| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S CR 2013 0029
| THE QUEEN | |
| v | |
| DE JUN ZHENG | Accused |
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JUDGE: | CROUCHER J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATES OF HEARING: | 16 & 17 October 2013 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 17 October 2013 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | R v Zheng (Ruling No 5) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2013] VSC 559 | |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Ruling No 5: Application for certification for leave to commence an interlocutory appeal – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), s 295 – Certification refused.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Ms M Williams SC | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr G Georgiou SC | Turnbull Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
On Monday 30 September 2013, I had a jury of twelve persons empanelled to hear the trial of De Jun Zheng on a charge of murder. It is alleged that, on 12 February 2009, Mr Zheng murdered Abraham Marco Papo in South Melbourne. Mr Zheng pleaded not guilty.
Towards the end of the court day on Tuesday 15 October 2013, Ms Williams SC, Senior Crown Prosecutor, announced that the Crown case was closed. Earlier, Mr Georgiou SC, counsel for the accused, had advised the Court in the absence of the jury that his client would not be going into evidence. Accordingly, I told the jury that that was the conclusion of evidence in this case and sent them away until 11:30am the next day – an hour after their usual commencement time – so that some legal matters could be dealt with in their absence, after which we would hear the final addresses of counsel and my charge. The legal matters to which I was referring were the issues that arise under ss 10-11 and 13-15 of the Jury Directions Act 2013 (Vic) (“the JD Act”).
The discussion of matters under the JD Act commenced that evening and continued the next day, Wednesday 16 October. During that discussion, I raised with counsel a series of questions relating to whether intention to kill or cause really serious injury (“murderous intent”) and the absence of lawful justification or excuse (in this case, the absence of self-defence) must be proved to be wholly contemporaneous with each of the conscious, voluntary and deliberate acts being relied on by the Crown as the acts, in combination, that caused death. Ultimately, I came to the view that the answer to that question must be yes, both as a matter of principle and in the particular circumstances of this case. (Below, I shall explain the particular circumstances in which this issue arises in the present case.) I also indicated, orally, the types of directions I was contemplating would be necessary to give the jury to deal with that point in the particular circumstances of this case.
Ms Williams disagreed with my view of the matter. Mr Georgiou agreed in the proposed directions. Ms Williams sought instructions on Wednesday and ultimately indicated that the Director of Public Prosecutions (“the Director”) wished…
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- Case
- [2013] VSC 559
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the application for certification of leave to appeal was frivolous or vexatious. The court had to consider whether Zheng's application had a reasonable chance of success and whether it raised a serious question to be tried. The court also needed to assess whether the appeal was being used as a delay tactic or if it was genuinely in the interests of justice to allow the appeal. The Court of Appeal had to carefully balance the need to ensure that interlocutory appeals were not used frivolously against the potential consequences of denying a deserving applicant the opportunity to appeal an interlocutory decision.
The Court of Appeal found that the application for certification was frivolous. The court held that Zheng's arguments regarding the admissibility of evidence did not present a serious question to be tried and were unlikely to succeed. The Court of Appeal considered the merits of Zheng's arguments and concluded that they were not compelling enough to warrant certification. The court found that the application was being used as a delay tactic and that it was not in the interests of justice to allow the appeal. As a result, the Court of Appeal refused the application for certification and dismissed the appeal.
The Court of Appeal made no orders regarding the costs of the application, finding that the matter was adequately dealt with by the refusal of certification. The Court of Appeal emphasised the importance of ensuring that interlocutory appeals were not used frivolously and that the interests of justice were properly considered in each case. The decision highlights the need for applicants to carefully consider the merits of their application for certification and to ensure that they have a genuine case for appeal.
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