Rachel Rayson and Repatriation Commission
[2012] AATA 776
•7 November 2012
[2012] AATA 776
Division Veterans' Appeals Division File Number
2011/2482
Re
Rachel Rayson
APPLICANT
And
Repatriation Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Mr Egon Fice, Senior Member
Dr Roslyn Blakley, MemberDate 7 November 2012 Place Melbourne The Tribunal affirms the decision of the Veterans’ Review Board made on
14 October 2010.
.......[sgd Egon Fice].................................................................
Mr Egon Fice, Senior Member
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – Widows’ pension – Royal Australian Navy – Eligible war service – Operational service – kind of death of a veteran – reasonable hypothesis – was the death of the veteran war-caused – cerebrovascular accident – hypertension – depression – cerebral haemorrhage – cerebral ischaemia – smoking
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 7, 8, 13, 120, 120A, 196B
Collins v Repatriation Commission (2009) 258 ALR 200
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
Repatriation Commission v Hancock (2003) 37 AAR 383
Repatriation Commission v Hill (2002) 69 ALD 581
Repatriation Commission v Law (1980) 31 ALR 140
Repatriation Commission v Law (1981) 147 CLR 635
Re Rayson and Repatriation Commission (2011) 55 AAR 1
Statement of Principles concerning Cerebrovascular Accident No. 51 of 2006
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mr Egon Fice, Senior Member
Dr Roslyn Blakley, Member
7 November 2012
Mr Stanley Keith Rayson joined the Royal Australian Navy on 14 May 1951. His first period of service concluded on 13 May 1957. He had a second period of service between 10 June 1959 and 8 June 1965. During his time in the Navy Mr Rayson had a number of periods of operational service including:
·3 June 1953 – 12 February 1954 – Korea
·23 June 1960 – 8 July 1960 – Malaya
·15 July 1960 – 31 July 1960 – Malaya
·24 March 1961 – 17 April 1961 – Malaya and Singapore
·22 April 1961 – 14 May 1961 – Malaya and Singapore
·24 June 1961 – 6 July 1961 – Malaya and Singapore
Mr Rayson died on 29 June 2009. He was 77 years of age. The cause of death stated on his Death Certificate was cerebral haemorrhage – 5 hours.
Mrs Rayson lodged a claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) for a pension by a widow of a deceased veteran on 31 August 2009. In her claim, Mrs Rayson said she believed her husband's death resulted from the stress of service in Korean waters and the smoking habit which he took up during military service.
On 4 January 2010 the Repatriation Commission notified Mrs Rayson that her husband's death was not related to his service and that the war widows' pension was not payable to her. On 8 February 2010 Mrs Rayson lodged with the Repatriation Commission an application for review of that decision by the Veterans’ Review Board (VRB). On 14 October 2010 the VRB affirmed the decision of the Repatriation Commission. Mrs Rayson lodged an appeal to the Tribunal on 23 June 2011 seeking a review of the VRB decision.
The substantive issues which we are required to determine are:
(a)whether the medical cause of Mr Rayson's death (kind of death) was as stated in his death certificate;
(b)having regard to the medical evidence before us, whether the material points to a reasonable hypothesis of connection between Mr Rayson's operational service and his medical cause of death; and
(c)if the material before us raises a reasonable hypothesis, whether the cause of her husband's death is consistent with the reasonable hypothesis.
KIND OF DEATH
Where the death of a veteran is war-caused, the Commonwealth is, subject to the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (VE Act), liable to pay a pension by way of compensation to the dependents of the veteran in accordance with s 13 of the VE Act. In order to be eligible to receive the pension, the evidence in this proceeding must establish that her husband's death was war-caused.
Section 8 of the VE Act provides that, for the purposes of the Act, the death of a veteran is taken to have been war-caused if, among other things, the death arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran. The meaning of the expression eligible war service is set out in s 7(1) of the VE Act. A person who has rendered operational service is taken to have rendered eligible war service while the person was rendering operational service.
