Rahal & Rahal (No 2)
[2023] FedCFamC1F 646
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Rahal & Rahal (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1F 646
File number(s): SYC 7908 of 2020 Judgment of: MCGUIRE J Date of judgment: 4 August 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for Review of a Senior Judicial Registrar’s decision – Both parties seek review – Interim/interlocutory issues – Husband’s proposed sale of former matrimonial home – Wife seeks interim property settlement from sources other than the sale of the home – Wife’s pending joinder application of numerous third party entities – Applications premature – Continuation of interim spousal maintenance orders – Leave to relist dependent upon wife’s joinder application Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 79, 83
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021(Cth) r 14.07
Cases cited: Strahan & Strahan [2009] FamCAFC 166; FLC 93-466 Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 52 Date of hearing: 26 July 2023 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mrs Mooney S.C. Solicitor for the Applicant: Barkus Doolan Winning Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Dickson K.C. Solicitor for the Respondent: Broun Abrahams Burreket ORDERS
SYC 7908 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS RAHAL
Applicant
AND: MR RAHAL
Respondent
order made by:
MCGUIRE J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 August 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The orders of the Senior Judicial Registrar of 31 May 2023, since stayed, be discharged.
2.The wife make, file and serve any application for joinder of other parties in the substantive proceedings within 14 days of the date of these orders failing which the husband have leave to relist the Review Application before McGuire J (or any other judge of Division 1 or Division 2 of this Court as may be available) in respect of the sale of the former matrimonial home at D Street, Suburb E, New South Wales (“Suburb E property”).
3.Each of the parties have leave to relist the wife's Amended Application for Review filed 19 July 2023 and/or the husband's Amended Response filed 24 July 2023 upon determination of any joinder application filed by the wife in the substantive proceedings and with reference to Order 2 herein.
4.The parties attend a mediation with a suitably qualified mediator to be agreed between the solicitors of the parties not later than 30 October 2023 after which the matter be listed as soon as practicable before the Case Management Judge of Sydney, for the allocation of a trial date as soon as practicable.
5.Forthwith the husband sign any and all documents necessary to make an insurance claim in respect of water damage/mould at the Suburb E property.
UNTIL FURTHER ORDER
6.Orders 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the orders of Henderson J made 15 December 2020 remain in full force and effect.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Rahal & Rahal has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCGUIRE J
APPLICATIONS:
I am asked to hear an Application for Review of orders made by the Senior Judicial Registrar (“SJR”) on 31 May 2023. Essentially, both the husband and wife ask for orders that differ from those made by the SJR.
There are substantive proceedings between the parties in respect of property, parenting, spousal maintenance, and child support issues. Those proceedings were issued in 2020. I am told the applications are not yet listed for trial and indeed have not reached the stage of mediation. The wife discloses costs to date of E$578,000. The husband costs to date are E$712,000.
The issues before the SJR were in respect of interlocutory/interim financial matters. I am now asked to read, on my calculations, some 2500 pages of affidavits, exhibits, and court books. This is where it is well-established that these Courts at the interim/interlocutory stage do not have the benefit of full forensic preparation; where such hearings are truncated and abridged; where there is no opportunity for the testing of the evidence by cross examination; and where the ability to make determinations of credit and disputed fact are to a large degree unavailable.
The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) mandate that the Application for Review is to be conducted as a hearing de novo, unlike an Appeal that requires a complaint of error of law or, at least, unreasonable factual determination. The Review carries no such hurdles.
On 15 December 2020 Henderson J made orders by consent inter alia as follows:
5.Without admissions or prejudice, the wife shall have the right of exclusive use and occupation of the [Suburb E] property and the husband shall be restrained from attending upon the property without the consent of the wife in writing.
6.Pending further Order, the husband pay the following by way of urgent spouse maintenance:
a.all mortgage payments, taxes, rates, water rates and usage, gas, electricity and other outgoings with respect of the [Suburb E] property and indemnify and keep indemnified, the wife in respect of same;
b.vet bills […] associated with the family [pet];
c.the family health insurance premiums at the current level and the wife's medical expenses.
