Rana v University of Adelaide - [2013] SASC 85

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeals to a Single Judge: Civil)
RANA v UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE
[2013] SASC 85
Judgment of The Honourable Justice White
7 June 2013
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW
PROCEDURE - INFERIOR COURTS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - DISTRICT COURT
The appellant brought proceedings in the District Court, having previously attempted to file his proceedings in this Court - the principal relief claimed was judicial review of decisions by the University - the appellant sought a transfer of the proceedings to this Court - the University sought dismissal of the appellant's claim under r 193 and on the basis that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to grant relief by way of judicial review - a District Court judge dismissed the proceedings.
On the appeal, the appellant raised five complaints: first, that the Judge should have determined his transfer application before determining the dismissal application; secondly, that he was denied procedural fairness by the University not providing a written outline of its submissions; thirdly, that the Judge had erred in not "penalising" the University for its alleged non-compliance with a procedural time limit; fourthly, that the Judge had failed to consider provisions of the University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA) said to indicate that the University is a "public administrative institution" whose decisions are amenable to judicial review; and, fifthly, that the Judge had failed to have regard to a letter from this Court's Registry regarding his initial attempt to commence proceedings in this Court.
Held (dismissing the appeal):
(1) The Judge's decision to determine the dismissal application first involved a matter of discretion - there is no basis upon which, in accordance with the applicable principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, this Court could intervene (at [40]).
(2) The absence of a written summary of argument from the University did not give rise to a relevant unfairness (at [48]).
(3) The late filing by the University of two documents did not have any material consequence (at [51]-[52]).
(4) It was not necessary for the Judge to reach a conclusion about the amenability to judicial review of the University's decisions in order to determine the two applications (at [56]).
(5) The Judge did not overlook the Registry's letter and referred expressly to it - in any event, the approach taken by this Court's Registry could not alter the circumstance that, at least on its face, the appellant's proceedings in the District Court sought relief which could only be granted by this Court (at [67]).
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 130; District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 8, s 24, s 30, s 37, s 43; University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 53, r 78, r 199, r 200, r 201, r 281, r 286; Supreme Court Civil Rules 1987 (SA) r 98.04; District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 131, r 193, referred to.
Biederemann v Magistrates Court of South Australia (2000) 210 LSJS 195; Dodoro v Knighting (2004) 10 VR 277; Ferdinands v Attorney-General of South Australia [2007] SASC 53; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; McDonald v The Workers Compensation Tribunal [2013] SASC 34; Re Luck (2004) 203 ALR 1, considered.

RANA v UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE
[2013] SASC 85
Appeal to a Single Judge

WHITE J. This is an appeal against a decision of a District Court judge dismissing proceedings in the District Court on the stated ground that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action and that, in their then current form, the proceedings are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process. The appellant (Mr Rana) contends that, instead of dismissing the action, the Judge should have ordered its transfer to this Court.
Mr Rana was unrepresented in the proceedings in the District Court and on the present appeal.
Background
By letter dated 30 October 2012 the respondent (the University) informed Mr Rana that he was excluded from its Barr Smith and Law School Libraries with immediate effect. I will refer to the decision communicated in the letter as “the exclusion order”.
It seems that since 2 November 2012 the University has enforced the exclusion order and has also taken action to enforce a deed made with Mr Rana on 2 March 2006 under which he agreed not to enter or remain on University grounds without its prior written consent (the 2006 Deed).
Mr Rana wished to challenge his exclusion from the University grounds. Initially, he attempted to commence proceedings in this Court but, in circumstances to which I will refer later, his documents were not accepted for filing.
On 22 November 2012 Mr Rana commenced proceedings against the University in the District Court by filing a summons and statement of claim. He sought declarations and an injunction, in particular, declarations that he is entitled to use the Barr Smith Library, the Law School Library, the National Wine Centre and to pass through the University when travelling to the city from his home on Hackney Road, Hackney. In addition, he sought a declaration that the 2006 Deed is null and void.
Mr Rana also filed other documents on 22 November 2012. These included an application seeking interlocutory relief of substantially the same kind as he sought in the statement of claim, two affidavits in which he deposed to the matters giving rise to his complaints, and an outline of the submissions which he intended to make on the hearing of his application. In the affidavits Mr Rana asserted that, in making the exclusion order, the University had denied him procedural fairness; that its decision was affected by bias; and that he had been wrongly designated by the University as a trouble‑maker.
