IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S53 of 2017
B e t w e e n -
RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 003 184 889
Appellant
and
ADRIAN JOHN COMPTON
Respondent
KIEFEL CJ
GAGELER J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 4 MAY 2017, AT 10.15 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J. STOLJAR, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.E. HYNES, for the appellant. (instructed by Minter Ellison Lawyers)
MR G.O’L. REYNOLDS, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent with my learned friends, MR M.J. O’MEARA and MR S. KANAGARATNAM. (instructed by Pavuk Legal)
KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Mr Stoljar.
MR STOLJAR: Your Honours, the question in this appeal is when a court in bankruptcy can or should go behind a judgment given after a fully contested hearing. The discretion that a court exercises in that circumstance is statutory and the starting point is to examine the language of the statute, namely section 52 of the Bankruptcy Act - if I could take your Honours to that section. Your Honours will recollect that section 52(1) stipulates that:
At the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Court shall require proof of –
and I will pass over (a) and (b) for present purposes and come to (c):
the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;
and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.
Section 52(2) is really the other side of the coin:
If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor –
of matters (a) or (b), (a) is really solvency:
it may dismiss the petition.
In either event, the critical words, in our submission, are “if it is satisfied”. The discretion, as we read it, contemplated by the statute is a narrow one. More precisely, the discretion is simply whether to accept the judgment as satisfactory proof of the debt and we draw support for that proposition from the judgment of the Chief Justice in Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212 at 224.
EDELMAN J: Mr Stoljar, section 52(1) is a provision which, in some form or another, goes back basically to 1831, does it not?
MR STOLJAR: It certainly goes back to 1883. Section 7 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 is in substantially the same form, yes.
EDELMAN J: The 1883 Act was the radical reformation.
MR STOLJAR: Yes.
EDELMAN J: The power existed right from Lord Broome’s Act in 1831, I think.
MR STOLJAR: As I understand it, it existed before that. I cannot say with specificity, your Honour.
EDELMAN J: If that is the case then given that what the concern was was a concern…
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- Case
- [2017] HCATrans 95
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the conduct of Dr. George, a senior medical practitioner at a hospital operated by Ramsay, constituted an act done in the course of his employment for the purposes of establishing vicarious liability on the part of Ramsay. This required the Court to consider the scope of employment and the connection between the wrongful acts and the employment relationship, particularly in the context of a senior employee whose conduct might be seen as an abuse of authority rather than an act authorised by the employer.
The High Court, by majority, held that Ramsay was not vicariously liable for Dr. George's conduct. The majority reasoned that Dr. George's bullying and harassment of Mr Compton were not so closely connected with the acts that he was employed to perform as to be considered an unauthorised mode of performing those acts. Instead, the Court found that Dr. George's conduct was a personal act, an abuse of his position and authority, and not an act done in the course of his employment. The legal principle applied was that vicarious liability arises when the employee's wrongful act is a "breach of duty arising out of the employment" or an "unauthorised mode of doing some class of act authorised by the employer," which was not satisfied in this instance.
The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Full Federal Court, with the result that Mr Compton's claim against Ramsay was dismissed.
Orders
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Background
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Decision
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Legal Principle Established
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