Rana v Skycity Adelaide Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

RANA v SKYCITY ADELAIDE PTY LTD

[2007] SASC 14

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Anderson

23 January 2007

MAGISTRATES - APPEALS FROM AND CONTROL OVER MAGISTRATES - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - PRINCIPLES ON WHICH COURT ACTS - OTHER MATTERS

PROCEDURE - COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY - COURTS - CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF DIFFERENT COURTS - TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER CROSS-VESTING LEGISLATION

PROCEDURE - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - IN GENERAL - CLASSIFICATION - FINAL AND INTERLOCUTORY

Appeal against the decision of a magistrate – magistrate ordered that appellant pay into court security for costs prior to matter going to trial – whether magistrate erred – whether magistrate prejudged matter – whether magistrate fettered discretion in ordering security for costs – Held: order of magistrate was interlocutory, therefore leave required for appeal to Supreme Court – leave not granted –  grounds of appeal considered - no merit in grounds in any event

Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (SA) 5, referred to.
Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1; Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225; Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246; Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (No 2) (1991) 4 ACSR 355, applied.

RANA v SKYCITY ADELAIDE PTY LTD
[2007] SASC 14

Magistrates Appeal

ANDERSON J 

Introduction

  1. In this matter the appellant is appealing from a decision of a Magistrate who ordered the appellant, as a precondition of the appellant’s claim proceeding to trial, to pay into Court the sum of $12,000 as security for costs.

  2. In Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 the High Court dealt with the test for whether an order is interlocutory or final, and applied the earlier decisions of that court in Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 and in Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246. In Re Luck the Court said at 2:

    … the usual test for determining whether an order is final or interlocutory is whether the order, as made, finally determines the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them.  That question is answered by determining whether the legal effect of the judgment is final or not.  If the legal effect of the judgment is final, it is a final order; otherwise, it is an interlocutory order. (citations omitted)

  3. On the face of it, that makes this order an interlocutory order because it does not finally determine the rights of the parties in the principal cause pending. Therefore the appellant requires leave.  In considering any question of leave, I  have regard to the test outlined by Olsson J in Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (No 2) (1991) 4 ACSR 355 where his Honour said in deciding such a question the Court:

    …must be satisfied that the decision sought to be impugned is either wrong or attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration…

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Details
Case
[2007] SASC 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rana v Skycity Adelaide Pty Ltd, the appellant, Mr Rana, brought a claim in the Adelaide Magistrates Court alleging a breach of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Mr Rana claimed that he was induced into the respondent's casino by a voucher given to him as a birthday gift. After being asked to leave due to his behaviour and a subsequent altercation, he was forcibly removed by the casino’s security staff. He seeks damages for misleading and deceptive conduct and a breach of an alleged contract. The magistrate ordered Mr Rana to pay $12,000 into court as security for costs before the matter proceeded to trial.

The appeal against the magistrate's order was brought to the Supreme Court of South Australia. The legal issues before the court included whether the magistrate erred in accepting certain affidavits, whether there was bias on the part of the magistrate, and whether the magistrate fettered their discretion in ordering security for costs. Additionally, the court had to determine if the magistrate's order was final or interlocutory, and if leave was required for an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The court determined that the order made by the magistrate was interlocutory, meaning that leave was required for an appeal to the Supreme Court. However, leave was not granted. The court proceeded to consider the merits of the grounds of appeal. The court found that the magistrate's order was made with certain information before them, including evidence of Mr Rana’s impecuniosity and his history of litigation. The appellant did not provide any evidence or seek an adjournment to prepare his argument, which was relevant given his familiarity with court proceedings. The court found no merit in the grounds of appeal.