On 11 December 2012, the University filed an interlocutory application seeking an order under r 193 of the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) dismissing Mr Rana’s action. I will refer to this application as “the dismissal application”. Neither the application nor the affidavit accompanying it contained any particulars but r 193 permits proceedings to be dismissed if the pleadings do not disclose a reasonable cause of action or if they are frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the Court.
The University’s defence, filed the same day, also contained a plea using the terms of r 193, but did not particularise that plea. It did, however, contain a plea that, insofar as Mr Rana sought to impugn the exclusion order on the ground that it was an administrative action and affected by a denial of procedural fairness, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim.
On 12 December 2012 the University filed an affidavit sworn by its General Counsel, Ms McInerney, but that affidavit seemed to be directed to Mr Rana’s application for interlocutory relief, rather than to the dismissal application.
Mr Rana responded with a further interlocutory application filed on 13 December 2012, seeking relief of various kinds. The aspects of this application which are most pertinent for present purposes are that Mr Rana abandoned his previous application for interlocutory relief and sought instead an order, in effect under s 24 of the District Court Act 1991 (SA), transferring his proceedings to this Court. It is evident that by this means, Mr Rana sought to overcome the limitations on the District Court’s jurisdiction raised by the University. I will refer to this second interlocutory application of Mr Rana as “the transfer application”.
The above summary is a somewhat simplified overview of the proceedings in the District Court. In part this is because, with all respect to Mr Rana, some of his filed documents lacked coherence and clarity. However, I think it suffices to indicate the background to the present appeal.
The Judge’s Decision
The transfer application and the dismissal application were heard by the Judge on 20 December 2012. In an ex tempore judgment, the Judge granted the University’s application and dismissed Mr Rana’s action, saying that he did so because it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the District Court. This meant that it was unnecessary for him to determine the transfer application, and the Judge did not make any formal order with respect to it.
The Appeal
On 1 March 2013, Mr Rana commenced the present appeal. This was outside the requisite 21 day period.[1] Accordingly, Mr Rana seeks an extension of time for the commencement of the appeal.
[1] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), r 281(1).
The Judge’s decision dismissing Mr Rana’s action was interlocutory in nature.[2] Accordingly, his appeal lies as of right[3] and is by way of rehearing.[4] I am to make my own independent review of the material before the Judge and the further material provided on the appeal. Rule 286(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) provides expressly that this Court may determine the appeal as the justice of the case requires even if an appellant has failed to state the grounds of appeal appropriately in the notice of appeal. That is, of course, subject to compliance with the requirements of procedural fairness. I should allow the appeal if I reach the conclusion that the decision of the Judge is wrong.
[2]    Re Luck [2003] HCA 70 at [9], (2004) 203 ALR 1 at 4; Dodoro v Knighting [2004] VSCA 217 at [20], (2004) 10 VR 277 at 282.
[3]    District Court Act 1991 (SA), s 43(2)(b).
[4]    Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, r 286(1).
The grounds in Mr Rana’s notice of appeal are not entirely clear, but I understand them to raise the following matters:
1.That the Judge should have determined Mr Rana’s transfer application before determining the University’s dismissal application.
2.That Mr Rana was denied procedural fairness in the proceedings before the Judge because the University had not provided in advance of the hearing an outline of the submissions which it intended making, with the effect that Mr Rana could not prepare an appropriate reply to them.
3.That the Judge had not “penalised” the University for the non‑compliance which Mr Rana alleged had occurred with respect to the time limits relating to the service of documents on him.
4.That the Judge had not considered provisions in the University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA) which indicated that it is a “public administrative institution”.
5.That the Judge had not considered the effect of a letter from the Supreme Court Registry relating to Mr Rana’s attempt on 14 November 2012 to commence proceedings in this Court in relation to the exclusion order.
These five matters are my paraphrase of the grounds of appeal, but Mr Rana accepted that they identify sufficiently the issues raised by his notice of appeal.
