R v WS - [2025] NSWDC 219

District Court

New South Wales

Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation: R v WS [2025] NSWDC 219
Hearing dates: March: 10,11,12,13,14,17,18,19,20,21,24,25,26,27,28and 31.
April: 1,2,3,4,7,8,9,10,15,16,17,24,28,29 and 30.
May: 1,2,5,6,12,13,14,15,16,19,20,21,22,26,29 and 30.
June: 2,3,4,5,6,10 and 11.
Date of orders: 18 June 2025
Decision date: 18 June 2025
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Before: Grant DCJ
Decision:
1. Verdicts of not guilty are entered in relation to Counts 1 to 33.
2. In relation to Counts 34 and 35, I am satisfied on the limited evidence available that the accused committed the offences charged.

Catchwords:
CRIME – Special hearing – previous trial – retrial ordered by Court of Criminal Appeal – subsequent finding of unfitness – Director elected special hearing – historical allegations said to have occurred between 1973 and 1991 – tendency evidence – allegations that the accused in part used hypnosis (or relaxation therapy involving massage) on complainants – expert evidence on memory and hypnosis – accused gave evidence in original trial – three further complainants subsequent to grant of re-trial

Legislation Cited:
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW)

Cases Cited:
AR v R [2025] NSWCCA 22
Banditt v The Queen [2005] HCA 80
Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14
Jovanovic v R (1997) 42 NSWLR 520
Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507
Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397
R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40
R v WS [2021] NSWCCA 124
R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82
Wardell v R [2025] NSWCCA 26
Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Rex (Crown)
WS (Accused)
Representation:
Counsel:
Mr W Martin (Crown)
Mr T Pickering (Accused)
Solicitors:
Mr S Rose and Ms S Tam (Crown)
Ms E Hurcum (Accused)

File Number(s): 2014/00280784
Publication restriction:
Pursuant to s 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), there is to be no publication of any information, picture or other material, that identifies or is likely to lead to the identification of a complainant. Identifying information has been removed from this version of the judgment to comply with the statutes.
The complainants Phillip and Joseph Wright have expressed their wish not to be subject to the non-publication order.

JUDGMENT

Procedural history
Special hearing

ELEMENTS

Indecent assault, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Counts 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8 (Complainant: CC), Counts 9,10,11,12,13, 14 and 16 (in the alternative to Count 15) (Complainant: Phillip Wright), Counts 17,18, 19,20,21,22,23 24, 26 (in the alternative to Count 25) and 27 (Complainant: Joseph Wright), Count 28 (Complainant: ST) and Counts 29 and 30 (Complainant: SF)

Sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s61D(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Count 15 (Complainant: Phillip Wright), Count 25 (Complainant: Joseph Wright)

Indecent assault and act of indecency, contrary to s61E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Counts 31,32 and 33 (Complainant: IM), Counts 34 and 35 (Complainant MH)

DIRECTIONS

General directions
Inferences
Burden of proof
The standard and onus of proof
The accused is charged with multiple counts (direction in accordance with R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82)
People lie for all sorts of reasons (direction in accordance with Jovanovic v R (1997) 42 NSWLR 520)
How I am to assess the evidence
The Crown case relies on the evidence of a single witness
Possible Inconsistencies in the evidence (direction in accordance with s 293A Criminal Procedure Act 1989 NSW)
There may be reasons for a delay in complaint or lack of complaint (direction in accordance with s 294(2) Criminal Procedure Act 1989 NSW)
Misconceptions about a person’s response to giving evidence (direction in accordance with s 292D Criminal Procedure Act 1989 NSW)
Danger of convicting the accused based on uncorroborated evidence (direction in accordance with s 294AA Criminal Procedure Act 1989 NSW)
Complaint evidence
Context evidence
The accused is forensically disadvantaged by the delay in proceedings
The accused is a person of good character
The prosecution suggests the accused told lies (direction in accordance with Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234)
The accused’s evidence and interview with police (direction in accordance with Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507)
Expert evidence
Crown witness not called (direction in accordance with Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397 at [27])
Tendency evidence

