Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd v Valuer-General - [2010] QLC 148

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd & Ors v Valuer-General [2010] QLC 0148

PARTIES: Cindy Ann Fleming as TTE & James Murray & Kylie Maree Forbes as TTE & Ors (VLA438-10), Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd (VLA439-10), Douglas Sydney and Misako Tai James (VLA440-10), Cindy Ann Fleming as TTE and Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd (VLA441-10), Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd as TTE (VLA442-10), Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd as TTE (VLA443-10), Body Corporate for "Macmillan Mews" Community Titles Scheme (VLA444-10), PJP Properties Pty Ltd as Trustee and Ralph Lauren 57 (VLA445-10), Ralph Lauren Pty Ltd (VLA446-10), Ralph Lauren Pty Ltd as TTE (VLA447-10), Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd (VLA448-10), Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd (VLA449-10), Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd (VLA450-10)

(applicants)
v.
Valuer-General
(respondent)

PROCEEDING:  Jurisdiction – Appeal against Unimproved Value
DELIVERED ON:                  23 December 2010
DELIVERED AT:                   Brisbane
MEMBER:Mr BR O’Connor, Judicial Registrar

ORDER:The Court has no jurisdiction to determine the appeals.

CATCHWORDS: Jurisdiction – Late filing of appeal – Whether reasonable excuse
APPEARANCES: Mr R. Anderson instructed by F.G. Forde, Knapp & Johnson Lawyers, for the applicant
Ms T. Johnson, Principal Lawyer, Department of Environment and Resource Management for the respondent.

The issue for determination in this application is whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals in circumstances where the notices of appeal were filed eight days out of time. The key dates in question are as follows:
·the Valuer-General’s decision on objection, made under s.43 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (VLA), was notified to the applicants, as required by that section by notice of decision issued dated 20 July 2010
·the applicants had a right of appeal under s.45 of the VLA against the decision but, by virtue of s.45(2), only if the appeal is instituted within 42 days after the date of issue
·the appeal period expired on 31 August 2010
·the applicant lodged notices of appeal with the Land Court received on 8 September 2010
The respondent alleges that the purported appeals were therefore filed eight days out of time.
Accordingly, the Registrar of the Court notified the applicant in accordance with s.57 of the VLA which states as follows:
57 Late filing
(1)If a notice of appeal is filed in the Land Court registry after the time stated in section 55(2), the registrar of the court must notify the owner that the appeal may not be heard unless the owner satisfies the court that the owner has a reasonable excuse for filing the notice after the time stated.
Example of reasonable excuse—
The notice of the chief executive’s decision or the notice of appeal was lost or delayed in the ordinary course of post.
(2)If the owner satisfies the court under subsection (1), the court may hear and decide the appeal.
(2A)However, the court must…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd v Valuer-General

Details

AGLC: Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2010] QLC 148
Case: [2010] QLC 148
Decision Date: 23 December 2010

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicants, including Ralph Lauren 57 Pty Ltd and others, appealed against the Valuer-General's decisions regarding objections to unimproved valuations. The applicants filed their notices of appeal eight days after the statutory deadline, raising the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeals. The primary legal issue was whether the Court could exercise its discretion under the Valuation of Land Act 1944 to extend the time limit for filing appeals, considering the applicants' failure to provide a reasonable excuse for the late filing.

The Court considered the statutory framework, noting that the time limit for filing appeals was a substantive provision, requiring a stringent approach. The Court reviewed the principles outlined in the High Court decision in Jackamarra v Krakouer, which emphasised the importance of "reasonable excuse" in determining whether to extend time limits. The Court also considered the applicants' affidavit, which detailed their miscalculation of the appeal period due to an erroneous interpretation of the statutory provisions and an unusually heavy workload. Despite the applicants' arguments and the general principles of extending time for procedural defaults, the Court concluded that the applicants' mistake, while innocent, did not constitute a "reasonable excuse" within the meaning of the statute.

Accordingly, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals due to the applicants' failure to file their notices of appeal within the required time frame and without a reasonable excuse. The Court dismissed the appeals, emphasising that the statutory time limit was a substantive provision that needed strict adherence.

The Court's decision underscored the importance of precise adherence to statutory time limits in substantive provisions, even in the face of an innocent mistake. The applicants' delay, although slight, was not deemed sufficient to warrant an extension of time under the specific statutory provision. The Court's ruling highlighted the need for careful attention to statutory deadlines and the limited scope of discretion in extending such deadlines.

Orders