7.That the husband continue to make or cause to be available [Motor Vehicle 1] to the wife and the wife have the right of exclusive use of [Motor Vehicle 1].
8.The husband pay all expenses of [Motor Vehicle 1] of registration, insurance, maintenance and repairs.
9.The husband pay or cause to be paid by way of spouse maintenance to the wife the sum of $1,000 per week commencing on first Monday following the making of these orders and each Monday thereafter.
10.That the husband shall pay by way of child support in addition to any assessed amount:
a.100% of the children's school fees, uniforms, text books, extra‑curricular activities, sports fees, sporting equipment and uniforms;
b.100% of the children's medical costs.
11.That the husband pay to the wife within 14 days the sum of $100,000 with the trial Judge to determine how it is to be characterised.
Injunctions
12.Pending further Order, the husband be restrained by injunction from:
a.Selling, obtaining a mortgage, assigning, alienating or further encumbering any real property in which the parties hold an interest, whether in their personal names, or in joint names.
13.That these Orders are made pending an interim hearing of the parties’ respective interim applications.
That interim hearing proceeded before the SJR and on 31 May 2023, the SJR delivered ex tempore reasons and orders on that day providing inter alia:
1.Pursuant to s.79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), within three calendar months of the date of these Orders, the husband shall do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to market for sale and sell the property situate at and known as [D Street, Suburb E] being the whole of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Folio Identifier […] (the [Suburb E] Property)…
3.7.payment to the Wife the sum of $400,000 by way of interim property settlement;
3.8.payment of the balance then remaining to be deposited to a controlled monies account held with Broun Abrahams Burreket in the names of [Mr Rahal] and [Ms Rahal]…
6. If requested by the wife in writing, the husband shall:
6.1.Make all such residential tenancy applications on behalf of the wife as she may direct, and within 48 hours of receipt by him of written notice from the wife to do so;
6.2.Do all acts and things necessary to assist the wife enter into a lease;
6.3.Pay in full the rental bond required for the wife to secure accommodation by way of lump sum spousal maintenance pursuant to section 74 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)…
8.The wife’s Application in a Proceeding filed 1 December 2022 and the husband’s Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 24 March 2023 are otherwise dismissed.
Those orders were later stayed pending my hearing of this Review. It would seem therefore, that orders effectively disposed of the wife’s application for spousal maintenance and ancillary orders. I, however, deal with these applications on a de novo basis.
BACKGROUND
The wife is 45 years of age. She is a student. She has not been gainfully employed for some years. She disputes the husband's contention that she has re-partnered.
The husband is 48 years of age. He may have re-partnered. He describes himself as a ‘manager’. His sworn financial statement discloses an income from three sources totalling $5314 per week, which I calculate to be gross $276,328 per annum.
The parties married and commenced cohabitation in 2009. They separated in February 2020 but remained resident under the same roof until late 2020. There are two children of the marriage namely X (aged 12 years) and Y (aged 10 years). In the interim the children have lived primarily with the wife and spent time with the husband. A Family Report has been prepared by Dr F dated 16 February 2023. Pursuant to the consent orders made before Henderson J in December 2020, the wife and the children remain resident in the former matrimonial home at Suburb E.
The husband’s father is prominent in his industry and operates his business interests under an umbrella of numerous corporate and trust entities in which the husband is a director or shareholder of some. The husband, however, denies any legal or equitable interest in property by reason of any position he may hold in respect of his father’s assets as distinct from being a discretionary beneficiary.
In a further affidavit sworn 25 July 2023, being the day prior to this Review hearing before me, the wife deposes that she has given instructions to her solicitors to make an application for leave to join some 22 corporate/trust entities as parties to the section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 Cth (“the Act”) aspect of these proceedings. It is reasonable to assume that these entities relate to the husband’s father and that the wife asserts interests or control in the husband.