The Crown case

Agreed facts

CC and Exhibit BBB
Allan Huggins and 117 Barney Street, Armidale

THE EVIDENCE

The evidence of the tendency witnesses
Crown submissions on tendency evidence
Accused's submissions on tendency evidence
Consideration of tendency evidence
The evidence of OW
The evidence of CW
The evidence of MB
The evidence of MR
The evidence of JC
The evidence of SH
The evidence of MG
The evidence of JK
The evidence of DMCG
The evidence of MHK

The evidence of the complainant witnesses
The evidence of CC
Count 1 – Indecent assault between 1 June 1973 and 31 August 1973
Count 2 – Indecent assault between 1 June 1973 and 31 August 1973
Count 3 – Indecent assault between 1 June 1973 and 30 September 1973
Count 4 – Indecent assault between 1 June 1973 and 30 September 1973
Count 5 – Indecent assault between 1 June 1973 and 31 September 1973
Cross-examination by the Crown prosecutor
Count 6 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1974 and 1 June 1974
Count 7 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1974 and 1 June 1974
Count 8 – Indecent assault between 1 June 1974 and 1 December 1974
After the offending
Cross-examination by Mr Pickering
Re-examination
The evidence of JLC (CC’s wife)
Cross-examination of JLC
The evidence of Wendy Starr
SC (CC’s older brother)
SHC (CC’s older sister)
Kerry Edwards
Cross-examination of Ms Edwards
Re-examination of Ms Edwards

The evidence of Phillip Wright
Inappropriate conduct by the school counsellor, Mr Huggins
Initial contact with the accused
Count 9 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1982
Count 10 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1982
Count 11 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1982
Count 12 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1982
Count 13 – Indecent assault between 1 October 1982 and 1 March 1984
Count 14 – Indecent assault between 1 October 1982 and 1 March 1984
Count 15 – Sexual intercourse without consent between 1 October 1982 and 1 March 1984
Count 16 (in the alternative to count 15) – Indecent assault between 1 October 1982 and 1 March 1984
Subsequent events
Phillip’s Wright’s evidence of complaint
Complaint witnesses regarding Phillip Wright
The evidence of Brother John Cantwell
The evidence of Father O’Brien
The recorded conversation between the accused and Phillip Wright
Determination regarding recorded conversation between Phillip Wright and the accused

The evidence of Joseph Wright
Count 17 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983
Count 18 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983
Count 19 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983
Count 20 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983
Count 21 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 13 July 1981
Count 22 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 13 July 1981
Count 23 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983
Count 24 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983
Count 25 – Sexual intercourse without consent between 14 July 1981 and 30 April 1983
Count 26 – (in the alternative to Count 25) Indecent assault between 14 July 1981 and 30 April 1983
Count 27 – (in the alternative to Count 25) Indecent assault between 1 January 1981 and 13 July 1981
Joseph Wright’s evidence concerning Allan Huggins
Joseph Wright’s evidence of complaint
Complaint evidence regarding Joseph Wright

Evidence of Elaine Wright (Phillip and Joseph’s mother)
The evidence of ST
Count 28 – Indecent assault between 1 June 1981 and 31 December 1981
Other evidence regarding ST

The evidence of SF
Count 29 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 1982
Count 30 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 1982
Other evidence regarding SF

The evidence of IM
Count 31 – Indecent assault between 1 January 1985 and 31 March 1985
Count 32 – Indecent assault between 1 April 1985 and 31 April 1985
Count 33 – Indecent assault between 1 April 1985 and 31 May 1985
IM’s evidence of complaint
Cross-examination
The evidence of Amanda Cosgrove
The evidence of CM
The evidence of RM
The evidence of JLH

The evidence of MH
Count 34 – Indecent assault between 4 May 1990 and 7 January 1991
Count 35 – Indecent assault between 4 May 1990 and 7 January 1991
After the offending
Cross-examination of the complainant
The evidence of MCH (MH’s wife)
The evidence of JH (MH and SH’s mother)
Michelle West (practice manager at Grafton Dental Centre)