Introductory Matters
I will address these five grounds separately and then the application for the extension of time. Before doing so, it is appropriate to note some introductory matters.
Dismissal Not a Bar to the Commencement of Further Proceedings
The Judge’s decision did not preclude Mr Rana altogether from seeking relief in relation to the exclusion order. It was open to him, in the light of the Judge’s orders, to commence fresh proceedings in this Court (providing they were properly formulated) seeking the relief which he claimed.
In January 2013 Mr Rana attempted to adopt that course, but this Court’s Registry rejected the documents he presented for filing. Had Mr Rana presented documents in an acceptable form, this appeal would not have been necessary.
Jurisdictional Limitations of the District Court
The District Court does not have any supervisory jurisdiction with respect to administrative acts, other than that conferred by statute. In particular, the District Court does not have jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of a prerogative writ. These limitations on the jurisdiction of the District Court are stated explicitly in s 8(1)(b) of the District Court Act 1991 (SA):
8(1)The Court has the same civil jurisdiction (both at law and in equity) as the Supreme Court at first instance subject, however to the following qualifications:
(a) ...
(b) the Court has no supervisory jurisdiction except as expressly conferred by statute with respect to inferior courts or tribunals, or with respect to administrative acts, and has no jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of a prerogative writ.
There are some aspects of Mr Rana’s claim which do not seek judicial review and are therefore within the District Court’s jurisdiction. However, Mr Rana did not dispute the University’s contention that he was seeking (at least in large part) a review of an administrative decision and that, in the event that the decision is amenable to judicial review, his claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. He did not claim that he was invoking any statutory jurisdiction of the District Court. In fact, at the hearing on 20 December 2012, Mr Rana acknowledged that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine his claim. That was why he was seeking the transfer of his proceedings to this Court.
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction with respect to judicial review of administrative acts of public bodies is regulated by rr 199‑201 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA). Rule 200 provides:
200—Court's permission required for proceeding in which order for judicial review sought
(1)If a plaintiff claims to be entitled to an order for judicial review, an action for judicial review may be commenced but cannot proceed further in the Court without the Court's permission.
(2)     An action for judicial review must be commenced as soon as practicable after the date when the grounds for the review arose and, in any event, within 6 months after that date.
(3)     The originating process for an action for judicial review must, when filed in the Court, be accompanied by—
(a)an application for the Court's permission to proceed with the action; and
(b)     an affidavit—
(i)    stating the nature of the order sought; and
(ii)setting out, in detail, the grounds on which the applicant seeks the order for judicial review.
(4)     The Court may grant permission if the Court is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis on which the applicant might establish a right to an order for judicial review.
(5)     If the Court grants its permission, the Court must determine whether the action is to be heard by the Court constituted of a single Judge or by the Full Court.
...
It can be seen that r 200 contemplates that an action for judicial review may be commenced by summons but stipulates expressly that the action is not to proceed further without the Court’s permission. By r 200(4) the Court may grant permission if it is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis on which the applicant may establish a right to an order for judicial review.
In deciding whether it is so satisfied, the Court will have regard to a number of matters including an applicant’s standing, the nature and justiciability of the decision sought to be impugned, the identity of the decision‑maker, and whether all persons who ought to be named as defendants to the proceedings have been named.[5] The requirement that there be “a reasonable basis” may not be a demanding threshold, but it must nevertheless be established and the Rules contain an explicit procedural regime relating to its establishment.
[5] Ferdinands v Attorney‑General of South Australia [2007] SASC 53 at [3]; McDonald v The Workers Compensation Tribunal [2013] SASC 34 at [4].
Rule 200 contemplates that the application for permission will be determined by the Court soon after the commencement of the action. For this reason, r 200(3) requires that the originating process for an action for judicial review be accompanied, when filed, by an affidavit setting out in detail the grounds on which the applicant seeks the order for judicial review. As Debelle J observed in relation to r 98.04 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA),[6] it is inappropriate for there to be a grant of permission to proceed unless and until the grounds of the application have been provided. Debelle J continued:
In the absence of those grounds, it is not possible to know whether there is any merit in the application. The requirement to obtain leave to serve the application is a kind of screening process intended to ensure, first, that there is a decision which is amenable to judicial review and, secondly, that there are grounds which might call that decision into question.
