FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| RAHMAN v DUBS & ORS (No.2) | [2020] FCCA 1086 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application for costs of supporting creditors where solicitor attended half of the full day hearing – costs awarded per the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s.32 Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth), r.13.01 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) |
| Cases cited: |
| Applicant: | MOHAMMAD TABIBAR RAHMAN |
| First Respondent: | ROSALIND V DUBS |
| Second Respondent: | AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SECURITY AUTHORITY |
| Third Respondent: | DAVID JOHN FRANK LOMBE |
| Supporting Creditor: | PETER RIORDAN |
| Supporting Creditor: | DAVID MCGRATH |
| File Number: | SYG 3339 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Baird |
| Hearing date: | Heard on the papers |
| Date of Last Submission: | 3 October 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 7 May 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Mr M T Rahman in person |
| Solicitors for the Third Party Creditors: | Mr D Wong, Makinson d’Apice Lawyers |
ORDERS
Order that the costs of the third party creditors Peter Riordan and David McGrath fixed in the sum of $2,241 are to be paid out of the estate of Mr Mohammad Tabibar Rahman, a bankrupt, in accordance with s.109 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3339 of 2018
| MOHAMMAD TABIBAR RAHMAN |
Applicant
And
| ROSALIND V DUBS |
First Respondent
| AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SECURITY AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
| DAVID JOHN FRANK LOMBE |
Third Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
These reasons address the post-hearing application for costs made by certain third party Creditors, namely Messrs Peter Riordan and David McGrath, for their costs of and incidental to Mr Mohammad Tabibar Rahman’s Application to this Court for an order pursuant to s.135B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to annul his bankruptcy.
Mr Rahman filed the Application on 30 November 2018, and subsequently, by application in a case filed 19 July 2019, also sought an order that I recuse myself. On 24 September 2019, I heard the Application and the application in a case, and delivered reasons ex tempore, dismissing both the Application and application in a case. Those reasons are now published as Rahman v Dubs & Ors [2019] FCCA 3899.
Mr Rahman was made bankrupt in 2012, when on 19 July 2012 a sequestration order was made against his estate. The history of his bankruptcy, and various court proceedings brought by, or concerning, Mr Rahman and the bankrupt estate of Mr Rahman are sufficiently descripted in my reasons.
In the course of the interlocutory steps preparatory to the hearing of the Application, I made orders excusing Mr Rahman from the obligation to inform creditors of the hearing of the Annulment Application. However, on 5 September 2019 Mr Rahman filed a Notice to Creditors of Annulment Application, in which he included among the creditors in the Schedule, the Creditors Peter Riordan and David McGrath.
Those Creditors, by their solicitor, Mr David Wong, of Makinson d’Apice, filed a notice of appearance and address for…
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- Case
- [2020] FCCA 1086
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the default judgment should be set aside. This required the Court to consider the principles governing applications to set aside default judgments, specifically the applicant's obligation to demonstrate a meritorious defence and the Court's discretion to grant such relief. The Court also had to assess whether the applicant had provided a sufficient explanation for his failure to file the defence in a timely manner.
Judge Baird applied the well-established principles for setting aside default judgments, which require a two-pronged approach. Firstly, the applicant must show a defence on the merits, even if only in outline. Secondly, the applicant must provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the defence. In this instance, the Court found that the applicant had failed to satisfy either limb of this test. His explanation for the delay was deemed insufficient, and the material before the Court did not disclose a defence with a real prospect of success. Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion against setting aside the default judgment.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Legal Principle Established
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