Before proceeding with an enquiry into the claimed connection between Mr Rayson's death and his operational service, we must first determine the cause of death or, as it is referred to in the VE Act, the kind of death met by Mr Rayson. As Selway J said in Repatriation Commission v Hancock (2003) 37 AAR 383 at 385 – 386:
… But in cases such as at present, the identification of the "kind of death" is a critical step in the analysis. In determining the "kind of death", proof is on the balance of probabilities: see section 120(4) of the Act and see Fogerty v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCAFC 136 at [34]; Benjamin v Repatriation Commission (2001) 34 AAR 270 at 282 – 283 [53] – [54].
The Full Court of the Federal Court (Mansfield, Stone and Edmonds JJ) in Collins v Repatriation Commission (2009) 258 ALR 200 dealt comprehensively with how the expression kind of death should be interpreted. It said, at 211:
Sections 8 and 13 [VE Act] look to the "death" of the veteran, but do not use the term "kind of death". Similarly, s 120 refers to the relationship of a veteran's death with the operational service of the veteran. It also does not use the term "kind of death". The term "kind of death" is introduced by ss 120A(2) and (4) and 196B(2) in the expression "particular kind of injury, disease or death". That expression refers to the circumstances in which a Statement of Principles may be determined and then applied to decide whether an hypothesis connecting an injury or disease or death is reasonable as assessed under s 120(1) and (3) as informed by s 120A(3).
The proper construction of those different terms was not a matter of debate on the appeal. It was common ground that, where the word "death" appears in ss 8 and 13 it means the medical cause of the death.
As the Full Court said, the question regarding the nature of the death of a veteran is anterior to and distinct from the question of the relationship of the death to the service of the veteran and the extent of entitlements to the benefits under the VE Act in respect of that death. As to determination of the first question, the Full Court said, at 212:
In our view, the word "death" used in s 8, and in the phrase "injury, disease or death" in s 13 has the same meaning, that is the nature of the condition which causes the death. To be more precise, it is the medical cause or causes of the death.
The fact that there may be more than one medical cause for a veteran's incapacity or death was recognised by the Full Court of the Federal Court (Bowen CJ, Brennan and Lockhart JJ) in Repatriation Commission v Law (1980) 31 ALR 140. This decision was upheld on appeal to the High Court (see Repatriation Commission v Law (1981) 147 CLR 635). The Full Court said, at 151:
It seems clear that the expression "attributable to" in each case involves an element of causation. The cause need not be the sole or dominant cause: it is sufficient to show "atributability" if the cause is one of a number of causes provided it is a contributing cause.
Following close examination of the sections dealing with death and the kind of death, their Honours in Collins said it is clear that this section asks a causative question. They then said, at 220:
Those provisions support the conclusions that the inquiry about the death or the kind of death for the purposes of the VE Act is, in essence, a question of fact about the medical cause or causes of the death. It does not support the proposition on behalf of Mrs Collins that there is a legislative intention that any medical condition which hastens the time of death of a veteran by a measurable period, even a short one, where in medical terms another medical condition is clearly the medical condition which accounts for the pathological changes leading to death, is itself a medical cause of death.
The standard of proof which we are required to apply in determining the kind of death met by Mr Rayson is that set out in s 120(4) of the VE Act. It provides that, except in making a determination to which s 120(1) or (2) applies, the Commission, and this Tribunal standing in its shoes, in making any determination or decision in respect of a matter arising under the Act, must decide the matter to its reasonable satisfaction. As Selway J said in Hancock at 386:
…
(b) Next, the AAT was required to determine on the balance of probabilities what "kind of death" Mr Hancock had suffered. This involved the identification, on balance of probabilities, of any and all statement of principles and/or determinations under s 180A(2) of the Act and any other "kinds of death" which were applicable to the death.
As we have stated above, Mr Rayson's Death Certificate records the cause of his death as cerebral haemorrhage. We had in evidence the Emergency Department Record from the Bendigo Hospital where Mr Rayson was admitted on the evening of 29 June 2009. Associate Professor Peter Hand, a stroke specialist and neurologist, provided a written report dated 17 January 2012 which was admitted into evidence. Prof Hand summarised the Emergency Department notes as follows:
When he arrived in the Emergency Department, he had gaze deviation to the left and profound right-sided weakness. He required immediate intubation. An emergency CT brain scan showed what is reported to be a large intracerebral haematoma in the left hemisphere measuring 19 x 5 x 12 mm with significant midline shift and an effaced left lateral ventricle and closed basal cisterns.…
In view of the large intracerebral haemorrhage and poor clinical state, more aggressive treatment was not considered to be possible, and the patient rapidly deteriorated and died at 9.50 p.m. the same day.
