Reported Decision:
4 DCLR (NSW) 227
District Court
CITATION: Ragen v The Nominal Defendant (No 2) [2007] NSWDC 85
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.HEARING DATE(S): 2 March 2007
JUDGMENT DATE:
21 March 2007JURISDICTION: Civil Jurisdiction JUDGMENT OF: Johnstone DCJ at 1 DECISION: Application refused CATCHWORDS: TORT (MOTOR ACCIDENT) - Threshold for damages for non-economic loss - Application at conclusion of trial for referral back to MAS for re-assessment of degree of permanent impairment - STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - Construction of Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 LEGISLATION CITED: Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999: s 58, 60, s 61, s 62, s 131 and s 132
Civil Procedure Act 2005: s 56CASES CITED: Humphreys v Mulco Tool & Engineering Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 355 at [134]
Mafra v Egan (No 1) [2006] NSWDC 22
Muljeskovic v Zrieka (Unreported, NSWDC 15.12.06, Judicial Registrar McDonald in 1799/05)
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at [22]
Schenck Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Coal Technology Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 211 at [43]
Towell v Schuetrumpe [2006] NSWDC 159PARTIES: David Harry Ragen (Plaintiff)
The Nominal Defendant (Defendant)FILE NUMBER(S): 2746/03 COUNSEL: Mr Lidden SC with Mr Khandhar for the plaintiff
Mr Elkaim SC for the defendantSOLICITORS: Brydens Law Office (Plaintiff)
Holman Webb (Defendant)
JUDGMENT
Introduction
1. Mr Ragen was injured in a motor accident when he was driving along the M4 Motorway on 2 March 2000. He says the accident was caused by the fault of the driver of a motor vehicle the identity of which could not be established, after due enquiry and search, and brought this action for the recovery of damages against the Nominal Defendant: s 34(1) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (the MAC Act 1999). The Nominal Defendant denied liability.
2. Mr Ragen alleged that as a result of the accident he sustained significant orthopaedic injuries and a severe secondary psychological condition.
3. His claim came to trial without Mr Ragen having established that the degree of permanent impairment he suffered as a result of the injuries caused by the motor accident was greater than 10%: s 131 of the MAC Act 1999.
4. In respect of psychiatric impairment a medical assessor, Dr J Parmegiani, had made an assessment under s 132(1) of the MAC Act 1999. He issued a Permanent Impairment Certificate on 9 November 2004 certifying the permanent impairment at less than 10%, namely 5%.
5. In respect of orthopaedic impairment a medical assessor, Dr S Perla had made an assessment under s 132(1) of the MAC Act 1999. He issued a Permanent Impairment Certificate on 11 October 2004 certifying the permanent impairment at less than 10%, namely 7%. On 15 September 2005 Judge Sorby set Dr Perla’s Certificate aside, under s 61(4) of the MAC Act 1999. Judge Sorby was asked, under s 61(6), to substitute a determination of the court as…
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- Case
- [2007] NSWDC 85
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with interpreting the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 to determine if the applicant's application for reassessment was valid. The applicant argued that there had been a material change in the circumstances since the original assessment, warranting a referral back to the MAS. The respondent contended that there had been no such change and that the applicant's application was an attempt to circumvent the statutory framework. The court needed to balance the statutory provisions against the applicant's circumstances to decide if a referral was warranted.
In delivering its judgment, the court considered the statutory provisions and the circumstances of the case. It concluded that there had not been a material change in the circumstances since the original assessment, and therefore, the applicant was not entitled to a referral back to the MAS for reassessment of the degree of permanent impairment. The court found that the applicant's application was an attempt to circumvent the statutory framework and was not in line with the intent of the legislation. Consequently, the application for referral was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application refused
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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