Thus, the affidavit in support of the application for judicial review must state the grounds. In other words, the necessity for grounds to be stated is a condition precedent to the grant of leave.[7]
[6] Biedermann v Magistrates Court of South Australia [2000] SASC 303 at [17]; (2000) 210 LSJS 195 at 198.
[7] Ibid at [17]-[18]; 198.
In this way this Court is to exercise some supervision over the invoking of its jurisdiction with respect to judicial review of administrative action.
The regime established by r 200 should not readily be circumvented by the transfer to this Court of proceedings which have been commenced in the District Court. This should be a significant consideration when the District Court is asked to transfer proceedings to this Court which involve judicial review. I do not wish to be understood by this as indicating that it will never be appropriate for District Court proceedings containing a claim for judicial review to be transferred to this Court: only that the existence and purpose of the regime established by r 200 should be a relevant consideration in the determination of any application for such a transfer, and may often indicate that such a transfer is inappropriate.
The Approach of the Judge
On its face, there is a difficulty in the Judge’s conclusion that Mr Rana’s statement of claim did not disclose a cause of action, and that his proceedings are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. That is because the Judge did not engage in any analysis of the statement of claim, nor did he provide any reasons for his characterisation.
The absence of such an analysis and reasons is not explicable on the basis that the Judge adopted, without elaboration, particulars or a submission made by the University. As already noted, the documents filed by the University did not particularise its application under r 193. Further, although counsel for the University made a submission that Mr Rana’s statement of claim and the proceedings should be characterised in the way found by the Judge, counsel did not provide any of the analysis which would be required for such a conclusion.
The Judge was concerned that it may be inappropriate for the District Court to consider the University’s submissions as to the application of r 193 if that involved a consideration of the pleading of causes of action over which that Court had no jurisdiction. Ordinary considerations of respect and comity make understandable the Judge’s caution in this respect.
Quite apart from that consideration, the course of the hearing on 20 December provides an explanation for the Judge not engaging in the kind of analysis which one would otherwise expect in the determination of a r 193 application. During the course of that hearing, it became common ground that the District Court lacked jurisdiction with respect to Mr Rana’s claim, at least with respect to his claims concerning administrative decisions said to be amenable to judicial review. As already noted, Mr Rana expressly accepted that his claim was beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court.

That being so, the issue for determination at the hearing on 20 December became confined, being essentially: dismissal of the action, or transfer to this Court. The Judge accepted two interrelated submissions of the University and decided that the former course was appropriate.
First, the Judge accepted that it was preferable that the Court with the jurisdiction to hear Mr Rana’s claim should determine whether his documents should be accepted for filing, rather than the District Court making a determination which would have that effect.
Secondly, the Judge considered that Mr Rana should not be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court through the “back door” of the District Court. This was especially so given that Mr Rana’s original attempt to commence proceedings in this Court had been rejected because of perceived inadequacies in his documents.
In the light of the change in the issues arising for determination, it may have been preferable for the Judge to have said specifically that he based his decision on the (conceded) lack of jurisdiction of the District Court rather than expressing his conclusion using the terminology of r 193. However, the fact that the Judge did not do so does not alter the reality that Mr Rana had conceded the absence of the District Court jurisdiction, at least in relation to his claims concerning administrative decisions said to be amenable to judicial review; that the issue in that circumstance had devolved to one of whether the proceedings should be dismissed or transferred; and that the Judge considered that dismissal was appropriate and transfer was not.
Having regard to these introductory matters, I now turn to Mr Rana’s grounds of appeal.
Determining the Dismissal Application before the Transfer Application
At the hearing before the Judge, Mr Rana objected to the University being permitted to make submissions in support of its dismissal application before he made submissions in support of his transfer application. The Judge then heard submissions on who should go first. Those submissions revealed the overlap between the issues arising on the two applications, and the Judge effectively heard submissions on both applications at the one time.
Mr Rana submitted that the Judge should have addressed and determined the transfer application first.
In my opinion, there is nothing in this complaint. It was open to the Judge to decide the order in which he would determine the two applications. That decision involved a matter of discretion of the kind attracting the application of House v The King[8] principles on appeal. There is no basis upon which, in accordance with those principles, this Court could intervene.