Annexed to his affidavit sworn 21 July 2023 the husband provides a ‘draft balance sheet’. The contents do not appear to be disputed for the purposes of this application but where the wife, of course, asserts that the husband has further equitable or legal interests in property. The balance sheet discloses gross assets of $12,486,653 and liabilities of $4,057,663, giving net value of non-superannuation assets at $8,428,990. It is abundantly clear that the majority of that pool comprises of the Suburb E property of value $11,500,000, with attached mortgages of E$3,300,000 and two recreational vehicles in the possession of the husband with a combined value of $625,000. There are otherwise relatively minor bank account balances, a family trust interest ($137,154), and a further substantial liability claimed by the husband being an outstanding loan to his parents of $700,000.
Combined superannuation interests of the parties total $2,859,515.
The parties agree that recent interest rate increases now see the instalment payments on the Suburb E mortgage total E$25,000 per month or E$300,000 per annum.
The husband’s undisputed evidence is that he has ongoing financial commitments to the two recreational vehicles totalling $1,446 per week or $6266 per calendar month.
The parties agree that the husband received an injection of funds of $483,275 into his bank account in February 2023. He deposes that the balance of that account is now $40,734. He provides untested assertions as to expenditure of the sum of approximately $443,000 in the five months since February 2023. The wife disputes the husband's claimed expenditure. Further, the wife says that bank statements disclosed by the husband are missing in respect of one month in which an amount of $120,000 remains unexplained. The husband says that the deposit was on account of an amount owed to him by the Rahal Family Trust, being a trust established by his father in 1995. The husband's claimed expenditure includes payment of recreational vehicle-related fees ($7800) and legal fees ($114,800).
DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON
The wife relies on an affidavit sworn 18 July 2023 comprising of 29 pages and 152 paragraphs together with 189 pages of annexures and a second affidavit sworn 25 July 2023 comprising five pages and 18 paragraphs with 53 pages of annexures. In addition, the wife provides a tender bundle of 84 pages. She relies on a financial statement sworn 25 November 2022. Helpfully, the wife has provided a case outline together with her Counsel’s succinctly written submissions.
The husband relies on his affidavit sworn 21 July 2023. It comprises of 25 pages and 128 paragraphs. He exhibited documents totalling 643 pages. He also helpfully provides a case summary document.
The husband relies on an affidavit of Mr G, accountant.
Both parties rely on documentation provided by the single expert, Ms H and, in particular, answers to questions prepared by Ms H on 21 July 2023.
THE WIFE’S CASE
The wife says that she wants to retain the former matrimonial home at Suburb E in the ultimate property settlement. She gives a notice that she intends to join in these proceedings some 22 parties being the husband’s father’s companies/trusts (and perhaps other shareholders or office-holders as well), arguing that the husband has legal or equitable interests to property in those entities. As such, she argues that the value of the property pool will be significantly increased from the limited 'hard assets' currently in the parties’ possession and control, being effectively the equity in the former matrimonial home and the husband's two recreational vehicles. The wife says, therefore, that a consideration of section 79(4) of the Act will give her a legitimate and reasonable opportunity to retain the former matrimonial home (presumably unencumbered) within the ambit of her entitlement on an increased value of the property pool.
The wife says that it is open for the Court to order the sale of the husband's two recreational vehicles with a value of $625,000 and a commitment by the husband of $1446 per week as an alternative should the husband claim that he is unable to meet the mortgage instalments on the former matrimonial home and other court ordered commitments in the interim. In this respect, the wife says that the husband's claimed retention of the recreational vehicles by him for the enjoyment of he and the children is not a strong argument as against his proposed sale of the former matrimonial home in which the wife and children reside.
The wife asks for the husband to pay her $350,000 by way of interim property settlement or, alternatively, that the husband sell his two recreational vehicles and that she received $350,000 from the proceeds as an interim property settlement with the residue to be paid into a mortgage offset account, such mortgage secured by the Suburb E property.
Further in the alternative the wife argues that, should the Suburb E property be ordered to be sold, then she receive $350,000 by interim property settlement and $100,000 by lump sum spousal maintenance from the proceeds of sale.
It seems to be the wife’s case, in any event, that the husband continue to meet interim spousal maintenance, vet expenses, and ancillary children's expenses (over and above child support assessment) in the terms of the consent orders made by Henderson J on 15 December 2020.
