Rana v University of Adelaide

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeals to a Single Judge: Civil)

RANA v UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE

[2013] SASC 85

Judgment of The Honourable Justice White

7 June 2013

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW

PROCEDURE - INFERIOR COURTS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - DISTRICT COURT

The appellant brought proceedings in the District Court, having previously attempted to file his proceedings in this Court - the principal relief claimed was judicial review of decisions by the University - the appellant sought a transfer of the proceedings to this Court - the University sought dismissal of the appellant's claim under r 193 and on the basis that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to grant relief by way of judicial review - a District Court judge dismissed the proceedings.

On the appeal, the appellant raised five complaints: first, that the Judge should have determined his transfer application before determining the dismissal application; secondly, that he was denied procedural fairness by the University not providing a written outline of its submissions; thirdly, that the Judge had erred in not "penalising" the University for its alleged non-compliance with a procedural time limit; fourthly, that the Judge had failed to consider provisions of the University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA) said to indicate that the University is a "public administrative institution" whose decisions are amenable to judicial review; and, fifthly, that the Judge had failed to have regard to a letter from this Court's Registry regarding his initial attempt to commence proceedings in this Court.

Held (dismissing the appeal):

(1) The Judge's decision to determine the dismissal application first involved a matter of discretion - there is no basis upon which, in accordance with the applicable principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, this Court could intervene (at [40]).

(2)  The absence of a written summary of argument from the University did not give rise to a relevant unfairness (at [48]).

(3)  The late filing by the University of two documents did not have any material consequence (at [51]-[52]).

(4)  It was not necessary for the Judge to reach a conclusion about the amenability to judicial review of the University's decisions in order to determine the two applications (at [56]).

(5)  The Judge did not overlook the Registry's letter and referred expressly to it - in any event, the approach taken by this Court's Registry could not alter the circumstance that, at least on its face, the appellant's proceedings in the District Court sought relief which could only be granted by this Court (at [67]).

Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 130; District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 8, s 24, s 30, s 37, s 43; University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 53, r 78, r 199, r 200, r 201, r…

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Details
Case
[2013] SASC 85
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mr Rana brought proceedings in the District Court against the University of Adelaide. The principal relief he claimed was judicial review of decisions by the University. The University sought dismissal of Mr Rana's claim on the basis that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to grant relief by way of judicial review. A District Court judge dismissed the proceedings, and Mr Rana appealed to the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The appeal raised several legal issues, including whether the District Court judge should have determined Mr Rana's transfer application before deciding the University's dismissal application, whether Mr Rana was denied procedural fairness, whether the judge had failed to penalise the University for non-compliance with time limits, whether the judge had failed to consider the University's status as a public administrative institution, and whether the judge had overlooked a letter from the Supreme Court Registry.

The Supreme Court found that the District Court judge's decision to determine the dismissal application first involved a matter of discretion, and that there was no basis to intervene in accordance with the principles in House v The King. The court also found that Mr Rana was not denied procedural fairness, that the late filing of two documents by the University did not have any material consequence, and that it was not necessary for the judge to reach a conclusion about the amenability to judicial review of the University's decisions. The court found that the judge had not overlooked the Registry's letter and had expressly referred to it. In any event, the court found that the approach taken by the Registry could not alter the fact that the appellant's proceedings in the District Court sought relief that could only be granted by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It made no orders as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held (dismissing the appeal):

(1) The Judge's decision to determine the dismissal application first involved a matter of discretion - there is no basis upon which, in accordance with the applicable principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, this Court could intervene (at [40]).

(2) The absence of a written summary of argument from the University did not give rise to a relevant unfairness (at [48]).

(3) The late filing by the University of two documents did not have any material consequence (at [51]-[52]).

(4) It was not necessary for the Judge to reach a conclusion about the amenability to judicial review of the University's decisions in order to determine the two applications (at [56]).

(5) The Judge did not overlook the Registry's letter and referred expressly to it - in any event, the approach taken by this Court's Registry could not alter the circumstance that, at least on its face, the appellant's proceedings in the District Court sought relief which could only be granted by this Court (at [67]).