[8] (1936) 55 CLR 499.
It could also be said that the dismissal application had been filed first in time and so was entitled to some priority. However, I would not be inclined to attach much weight to this consideration: it being more appropriate to have regard to the intrinsic merits of the respective applications.
Even if the Judge had addressed the transfer application first, the ultimate outcome is unlikely to have been different. Many of the considerations bearing on transfer were also pertinent to the dismissal application, and vice versa, and it was not open to Mr Rana to advance an inconsistent position: that is, that his action should be transferred to this Court because the District Court lacked jurisdiction, but that if it was not transferred, it should not be dismissed because the District Court did have the necessary jurisdiction. If transfer to this Court was inappropriate, then dismissal of the action was almost inevitable, given the limitations on the District Court’s jurisdiction.
Transfer to this Court was inappropriate for several reasons: the procedural regime in r 200 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) should not be circumvented by such transfer; it was open to Mr Rana to commence fresh proceedings in a form complying with this Court’s Rules; the commencement of fresh proceedings would mean that the acceptance of documents for filing would then be controlled by the Court with jurisdiction to hear the claims; and, given that Mr Rana had previously satisfied the criteria for a waiver of the filing fee in the District Court, such commencement was unlikely to result in prejudice to him. I mention in this latter respect that, at the time of the Judge’s decision, there was over four months left of the six month limitation period fixed by r 200(2).
Alleged Denial of Procedural Fairness – Absence of Summary of Argument
In the absence of any direction to that effect, the University was not obliged to file and serve an outline of the submissions to be made on 20 December 2012.
When Mr Rana appeared before the Judge on 12 December 2012, he did not seek any direction for the provision of written summaries of argument, and the Judge did not act of his own motion to make such an order. However, Mr Rana did, by [7] of his interlocutory application filed on 13 December 2012, seek an order that the University provide a summary of argument, and that he have a right of reply to that summary. That interlocutory application was made returnable before the Judge on 20 December 2012, that is, at the same time at which the argument on the University’s application was to take place. Obviously enough, an order on that day for the provision of a written summary of argument was not going to assist Mr Rana in relation to the argument which was to take place that same day.
Had the Judge actually, and not just nominally, dismissed Mr Rana’s action on the grounds that his statement of claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action or because he considered the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process, there may have been some merit in Mr Rana’s claim that he had been prejudiced by the absence of a summary of argument. That is because the University had not otherwise particularised its application under r 193. This meant that, but for the turn which the proceedings took on 20 December, Mr Rana would have learnt of the University’s critique of his proceedings for the first time through the oral submissions of its counsel.
That may well have involved some unfairness to Mr Rana as an unrepresented litigant. However, it is not necessary to express a final view about that. As already indicated, the submissions on 20 December before the Judge did not turn on r 193 but instead on the fact that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine much of Mr Rana’s claim and on the question of whether or not there should be a transfer.
The transcript of the hearing on 20 December indicates that Mr Rana had anticipated the matters which were agitated in relation to those applications and was able to address them. Accordingly, no relevant unfairness was caused.
That being so, it is unnecessary to consider further whether the absence of a summary of argument from the University, in the circumstance that it had not otherwise particularised its application, would have given rise to a relevant denial of procedural fairness.
Alleged Non‑compliance with Time Limits
Mr Rana contended that the Judge had erred in failing to take into account in his determination of the transfer application the non‑compliance with a procedural time limit which he alleged against the University. As I understand it, his complaint was that the University had not given him at least two days notice of the dismissal application, as required by r 131(2) of the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) for interlocutory applications.
Again, there is nothing in this complaint. It is true that the University filed the dismissal application on 11 December 2012 which was the day before Mr Rana’s original application for interlocutory relief was to be heard. However, both the Judge and the University recognised that Mr Rana had to have time to consider the papers filed by the University. For that reason the hearing on 12 December was adjourned to 20 December 2012.
The University’s solicitor did file a second affidavit and a list of authorities on 19 December. However, neither of these was of any consequence. The only purpose of the affidavit was to exhibit the District Court’s own procedural record, and at the hearing on 20 December counsel for the University did not refer in a material way to any of the authorities in the filed list.