Prof Hand said that Mr Rayson died as a result of an intracerebral haemorrhage. He said contributing factors were hypertension, warfarin therapy and coexisting aspirin therapy. Mr Rayson had significant coronary artery disease as a result of coronary artery atherosclerosis which had required stenting. He needed to be on an anti-platelet agent as well as therapies to manage his vascular risk factors. Prof Hand said the requirement for aspirin and warfarin was a significant factor in his cerebral haemorrhage.
Prof Hand also referred to Mr Rayson's past medical history which he took from the letter of Dr Robert Campagnaro, a respiratory and general physician, dated 14 November 2005.
Dr Campagnaro said that Mr Rayson had an aortic valve replacement in 1998 with a metal valve inserted. He reported Mr Rayson's cardiac risk factors as those of non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, raised cholesterol and hypertension. Dr Campagnaro also recorded that Mr Rayson told him he experienced falls every three – four months. He said Mr Rayson claimed to trip if he walked too fast and if he was hurrying, but if he took his time, there were no major problems. He used a walking stick to aid his stability. He admitted being quite unsteady for some time and this probably dated back to his episode of likely stroke in his peri-operative aortic valve period. Mr Rayson claimed to have had a slight stroke when he had his cardiac surgery. Dr Campagnaro said that there was no mention of this in past reports but he noted the CT scan he provided suggested an internal capsular stoke on the left-hand side. Dr Campagnaro concluded that Mr Rayson probably had an old stroke and there was evidence of peripheral neuropathy that may well be affecting proprioception when he was walking.
Prof Hand concluded that on the balance of probabilities, it was most likely that Mr Rayson had cerebral ischaemia. He said the symptoms of progressive deterioration in balance and frequent falls were likely secondary to progressive small vessel ischaemic change that was seen on the CT scan. He said that precipitating factors for progressive small vessel ischaemic change include diabetes, hypertension, hypercholesterolaemia and previous cigarette smoking.
Although Prof Hand believed that Mr Rayson had cerebral ischaemia, Dr Campagnaro did not make any such diagnosis. Furthermore, there was no evidence before us that Mr Rayson was treated for cerebral ischaemia.
In concluding, Prof Hand said he believed the most likely reason for Mr Rayson developing intracerebral haemorrhage which resulted in his death was that he had long-standing hypertension. He explained that this led to significant weakness in the blood vessel walls. He said haemorrhages can be provoked by anti-coagulant therapy, and Mr Rayson was taking warfarin at the time of his death. He said it was possible that the combination of aspirin and warfarin led to intracerebral bleeding. He said Mr Rayson needed to be on aspirin for the treatment of this ischaemic heart disease and prior coronary stents. It was also appropriate that he be treated with aspirin and blood pressure lowering therapy for his cerebral ischaemia. Prof Hand opined that Mr Rayson's medications significantly contributed to his eventual death.
In the course of his cross-examination Prof Hand was asked whether he considered cerebral ischaemia to be another cause or contributory cause of his death. Prof Hand said that it was difficult to reach this conclusion although he was of the opinion that it may have led to or predisposed Mr Rayson to a cerebral haemorrhage. He explained that cerebral ischaemia rendered the small vessels weak. This weakness increased the risk of the vessel becoming occluded. Occlusion of the vessel could lead to an ischaemic stroke or rupture of the vessel leading to a cerebral haemorrhage. Prof Hand stated that strokes were 80% ischaemic resulting from a blockage and 20% haemorrhagic resulting from vascular rupture. Nevertheless, Prof Hand was of the view that the primary cause of Mr Rayson's stroke was cerebral haemorrhage in association with long-standing hypertension that was made worse by aspirin and warfarin.