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Rana was unrepresented in the proceedings in the District Court and on the present appeal.Background By letter dated 30 October 2012 the respondent (the University) informed Mr Rana that he was excluded from its Barr Smith and Law School Libraries with immediate effect. I will refer to the decision communicated in the letter as “the exclusion order”. It seems that since 2 November 2012 the University has enforced the exclusion order and has also taken action to enforce a deed made with Mr Rana on 2 March 2006 under which he agreed not to enter or remain on University grounds without its prior written consent (the 2006 Deed). Mr Rana wished to challenge his exclusion from the University grounds. Initially, he attempted to commence proceedings in this Court but, in circumstances to which I will refer later, his documents were not accepted for filing. On 22 November 2012 Mr Rana commenced proceedings against the University in the District Court by filing a summons and statement of claim. He sought declarations and an injunction, in particular, declarations that he is entitled to use the Barr Smith Library, the Law School Library, the National Wine Centre and to pass through the University when travelling to the city from his home on Hackney Road, Hackney. In addition, he sought a declaration that the 2006 Deed is null and void. Mr Rana also filed other documents on 22 November 2012. These included an application seeking interlocutory relief of substantially the same kind as he sought in the statement of claim, two affidavits in which he deposed to the matters giving rise to his complaints, and an outline of the submissions which he intended to make on the hearing of his application. In the affidavits Mr Rana asserted that, in making the exclusion order, the University had denied him procedural fairness; that its decision was affected by bias; and that he had been wrongly designated by the University as a trouble‑maker. On 11 December 2012, the University filed an interlocutory application seeking an order under r 193 of the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) dismissing Mr Rana’s action. I will refer to this application as “the dismissal application”. Neither the application nor the affidavit accompanying it contained any particulars but r 193 permits proceedings to be dismissed if the pleadings do not disclose a reasonable cause of action or if they are frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the Court. The University’s defence, filed the same day, also contained a plea using the terms of r 193, but did not particularise that plea. It did, however, contain a plea that, insofar as Mr Rana sought to impugn the exclusion order on the ground that it was an administrative action and affected by a denial of procedural fairness, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim. On 12 December 2012 the University filed an affidavit sworn by its General Counsel, Ms McInerney, but that affidavit seemed to be directed to Mr Rana’s application for interlocutory relief, rather than to the dismissal application.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WHITE J
The above summary is a somewhat simplified overview of the proceedings in the District Court. In part this is because, with all respect to Mr Rana, some of his filed documents lacked coherence and clarity. However, I think it suffices to indicate the background to the present appeal.The Judge’s Decision The transfer application and the dismissal application were heard by the Judge on 20 December 2012. In an ex tempore judgment, the Judge granted the University’s application and dismissed Mr Rana’s action, saying that he did so because it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the District Court. This meant that it was unnecessary for him to determine the transfer application, and the Judge did not make any formal order with respect to it.The Appeal On 1 March 2013, Mr Rana commenced the present appeal. This was outside the requisite 21 day period.[1] Accordingly, Mr Rana seeks an extension of time for the commencement of the appeal.[1] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), r 281(1). The Judge’s decision dismissing Mr Rana’s action was interlocutory in nature.[2] Accordingly, his appeal lies as of right[3] and is by way of rehearing.[4] I am to make my own independent review of the material before the Judge and the further material provided on the appeal. Rule 286(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) provides expressly that this Court may determine the appeal as the justice of the case requires even if an appellant has failed to state the grounds of appeal appropriately in the notice of appeal. That is, of course, subject to compliance with the requirements of procedural fairness. I should allow the appeal if I reach the conclusion that the decision of the Judge is wrong.[2] Re Luck [2003] HCA 70 at [9], (2004) 203 ALR 1 at 4; Dodoro v Knighting [2004] VSCA 217 at [20], (2004) 10 VR 277 at 282.[3] District Court Act 1991 (SA), s 43(2)(b).[4] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, r 286(1). The grounds in Mr Rana’s notice of appeal are not entirely clear, but I understand them to raise the following matters:1.That the Judge should have determined Mr Rana’s transfer application before determining the University’s dismissal application.2.That Mr Rana was denied procedural fairness in the proceedings before the Judge because the University had not provided in advance of the hearing an outline of the submissions which it intended making, with the effect that Mr Rana could not prepare an appropriate reply to them.3.That the Judge had not “penalised” the University for the non‑compliance which Mr Rana alleged had occurred with respect to the time limits relating to the service of documents on him.4.That the Judge had not considered provisions in the University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA) which indicated that it is a “public administrative institution”.5.That the Judge had not considered the effect of a letter from the Supreme Court Registry relating to Mr Rana’s attempt on 14 November 2012 to commence proceedings in this Court in relation to the exclusion order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WHITE J