The accused’s electronically recorded interview with police (ERISP)
The accused’s evidence at trial
Witnesses who gave evidence about hypnosis and/ or relaxation therapy
Other witnesses in the defence case

SUBMISSIONS

Crown submissions
Defence submissions

DETERMINATION

Introduction
Implausibility

Phillip Wright – Counts 9 to 16
General observations
Complaint evidence
Complaint to Steven Royal
Other complaints
Complaint to Ms Hardman

Inconsistencies between the evidence of Phillip and Joseph Wright
Counts 13, 14, 15 and the alternative 16
Counts 9, 10, 11, and 12

Joseph Wright – Counts 17 to 27
General observations
The reliability of Joseph’s memory
Professor Barnier
Dr Roberts
Margaret O’Brien
Cross examination of Ms O’Brien

Inconsistencies between the evidence of Phillip and Joseph Wright

ST – Count 28
Introduction
Implausibility given the presence of others in the surgery at material times
His mother’s evidence
ST’s uncertainty
The possibility that the alleged touching was accidental
Lack of complaint
Lack of evidence suggesting that the complainant attended upon the accused
Concluding remarks

SF – Counts 29 and 30
Unreliability of SF’s memory
SF was prone to exaggeration and censorship
Complaint

CC – Counts 1 to 8
Cross-examination of the complainant
The accused’s appointment book
The evidence of Kerry Edwards
Complaint
Unreliability of CC’s memory

IM – Count 31, 32 and 33
Inconsistencies
Issues with credibility brought to light by evidence of JLH

MH – Count 34 and 35
Contamination as a result of communication with Phillip Wright
Dental records
Complaint
Inconsistencies
Determination

Concluding remarks

Orders

JUDGMENT

Procedural history

On 14 August 2017, the accused, WS, was arraigned before Syme DCJ and a jury of 12 in the District Court at Sydney on an indictment that contained 26 counts.
The Crown case was that the accused practiced as a dentist in Armidale and surrounding areas in the 1980s. He was trained in hypnotherapy and was a member of the Australian Society of Hypnosis. He used hypnotherapy as part of his dental practice to assist patients with relaxation and their fear of dentistry. He also performed dedicated hypnotherapy or relaxation sessions in a separate room in the practice. The Crown alleges that the accused used hypnotherapy techniques during both dental appointments and the pure hypnotherapy sessions to commit acts of indecency upon teenage and pre-teenage boys.
The trial before Syme DCJ concerned four complainants: Phillip and Joseph Wright, who are brothers (and who have expressed their desire not to be referred to using pseudonyms) SF and ST, as well as several tendency witnesses who alleged they were subjected to similar conduct (indecent acts) by the accused. A non-publication order will remain in place in respect of the accused’s identity. He will be referred to by the pseudonym “WS” as there is a risk that the publication of his identity would reveal the identity of the complainants who do wish to remain anonymous.
The jury retired to consider their verdicts on 3 October 2017. On 16 October 2017, the jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilty to Counts 24, 25, and 26, being the charges relating to SF and ST.
On 19 October 2017, the jury returned the following majority verdicts on the counts relating to Joseph Wright:

Guilty to Counts 9 to 12,

Not guilty to Count 13 (principal count) and Count 14 (first alternative count to Count 13), but guilty on Count 15 (second alternative count to count 13),

Not guilty to Count 16 (principal count) and Count 17 (first alternative count to Count 16) but guilty to Count 18 (second alternative count to Count 16),

Guilty to Counts 19 and 20, and

Guilty to Count 21.