In these circumstances, it is not necessary to address the question of whether there are any circumstances in which a litigant should be “penalised”, as contended by Mr Rana, for non‑compliance with a procedural time limit.
The University as a “Public Administrative Institution”
Mr Rana contended that the Judge had determined the two applications without regarding the University as a “public administrative institution”. As part of this submission, Mr Rana referred to various provisions in the University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA).
It was not clear what Mr Rana intended by this complaint. It seems that Mr Rana raised the contention that the University is a “public administrative institution” as part of his contention that the exclusion order and the University’s conduct in enforcing the terms of the 2006 Deed are matters which are amenable to judicial review.
In my opinion, it was not necessary for the Judge to reach a conclusion about the amenability to judicial review of the impugned conduct in order to determine either the dismissal application or the transfer application. He was entitled to proceed on the view of the matter for which Mr Rana himself had contended, without deciding the correctness or otherwise of that contention.
It would, in any event, have been inappropriate for the Judge to have determined the amenability of the impugned conduct to judicial review. It is preferable that it be this Court, which does have jurisdiction with respect to judicial review, which determines issues of that kind. In so holding, I do not overlook that there may be cases in which an issue about the amenability of certain conduct to judicial review may arise as a collateral issue in proceedings in the District Court, and that a determination in such cases may not be inappropriate, but the present case was not of that kind.
Accordingly, this ground of appeal fails.
The Supreme Court Registry Letter of 14 December 2012
Mr Rana contended that the Judge had failed to have regard to the refusal of the Registry of this Court to accept for filing the documents which he had lodged on 14 November 2012 by which he had sought to commence in this Court his proceedings against the University. He referred in this respect to a letter of 19 November 2012 from a Registry officer which, in its substantive part, said:
Pursuant to Rule 53 of the Supreme Court Rules 2006, the Registrar having considered the Summons, I advise that your Summons has been refused for filing due to the following reasons:
· The District Court has jurisdiction [to] hear this type of action;
· In accordance with the Remission of Court Fees application, you have not stated in Part D, why the Supreme Court should hear [the] action and reduce the fee to that of the District Court.
Your documents are enclosed for you to file with the District Court.
(Emphasis in original)
Three days later, Mr Rana commenced his proceedings in the District Court. It is not clear whether the summons, statement of claim, interlocutory application and affidavit which he filed on 22 November are in the same form as those lodged with this Court on 14 November, but it reasonable to suppose that the two sets of documents would have had, at the least, much in common.
In effect, the Registry letter of 19 November 2012 informed Mr Rana that his documents were not accepted for filing in this Court because the District Court had jurisdiction and because of some perceived incompleteness in his application for remission of the filing fees. The latter consideration did not really seem to bear on whether the documents should be accepted for filing, but it is not necessary for present purposes to express a final view about that matter.
Rule 53 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) provides for circumstances in which documents lodged for filing may be rejected. It provides:
53—Power to reject documents submitted for filing
(1)     A document is an abuse of the process of the Court if it contains matter that is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious.
(2)     If it appears to the Registrar that a document submitted for filing is an abuse of the process of the Court, the Registrar must refer the matter to a Judge or Master.
(3)     If the Judge or Master so directs, the Registrar will reject the document.
(4)     If it appears to the Court that a document that is an abuse of the process of the Court has been filed in the Court, the Court may direct that it be struck from the file.
In effect, this Court’s Registry may reject documents for filing which amount to an abuse of the process of the Court or which contain matters which are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious.
Although the Registry letter of 19 November 2012 informed Mr Rana that his documents were being rejected under r 53, the stated reasons did not suggest, in the language of r 53, that his proposed proceedings were an abuse of the process of the Court or contained matter which was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious. Conversely, the circumstance to which the letter referred, namely, that the proposed proceeding involved a matter in which the District Court also had jurisdiction, is not one of the matters specified in r 53 as justifying the rejection of documents lodged for filing.
Whether or not an application for remission of fees under s 130(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) may be refused because the District Court also has jurisdiction with respect to a proposed proceeding does not arise for determination on this appeal.
