencing Law in New South Wales” (Butterworths). Their Honours quoted paragraph 1-030 as follows: 

    “A fundamental principle of sentencing is that sentencing does not involve precise mathematical formulae nor admit of a single correct answer. However, when a sentencer is required to sentence an offender in relation to more than one offence the sentencer must: (i) impose a sentence in relation to each offence; (ii) then consider whether the sentences should be cumulative or concurrent or partly cumulative and partly concurrent; (iii) then consider the question of totality.”

19. I am satisfied the respondent was fully aware of the obligation imposed upon him by the orders of Rowlands J and reinforced by the orders of Loughnan JR.  The respondent continues to assert his innocence.  It is his case as I understand it that it is impossible to comply with the trial judge’s orders.  That situation is not open to him.  His contention that Rowlands J “misunderstood” the situation I reject.  I am satisfied that the husband has chosen the course of action that he has adopted and pursued.  He continues to assert that there are no such processes.  He continues to assert that no money is earned, produced or generated that can in any way be applied in satisfaction of the learned trial judge’s orders.  However the husband has never done that which is required of him to provide a proper accounting of what has occurred with the various interlocking business entities.  I dealt with this aspect of the matter when finding the contempts proved.

1. I am satisfied that the husband’s course of action is a deliberate and calculated one. As has been pointed out before, his protestations that he has done all he can, and to a lesser extent that the learned trial judge misunderstood, are excuses that he has previously advanced. He has not at any time acknowledged that he has a responsibility under his Honour’s orders. He has not sought, or attempted, to in any way, form or fashion be excused from compliance with the orders of Rowlands J. He has not prosecuted any appeal, nor has he sought relief pursuant to any other section of the Family Law Act.

2. Mr Richardson further says that I can take into account the husband’s failure to comply with my orders of 21 September 2007.  I am satisfied, barely, that the responsibility and indeed the fault for the late filing of the documents is to be born by those advising the husband.  Accordingly I do not find that that failure is, in any way, to be taken against the respondent in imposing sentence upon him.  However the cheque which was initially forwarded is to my mind in a somewhat different category.  Notwithstanding that my order was clear and specific the husband, in the letter forwarded on his behalf enclosing the first cheque, sought to cavil with the clear requirements of my order.  This is an indication that the husband continues in a course of conduct which demonstrates he has scant regard for orders of this Court.  Overall I am satisfied the husband has decided to take a course of action, which has the effect of ignoring the orders of this Court.

3. It is against that background that I turn to the penalties that are open to me to impose by way of punishment on the husband.

4. I am satisfied that the penalties available to me to punish the respondent are a committal to prison, a fine, or both. (section 112AP(4)). Further, I may make an order for (a) punishment on terms, suspension of punishment or the giving of security for good behaviour (112AP(6)).

5. So far as any imposition of a fine is concerned; the evidence before me indicates that the husband has no capacity to pay a fine of any significance.  I am satisfied that on his own evidence the husband has an income of less than $3,000 in the last year.  Certainly the husband did arrange for payment of the amounts of costs I had ordered previously, but initially what was proffered was another person’s cheque and eventually the amount was paid by bank cheque.  I am not advised or informed who provided the funds for that bank cheque.

6. If I were to punish these contempts, or either of them, by way of fine, the amount imposed necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offence and to act as both a general and specific deterrent would to need be a substantial sum.  In all the circumstances I am satisfied that to impose such a fine would be pointless.  The husband would not be able to pay any fine.  The matter would thus be extended, requiring additional applications and the incurring of an even greater amount for costs.

7. Accordingly I am satisfied that there is in this case no utility in imposing a monetary penalty upon the respondent.

8. The use of a further reconnaissance serves little purpose.  The husband has so far ignored the requirements imposed upon him by his Honour’s orders.  The husband continues to assert that there is nothing he can do with the orders of Rowlands J.  As I have already indicated, he chose not to comply with my order concerning the payment of costs until the day of the hearing.  Thus to impose any further sanction that required the husband to comply with his Honour’s orders would achieve nothing and would only further complicate this unfortunate and protracted matter. 

9. What then are the other options?  I can impose punishment on terms.  However it is clear that I do not have available to me the sentencing options available to a Judge or Magistrate sentencing under New South Wales State law.  There is no way in which I can for example order a sentence to be served by way of periodic or home detention. 

10. That leaves me in the position where I can, if I consider appropriate, impose a suspended sentence upon the respondent, thus stopping short of immediate full time custody.  This solution in the circumstances of this case does not provide a proper and adequate sanction.  For the reasons I have already given, I am satisfied that the husband will not comply with his Honour’s orders if given a further opportunity.  Accordingly to impose a suspended sentence with the aim of ensuring compliance would be of no use.  Further in a case such as this, the imposition of a suspended sentence does not demonstrate a general deterrence, ensuring that others are very conscious that court orders are to be obeyed and if they are not the Court will take appropriate steps to enforce them. 