On 23 October 2017, the jury returned majority verdicts of guilty to Counts 1 to 5, which related to Phillip Wright. They were unable to reach a verdict to Counts 6 to 8 and were discharged on these counts.
On 23 October 2017 the accused’s bail was revoked. He was sentenced by Syme DCJ on 12 January 2018 to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 16 years with a non-parole period of eight years.
The accused lodged an appeal against these convictions. After some delay, the matter was heard on 22 March 2021. On 21 July 2021, the Court of Criminal Appeal (Price J, and Hoeben CJ at CL and Ierace J agreeing) quashed the convictions on the basis that the trial judge had not directed the jury regarding statements made by the accused during a recorded conversation in 2014 where Phillip Wright confronted him about allegations of sexual abuse. A new trial was ordered: R v WS [2021] NSWCCA 124.
The accused was granted bail by M Williams DCJ in the District Court at Sydney on 5 July 2021. He spent a total of three years, eight months and 12 days in custody.

Special hearing

The accused is elderly and suffers from dementia. On 11 March 2024, by consent, he was found unfit to stand trial within 12 months by Conlon DCJ in the District Court at Sydney pursuant to the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (the Act). The accused is to be dealt with under Division 3 of the Act.
Pursuant to s 53(2) of the Act, the Court received advice from the ODPP that further proceedings would be taken in respect of the offences. As a result of that advice, the Crown filed a 35-count indictment, and a special hearing was conducted commencing 10 March 2025 before me. The special hearing concerns the original complainants: Phillip and Joseph Wright, SF and ST as well as three additional complainants: CC, IM, and MH. The offences against CC are alleged to have occurred between June 1973 and June 1974. The offences against IM are alleged to have occurred in 1985, and the offences against MH are alleged to have occurred between 1990 and 1991. The original trial concerned acts alleged to have occurred at the accused’s practice in Barney Street, Armidale. The allegations in the special hearing before me also concern acts alleged to have occurred at the accused’s practice in Walcha (CC) around 1973, and at his practice in Grafton (MH) around 1991.
The counts are as follows, that the accused,

between 1 June 1973 and 31 August 1973, at Walcha in the State of New South Wales, did assault CC, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 June 1973 and 31 August 1973, at Walcha in the State of New South Wales, did assault CC, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 June 1973 and 30 September 1973, at Walcha in the State of New South Wales, did assault CC, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), (I granted leave on 29 May 2025 for the Crown to amend this count on the indictment to its current form),

between 1 June 1973 and 30 September 1973, at Walcha in the State of New South Wales, did assault CC, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), (I granted leave on 29 May 2025 for the Crown to amend this count on the indictment to its current form),

between 1 June 1973 and 30 September 1973, at Walcha in the State of New South Wales, did assault CC, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), (I granted leave on 29 May 2025 for the Crown to amend this count on the indictment to its current form),

between 1 January 1974 and 1 June 1974, at Walcha in the State of New South Wales, did assault CC, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1974 and 1 June 1974, at Walcha in the State of New South Wales, did assault CC, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 June 1974 and 31 December 1974, at Walcha in the State of New South Wales, did assault CC, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), (I granted leave on 29 May 2025 for the Crown to amend this count on the indictment to its current form),

between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1982, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Philip Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1982, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Philip Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1982, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Philip Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1982, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Philip Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 October 1982 and 1 March 1984, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Philip Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 October 1982 and 1 March 1984, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Philip Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 October 1982 and 1 March 1984, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Philip Wright without his consent, knowing he was not consenting, contrary to s61(D)(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

in the alternative to count 15, between 1 October 1982 and 1 March 1984, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Philip Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 13 July 1981, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 13 July 1981, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 1983, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 14 July 1891 and 30 April 1983, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with Eric (Joseph) Wright, without his consent knowing he was not consenting, contrary to s61(D)(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

in the alternative to Count 25, between 14 July 1981 and 30 April 1983, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

