R v Young - [2004] VSCA 166

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 271 of 2002

THE QUEEN
	v.
PAUL CHARLES YOUNG

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JUDGES:	WINNEKE, P., ORMISTON and CHARLES, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	7 September 2004
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	9 September 2004
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2004] VSCA 166

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Criminal law - Armed robbery - Applicant pleading guilty in County Court but seeking thereafter to change plea - Whether denial of justice warranting setting aside of the conviction - Whether sentence imposed excessive.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr J.D. McArdle, Q.C.	Ms K. Robertson, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
The Applicant in person

WINNEKE, P.,
ORMISTON, J.A.,
CHARLES, J.A.:

This is an application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence by Paul Charles Young, who was convicted in the County Court at Melbourne of an armed robbery of the ANZ Bank in Moonee Ponds on 19 April 2000. The conviction was recorded following the applicant's plea of guilty to the charge on 29 October 2001, whereupon the judge remanded the applicant for sentence. Due to circumstances which are, for present purposes, unnecessary to rehearse, the applicant did not stand for sentence until 17 October 2002. He was then sentenced to a term of five years' imprisonment; and the judge ordered that he serve a non-parole period of three-and-a-half years. The applicant informs us that he has approximately nine months to serve before he becomes eligible for parole. The judge declared a pre-sentence detention period of 306 days.

The "conviction" application is an unusual one because, as we have previously noted, the conviction was recorded following a plea of guilty. Within a period of some two weeks of the entering of that plea on 29 October 2001, the applicant informed the court that he wished to change his plea to "not guilty". His application to do so was entertained by Judge Robertson in the County Court on 19 December 2001; in the course of which the applicant gave evidence and was cross-examined. On 21 December 2001, the judge refused the application and gave reasons for doing so.

The applicant has appeared before this Court in person. He challenges the conviction on the basis that the trial judge was in error in refusing the application for leave to change the "guilty" plea to one of "not guilty", and that, accordingly, a miscarriage of justice has occurred. His application for leave to appeal against sentence is founded upon his contention that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive; and is rendered so largely because his Honour placed too much emphasis or weight upon the purpose of general deterrence for reasons which we will later identify. It should be said that the applicant presented his arguments to this Court lucidly and intelligently; and with commendable brevity. He clearly understands the function of this Court as an appellate court; namely that we do not have an unfettered right to discharge afresh the functions committed to the trial judge; nor do we have an unfettered power…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Young

Details

AGLC: R v Young [2004] VSCA 166
Case: [2004] VSCA 166
Decision Date: 9 September 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved an applicant who had pleaded guilty to charges of armed robbery in the County Court but later sought to change their plea. The applicant argued that the denial of justice warranted setting aside the conviction and that the sentence imposed was excessive. The court was tasked with determining whether the applicant's rights had been infringed to the extent that the conviction should be overturned and whether the sentence was appropriately severe.

The court examined whether the applicant's decision to plead guilty was made voluntarily and whether any procedural unfairness had occurred that would justify setting aside the conviction. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the sentence imposed was disproportionate to the crime committed. The applicant contended that the initial plea was not fully informed due to a lack of legal representation and alleged pressure from the police. The court also had to consider if the sentence was manifestly excessive, which would warrant an appeal.

In reaching its decision, the court held that the applicant's plea was indeed voluntary and informed, and no procedural unfairness had occurred. The court found that the applicant had been adequately represented throughout the process and that any pressure from the police did not undermine the voluntariness of the plea. Regarding the sentence, the court determined that it was within the appropriate range for the offence and did not constitute an excessive punishment. Consequently, the court dismissed the application to set aside the conviction and rejected the claim that the sentence was excessive.

The court's final orders were to uphold the conviction and sentence as originally imposed by the County Court. The court did not find any basis to interfere with the procedural fairness of the plea or the proportionality of the sentence.

Orders