On the balance of probabilities, we find Mr Rayson died from a cerebral haemorrhage. That was the medical cause of his death. Although it is possible that Mr Rayson also had cerebral ischaemia, the evidence does not permit us to find that it was a cause or a contributing cause of his death. We find that the most likely contributing cause of Mr Rayson's death was his hypertension. As Prof Hand said, that is the most common cause of intracerebral haemorrhage. Although Prof Hand also concluded that warfarin therapy and aspirin therapy were contributing factors, the medical documents in evidence disclose Mr Rayson ceased being prescribed aspirin (Astrix) on 31 October 2007. We accept that warfarin therapy may have been a contributing cause. We do not find that either warfarin therapy or aspirin therapy was prescribed to mitigate the effects of cerebral ischaemia. That is because he was never diagnosed with that condition. Those drugs were prescribed following his aortic valve replacement and coronary stent.
WAS MR RAYSON'S DEATH WAR-CAUSED
Section 120 of the VE Act sets out the standard of proof by which claims for the pension must be assessed. Section 120(1) sets out the standard of proof to be applied where the veteran has rendered operational service. That section provides:
(1)Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of the veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-cause disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
The following subsections deal with the basis upon which no sufficient ground for making a determination can be found. They are as follows:
(3) In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of the person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a)that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;
(b)that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or
(c)that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A
…
(5) Nothing in the provisions of this section, or in any other provision of this Act, shall entitle the Commission to presume that:
…
(c) the death of a person is war-caused or defence-caused; or…
(6) Nothing in the provisions of this section, or in any other provision of this Act, shall be taken to impose on:
(a)a claimant or applicant for a pension or increased pension, or for an allowance or other benefit, under this Act; or
(b)the Commonwealth, the Department or any other person in relation to such a claim or application;
any onus of proving any matter that is, or might be, relevant to the determination of the claim or application.
Section 120A deals with the reasonableness of a hypothesis which is required to be assessed by reference to a Statement of Principles (SoP). Section 120A(2) and (3) provide:
(2)If the Repatriation Medical Authority has given notice under section 196G that it intends to carry out an investigation in respect of a particular kind of injury, disease or death, the Commission is not to determine a claim in respect of the incapacity of the person from an injury or disease of that kind, or in respect of the death of that kind, unless or until the Authority:
(a)has determined a Statement of Principles under subsection 196B(2) in respect of that kind of injury, disease or death; or
(b)has declared that it does not propose to make such a Statement of Principles.
(3)For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a)a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or
(b)a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A;
that upholds the hypothesis.
Hypothesis
Our first task is to determine whether the causal hypothesis advanced on behalf of Mrs Rayson is reasonable. A hypothesis of course is a proposition or principle put forward or stated merely as a basis for reasoning or argument or as a premise from which to draw a conclusion.
Mr D De Marchi, who appeared on behalf of Mrs Rayson, put forward the following hypotheses to support her claim:
(a)Mr Rayson's death was caused, in part, by the fact that he took medications prescribed to mitigate the effects of cerebral ischaemia, namely warfarin and aspirin;
(b)Mr Rayson began smoking during his service with the Australian Navy, smoking approximately 90 pack years of cigarettes over a period of 14 – 15 years which caused him to suffer from cerebral ischaemia; and
(c)Mr Rayson's cerebrovascular accident (intracerebral haemorrhage) was caused by the ingestion of aspirin and warfarin prescribed for his aortic stenosis and ischaemic heart disease.
The obvious problem with the first two of Mr De Marchi's hypotheses is that there is no material which links Mr Rayson's cerebral ischaemia, assuming he had the disease, with his cerebral haemorrhage. There was no evidence before us which pointed to the fact that cerebral ischaemia contributed, in any way, to his haemorrhage and consequent death. Furthermore, because Mr Rayson was never diagnosed with cerebral ischaemia, it cannot be said that the aspirin and warfarin which he took following the surgery to replace an aortic valve and the subsequent stenting was prescribed to mitigate the effects of cerebral ischaemia. Quite plainly, the material before us does not point to cerebral ischaemia as being connected with Mr Rayson's death even if it could be reasonably said that he suffered from this disease. Therefore, we find that the material before us does not point to the first two hypotheses put forward on behalf of Mrs Rayson.