in the alternative to Count 25, between 1 January 1981 and 13 July 1981, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault Eric (Joseph) Wright, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 June 1981 and 31 December 1981, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault ST, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 1982, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault ST, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 1982, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault SF, a male person and commit an act of indecency on him, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 January 1985 and 31 March 1985, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault IM, and at the time of the assault committed an act of indecency on IM, contrary to s61E(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 April 1985 and 31 April 1985, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault IM, and at the time of the assault committed an act of indecency on IM, contrary to s61E(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 1 April 1985 and 31 May 1985, at Armidale in the State of New South Wales, did assault IM, and at the time of the assault committed an act of indecency on IM, contrary to s61E(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 4 May 1990 and 7 January 1991, at Grafton in the State of New South Wales, did assault MH, and at the time of the assault committed an act of indecency on MH, contrary to s61E(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

between 4 May 1990 and 7 January 1991, at Grafton in the State of New South Wales, did assault MH and at the time of the assault committed an act of indecency on MH, contrary to s61E(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),

The counts have changed over the lengthy and complex procedural history of this matter. I have included a table below setting out the old counts with the corresponding new counts for the purpose of clarity.

Old count (trial before Syme DCJ)

New count (special hearing before Grant DCJ)

N/A, additional complainant (CC)

Counts 1 to 8 (CC)

Phillip Wright

Count 1

Count 9

Count 2

Count 10

Count 3

Count 11

Count 4

Count 12

Count 5

Count 13

Count 6

Count 14

Count 7

Count 15

Count 8

Count 16

Eric (Joseph) Wright

Count 9

Count 17

Count 10

Count 18

Count 11

Count 19

Count 12

Count 20

Count 13

Found not guilty, not applicable in these proceedings

Count 14

Found not guilty, not applicable in these proceedings

Count 15

Count 21

Count 16

Found not guilty, not applicable in these proceedings

Count 17

Found not guilty, not applicable in these proceedings

Count 18

Count 22

Count 19

Count 23

Count 20

Count 24

Count 21

Count 25

Count 22

Count 26

Count 23

Count 27

ST

Count 24

Count 28

SF

Count 25

Count 29

Count 26

Count 30

N/A additional complainant(s) (IM and MH)

Count 31 to 33 (IM)

Count 34 and 35 (MH)

The special hearing was conducted as nearly as possible as if it were a trial of criminal proceedings: s 56(1).
The fact that the accused has been found unfit to be tried is not presumed to be an impediment to his representation. The accused is represented by Mr Pickering of counsel.
A special hearing must not prejudice the accused any more than his unfitness already may do. He must be legally represented. He may raise or have raised on his behalf whatever defences a fit person could raise in a conventional trial. He may, or may not, give evidence. The purposes of a special hearing include,

To ensure that justice is done, as best it can be in the circumstances (to the accused person and the prosecution), and,

To give an accused person an opportunity to be found not guilty and if he requires further treatment, that it may be given to him outside the criminal justice system.

At a special hearing, the accused person is taken to have pleaded not guilty to the charges against him, unlike in a conventional trial where an accused is arraigned and may enter a plea of either guilty or not guilty to the charges.
I must reach my verdict on what the Act describes as “the limited evidence available.” The verdicts open to me are,

Not guilty of the offence charged,

A special verdict of ‘act proven but not criminally responsible’,

That on the limited evidence available, the accused committed the offence charged, and

That on the limited evidence available, the accused committed an offence available as an alternative to the offence charged.

If I find the accused not guilty then that will be the end of the matter. If however, I find that on the limited evidence available, he did commit the offence or offences charged or an available alternative offence, it will be my duty to decide whether, had he been fit to be tried in a normal way, and been convicted, whether he would have been subjected to a term of imprisonment, and if he would have been, what term would have been appropriate. Other non-custodial options are available but may not arise here.
If I nominate an appropriate term of imprisonment, the Mental Health Review Tribunal will continue to review him and make appropriate recommendations. My duty at present is confined to deciding whether, on the limited evidence available, the Crown has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offences charged.
The accused in these proceedings is elderly, suffers from dementia, and is currently being cared for in regional NSW by a family member. Mr Pickering, without objection from the Crown, sought to have the accused appear via AVL for the duration of the special hearing, with adjusted sitting hours to accommodate the accused’s limited attention capacity. I acceded to this request as it was appropriate in the circumstances: s 56(8).

