Rajaratnam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rajaratnam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1707

MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application for protection visa – whether error of law – use by Refugee Review Tribunal of word ‘motivation’ rather than ‘for reasons of …’ – whether matters noted by Refugee Review Tribunal overlooked in reaching decision – assessment of probability that event may occur – whether Refugee Review Tribunal based assessment only on past event – whether procedures required by the Act observed in connection with the making of the decision – whether failure by Refugee Review Tribunal to provide proper written reasons for decision

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 430, 476

Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola [1999] FCA 1134 (1999) 166 ALR 641, referred to
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, cited
Ram v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 565, cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, cited
Abdalla v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 51 ALD 11, followed
Logenthiran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Wilcox, Lindgren and Merkel JJ unreported, 21 December 1998), followed
Perampalam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 165, (1999) 55 ALD 431, followed
Thevendram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 182, followed

MANUEL RAJARATNAM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 777 of 1999

BRANSON J
SYDNEY
9 DECEMBER 1999

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 777 of 1999

BETWEEN:

MANUEL RAJARATNAM
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 DECEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 777 of 1999

BETWEEN:

MANUEL RAJARATNAM
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

9 DECEMBER 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review by the Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) by which the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

  2. A criteria for a protection visa is that the decision-maker is satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter together referred to as “the Convention”) (s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations cl 866.211). Australia has protection obligations under the Convention to a person who:

    “… owing to a well-founded…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1707
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rajaratnam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Sri Lankan Tamil man, sought a protection visa in Australia based on his fear of persecution due to his ethnicity. His application was rejected by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, a decision that was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant contested the Tribunal's decision, arguing that it contained legal errors that necessitated judicial review. The court examined the applicant's claims and evidence, which were accepted by the Tribunal regarding incidents involving Lt. Ratnayake, who had taken possession of the applicant's shop stock without payment, harassed him, and threatened his life. The Tribunal concluded that Lt. Ratnayake's actions were personal rather than indicative of broader persecution against Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The legal issues the court had to decide included whether the Tribunal erred in its interpretation and application of the law in concluding that Lt. Ratnayake's actions were personal rather than characteristic of persecution against a Convention group. The applicant argued that the Tribunal overlooked the racial abuse and general harassment faced by Tamils in Sri Lanka. The court, however, found that the Tribunal had not erred in its conclusion, noting that the Tribunal's focus on causation was appropriate and that its findings did not ignore the broader context of Tamil persecution. The court held that the Tribunal was correct in its interpretation of the law and its application to the facts as found.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle that the Tribunal's decision should not be reviewed on its merits but rather on whether it involved an error of law. The court determined that the Tribunal's decision did not involve such an error, as it had correctly identified the issue of causation and had made factual findings that were not manifestly unreasonable. The court also emphasised that the identification of the persecutor's motivation was crucial and that the Tribunal had appropriately considered the broader context of Tamil persecution in Sri Lanka.

ORDERS:
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

A criteria for a protection visa is that the decision-maker is satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter together referred to as “the Convention”) (s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations cl 866.211). Australia has protection obligations under the Convention to a person who:“… owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country ….” (Article 1A(2) of the Convention)FACTS The applicant is a forty-three year old Sri Lankan man of Tamil ethnicity who arrived in Australia on 11 April 1996. On 22 May 1996 he applied for a protection visa. His application was rejected by a delegate of the respondent on 30 September 1996. The applicant sought review of the decision of the delegate of the respondent. On 15 July 1999 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate. The Tribunal accepted certain aspects of the applicant’s claims and rejected others. As there is no challenge touching on those aspects of the applicant’s claims that were rejected by the Tribunal, it is sufficient to set out a summary of the applicant’s claims so far as they were accepted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal found the applicant’s claims and evidence to be “plausible and credible” to the extent that they related to problems which he encountered with a Lt. Ratnayake and to an incident of extortion which he experienced at a checkpoint in Kollupittya apparently in 1995. The applicant’s problems with Lt. Raynayake were of a serious nature. In summary, Lt. Ratnayake took possession of significant amounts of the stock of the shop jointly owned by the applicant and his business partner, Mr Yousuf, without paying for it. When the applicant complained to a senior army officer about Lt. Ratnayake’s conduct, he suffered serious harassment in his shop at the hands of certain members of the army, and his life was threatened by Lt. Ratnayake. During the course of the incident Lt. Ratnayake said that it was his duty to eliminate all the Tamils from Sri Lanka, that there was no room for Tamils to be in the country and that Sri Lanka belonged to the Singhalese. Subsequently, after receiving a letter from the Army requesting him to report to the army camp on a nominated day, the applicant was effectively abducted by Lt. Ratnayake and driven in a jeep to a house. He was blindfolded before arriving at the house. After spending some time in the house he was taken a short distance from the house and his blindfold was removed. He saw seven to eight soldiers with Lt. Ratnayake and two handcuffed and blindfolded youths. He was told that the two youths were members of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan). Each of the youths was shot and killed by the soldiers. Their bodies were dumped into a river.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J
This ground of review must also fail.CONCLUSION The decision of the Tribunal will be affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J

The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of the Convention.CONSIDERATION The applicant attacked the Tribunal’s conclusion that Lt. Ratnayake’s interest in the applicant was purely personal and not “characteristic of any Convention grouping”. He placed reliance on decisions of this Court which have recognised that as a matter of common sense and practical reality, a particular event may have more than one effective cause (see, for example, Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola [1999] FCA 1134 (1999) 166 ALR 641 at paras 13-16 and the authorities there cited). I see no reason to conclude that the Tribunal was led into legal error by its use of the word “motivation” rather than the language of the Convention “for reasons of …”. The reasons of the Tribunal are not to be over-zealously scrutinised. In a number of authorities the importance of the identification of the motivation of a persecutor has been stressed (see, for example, Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 esp per Dawson J at 241 and Gummow J at 284; Ram v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 565 at 568, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ at 574). The Tribunal correctly, in my view, identified the issue for its consideration as one of causation. Further, the emphasis placed by the Tribunal on its finding that Lt. Ratnayake’s interest in the applicant was purely personal suggests that it was alert to the possibility of the applicant’s harsh treatment by Lt. Ratnayake having more than one effective cause. The Tribunal is to be understood as rejecting this possibility as a matter of fact. The applicant emphasised that the applicant was subjected to racial abuse by Lt. Ratnayake and accused of assisting the Tamil organisation, the LTTE. The applicant also drew attention to the evidence before the Tribunal that Tamil businessmen in Sri Lanka suffer harassment and that Tamils generally suffer human rights abuses in Sri Lanka. I see no reason to conclude that the Tribunal overlooked these matters when it concluded that Lt. Ratnayake’s interest in the applicant was purely personal. It referred in its reasons for decision to independent evidence from a number of sources touching on bribery and extortion in Sri Lanka with particular reference to Tamils. A differently constituted Tribunal might have reached a different decision on the evidence. However, it is not open to this Court to review the decision of the Tribunal on its merits. To the extent that the Tribunal’s decision was based on the conclusion that Lt. Ratnayake’s interest in the applicant is purely personal, I am not satisfied that the decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal (s 476(1)(e) of the Act).