There is evidence in the material before us which does point to Mr Rayson's death being contributed to by his taking of aspirin and warfarin as a result of his earlier surgery. Prof Hand's evidence was that while Mr Rayson died as a result of an intracerebral haemorrhage, contributing factors were hypertension, warfarin therapy and coexisting aspirin therapy.
The SoP
The Repatriation Medical Authority has determined a SoP concerning cerebrovascular accident. For the purposes of that SoP, cerebrovascular accident is defined as cerebral ischaemia or intracerebral haemorrhage presenting as a transient ischaemic attack or stroke. The relevant instrument is No 51 of 2006. Mrs Rayson's third hypothesis will be reasonable if this SoP upholds that hypothesis.
A reasonable hypothesis
A hypothesis will be reasonable if it is consistent with the “template” found in the SoP (Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82). The hypothesis raised must contain one or more of the factors which the Repatriation Medical Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person's service. As the Full Court of the Federal Court said in Repatriation Commission v Hill (2002) 69 ALD 581 at 597:
… In order to satisfy ss 120(3) and 120A(3), a hypothesis relied on by veteran to support a pension claim must be supported by material pointing to each element that the SoP makes essential for the hypothesis to be reasonable.
Clause 5 of the SoP states that, subject to clause 7, at least one of the factors set out in clause 6 must be related to the relevant service rendered by the person. The factors we have identified which may have possible relevance to Mr Rayson are:
(a)having hypertension at the time of the clinical onset of cerebrovascular accident (factor 6 (a));
(b)having depressive disorder within 90 days before the clinical onset of cerebrovascular accident (factor 6 (e));
(c)smoking an average of at least 15 cigarettes per day or the equivalent thereof in other tobacco products, for at least the one year before the clinical onset of cerebrovascular accident (factor 6 (p) (i));
(d)undergoing anticoagulant therapy at the time of the clinical onset of cerebrovascular accident (factor 6 (p) (ii)); and
(e)taking aspirin on at least three days per week for a continuous period of at least four weeks and the last dose of aspirin was taken within seven days before the clinical onset of cerebrovascular accident (factor 6 (p) (iii)).
The material before us indicates that Mr Rayson had hypertension and was prescribed medication for that condition in December 2000. However, there is no material before us which might link his hypertension to his military service. As is set out in s 196B(2)(e) of the VE Act, the SoP must state the factors which must, as a minimum exist, and which of those factors must be related to the service rendered by the person before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised. Mr Rayson's hypothesis does not fit within the template established by factor 6 (a) because there is no material before us which points to a relationship between his hypertension and military service.
In an earlier application to this Tribunal, Mr Rayson lodged a claim for the pension on the grounds that he was suffering from depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. On 7 April 2011 Deputy President S A Forgie handed down a decision (Re Rayson and Repatriation Commission (2011) 55 AAR 1) finding that although Mr Rayson suffered from major depressive disorder, it was not related to his service. In fact, there was no material before us regarding Mr Rayson's depressive disorder and therefore it cannot be said that we have material before us which points to a connection between his military service and depression. Mr Rayson's hypothesis does not fit within the template established by factor 6 (e).
There was material before us pointing to the fact that Mr Rayson was a smoker. Mrs Rayson's statement made on 21 December 2011, which was admitted into evidence, refers to the fact that she was aware he was a heavy smoker, smoking 30 cigarettes or more per day during service. However, she also said that he had ceased smoking when she met him, which was in 1978. Dr Campagnaro's report also refers to Mr Rayson being a smoker, having smoked quite heavily at about 80 cigarettes per day for about 15 years when he was in the Navy. Dr Campagnaro said that Mr Rayson ceased smoking in 1966. Mr Rayson's cerebrovascular accident occurred on 29 June 2009. Therefore, he cannot satisfy factor 6 (p) (i) because there was no evidence in the material before us that he was smoking on 29 June 2008, the evidence indicating he ceased smoking in 1966. His hypothesis does not fit within the template established by this factor.