The basis upon which the Registry took the view that the District Court did have jurisdiction to hear and determine Mr Rana’s claim as presented to this Court (on the assumption that it was expressed in the same terms as the statement of claim filed in the District Court on 22 November) is not known. The Registry may have considered only the nature of the relief sought by Mr Rana, that is, declarations and an injunction. The District Court does have jurisdiction to grant these forms of relief.[9] Perhaps the Registry was also influenced by the fact that, on one view, Mr Rana’s proceedings seemed to involve a dispute about the revocation by a landholder of a licence permitting a member of the public to enter the landholder’s land. However, as the University itself recognised, Mr Rana’s pleading also involved a challenge to the manner in which it had made the underlying decisions leading to the exclusion order.
[9] District Court Act 1991 (SA) , ss 30, 37.
The jurisdiction of a court is to be determined as a matter of substance, and not merely by reference to the particular form of relief nominated by a claimant. If Mr Rana’s proposed statement of claim did, as a matter of substance, raise claims by way of judicial review, then, subject to documents being in proper form, they should have been accepted for filing, leaving for later determination the question of whether the decisions which Mr Rana sought to impugn were amenable to judicial review.
It is understandable that, having attempted to commence the proceedings in this Court, and then having acted in accordance with the Registry letter of 19 November 2012, Mr Rana has some sense of grievance at his District Court action being dismissed on the ground that that Court lacks jurisdiction.
However, I do not consider that this leads to the conclusion that the appeal should be allowed. First, the Judge in the District Court did not overlook the Registry letter of 19 November 2012. He referred expressly to that letter in his ex tempore reasons. Further, and in any event, the approach taken by the Registry of this Court on 19 November 2012 could not alter the circumstance that, at least on its face, the proceedings in the District Court sought review of administrative decisions which (if the decisions are amenable to judicial review) could be pursued only in this Court.
It is also understandable that the Judge, knowing that Mr Rana’s attempt to commence proceedings in this Court had been rejected, considered it inappropriate to order the transfer of the District Court proceedings to this Court so as, in effect, to permit Mr Rana to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court by the “back door”.
The course of events before 22 November 2012 may be unfortunate, but it does not mean that the Judge erred in dismissing the action instead of referring it to this Court.
The effect is that I consider that none of Mr Rana’s grounds of appeal should succeed.
Extension of Time
As previously noted, Mr Rana did not commence the present appeal until 1 March 2013. Accordingly, he needs an extension of time in which to commence the appeal.
The explanation for Mr Rana not commencing the appeal within time appears to be this. Following the dismissal of the District Court action, he attempted to commence fresh proceedings in this Court. The date upon which he lodged his proposed documents is unclear: it could have been 21 December 2012 or, alternatively, 4 January 2013. The documents comprised (apparently) a proposed summons, an outline of submissions, an interlocutory application and two affidavits. The Registrar referred the documents to a Master. By an administrative ruling dated 14 February 2013, the Master directed that the documents submitted by Mr Rana for filing should be rejected. He did so because of deficiencies in the proposed statement of claim; because in the one proceeding Mr Rana also sought, impermissibly, judicial review of the decision of the District Court Judge of 20 December 2012; because, in any event, the District Court was not named as a proposed party to the proceedings; because the accompanying affidavits contained inadmissible content rendering them vexatious; and because of concerns that Mr Rana may be a person under a disability for the purposes of r 78 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) and therefore unable to take proceedings except through a litigation guardian.
It seems that the Registrar then acted in accordance with the Master’s decision.
It is not clear when the Registrar’s rejection of the document was communicated to Mr Rana but it must have been sometime after 14 February 2013 and before 1 March 2013. It is apparent that Mr Rana’s response to the rejection of his attempt to commence fresh proceedings was to commence the present appeal.
The period of extension sought is not long, and the University did not point to any material prejudice from the grant of an extension. If the appeal otherwise had merit, I may well have concluded that there was a satisfactory explanation for Mr Rana’s failure to commence his appeal in time and that an extension should be granted. That may have been especially so in the light of Mr Rana’s earlier attempts to commence proceedings in this Court.
However, as I consider that the appeal should, in any event, be dismissed on its merits, it is not necessary to reach a final conclusion about this.
Conclusion
For the reasons given above, I dismiss the appeal. I will hear from the parties as to any consequential orders.