Rahman v Ashpole

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rahman v Ashpole [2007] FCA 1067

MOHAMMAD TABIBAR RAHMAN v LIN ASHPOLE, MARTIN BARKER AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
NSD 1196 OF 2007

GRAHAM J
16 JULY 2007
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1196 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

MOHAMMAD TABIBAR RAHMAN
Applicant

AND:

LIN ASHPOLE
First Respondent

MARTIN BARKER
Second Respondent

PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

GRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 JULY 2007

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal filed 27 June 2007 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the first and second respondents on an indemnity basis.

3.The applicant pay the costs of the third respondent on a party and party basis.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1196 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

MOHAMMAD TABIBAR RAHMAN
Applicant

AND:

LIN ASHPOLE
First Respondent

MARTIN BARKER
Second Respondent

PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

GRAHAM J

DATE:

16 JULY 2007

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Section 31A(2) and (3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the ‘Federal Court of Australia Act’) relevantly provided as follows:

    ‘31A(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole…of a proceeding if:

    (a)the first party is defending the proceeding …; and

    (b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding….

    (3)     For the purposes of this section … a proceeding … need not be:

    (a) hopeless; or

    (b) bound to fail;

    for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.’

  2. On 5 February 2007, the applicant commenced proceeding NSD 148 of 2007 seeking relief under ss 5, 6 and 7 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ‘AD(JR) Act’). The gravamen of the applicant’s complaint was that a decision of Anna Dobkin, Assistant Compliance Officer, Compliance Section of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 8 January 2007 warranted review under the AD(JR) Act. The applicant pointed out that at the time of the making of his application on 5 February 2007, he was unaware of a further decision of Ms Dobkin of 1 February 2007 and of another decision of Ms Dobkin of 28 February 2007, which was communicated to the applicant on 28 February 2007 and also to a Mr Marshall at ‘Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited’ (sic).

  3. The respondents named by the applicant in his Application filed 5 February 2007 were two officers of Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the ‘Commonwealth Bank’) and the Privacy Commissioner. 

  4. By a Notice of Motion filed 26 March 2007, the first and second respondents applied to have the Application struck out or summarily dismissed. On 27 April 2007, the first and second respondents amended their Notice of Motion to also seek summary judgment under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act and to…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1067
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Rahman v Ashpole involves the applicant, Mr. Rahman, challenging a decision made by Ms. Dobkin, which he claims infringed upon his privacy. The dispute was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, with the primary judge dismissing Mr. Rahman's application for judicial review. Mr. Rahman sought leave to appeal this decision, raising issues about the applicability of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) to the decisions made by Ms. Dobkin and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA).

The central legal issue the court had to decide was whether the decision conveyed to Mr. Rahman by Ms. Dobkin on 8 January 2007 constituted a 'decision to which this Act applies' under the ADJR Act. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether Mr. Rahman's application had any reasonable prospect of success against the respondents, given that the decision was allegedly revoked by Ms. Dobkin before the proceedings were initiated. Furthermore, the court considered whether the first and second respondents, who are officers of CBA, could be held liable independently of the bank under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).

The court found that the definition of 'decision to which this Act applies' in s 3(1) of the ADJR Act extended to decisions made by Ms. Dobkin. However, the court ruled that the application was moot because the decision in question had been revoked before the proceedings were commenced. The court also concluded that Mr. Rahman's application had no reasonable prospect of success against any of the respondents, as the first and second respondents were not independently liable under the Privacy Act, and the decision made by Ms. Dobkin appeared to be legally correct. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

In summary, the court dismissed Mr. Rahman's application for leave to appeal, ordered that he pay the costs of the first and second respondents on an indemnity basis, and the costs of the third respondent on a party and party basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal filed 27 June 2007 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the first and second respondents on an indemnity basis.

3. The applicant pay the costs of the third respondent on a party and party basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAHAM J
The expression ‘decision to which this Act applies’ is relevantly defined in s 3(1) of the AD(JR) Act as follows:‘3(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:…“decision to which this Act applies” means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not and whether before or after the commencement of this definition):(a) under an enactment referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) of the definition of enactment; or(b) by a Commonwealth authority or an officer of the Commonwealth under an enactment referred to in paragraph (ca) or (cb) of the definition of enactment:other than …’ As indicated in paragraph 13 of the primary judge’s reasons for judgment, it is accepted that the definition of ‘decision to which this Act applies’ would extend to a relevant decision made by Ms Dobkin. In arguing the application for leave to appeal, the applicant cited paragraph 15 of the primary judge’s reasons for judgment as containing the ‘main issue’. It is appropriate to set out the terms of paragraphs 14 to 18 inclusive of the primary judge’s reasons and the primary judge’s summary at paragraph 25, which were as follows: ‘14 However, on every occasion that the matter has been before the Court Mr Rahman has insisted that his application is brought only against the letter from Ms Dobkin dated 8 January 2007. With this in mind initially, the conclusion seems to be inevitable that the proceedings against the Privacy Commissioner have no prospect of success.15 In my view the decision conveyed to Mr Rahman on 8 January 2007 was revoked by letter dated 1 February 2007, before the proceedings were commenced. As a result the application filed by him is moot. As he has insisted that the proceedings should go forward without amendment it is inevitable that I should conclude that they have no reasonable prospect of succeeding against the third respondent. [I should add that the applicant confirms that he so insisted when the matter was before the primary judge.]16 They have no reasonable prospect of succeeding either against the first or second respondents. There are a number of reasons for this conclusion. In the first place, there is no basis to think that either of them made a decision to which the ADJR Act applied. Moreover, s 8 of the Privacy Act renders their conduct, if it were otherwise actionable, conduct of CBA. The obligations owed by CBA as an “organisation” identified in s 6C of the Privacy Act to comply with the “National Privacy Principles” (see s 16A of the Privacy Act) do not appear to me to extend to the first and second respondents independently of CBA. In my view their joinder individually to the proceedings is quite misconceived. However the matter is viewed, there is no reasonable prospect that the application could succeed against them and they are entitled to summary judgment also. 17 Even had Mr Rahman amended the proceedings to focus attention upon Ms Dobkin’s letter of 28 February 2007 the application would nevertheless have no reasonable prospects of succeeding against any of the respondents. 18 So far as the first and second respondents are concerned that is for the reasons which I have already expressed. So far as the third respondent is concerned it is for the reason that Ms Dobkin appears to have correctly identified the legal position.…25 In my view Mr Rahman’s contentions and his application, wherever they are, or might be, directed are misconceived and without any foundation. It is inevitable that the application be dismissed for that reason and I will so order.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAHAM J

Full text does not contain this section.