Although termed ‘interim property settlement’, the wife’s case summary suggest she intends the $350,000 (from whichever source) to be put towards her ongoing litigation expenses. She does not, however, specifically ask for the payment to be categorised as ‘litigation funding/costs’ or ‘spousal maintenance’.
The wife argues that the husband should be ordered to progress an insurance claim in respect of the former matrimonial home which has suffered water damage and where the wife has received a reasonable quote for repairs of $45,656.
Generally the wife suggests that the husband’s proposed sale of the former matrimonial home is a form of financial harassment in circumstances where she says that he understates the reality of his wealth and income from all resources available to him, and where the husband solely controlled the family’s finances during the relationship.
The wife argues for a continuation of spousal maintenance on the basis of the needs set out in her sworn financial statement/affidavit and where she has not been remuneratively employed since the birth of the children and where the husband was the sole financial provider for the family unit prior to separation, then she says that he has the ability to contribute to her financial needs.
THE HUSBAND'S CASE
The husband argues that the immediate sale of the Suburb E property is necessary due to his inability to finance ongoing commitments, including the mortgage on the property and the other obligations subject of the consent orders made by Henderson J on 15 March 2020. Specifically, the husband says interest rates have risen to an extent that the mortgage instalments are now $25,000 per month or $300,000 per annum, where he has an income of $276,000 per annum.
The husband proposes interim property distributions to each of the parties of $400,000 from the sale of the home, thereby alleviating the requirement for the husband’s interim spousal maintenance and other repayments ordered by consent on 15 December 2020. He says that the balance be retained in an interest-bearing trust account in the names of both parties.
The husband denies that he has any interest in property, either legal or equitable, other than that disclosed in the above-mentioned balance sheet, essentially comprising of the Suburb E property and the two recreational vehicles.
The husband argues that the sale of the recreational vehicles as proposed by the wife would not alleviate his financial difficulties given the mortgage commitments relative to his income. He argues, in any event, that the vehicles are assets enjoyed by the children and their sale is not necessary if the former matrimonial home is to be sold.
The husband says that the wife’s ambition to retain the former matrimonial home (presumably unencumbered) at $11.5 million is fanciful, unrealistic and not a legitimate expectation where to do so would give her in excess of 100% of the property pool where, in any event, the wife’s entitlement would be subject to consideration of his superior initial and other contributions
The husband argues for ancillary orders including the discharge of an order from 10 June 2021 requiring single expert expenses to be met at first instance by him and that hereinafter such expenses be ‘paid by each party’.
FINDINGS AND CONCLSUIONS
It must be emphasised that the findings and determination here are at an interim/interlocutory stage without the benefit of testing of the evidence and with difficulties of disputed fact and credit issues being unresolved.
In its abstract, the consideration for the Court here is a balancing of the two positions. Firstly, the wife argues for her to retain the former matrimonial home (presumably unencumbered) at $11.5 million in the property settlement. She says, and I agree, that prima facie, the property pool as to its contents and value remain vague and uncertain and given her commitment to make an application to join up to 22 separate corporate/trust entities in which she says the husband may have an interest. Secondly, and where the husband denies any such interest, he says that the property pool is limited to that disclosed by him and that the wife's quest to retain the former matrimonial home is fanciful, unreasonable, and not legitimate. It follows he says, that ongoing commitments to a mortgage and other outgoings mandated by court order are not commensurate with his income and that the sale of the Suburb E property is both necessary and inevitable. The implication from this argument is that the sale of the recreational vehicles is at best a 'band aid' in that it will not address the financial shortfall past the very short-term.
The affidavit of Mr G, accountant, supports the husband’s position. He is the accountant for the husband's father and his entities. He deposes that the husband effectively has neither legal nor beneficial interest in any of the assets the husband's father owns through corporate/trust entities and nor are they controlled by him. Mr G's affidavit was prepared in relation to objections to subpoena issued to the husband’s father’s entities by the wife.
