| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S CR 2017 0121
| THE QUEEN |
| v |
| KAMIL YUCEL |
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JUDGE: | Beale J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 7, 8 and 12 February 2018 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 13 February 2018 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | R v Yucel (Ruling No 3) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2018] VSC 51 | First revision: 15 February 2018 |
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EVIDENCE – Public interest immunity – Accused is charged with murder – Defence of self-defence – Matters of State – Evidence Act 2008 ss 130, 130A.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Mr M Rochford QC with Ms N Warda | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr P Morrissey SC Ms G Morgan | Steven Andrianakis & Associates |
| For the Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police | Mr C Tran with Ms K Chow | Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office |
| For the Commonwealth | Mr G Livermore | Australian Government Solicitors Office |
HIS HONOUR:
Summary
This ruling, which relates to a public interest immunity (PII) claim by the Commonwealth must be read in conjunction with R v Yucel(Ruling No 1)[1] and R v Yucel(Ruling No 2).[2]
[1][2017] VSC 807.
[2][2018] VSC 27.
Ruling No 1 is relevant because there I set out the principles that have informed my application of s 130 of the Evidence Act 2008 to the information the subject of this ruling.
In Ruling No 2, after due consideration of a confidential affidavit (CA1) and confidential written submissions (CWS1) supplied to me by the Commonwealth, I upheld the Commonwealth’s PII claim in relation to all but three paragraphs of a draft Intelligence Bulletin headed ‘Fatal Shooting of Rahat Khan on 12 July 2016’ and dated 27 July 2016. The information the subject of this ruling is those three paragraphs (the Information).
In respect of the Information, the Commonwealth asked me to revisit Ruling No 2 in the light of further material which was to be supplied in the form of a supplementary confidential affidavit (CA2). Pursuant to my grant of leave, CA2 was to be confined to material based on new facts and circumstances that had arisen on or after 29 January 2018, which was the date that CA1 was filed.
Having considered CA2, and after a careful re-reading of CA1, I indicated yesterday morning that I was still not minded to uphold the Commonwealth’s PII claim regarding the Information. I said the following in open court:
On 7 February 2018, Mr Livermore (for the Commonwealth), asked me to revisit and reconsider R v Yucel (Ruling No 2), which I published on 6 February 2018. On 8 February, pursuant to a grant of leave, the Commonwealth filed a supplementary confidential affidavit. I have revisited my ruling in the light of the supplementary confidential affidavit and have carefully re‑read the original confidential affidavit, but I remain of the view expressed in Ruling No 2 that the public interest in disclosure of what I'll just call "the information" outweighs the public interest in preserving its secrecy or confidentiality. Indeed, I consider that the supplementary affidavit lends support for the conclusion I reached in Ruling No 2. I am necessarily constrained in what I can say by way of explanation but I can say this: in the first sentence of paragraph [73] of the original affidavit, up to and including the second comma, the Commonwealth makes what I consider to be a telling concession. As a consequence, I do not think there is a rational basis for the argument that is made in the original affidavit in the balance of paragraph [73] and in paragraph [74]. Accordingly, I do not think there is a plausible foundation for the Commonwealth's primary concern, which is articulated in the last sentence of paragraph [74] and permeates both confidential affidavits. That's the first issue.
The second issue is this, and it concerns whether there should be leave to the Commonwealth to adduce further material. …I will grant leave to the Commonwealth to file any additional confidential material. I will not limit that material to material based on new facts and circumstances arising on or after 29 January 2018. It is to be filed on or before 9am on 13 February, so tomorrow morning.
This morning, in accordance with my grant of leave, the Commonwealth filed a third confidential affidavit (CA3) and further confidential written submissions (CWS2) in support of its PII claim regarding the Information. I have given careful consideration to this new material, and reviewed the old material (CA1, CA2 and CWS1) in the light of it.
Analysis
My view remains the same in relation to the Information and I now direct that the Information be supplied to the defence. I am still constrained in what I can say about my reasons for ordering disclosure of the information but I will say this.
At [13] of CA3, in the second sentence, there is, in my view, another telling concession by the Commonwealth. It supports the line of reasoning on which my conclusion is founded. That line of reasoning is in part articulated by the Commonwealth in [12] of CA3. I say in part because [12] of CA3 does not take into account two other relevant considerations, the first of which is disclosed, for example, by the fifth sentence of [11] of CA2. That sentence, to my mind, describes a state of affairs[3] which supports rather than undermines my line of reasoning. So too does the Commonwealth’s public and longstanding commitment in respect of the matter which is mentioned in the last two words of the heading above [5] of CA2.
[3]See also the first sentence of [19] of CA3 up to the word “and” where it first appears.
I reject the submission at [10] and [11] of the CWS2. I am not in a position where I can set out why I consider that the Information could be of substantial assistance to the defence, as I said in Ruling No 2 at [4], but I note that [10] and [11] of CWS2 do not grapple with the import of the last sentence of the second last of the three paragraphs constituting the Information.
- AGLC
- R v Yucel (Ruling No 3) [2018] VSC 51
- Case
- [2018] VSC 51
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the evidence in question should be admitted, considering the provisions of the Evidence Act 2008. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the evidence was subject to public interest immunity under sections 130 and 130A of the Act. The defence argued that the evidence was necessary to establish the accused's defence of self-defence. The prosecution contended that the evidence was protected by public interest immunity, and its disclosure would harm the public interest.
The court examined the nature of the evidence and the potential harm that might result from its disclosure. It considered the public interest in the administration of justice and the protection of national security. The court ultimately concluded that the evidence was subject to public interest immunity and could not be disclosed. The court found that the potential harm to the public interest outweighed the need for the evidence to establish the accused's defence of self-defence. As a result, the evidence was excluded from the trial.
The final orders of the court were that the evidence in question would not be admitted into evidence in the trial. This decision meant that the accused could not rely on the excluded evidence to support their defence of self-defence. The court's ruling was based on the balance between the public interest in the administration of justice and the protection of national security. The trial proceeded without the excluded evidence, and the accused was found guilty of murder.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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