ELEMENTS

Indecent assault, contrary to s81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

Counts 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8 (Complainant: CC), Counts 9,10,11,12,13, 14 and 16 (in the alternative to Count 15) (Complainant: Phillip Wright), Counts 17,18, 19,20,21,22,23 24, 26 (in the alternative to Count 25) and 27 (Complainant: Joseph Wright), Count 28 (Complainant: ST) and Counts 29 and 30 (Complainant: SF)

The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt three elements:

That the accused assaulted the complainant,

The person was a male, and

The assault was indecent.

An “assault” is the deliberate and unlawful touching of another person. The slightest touch is sufficient to amount to an assault and it does not have to be a hostile or aggressive act, or one that caused the complainant fear or pain.
“Indecent” means contrary to the ordinary standards of respectable people in this community. The act must have a sexual connotation or overtone.
Regarding Counts 21 and 22, I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offences were committed after 13 July 1981.

Sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s61D(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

Count 15 (Complainant: Phillip Wright), Count 25 (Complainant: Joseph Wright)

The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt three elements:

That the accused had sexual intercourse with the complainant,

The sexual intercourse was without the consent of the complainant, and

The accused knew the complainant did not consent.

“Sexual intercourse” means sexual connection occasioned by:

The penetration of the anus of any person by any part of the body of another person (except where the penetration is carried out for proper medical purposes),

Sexual connection occasioned by the introduction of any part of the penis of a person into the mouth of another person,

The continuation of the sexual intercourse as defined in paragraph (1) or (2).

“Consent” involves a conscious and voluntary agreement on the part of the complainant to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused. It can be given verbally or expressed by actions. Similarly, absence of consent does not have to be in words, it also may be communicated in other ways such as the offering of resistance although this is not necessary as the law specifically provides that a person who does not offer actual physical resistance to sexual intercourse is not, by reason only of that fact, to be regarded as consenting to the sexual intercourse. Consent which is obtained after persuasion is still consent provided that ultimately it is given freely and voluntarily.
The law says that the accused “knew” the complainant did not consent if he was aware the complainant was not consenting (actual knowledge) or was reckless as to whether the complainant was consenting or not.
To establish that the accused was “reckless”, the Crown must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that either:

the accused simply failed to consider whether or not the complainant was consenting at all, and just went ahead with the act of sexual intercourse, [even though the risk the complainant was not consenting would have been obvious to someone with the accused’s mental capacity if the accused had turned their mind to it], or

the accused realised the possibility the complainant was not consenting but went ahead regardless of whether the complainant was consenting or not.

The accused’s knowledge of the complainant’s lack of consent for the purposes of s 61D (2) is to be interpreted subjectively requiring proof of subjective foresight of the possibility of non-consent: Banditt v The Queen [2005] HCA 80.
Regarding Count 25, I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offences were committed after 14 July 1981. If I am not so satisfied, I must consider the alternative Count 27 (that the offence was committed before 14 July 1981).

Indecent assault and act of indecency, contrary to s61E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

Counts 31,32 and 33 (Complainant: IM), Counts 34 and 35 (Complainant: MH)

The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt four elements:

That the accused assaulted the complainant,

The assault was indecent,

The assault was without the consent of the complainant, and

The accused knew or was reckless as to whether the complainant was not consenting.

An “assault” is the deliberate and unlawful touching of another person. The slightest touch is sufficient to amount to an assault and it does not have to be a hostile or aggressive act, or one that caused the complainant fear or pain.
“Indecent” means contrary to the ordinary standards of respectable people in this community. The act must have a sexual connotation or overtone.
“Consent” involves a conscious and voluntary agreement on the part of the complainant to be touched by the accused in the manner alleged. It can be given verbally or expressed by actions. Similarly, absence of consent does not have to be in words, it also may be communicated in other ways such as the offering of resistance, although this is not necessary as the law specifically provides that a person who does not offer actual physical resistance to the touching is not, by reason only of that fact, to be regarded as consenting to the touching. Consent which is obtained after persuasion is still consent provided that ultimately it is given freely and voluntarily.
The law says that the accused “knew” the complainant did not consent if he was aware the complainant was not consenting (actual knowledge) or was reckless as to whether the complainant was consenting or not.
To establish that the accused was “reckless”, the Crown must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that either:

