DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Ramsay v De Wet & Anor [2022] QDC 287
PARTIES:
RAMSAY, William John
(Applicant)
v
DE WET, Charmaine
(First Respondent)
&
AAI LIMITED TRADING AS SUNCORP INSURANCE
ABN 48 005 297 807
(Second Respondent)FILE NO:
BD 1557/21
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application Hearing
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
14 December 2022
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
25 March 2022
JUDGE:
Devereaux SC CJDC
CATCHWORDS:
INSURANCE – MOTOR VEHICLES – COMPULSORY THIRD PARTY INSURANCE AND LIKE SCHEMES – NOTICES, CLAIMS AND EXTENSION OF TIME – QUEENSLAND - where the applicant seeks to pursue a personal injury claim in respect of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 18 February 2012 – where the applicant applies pursuant to s. 31 of the Limitations of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) for an extension of the limitation period – where the applicant began to experience symptoms of the psychiatric injury upon which his claim is based approximately 6 months after the accident – where the applicant served his Notice of Claim on 10 August 2021 – where the respondent submits that the applicant had knowledge of sufficient facts to support a cause of action before 10 August 2020 – whether the applicant learned a material fact of a decisive character after the expiration of the limitation period
LEGISLATION:
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 ss. 30(1), 31(2)
CASES:
Hopkins v State of Queensland [2004] QDC 21
Sugden v Crawford [1989] 1 Qd R 683
COUNSEL: J Kimmins for the Applicant.
G Taylor for the First and Second Respondents.SOLICITORS: Kare Lawyers for the Applicant.
Jensen McConaghy for the First and Second Respondents.
Introduction
At about 1.30 am on 18 February 2012, the applicant was a passenger in a car driven by his then girlfriend. She lost control when it left the road and entered a low-flowing creek. The vehicle was written off. The driver suffered significant head injuries that would have been terrible to witness. The applicant did not suffer any physical injuries. He was then 19 years old. His girlfriend was 17 years old.
The applicant claims to have a right of action arising from the incident. This application is for an order that the period of limitation for the claim - filed on 10 August 2021 - be extended.
The question is whether a material fact of a decisive character was not within the applicant’s means of knowledge until after 10 August 2020 (as an extension may be ordered up to one year after the date the fact was within the applicant’s means of knowledge). It is conceded by the respondent that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of the limitation period.[1]
[1]Limitation of Actions Act 1974 s. 31(2)
Relevantly to this application, material facts include the nature and extent of the personal injury caused by the negligence of the driver.[2]
[2]Limitation of Actions Act 1974 s. 30(1)(a)(iv)
A material fact may be…
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- Case
- [2022] QDC 287
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether Ramsay had knowledge of the material fact of a decisive character prior to the expiration of the limitation period. The court held that Ramsay did not know of the PTSD diagnosis until June 2020, which was after the limitation period had expired. The court found that the PTSD diagnosis was a material fact of a decisive character as Ramsay was not previously aware that he had ongoing injuries from the accident. The court noted that the applicant's experience of the crash and its impact on him was a significant factor in the diagnosis of PTSD. The court also considered the applicant's description of the horrific experience of the crash and his awareness that his life was not going to be the same.
The court granted the applicant's application for an extension of time. The court held that the PTSD diagnosis was a material fact of a decisive character and that the applicant did not know of the diagnosis until after the limitation period had expired. The court found that the applicant had not learned a material fact of a decisive character before the expiration of the limitation period. The court ordered that the applicant's Notice of Claim be accepted as having been served within the limitation period.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi