Ragless v South Australia Police (No 2) - [2016] SAEOT 4

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TRIBUNAL
(District Court Administrative and Disciplinary Division)
RAGLESS v SOUTH AUSTRALIA POLICE (No 2)
[2016] SAEOT 4
Judgment of His Honour Judge Costello, Member Ms A Bachmann and Member Mr R Altman
3 May 2016
HUMAN RIGHTS - DISCRIMINATION - GROUNDS OF DISCRIMINATION - DISABILITY OR IMPAIRMENT
Complaint issued against South Australia Police pursuant to the provisions of the Whistleblowers Act 1993 - complainant alleged that the Firearms Branch colluded with members of the South Australian Field and Game Association to victimise him by having his firearms licence removed.
HELD: Complainant has not demonstrated that the respondent committed an act of victimisation against him substantially on the ground of his disclosure of public interest information. Complaint dismissed.
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 ss 4, 5, 9; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 ss 6, 86, 93, 95, 96; Firearms Act 1977 ss 21I, 27A, 28, referred to.
King v SA Psychological Board (1998) SASC 6621, considered.

RAGLESS v SOUTH AUSTRALIA POLICE (No 2)
[2016] SAEOT 4
Introduction

This is a Complaint by Stephen Ragless against South Australia Police pursuant to the provisions of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (‘WPA’) and the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (‘EOA’).
The Complaint
On 20 November 2013 the complainant, Mr Ragless, lodged a Complaint in the Equal Opportunities Commission, which he summarised in the following terms:
I have action in place with the EOC on discrimination issues.[1]
These issues have surfaced due to my actions to exposed [sic] a dangerous incident on a Firearms Range. Individuals, the club involved and the Firearms Branch have colluded to victimize me and damage my credibility to hide these issues. Recent threatening and obscene text messages, unwarranted police action and the timing of civil action by one of the clubs officials has caused me to call for any protection the Whistleblowers Act can offer. (our emphasis)
[1] We understand this to be a reference to other Complaints which Mr Ragless had filed in the Commission against other entities and individuals.
In his Complaint Mr Ragless stated that his motivation for lodging the Complaint was ‘ongoing action to conceal corruption and collusion to avert the course of justice’.
Background to the Complaint
In September 2012 Mr Ragless was a member of the Southern Branch of the South Australian Field and Game Association (‘SAFGA’). At that time he was involved in an incident on a shooting range with a member of the Committee of its Southern Branch. He subsequently reported the incident to the President of the Southern Branch.
Mr Ragless formed the view that his concerns were not being treated seriously. He decided to stand for a position on the Southern Branch Committee and publicly announced his intention to do so.
Mr Ragless says that in an effort to thwart him, the then State Secretary of SAFGA, Darian Stringer contacted Mr Pippos at the Firearms Branch on 9 October 2012 and persuaded him to initiate action to have the complainant’s firearms licence removed.
Mr Ragless asserted that on 12 October 2012 Mr Stringer filed a Notification with South Australia Police asserting that Mr Ragless was unfit to hold a licence on mental health grounds and that when he made that assertion he knew that it was false. On 12 October 2012 South Australia Police issued a Notice of Suspension of Firearms Licence to Mr Ragless. Mr Ragless asserts that members of the Firearms Branch knew that the suspension was based on the alleged deliberately false report of Mr Stringer.
In response to the Notice of Suspension Mr Ragless made a complaint to the Firearms Branch on 15 October 2012 stating that members of the executive of the Southern Branch were conspiring against him and that the Notification was their ‘latest ploy to have my licence removed as an attempt to water down a dangerous and alarming incident’.[2]
[2] The incident referred to was the incident on the shooting range.
He again wrote to the Firearms Branch on 29 October 2012. He complained that he had heard nothing from the Firearms Branch since his initial complaint of 15 October 2012 and said:
... This issue highlights corruption at a firearms club. The committee includes the founder of the world wide franchise group Cartridge World who is using his power to influence and intimidate my supporters with the threat of legal action. The secretary of the State body is an ex policeman with friends in the firearms branch and I wonder if his influence may have some bearing on my treatment.
If you consider my safety issues should not be taken seriously because of a false statement questioning my mental stability by person prescribed by the Firearms Act you are in the wrong department. (our emphasis)
...
Mr Ragless alleged that the Firearms Branch then colluded with officials at SAFGA, including Mr Stringer, to ensure that his licence was not returned. His licence was not in fact restored to him until early 2013.
Against that background it is convenient to set out the legislative scheme pursuant to which the Complaint was instituted.
The Statutory Scheme
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993
Section 5 of the WPA relevantly provides:
5—Immunity for appropriate disclosures of public interest information
(1) A person who makes an appropriate disclosure of public interest information incurs no civil or criminal liability by doing so.
(2) A person makes an appropriate disclosure of public interest information for the purposes of this Act if, and only if—
(a)the person—
(i) believes on reasonable grounds that the information is true; or
(ii) is not in a position to form a belief on reasonable grounds about the truth of the information but believes on reasonable grounds that the information may be true and is of sufficient significance to justify its disclosure so that its truth may be investigated; and
(b)the disclosure is made to a person to whom it is, in the circumstances of the case, reasonable and appropriate to make the disclosure.
(3) A disclosure is taken to have been made to a person to whom it is, in the circumstances of the case, reasonable and appropriate to make the disclosure if it is made to an appropriate authority (but this is not intended to suggest that an appropriate authority is the only person to whom a disclosure of public interest information may be reasonably and appropriately made).
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a disclosure of public interest information is made to an appropriate authority if it is made to a Minister of the Crown or—
(a)where the information relates to an illegal activity—to a member of the police force;
(b)where the information relates to a member of the police force—to the Police Ombudsman;
(c)where the information relates to the irregular or unauthorised use of public money—to the Auditor-General;
(d)where the information relates to a public sector employee—to the Commissioner for Public Sector Employment;
(e)where the information relates to a member of the judiciary—to the Chief Justice;
(f)where the information relates to a member of Parliament—to the Presiding Officer of the House of Parliament to which the member belongs;
(g)where the information relates to a public officer (other than a member of the police force or a member of the judiciary)—to the Ombudsman;
(h)where the information relates to a matter falling within the sphere of responsibility of an instrumentality, agency, department or administrative unit of government—to a responsible officer of that instrumentality, agency, department or administrative unit;
(i)where the information relates to a matter falling within the sphere of responsibility of a local Government body—to a responsible officer of that body;
(j)where the information relates to a person or a matter of a prescribed class—to an authority declared by the regulations to be an appropriate authority in relation to such information.
(5) If a disclosure of information relating to fraud or corruption is made, the person to whom the disclosure is made must pass the information on as soon as practicable to—
(a)in the case of information implicating a member of the police force in fraud or corruption—the Police Ombudsman;
(b)in any other case—the Anti-Corruption Branch of the police force.
Section 4(1) relevantly provides:
4—Interpretation
public interest information means information that tends to show—
(a) that an adult person (whether or not a public officer), body corporate or government agency is or has been involved...—
(i)in an illegal activity; or
(ii)in an irregular and unauthorised use of public money; or
(iii)in substantial mismanagement of public resources; or
(iv)in conduct that causes a substantial risk to public health or safety, or to the environment; or
(b) that a public officer is guilty of maladministration in or in relation to the performance ... of official functions.
public officer means—
(a) a person appointed to public office by the Governor; or
(b) a member of Parliament; or
(c) a person employed in the Public Service of the State; or
(d) a member of the police force; or
(e) any other officer or employee of the Crown; or
(f) a member, officer or employee of—
(i)an agency or instrumentality of the Crown; or
(ii)a body that is subject to control or direction by a Minister, agency or instrumentality of the Crown; or
(iii)a body whose members, or a majority of whose members, are appointed by the Governor or a Minister, agency or instrumentality of the Crown; or
(g) a member of a local government body or an officer or employee of a local government body.
Section 9 relevantly provides:
9—Victimisation
(1) A person who causes detriment to another on the ground, or substantially on the ground, that the other person ... has made or intends to make an appropriate disclosure of public interest information commits an act of victimisation.
(2) An act of victimisation under this Act may be dealt with—
(a)as a tort; or
(b)as if it were an act of victimisation under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 but, if the victim commences proceedings in a court seeking a remedy in tort, he or she cannot subsequently lodge a complaint under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 and, conversely, if the victim lodges a complaint under that Act, he or she cannot subsequently commence proceedings in a court seeking a remedy in tort.
...
(4) In this section—
detriment includes—
(a)injury, damage or loss; or
(b)intimidation or harassment; or
(c)... or
(d)threats of reprisal.
Equal Opportunity Act 1984
Section 9(2) of the WPA provides than an act of victimisation under the WPA may be dealt with as if it were an act of victimisation under the EOA.
For the purposes of this application s 86 of the EOA relevantly provides:
86—Victimisation is unlawful
(1)   It is unlawful for a person to commit an act of victimisation.
(2)   For the purposes of this section, a person commits an act of victimisation against another person (the victim) if he or she treats the victim unfavourably on the ground that the victim has—
(a)brought proceedings under this Act against a person; or
(b)given evidence or information in proceedings under this Act; or
(c)made allegations that the victim or some other person has been the subject of an act that contravenes this Act; or
(d)reasonably asserted the victim's right or the right of some other person to lodge a complaint or take other proceedings under this Act; or
(e)otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act,
or on the ground that he or she knows that the victim intends to do any of those things, or suspects that the victim has done, or intends to do, any of those things.
(3)   Unfavourable treatment on the ground that a person—
(a)has made a false allegation; or
(b)has not acted in good faith,
does not constitute an act of victimisation.
Section 6 relevantly provides:
6—Interpretative provisions
(1)   For the purposes of this Act, the holder of a public or statutory office will, in carrying out official duties, be taken to be acting in the course of employment.
(2)   For the purposes of this Act, a person acts on a particular ground referred to in this Act if the person in fact acts on a number of grounds, one of which is the ground so referred to, and that ground is a substantial reason for the act.
(3)   For the purposes of this Act, a person (the discriminator) treats another unfavourably on the basis of a particular attribute or circumstance if the discriminator treats that other person less favourably than in identical or similar circumstances the discriminator treats, or would treat, a person who does not have that attribute or is not affected by that circumstance.
...
Section 93 relevantly provides:
93—Making of complaints
(1)   A complaint alleging that a person has acted in contravention of this Act may be made—
(a)   by a person aggrieved by the act;
...
(1c) A complaint—
(a)must be in writing and set out the details of the alleged contravention; and
(b)must be lodged with the Commissioner.
(2)   A complaint must be lodged—
(a)if the alleged contravention is constituted of a series of acts—within 12 months of the last of those acts;
(b)in any other case—within 12 months of the date on which the contravention is alleged to have been committed.
(2a) The Commissioner may, on application, extend the time for lodging a complaint, even if the time for lodging the complaint has expired, if the Commissioner is satisfied—
(a)that there is good reason why the complaint was not made within the stipulated time period; and
(b)that in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to do so.
...
Section 95B relevantly provides:
95B—Referral of complaints to Tribunal
If, in respect of a complaint, the Commissioner—
(a)   is of the opinion that the matter cannot be resolved by conciliation; or
(b)   has attempted to resolve the matter by conciliation but has not been successful in that attempt; or
(c)   has declined to recognise the complaint as one on which action should be taken and the complainant has, within 3 months of being notified of the Commissioner's decision, by notice in writing, required the Commissioner to refer the complaint to the Tribunal, the Commissioner must refer the matter to the Tribunal for hearing and determination.
Section 96 relevantly provides:
96—Power of Tribunal to make certain orders
(1) The Tribunal may, on determining that the respondent in proceedings under this Part has acted in contravention of this Act, make one or more of the following orders:
(a)subject to this section, an order requiring the respondent to pay compensation (of such amount as the Tribunal thinks fit) to a person for loss or damage arising from the contravention;
...
(2) The Tribunal may, at any stage of proceedings under this Part—
(a)make an interim order to prevent prejudice to a person affected by the proceedings;
(b)make an order dismissing the proceedings.
...
The Notification by Mr Stringer, which led to the suspension of Mr Ragless’ licence, was made pursuant to the Firearms Act 1977 (‘the FA’).
Section 21I of the FA relevantly provides:
21I—Obligation to report
(1)   If the controlling body of a recognised firearms club has reasonable cause to suspect in relation to a member of the club that the member is suffering from a physical or mental illness or condition, or that other circumstances exist, such that there is a threat to the member's own safety or the safety of another associated with the member's possession or use of a firearm, the club must, as soon as practicable after the suspicion is formed, make a report to the Registrar including—
(a)the name and address of the person the subject of the suspicion; and
(b)the suspected threat to safety and circumstances giving rise to the threat (including the nature of any physical or mental illness or condition contributing to the threat).
(2)   If a member of a recognised firearms club or a person employed or engaged at the grounds of a recognised firearms club has reasonable cause to suspect that a person to whom a firearms prohibition order applies has gained or attempted to gain access to the grounds of the club, the member or person must, as soon as practicable after the suspicion is formed, report the matter to a police officer.
(3)   If a commercial range operator or a person employed or engaged at the range of a commercial range operator has reasonable cause to suspect that a person to whom a firearms prohibition order applies has gained or attempted to gain access to the range of the operator, the operator or person must, as soon as practicable after the suspicion is formed, report the matter to a police officer.
(4)   A person incurs no civil or criminal liability in making a report in good faith in compliance, or purported compliance, with this section.
Section 27A of the FA relevantly provides:
27A—Obligation to report unsafe situations associated with firearms
(1)   If a medical practitioner, or other person prescribed for the purposes of this subsection, has reasonable cause to suspect in relation to a person whom he or she has seen in his or her professional capacity—
(a)that the person is suffering from a physical or mental illness or condition, or that other circumstances exist, such that there is a threat to the person's own safety or the safety of another associated with the person's possession or use of a firearm; and
(b)that the person has, or might be intending to acquire, a firearm,
the medical practitioner or other prescribed person must make a report to the Registrar under this section.[3]
(2)   If an employer has reasonable cause to suspect in relation to an employee whose work with the employer involves the possession or use of a firearm that the employee is suffering from a physical or mental illness or condition, or that other circumstances exist, such that there is a threat to the employee's own safety or the safety of another associated with the employee's possession or use of a firearm, the employer must make a report to the Registrar under this section.
(3)   A report under this section—
(a)must be made as soon as practicable after the suspicion is formed; and
(b)must include—
(i)   the name and address of the person the subject of the suspicion; and
(ii) the suspected threat to safety and circumstances giving rise to the threat (including the nature of any physical or mental illness or condition contributing to the threat).
(4)   A person incurs no civil or criminal liability in taking action in good faith in compliance, or purported compliance, with this section.
[3] The Notice of Suspension stated that the Delegate of the Registrar had received a Notification from a prescribed person pursuant to s 27A of the FA. Mr Stringer was not a prescribed person pursuant to that section. Nevertheless, we accept that as the Secretary of the SAFGA he was a person who was obliged to lodge a Notification if he genuinely believed circumstances existed whereby a firearms licence holder was suffering from a mental illness which may make him a threat to the safety of himself or others. In our view, the incorrect reference to s 27A did not invalidate the Notice of Suspension. Also see ss 20(5) and 21I of the FA.

Section 28 of the FA relevantly provides:
28—False information
(1) A person who provides information to the Registrar or any other person under this Act that is false or misleading in a material particular is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty: $10 000 or imprisonment for two years.
(2) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that the defendant believed upon reasonable grounds that the information was true.
The Hearing
In view of the fact that Mr Ragless was representing himself, Mr White, counsel for the respondent, volunteered to present the respondent’s case first.
He called the following witnesses:
Evangelos Pippos
He is a now retired police officer but in 2012 he was the Operations Senior Sergeant at the Firearms Branch. He had little actual recall of the events surrounding Mr Ragless and was, to a significant extent, reliant on documents recovered from police files.
He noted the contents of an email from Mr Stringer dated 9 October 2012 in which Mr Stringer, in his capacity as State Secretary of SAFGA, raised concerns regarding the mental health of one of SAFGA’s members and queried whether his firearms could be removed pending a medical assessment.
Mr Pippos said that although he did not now recall receiving such an email, in the normal course he would have advised Mr Stringer to lodge a formal Notification pursuant to the FA raising his concerns.
Mr Pippos said that he was unaware at that time of any allegation by Mr Ragless that Mr Stringer had lodged a false Notification but said that if there had been any evidence to support such an allegation, it would have been investigated.
He went on to say that if the Firearms Branch receives an apparently genuine Notification of concerns as to a firearms licence holder’s fitness to hold a licence, the Branch would, in the normal course, take action to suspend that person’s licence pending a medical assessment.
He said that on its face the Notification appeared to be genuine and that he understood the Notification from Mr Stringer to have been treated as being genuine.
In the circumstances, he said that the Registrar of Firearms subsequently suspended his licence and required Mr Ragless to supply medical evidence to indicate that he was considered fit to hold a licence.
In cross-examination he said that apart from his dealings with Mr Stringer, in his capacity as an official of a gun club, he had had no dealings with him. He said he was not a good friend of Mr Stringer.
He also noted that the Suspension Notice made reference to some of the same grounds for concern, regarding the complainant’s fitness to hold a firearms licence, that were identified by Mr Stringer in his Notification.
We accept Mr Pippos as a truthful and reliable witness.
Ms Mays
Ms Mays is a Senior Adjudicator with the Firearms Branch whose role it is to deal with Notifications and other issues generally arising with respect to the suitability of individual members to hold a firearms licence under the FA. She occupied that role in 2012 and 2013.
She understood that Mr Ragless is asserting that Mr Stringer had made a deliberately false Notification. She said that there was nothing which would have alerted her that the Notification was deliberately false and, as such, an offence against the FA. If she had entertained any such suspicion (which she did not), she would have referred the Notification to senior officers in the Branch.
She said that she also saw a report from a psychiatrist, Dr Minkiewicz, dated 5 November 2012. In that report Dr Minkiewicz recommended that Mr Ragless’ licence remain suspended for the immediate future. Ms Mays said that she saw nothing in that report to alert her that Mr Stringer’s report was false.
She understood that one of the concerns expressed by Mr Ragless was that he was not able to speak to anyone at the Firearms Branch for some weeks after the suspension of his licence.
She offered a possible explanation as to why Mr Ragless was not offered an interview by police. She said that in cases such as this, the Branch preferred to have things put in writing in the interests of overall transparency and in the event that a matter subsequently went to an appeal.
We accept Ms Mays as a truthful and reliable witness.
Constable Stuart Anderson
Between 2008-2012 he was a member of the Firearms Legislative Advisory group. Mr Stringer was a member of that group and it was only in that capacity that Constable Anderson knew him. He was not a personal friend of Mr Stringer.
Late in 2012 Mr Stringer contacted him concerning Mr Ragless. He said that he was concerned about his mental condition and sought some guidance as to SAFGA’s obligations with respect to making a Notification.
Constable Anderson reviewed the website of Mr Ragless and agreed that Mr Stringer may have some cause to make a Notification. He described the material on his website as ‘fixated’ and ‘ranting’. He was never aware of any information to suggest that Mr Stringer’s Notification may have been false.
In cross-examination he said that the priority in issues surrounding the lodgement of Notifications and in turn, suspension of licences, was public safety and that the usual response of the police was to act first (to remove a licence) and investigate later.
He said that, as far as he was concerned, he would have been happy to talk to a licence holder whose licence had been suspended if he felt that he could help that person.
He also said that the Branch did get suspicious Notifications occasionally and that in such cases the Notification was referred to senior officers for consideration. There was, in his view, no occasion to do so in the case of the Notification concerning Mr Ragless.
We accept that Constable Anderson was an honest and reliable witness.
Sergeant Riach
In 2012 he was an Operations Sergeant in the Firearms Branch. In October 2012 Mr Ragless telephoned him in relation to an incident on the shooting range of his gun club. He asked Mr Ragless to put something in writing and in response he received an email from him dated 29 October 2012.
In that email Mr Ragless said that allegations regarding his mental state were false. In view of the fact that the email did not directly name Mr Stringer, he did not interpret it to be a reflection on Mr Stringer personally, but rather was more of a complaint about members of the executive of his local club.
He agreed that the email did identify concerns that Mr Ragless had about an incident on his shooting range. As a result Sergeant Riach said that an investigation was carried out into the incident in the course of which police officers inspected the range facility.
He said that Mr Stringer had telephoned him in relation to his concerns about Mr Ragless’ behaviour and that he, in turn, had given him ‘fairly general advice’ about his obligations under the Act.
He said that after receiving the email from Mr Ragless he passed it onto Mr Pippos who was handling the matter generally.
In cross-examination he denied having a discussion with Mr Ragless about fellow members making false reports about his mental health.
We accept that Sergeant Riach was an honest and reliable witness.
The Complainant’s Case
Mr Ragless
Mr Ragless gave evidence. He tendered two statements[4], together with a series of exhibits which formed the basis of his evidence-in-chief.
[4] Exhibits C3 and C4.
In cross-examination he acknowledged that in June 2008 he had been admitted to the Noarlunga Hospital with what he described as a psychotic depression.[5] He said that after his discharge from hospital he was treated by a psychiatrist who prescribed anti depressive medication which he took for the next three-and-a-half years. He finally ceased taking his medication in around May 2012.
[5] After his admission to hospital Mr Ragless volunteered to hand over his firearms and his firearms licence was suspended.
He agreed that the following statements in Mr Stringer’s Notification were accurate, namely that Mr Ragless:
·       had been under medical care and ceased his medication
·       had previously surrendered his firearms licence
·       had reported his previous mental illness in a National Magazine.
He agreed that a number of the statements in a second Notification by his then Club President, Mr Dawes, were also correct.
He agreed that if these Notifications were accepted, at face value, by assessing officers of the Firearms Branch, there was nothing in them which would suggest the Notifications were false.[6]
[6] T129.
He agreed that based upon the information in the Notifications, it was quite appropriate for the Firearms Branch to take the action it did to suspend his firearms licence.[7]
[7] T130.
He said that he was ‘quite comfortable with them taking my guns away’ because he believed that someone from ‘the Firearms Branch and the police would sort this issue out but they didn’t’.[8]
[8] T130.
He also agreed that on 12 October 2012 (in the Notice of Suspension) he was given an opportunity to provide a response to the suspension. He said that he ‘did provide a response and they [the police] ignored it’.[9]
[9] T131.
He said that on many occasions he asked the Firearms Branch to listen to his story but that they didn’t.[10]
[10] T131.
He agreed that on 14 November 2012 he emailed Mr Pippos saying that he had been ignored for the past eight weeks but that he would ‘be in the Angas Street Police Station at 1 pm with someone else you can try to ignore’.[11]
[11] T134. He said that he used this language because he intended to get some attention from the Firearms Branch.
He agreed that on that day he had had an interview with two officers from the Firearms Branch which lasted 50 minutes. He agreed that, at the time of the interview, the police were in possession of Dr Minkiewicz’s report and that there was again nothing in her report which should have suggested to police that Mr Stringer had told lies in his Notification.[12]
[12] T137-138.
Finally, he agreed that, in the interview, he had been given an opportunity to discuss his concerns about what was happening in relation to his firearms licence.
In re-examination he described the Minkiewicz report as both accurate and fair, including her recommendation that his licence continue to remain suspended.[13]
[13] T138.
Mr Ragless also tendered a bundle of medical reports including a report from Dr Minkiewicz dated 22 January 2013, wherein she recommended to the Delegate of the Registrar of Firearms that Mr Ragless have his licence restored.[14]
[14] We understand that this licence was reinstated in February 2013, following a report from Constable Holland, Firearms Investigator to Ms Mays.
We accept that Mr Ragless was an honest witness and that he truly believed that a deliberately false report had been lodged by Mr Stringer. We accept that he also truly believed that the police knew the report to be false and colluded with Mr Stringer in the removal of his licence.
Regardless of the genuineness of his beliefs, one of the issues which we must determine is whether he has provided evidence to demonstrate that the police knowingly colluded in this way.
Mr Carter
Mr Carter was a friend of Mr Ragless whose firearms licence was suspended in late 2014 following a report from the then secretary (not Mr Stringer) of the SAFGA.
In our view, this evidence was not relevant to the issues we were asked to determine and we declined to receive oral evidence from Mr Carter.
Mr Clive Ragless
He is one of the complainant’s brothers. He told the Tribunal about the impact that the events surrounding his licence suspension had had on Mr Ragless. We accept that Mr Clive Ragless was both honest and reliable in giving his evidence.
Discussion
As we said at the outset, Mr Ragless asserted that his firearms licence had been suspended by the Registrar of Firearms after a Notification by Mr Stringer.
Mr Ragless asserts that subsequent to the suspension of his licence, on 15 October 2012, he informed the police that the Notification, using as it did his mental health as a basis for the suspension, was simply a ploy to, in effect, silence him.
He further asserted that in an email on 29 October 2012 he informed police that there was ‘corruption at a firearms club’ and that Mr Stringer was an ex policeman with friends in the Firearms Branch and ‘wondered’ whether his influence was having some bearing on his treatment.
He went on to say in that email that if officers in the Firearms Branch thought his assertions that safety issues shouldn’t be taken seriously because of his mental illness, they were ‘in the wrong department’.
In his Complaint Mr Ragless sought to invoke the provisions of the WPA.
In our view, in order for Mr Ragless to succeed in a Complaint involving the WPA he needs to demonstrate that:
·       he has made a disclosure of public interest information;
·       his disclosure of such information was an appropriate disclosure;
·       the respondent committed an act of victimisation against him in that it caused him detriment;
·       the detriment was caused to him on the ground or substantially on the ground that he has made an appropriate disclosure of public interest information.
Public Interest Information
Public Interest Information, for the purposes of s 4 of the WPA, includes illegal activity. Mr Ragless has asserted that Mr Stringer made a knowingly false statement to the police.
Section 28 of the FA makes it an offence to make a false Notification and, as such, we accept that a disclosure that someone had made a deliberately false Notification is capable of constituting public interest information. The next question is whether it amounts to an appropriate disclosure of such information.
Appropriate Disclosure
There will be an appropriate disclosure of such information if a person, in the position of Mr Ragless, either:
· believes on reasonable grounds that the information is true; or
· believes on reasonable grounds that the information may have been true and is of sufficient significance to justify its disclosure.
We have no doubt that Mr Ragless believes that Mr Stringer made a deliberately false report. We are not persuaded that there were reasonable grounds for Mr Ragless to entertain such a belief. Mr Ragless may have doubted the accuracy of the Notification, but there was no reasonable basis, in our view, for him to harbour a belief that it was true that Mr Stringer had made a deliberately false Notification.
The next question is whether he believed on reasonable grounds that it may have been true.
Mr Ragless says that the evidence, for his belief on reasonable grounds that it may have been true, is to be found in the following:
·       The fact that Mr Stringer had tried to contact officers in the Firearms Branch before 9 October 2012 and said so in his email to Mr Pippos of 9 October 2012;
·       The fact that he, Mr Ragless, had heard (from a Mr Pash, a fellow gun club member) that Mr Stringer was going to take his licence away before it happened;
·       An email of 12 October 2012, which he sent to Mr Stringer where he, Mr Ragless, tells Mr Stringer that moves are afoot to have him assessed ‘for his sanity’;
·       The fact that the police agreed that at the time his firearms were actually removed he was upset but compliant, which meant that he had no instability issues;
·       Mr Stringer’s email of 9 October 2012 to Mr Pippos raising concerns about his mental instability;
·       The fact that the Notification was made by Mr Stringer without medical evidence;
·       A psychological report prepared on 7 November 2012, which contained allegations about Mr Ragless, the contents of which were altered in a latter version;
·       The absence of the original Notification from Mr Stringer in the police files; and
·       The fact that Mr Ragless was not asked to discuss the suspension with anybody until his interview with police on 14 November 2012.
In our view, these pieces of information, neither individually nor collectively, are sufficient to lead Mr Ragless to believe on reasonable grounds that the information may have been true. It is therefore strictly speaking unnecessary to consider whether the information was of sufficient significance to justify it disclosure. If we had reached a different conclusion on this issue, we would regard the information as being of sufficient significance. However, in the event that we are wrong on this issue, we propose to consider the other requirements which Mr Ragless needs to demonstrate.
The next issue is whether the respondent caused him detriment.
Detriment
The question of what constitutes a detriment for the purposes of the WPA was considered by Bleby J in King v SA Psychological Board[15] where his Honour said:[16]
It is not necessary in these proceedings to determine the full extent of the definition of ‘detriment’ contained in s 9(4) of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993. I am prepared to assume, for present purposes, that it is wide enough to cover loss of reputation and some forms of stress disorder, although I doubt whether it covers discrimination at large, given the limitation contained in paragraph (c) of the definition requiring, in the case of discrimination, relationship to a person’s employment. I am also prepared to assume the allegations in the Notice of Complaint and Further Particulars of Victimisation and Detriment are wide enough to include allegations of some form of stress disorder and loss of reputation. However, I should not be taken as conceding that the definition of ‘detriment’ is sufficiently wide to cover the appellant’s allegations. If, for example, the evidence were to show that he merely had some grievance that the respondent had not performed its statutory duty, I doubt whether the appellant could be shown to have suffered ‘injury, damage or loss’, being the normal meaning of the word ‘detriment’ or whether he could be shown to have suffered detriment in the extended meanings contained in the other paragraphs of the definition. However, for present purposes I must assume the most favourable case possible from the appellant’s point of view, and I therefore assume that he has suffered a detriment.
[15] (1998) SASC 6621.
[16] Ibid at p 6.
Mr Ragless spoke of his humiliation, hurt feelings and distress. We accept that such outcomes can constitute detriment for the purposes of the Act.
The final question which arises is whether Mr Ragless has demonstrated that the respondent has caused him detriment on the ground or substantially on the ground of his disclosure.
As to this issue Bleby J in King said:[17]
The appellant must then allege that that detriment was caused by the respondent and on the ground, or substantially on the ground, that he made the disclosure. In my opinion, that means that the respondent must have caused the detriment by virtue, or substantially by virtue, of the fact of the disclosure in itself. In other words, it must be shown that because the appellant made a disclosure of public interest information to the Board, the Board caused him some detriment. In effect, it must be some form of reprisal for the fact of making the disclosure.
[17] Ibid at pp 6-7.
In the present proceedings the respondent, after receiving an initial email from Mr Ragless on 15 October 2012, did not respond.
The actions of the respondent and its failure to respond need to be viewed against the background of the fact that it had given him a Notice of Suspension, which called for a psychiatric report. The respondent’s failure to respond is perfectly explicable in that light. There is no evidence to suggest that it determined not to contact him as some form of reprisal for him disclosing a possible offence or corrupt practice by the members of the committee of his club, let alone colluded to cover up a possible offence or to corruptly silence him.
Thereafter on 29 October 2012 Mr Ragless forwarded a second email to the police. In that email he reiterated his concerns about false reporting and/or corruption. Some fortnight or so later (albeit after a threatening email which was designed to get attention according to Mr Ragless’ evidence) he was given the opportunity to have a long interview with police, during which he also accepted he was given an opportunity to tell his story.

There is, in our view, again no evidence to support his assertion that he has been victimised for his disclosure. On the contrary, within two weeks of his second email he was given an opportunity to put his version of events.
During this interview police discussed with him the report of Dr Minkiewicz, which he agreed did not contradict Mr Stringer’s Notification. The police also told him that they were planning to inspect the shooting range and check for safety issues, which they subsequently did.
In summary, armed with a psychiatric report which vindicated the ‘Stringer Notification’ and having agreed to carry out an inspection of the range, we are of the view that, there was little else that the respondent should have done. There was absolutely no evidence pointing towards an offence by Mr Stringer or corruption at his club let alone corruption by members of the Firearms Branch. Far from victimising Mr Ragless, in our view, the respondent actually carried out its job while responding (perhaps somewhat belatedly) to his concerns.
There is no evidence of ‘reprisal’ by the respondent in the sense adverted to by Bleby J in King.
In summary, in the face of an apparently valid Notification, the police acted appropriately to remove his firearms. Thereafter, they received a psychiatric report which supported a continuation of the suspension. Then, in response to some intentionally provocative behaviour on his part, police interviewed him for nearly an hour.
Finally, police officers inspected the range where the incident took place. It is difficult to understand what more was to be expected of the respondent in the circumstances.
In our view, the response of the respondent was appropriate even if, as we have said, a little belated.
There is no evidence to support the complainant’s assertion that the respondent failed to act on his Complaint because of his assertions that Mr Stringer falsified the Notification, or that in some way the Firearms Branch were colluding in unlawfully removing his firearms.
Conclusion
The respondent did not commit an act of victimisation against the complainant substantially on the ground of that disclosure of public interest information.
The Complaint is therefore dismissed.