Nevertheless, evidence from the single expert, Ms H, is equivocal in respect of the conclusions of the husband's accountant. In so finding, I reference the annexure to the wife's affidavit sworn 25 July 2023, being a single expert's answers to questions posed by the wife's solicitors. At this interim stage I need not to dwell on the specifics of those answers/responses except to repeat my view that the answers are equivocal as to the conclusions of the husband's accountant. As such, I cannot find on the balance of probabilities that the wife's joinder of corporate/trust entities of the husband's father is not legitimate in ultimately proving legal, equitable and beneficial interest by the husband in those entities.
In this respect, I am grateful for being alerted to, and adopt, the submissions of Counsel for the wife in respect of the well-known decision of Strahan & Strahan[1], where the majority of the Full Court observed at [57]:
[57]A review of the legislation and authorities allow for a number of comments to be made concerning the appropriate approach to applications for interim property settlement orders:
(a)There is power to make interim property orders under s.79, which should be exercised when “appropriate”: s.79(1) and (5).
(b)In order to determine whether it is “appropriate” to exercise the power, the case must be analysed as required by s.79 through the usual 4 step process of identifying the pool, contributions, s.75(2) factors, and whether the ultimate orders are “just and equitable”.
(c)As it is an interim hearing careful consideration must be given to the potential impact of any disputed facts and circumstances. Consideration must be given to the claims of the parties and their legitimate expectations. Whether the orders could later be reversed, bearing in mind the need to ultimately be in a position to make ‘appropriate’ orders that are “just and equitable”, will often be a significant, but not necessarily determinative consideration. For example the sale of an asset may not be reversible, but may be inevitable on any version of the facts of the case. In other cases the present needs may be so compelling as to outweigh these risks.
(d)The reasons for making interim orders must be identified and assessed to allow them to be properly weighed against the risk that interim orders may pose to the parties’ claims or legitimate expectations.
(e)Orders under s.79 are to provide relief to parties to the marriage by ensuring that they receive “appropriate” shares of the matrimonial resources. It would be naïve to overlook the significant power differential between parties in many cases as a result of access to financial resources in the interim, pending final orders under s.79. It may well be unjust and inequitable for one party to be denied access to matrimonial property for a substantial period whilst awaiting a trial. Similarly, it may be unjust and inequitable to require the sale of a matrimonial home in the interim where a party has no other assets and can not reasonably purchase an alternative home until the quantum of the final orders is determined. In this sense regard must be had to the positions of the parties at the time of the application for interim orders.
[1] Strahan & Strahan [2009] FamCAFC 166; FLC 93-466.
With respect, their Honours’ comments above succinctly and relevantly relate to the very issues and considerations for this Court at this interim/interlocutory stage.
The wife in her affidavit sworn 25 July 2023, deposes at [7] in relation to Ms H’s answers:
7.After reviewing the Answers, I am now in the process of filing a joinder Application in which I will be seeking to join the following entities identified by [Ms H] in her Report and in her Answers:
7.1. The [K Unit Trust].
7.2. The [Rahal Family Trust].
7.3. The [J Trust].
7.4. [L Pty Ltd].
7.5. [M Pty Ltd].
7.6. [N1 Unit Trust];
7.7. [N2 Unit Trust].
7.8. [P Pty Ltd].
7.9. [Q Pty Ltd].
7.10. [R Unit Trust].
7.11. [S1 Unit Trust];
7.12. [S2 Unit Trust];
7.13. [S3 Unit Trust];
7.14. [S4 Unit Trust];
7.15. [T Pty Ltd].
7.16. [T1 Unit Trust];
7.17. [T2 Unit Trust];
7.18. [T3 Unit Trust];
7.19. [T4 Unit Trust];
7.20. [T5 Unit Trust];
7.21. [T6 Unit Trust];
7.22. [U Pty Ltd].
The wife states that the husband has not fully discovered documents for entities of which he is a director or shareholder. She deposes that she, therefore, cannot finalise her understanding of the property pool.