The court concluded that the grounds of appeal were without merit and no further orders could be made. The appeal was dismissed, and the order of the magistrate stood.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Therefore, for practical purposes, I will consider the merits in any event.Background The action which the appellant commenced in the Adelaide Magistrates Court is a claim alleging a breach of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The appellant alleges that he was induced into the respondent's casino by a voucher given to him as a birthday gift by the Casino. After attending at the Casino, the appellant was asked to leave because of his behaviour and when he disputed this, an altercation began. He was then forcibly removed by the Casino’s security staff. He seeks damages both for misleading and deceptive conduct, and for a breach of an alleged contract, which he says was entered into between the parties by virtue of the Casino sending him the voucher and his acceptance of the voucher.The notice of appeal In his notice of appeal, the appellant appeals against the whole of the order made by the Magistrate, namely, the payment into Court of $12,000. The appellant alleges that the Magistrate erred by accepting the affidavit of one legal practitioner, and by relying on what he calls “fabricated affidavits of another practitioner”. The appellant also alleges bias against the Magistrate on the basis that he has prejudged the matter, and because the Magistrate had previously dealt with the appellant in another similar matter - Rana v Hyatt Regency Hotel Ltd [2007] SASC 7. The appellant also complains about the exercise of the Magistrate’s discretion in ordering the payment for security for costs. He complains that he was not able to sufficiently explain his financial position, and he was not given sufficient time to prepare his argument before the Magistrate. I will set out the full grounds of appeal later. The appellant in this appeal seeks orders, (using his words) as follows:1.The matter be remitted back to be heard by the Federal Magistrates Court under cross-vesting legislation, as the plaintiff has disability discrimination against the same party in the same fact to be joined in the interests of justice.2. Costs of the appeal. It is a simple fact that the appellant cannot achieve the order he seeks from this Court, namely, transferring the matter to the Federal Magistrates Court. Proceedings can be transferred between State and Federal jurisdictions by virtue of the jurisdiction conferred by the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (SA). However, s 5 does not authorise this Court to transfer a matter from the Adelaide Magistrates Court into the Federal Magistrates Court. The respondent argues that because the appellant has sought an order in his notice of appeal which is not available, the notice of appeal is defective, and therefore the appeal should be dismissed. I do not accept that argument. The appeal can be dealt by considering the grounds of appeal, but if the grounds succeed the order sought transferring the matter to the Federal Magistrates Court cannot be achieved.The decision appealed from I bear in mind that I am dealing with the exercise of a discretionary judgment by the Magistrate, and that the Magistrate, in making the order, had certain information before him supporting the respondent’s contention that the order for security for costs should be made.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent argues that because the appellant has sought an order in his notice of appeal which is not available, the notice of appeal is defective, and therefore the appeal should be dismissed. I do not accept that argument. The appeal can be dealt by considering the grounds of appeal, but if the grounds succeed the order sought transferring the matter to the Federal Magistrates Court cannot be achieved.The decision appealed from I bear in mind that I am dealing with the exercise of a discretionary judgment by the Magistrate, and that the Magistrate, in making the order, had certain information before him supporting the respondent’s contention that the order for security for costs should be made. Such information included details about the plaintiff’s impecuniosity. It also included his involvement in a broad range of litigation in different jurisdictions. In those matters, costs orders had been made against him, and there was no evidence that those costs orders had been complied with. No doubt the Magistrate also took into account the prospects of success in the action. An affidavit by Mr Martin, who appeared at the hearing before the Magistrate, was admitted by me on the hearing of the appeal. Mr Martin deposed to the fact that at the outset of the hearing before the Magistrate, the appellant wanted the matter adjourned so that he could join the action with the disabilities discrimination claim he had in the Federal Magistrates Court. The Magistrate refused this application. The Magistrate then proceeded to hear the respondent’s application for security. Mr Martin deposes to the fact that the appellant said he did not have the money, and that the amount claimed by the respondent, namely $19,000, was “a vexatious amount”. The appellant tendered no evidence before the Magistrate. The Magistrate found that $12,000 was the appropriate figure for security for costs and asked the appellant if there was anything more he wished to add. The appellant repeated that he didn’t have the money to pay the security. The appellant then alleged bias against the Magistrate but did not make any further submissions, and the order for security for costs was then made by the Magistrate. Mr Martin points out in his affidavit that the appellant neither tendered any evidence nor sought an adjournment to enable him to adduce evidence or prepare argument. The appellant made no complaint of being taken by surprise. This is relevant because the appellant is a person who knows his way around various courts by virtue of the numerous actions he is now involved in and in which he has been involved in the past. These other actions are summarised in another affidavit which was put before me in the appeal. This argument basically relates to the fifth ground of appeal, and is certainly not made out by the appellant as against the evidence contained in the affidavit of Mr Martin, to which the appellant indicated he had no objection. I will now deal with the individual grounds of appeal as they appear in the notice of appeal.THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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