11. I must then examine the appropriateness or otherwise of imposing a sentence of imprisonment.  I accept that such a sentence is the last option, to be used only when all other alternatives are demonstrated to be inadequate.

12. It is put to me with real force by Mr Maiden that I cannot punish for the contempt by way of imprisonment as there is no monetary loss established as a result of the husband’s failure to comply. With this submission I cannot agree. Whilst I am unable to fix with mathematical certainty the loss sustained by the wife I am satisfied that the decision of the learned trial judge was that the wife had an entitlement to an amount of $650 000. I am satisfied that in all the circumstances of this case I can be comfortably satisfied that the husband’s actions, perhaps more properly his total inaction, has deprived the wife of the fruits of her litigation as determined by Rowlands J in a judgment which has not been the subject of an appeal.

13. In Myers v Myers (supra) their Honours noted a submission made in that case that the correct approach to sentencing was that adopted by Palmer J in Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Machalik & Ors (2004) NSWSC 1259 where the trial judge imposed substantial fines and a fixed term of imprisonment for eighteen months and a non parole of twelve months. Their Honours of the Full Court drew a distinction with that sentence having been imposed in New South Wales (para. 32). Their Honours went on to make reference to paragraphs 71 and 72 of Abduramanoski.

14. Their Honours in Myers said (para. 34):

    “We note that sentencing for contempt involves a consideration of the individual circumstances of the particular case and we agree with the comments of Palmer J in Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Machalik (supra) at paragraph 49 that:

    “Review of the punishment in other cases is of little assistance as each case really depends upon the Court’s assessment of the relevant facts.”

15. At para. 35 their Honours said:

    “35. Whilst the sentence prima facie on its face is harsh, the trial Judge’s exercise of discretion must be considered in light of her findings, which are not challenged, about the appellant’s antecedents, and lack of contrition. Further, in our view, what is particularly relevant is s 112AP(7) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).”

16. Further their Honours at paragraph 36 of Myers (supra) made it clear that section 112AP(7) “enables the husband to come back at any time and argue for a different order.”

17. Thus the husband is entitled to bring the matter back to court at any time in the appropriate circumstances.  This clearly gives the husband the opportunity, at any time after he is sentenced, to seek to bring the matter back before the Court to have the sentence originally imposed, changed. 

18. It is put to me by senior counsel for the appellant that there is not real purpose in a period of fixed imprisonment being imposed in this case.  Rather it is argued that it is necessary to incarcerate the husband until such time as he complies with his Honour’s orders.  On the basis of the material I have already referred to, if I were to impose an indefinite sentence the husband could come back and argue for a different order (Myers supra). 

19. I am satisfied that there is no option other than to impose a sentence or sentences of immediate and full time imprisonment.

20. There are in this case two offences found proven.  I am satisfied that I am required to impose a discrete sentence in respect of each such offence.  I am satisfied that the sentences so imposed can be ordered to be served concurrently or cumulatively. 

21. In this case I am satisfied that the appropriate method of dealing with this matter is to order that the husband be sentenced to imprisonment until such time that he purges his contempt or until some other application is made on his behalf.  I am aware and fully conscious of the fact that this is a serious and drastic step.  However I am satisfied that in all the circumstances of this case it is a justified and proper sentence to be imposed.

22. In the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that this is the only method by which compliance with Rowlands J’s orders can be achieved.

23. I will therefore in respect of the first offence sentence the respondent to imprisonment until further order of the Court.

24. As to the second offence created by the breach of the reconnaissance of Judicial Registrar Loughnan, I am satisfied that it is appropriate that there be a fixed term of imprisonment and further that that term be one of four months.  In the circumstances of this case and having regard to the sentence I have already indicated I will impose in respect of the first proven breach, this is in all the circumstances surrounding this case an appropriate penalty, reflecting both a general and specific deterrent.

25. I am satisfied that in appropriate circumstances sentence can be served either concurrently or cumulatively.  In this case, having regard to the sentence I have already indicated that I will impose in respect of the first breach, I am satisfied that it is entirely appropriate that the sentences of indeterminate imprisonment and imprisonment for four months be served concurrently and I will so order.

26. In respect then of the first contravention constituted by the breach of the order of His Honour Justice Rowlands made on 10 January 2006, I order that the husband be forthwith imprisoned, to be held in prison until further order of this Court. On the second count, that is, the breach of the reconnaissance of Judicial Registrar Loughnan of 24 October 2006, I order that the husband be sentenced to imprisonment for a period of four months.  Finally I will order that those sentences be served concurrently.

I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Collier

Associate: 

Date:  28 March 2008