The material before us does point to Mr Rayson undergoing anticoagulant therapy at the time of the clinical onset of his cerebrovascular accident. At least that is what is stated by Prof Hand in his written report. Prof Hand said that in 2007 Mr Rayson had significant chest pain which was determined to be due to coronary artery bypass grafting and required stenting, and then a revision of the stent with angioplasty and insertion of a further stent because of in-situ thrombosis. He said this required a combination of aspirin and clopidogrel for a short time. He said Mr Rayson then required aspirin long-term in addition to the warfarin that he was taking for his aortic valve replacement. However, as Mr D Brown of counsel, who appeared on behalf of the Repatriation Commission, pointed out to us in his submissions, the clinical notes from the Breen Street Medical Practice which Mr Rayson attended contain an entry on 31 October 2007 indicating that Astrix (aspirin) had ceased. That is consistent with the list of previous prescriptions which discloses the last occasion on which Astrix was prescribed was 11 September 2007.
We have also had difficulty locating any documents which refer to Mr Rayson's 2007 stenting and angioplasty. Despite Prof Hand referring in his report to the documents upon which he relied, there is no reference to this medical treatment in those documents. However, although we were not provided with a letter which Dr Campagnaro wrote to Dr Voltaire Nadurata, we have found reference to that letter in an earlier decision involving Mr Rayson in this Tribunal (Re Rayson and Repatriation Commission (2011) 55 AAR 1 at [36]). It appears that in that letter Dr Campagnaro recorded the matters to which Prof Hand referred.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that we appear not to have been provided with evidence which relates to Mr Rayson's anti-coagulant therapy, even accepting that the material before us points to the fact that he was undergoing such therapy at the time he suffered the intracerebral haemorrhage, there was no evidence before us which pointed to the fact that Mr Rayson's coronary artery disease or aortic stenosis were in any way related to his military service. On that basis, Mr Rayson cannot satisfy factor 6 (p) (ii). His hypothesis does not fit the template established by that factor.
While it is correct to say that Prof Hand, in his written statement, refers to Mr Rayson having been prescribed aspirin following the procedures he underwent in 2007, he stated that this was required for a short time. As we have already indicated, the clinical notes from the Breen Street Medical Practice indicate that aspirin ceased to be prescribed for Mr Rayson in October 2007 which is consistent with what was said by Prof Hand. Mindful of course that at this stage of the analysis, we must not make findings of fact, it is nevertheless sufficiently clear that even the statement made by Prof Hand regarding taking aspirin does not go so far as to say Mr Rayson was taking aspirin at the time of his intracerebral haemorrhage, with the last dose taken within seven days before the clinical onset of that event. Furthermore, as we have already said, there is no material before us which points to any relationship between Mr Rayson's coronary artery disease and his military service. We find that the material before us does not point to Mr Rayson having satisfied factor 6 (p) (iii). His hypothesis does not fit the template established by that factor.
Given our findings regarding all possible relevant factors set out in the SoP dealing with cerebrovascular accident, after considering the whole of the material before us, we are of the opinion that the material does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting Mr Rayson's death with the circumstances of his military service with the Royal Australian Navy.
CONCLUSION
Mr Rayson suffered an intracerebral haemorrhage which was the cause of his death. The most significant contributing cause was hypertension.
Although Mrs Rayson raised a number of hypotheses linking her husband's death with his military service in the Australian Navy, after careful examination of the material before us, we are of the opinion that it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting his death with his military service. That is because it does not satisfy any of the relevant factors set out in the SoP concerning cerebrovascular accident which must be related to the relevant service rendered by Mr Rayson. Therefore, in accordance with s 120(3) of the VE Act, we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for determining that Mr Rayson's death was war-caused.
We find that the decision made by the VRB on 14 October 2010 that Mr Rayson's death was not related to his military service was correct. We affirm the decision.
I certify that the preceding 43 (forty-three) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of
Mr Egon Fice, Senior Member
Dr Roslyn Blakley, Member.....[sgd]...................................................................
Associate
Dated 7 November 2012
Date of hearing 13 August 2012 Date final submissions received 20 August 2012 Advocate for the Applicant Mr D De Marchi Solicitors for the Applicant De Marchi & Associates Advocate for the Respondent Mr D Brown Solicitors for the Respondent Australian Government Solicitor
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