Rabih Taleb v The Queen

[2015] HCASL 232

RABIH TALEB

v

THE QUEEN

[2015] HCASL 232
S133/2015

1. On 20 September 2013, the applicant was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales (Huggett DCJ) on two counts of indecent assault and one count of sexual intercourse without consent.  The applicant was found not guilty on another two counts of indecent assault and one count of committing an act of indecency towards a person over 16 years.  On 14 February 2014, Huggett DCJ imposed an overall sentence on the applicant of a non-parole period of three years with an additional term of three years.

2. The applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence on three grounds: that the trial judge erred by excluding certain evidence and questions about the prior sexual experience of the complainant ("ground 1"); that the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported on the evidence ("ground 2"); and that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive ("ground 3"). 

3. On 20 May 2015, the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Price, Davies and Schmidt JJ) granted leave to appeal in respect of ground 2 and ground 3 but dismissed the appeal.  Davies J (with whom Price and Schmidt JJ agreed) held, in respect of ground 1, that the trial judge was not in error in excluding the evidence sought to be admitted by the applicant.  In respect of ground 2, Davies J was satisfied from examining the evidence and the summing up by the trial judge that there was evidence on which the jury could reasonably have convicted the applicant whilst at the same time acquitting him on the counts of which he was found not guilty.  In respect of ground 3, Davies J held that it could not be said that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust, and that therefore it was not manifestly excessive.

4. The applicant seeks special leave to appeal to this Court in relation to his convictions, on the same grounds as advanced and dismissed below.  He requires an extension of time to do so.  An appeal to this Court would enjoy no prospects of success and it cannot be said that the interests of justice are engaged by this application.  Special leave should be refused and there is therefore no utility in granting the extension of time.

5. Pursuant to r 41.11.1, we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
10 December 2015
P.A. Keane