the accused simply failed to consider whether or not the complainant was consenting at all, and just went ahead with the touching, [even though the risk the complainant was not consenting would have been obvious to someone with the accused’s mental capacity if the accused had turned their mind to it], or

the accused realised the possibility the complainant was not consenting but went ahead regardless of whether the complainant was consenting or not.

The definitions of consent have been included for my consideration as the provision (s77 of the Crimes Act) which prescribes that consent is no defence to a sexual offence involving children under 16 is only applicable to females, and this offence concerns male complainants.

DIRECTIONS

General directions

In accordance with s 133 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), and as required by the decision of the High Court in Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250, I remind myself of the following principles of law:

A Judge who tries criminal proceedings without a jury may make any finding that could have been made by a jury on the question of the guilt of the accused person. Any such finding has, for all purposes, the same effect as a verdict of a jury.

A judgment by a Judge in any such case must include the principles of law applied by the Judge and the findings of fact on which the Judge relies.

If any Act or law requires a warning to be given to a jury in any such case, the Judge is to take the warning into account in dealing with the matter.

I remind myself of the requirement to state findings on the main grounds critical to the contest between the parties and on which the verdict rests. In this trial, the critical issue is whether the complainants were accurate and reliable witnesses.

Inferences

In my role as the judge of facts, I can draw inferences from the direct evidence from experiences had in my own life. Inferences may be valid or invalid, justified or unjustified, correct or incorrect. Noting the requirement to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, there is an additional requirement, among other things, to be extremely careful about drawing any inference. Any possible inference will be examined to ensure that it is a justifiable and rational inference in the circumstances.

Burden of proof

I now direct myself to the burden of proof of the guilt of the accused. To prove the accused guilty of each count, the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the elements of the offence in each count. That burden is placed squarely on the Crown and is in respect of every element or essential fact that makes up the offence charged. There is no stage where that burden is shifted to the accused to prove any fact or issue that is in dispute.

The standard and onus of proof

Beyond reasonable doubt are ordinary words that carry their everyday meaning, and that is how I understand them. If, at the end of my deliberations, after considering the evidence and submissions made by the parties, I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to any one or more of the elements for a particular count, a verdict of not guilty must be returned.
I direct myself to the presumption of innocence. The accused is presumed innocent unless and until the Crown satisfies me that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution must prove each element of each offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused has no onus of proving anything. I must not act on suspicion. I must not act on what I believe might probably be the case. I can only return a guilty verdict if I am satisfied the Crown has proved each critical element of the offence charged beyond reasonable doubt. If the Crown fails to meet that high onus, if I have doubts about their case on a count, the accused must have the benefit of any reasonable doubt, and I must return a verdict of not guilty on that count.
The accused gave evidence in the original trial. He did not have to do that as he bears no onus to prove anything, but the fact that he gave evidence does not alter the burden of proof. The Crown must prove the necessary elements of each offence and prove them beyond reasonable doubt. I will treat his evidence the same way as I treat the evidence of other witnesses. I can accept part of it and reject part of it.
The accused did not give evidence in the special hearing, concerning the additional complainants CC, IM and MH. I direct myself that he bears no onus to do so, and I must not draw any adverse inference from the fact that he did not give evidence.

The accused is charged with multiple counts (direction in accordance with R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82)

The accused is charged with 35 counts, relating to seven complainants. I must give separate consideration to each count. I must consider the evidence in respect of each count separately. I am entitled to return different verdicts on different counts if there is a logical reason for that outcome.
I direct myself that the availability of an alternative count is not an invitation to compromise my verdict.