The wife argues that the property pool is not crystallised. She is committed to making application for joinder of the (22) separate entities. I can enforce that commitment by order if necessary. I am not asked to or am I able to speculate as to the success or otherwise of the wife's joinder application at this juncture. I do know, however, that should the joinder application be successful then this could prima facie inflate the current known property pool. If, however, the joinder application is unsuccessful then I expect the property pool in its extent and value will be limited to that disclosed now by the husband's balance sheet and where, to be blunt, the wife's ambition to retain an unencumbered asset valued at dollars $11.5M from a pool of value E$8M would be immediately thwarted. If, however, the joinder application is successful then it would be premature of me now to find that the wife's ambition to retain the Suburb E property is fanciful, unreasonable, or not legitimate.
Consequently, and in summary, I find the application by the husband to sell the Suburb E property to be premature pending the wife's commitment to the joinder application. She has, however, flagged that application and any delay on her part in filing that application is prima facie detrimental to the husband who, of course, argues that the sale of the property is both inevitable and essential given the parties precarious financial position. I believe, therefore, that the wife should be given a reasonable period in which to bring that application, failing which the husband have leave to relist his application for sale of the Suburb E property before myself or another judicial officer of this Court. Unfortunately, I am unable to provide a hearing date for the wife's joinder application but will order such application to be expedited so far as I can.
Nevertheless, the wife’s application is couched as an interim property settlement in her favour from the husband and from sources other than from the sale of the Suburb E property. She argues simply that the husband make such payment of $350,000 or, alternatively, he do so from the sale of the two recreational vehicles.
Frankly, if I find the husband's application for the sale of the Suburb E property to be premature pending the wife's joinder application then I must, as a matter of logic, fairness and equity, also find the same in respect of the wife's application to sell other assets namely the recreational vehicles. Again, sequentially the success or otherwise of the wife’s joinder application is likely to determine the issue of the sale of the Suburb E property. In this sense, I agree with the husband that the sale of the recreational vehicles themselves would present only a short-term respite from the prima facie precarious financial position of these parties. As such, I see the wife's application to be similarly premature as that of the husband.
As to the wife’s more general option that the husband simply pay to her $350,000 by way of interim property settlement, she points to no other source of funds to finance such payment and hence the application in this these particulars cannot succeed.
It follows, of course, that my considerations of discharging the urgent/interim spousal maintenance orders from 15 December 2020 as urged only by the husband is also ultimately dependent upon the wife's joinder application. The following are relevant:
(1)The wife prima facie has needs particularised in her affidavit material;
(2)The wife has not worked remuneratively since the birth of the children and is currently a student;
(3)The husband was the sole financial provider for the family unit of four prior to separation;
(4)The husband entered into consent orders on 15 December 2020 including for the provision of mortgage payments on the former matrimonial home.
(5)Where the husband discloses his income variables over some years and with the additional input of the $483,000 in February 2023, and on a consideration of his section 83(2) of the Act, I am not satisfied that the orders of 15 December 2020 should be varied at this stage in any way. If, however, the husband maintains his inability to meet these obligations by reason of increased expenses then he retains the option to sell his two recreational vehicles which would immediately free him of what might be considered non-essential expenditure of $1446 per week or $6266 per calendar month, and where I assume that the wife would not oppose such a sale. I stress, however, that separate from my consideration above, this would be an option for the husband.
The wife asks for an order that the husband, as sole registered proprietor, pursue an insurance claim in respect of water damage/mould at the Suburb E property. Generally speaking, an asset should be properly maintained and preserved pending settlement. The wife has obtained a quotation. It is, in my view, for the insurance company to dispute that quotation. I will make the orders sought by the wife.
The husband seeks an order for an expedited hearing where he says that the sale of the former matrimonial home is inevitable and that the family's finances are perilous. Again, the wife’s joinder application is a necessary bar to immediately listing the matter for trial. I do, however, accept the husband’s submissions where this matter was filed as long ago as 2020, where it has a Family Report in respect of children's issues with such likely to become stale with further delay, and where the pool is simple and crystallised on the husband's version. Given the vagaries of the anticipated joinder application, I will otherwise accede to the husband's application and order that the trial be expedited. I will similarly place what I believe to be a reasonable time period for the wife to file her joinder application. I will move the matter forward by ordering the parties to attend a mediation.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McGuire. Associate:
Dated: 4 August 2023
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