People lie for all sorts of reasons (direction in accordance with Jovanovic v R (1997) 42 NSWLR 520)

It would be wrong of me to conclude that the complainants are telling the truth because there is no apparent reason, in my view, for them to lie. People lie for all sorts of reasons. Sometimes it is apparent. Sometimes it is not. Sometimes the reason is discovered. Sometimes it is not. I cannot be satisfied that the complainants are telling the truth merely because there is no reason for them to have made up these allegations. There might be a reason for them to be untruthful that nobody knows about.

How I am to assess the evidence

I must consider the evidence as a whole. Some of the evidence is direct, and some circumstantial as it involves drawing inferences from proved facts. I may not, as a matter of law, find the accused guilty on a count unless I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable explanation, or conclusion, other than the guilt of the accused.
In evaluating the evidence in this hearing, I can use my life experiences, training, and experience as a lawyer and judge. As part of my fact-finding process, I can make value judgments.
I note that for most people, giving evidence in a trial is not common, and may be a stressful experience. I must not jump to conclusions based solely on how a witness gives evidence. I am aware that people have different reactions and appearances when they give evidence. Witnesses come from different backgrounds, and have different abilities, values and life experiences. There are many variables that may affect their presentation. I must take care, as the manner in which witnesses give evidence may not be the only, or even the most important, factor in my decision. Rather, I am to assess the evidence “as far as possible, on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively established facts and the apparent logic of events”: Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22.
Many of the witnesses (including four of the complainants) did not give evidence before me. A video or audio recording of their evidence from the original trial, including cross-examination, was played to me in court. Some witnesses gave live evidence before me via AVL from a remote facility. I direct myself that I should not draw any inference against the accused or give the evidence any greater or lesser weight because it was given by an alternative means. I am to assess the evidence in the same way as I would assess the evidence of any other witness in this case.

The Crown case relies on the evidence of a single witness

The Crown seeks to prove the guilt of the accused with a case based largely or exclusively on the evidence of a single witness (the relevant complainant). Accordingly, unless I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the relevant complainant is both an honest and accurate witness in the account they have given, I cannot find the accused guilty of the offence charged.
Before I can convict the accused, I should examine the evidence of the relevant complainant very carefully to satisfy myself that I can safely act upon that evidence to the high standard required in a criminal trial.
I do not exercise caution because of any personal views I have of any of the complainants. But in any criminal trial, where the Crown case relies wholly or substantially on the evidence of a single witness, I must always approach that evidence with particular caution because of the onus and standard of proof placed upon the Crown. I am entitled to convict the accused on the evidence of the relevant complainant, but only after I have carefully examined the evidence and satisfied myself that it is accurate and reliable, beyond reasonable doubt.

Possible Inconsistencies in the evidence (direction in accordance with s 293A Criminal Procedure Act 1989 NSW)

When assessing the evidence, I must consider whether any differences in each complainant’s account are important to my assessment of their truthfulness and reliability. But when I do so, I must note that the experience of courts over many years has shown that trauma may affect people differently and that both truthful and untruthful accounts of a sexual offence may contain differences. This is because people may not remember all the details of a sexual offence or may not describe a sexual offence in the same way each time. It is relatively common for there to be differences in a complainant’s accounts of a sexual offence.

There may be reasons for a delay in complaint or lack of complaint (direction in accordance with s 294(2) Criminal Procedure Act 1989 NSW)

The Crown conceded that this direction was not applicable to these proceedings given they were commenced before these provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act applied. However, considering the nature of the matter, I determine it is prudent to direct myself, in relation to the lack of, or delay in complaint relevant to particular complainants, that I should bear in mind that a delay in complaining does not necessarily indicate that the allegation(s) are false. There may be good reasons why a victim of a sexual assault may hesitate in making, or refrain from making, a complaint about it.
The defence case is the complainant(s) are not telling the truth, that there were gaps in their accounts, and that there were differences and inconsistencies between the witness’s accounts. It is my job, as judge of the facts, to decide whether or not any differences in the complainant’s account are important in assessing their truthfulness and reliability.

Misconceptions about a person’s response to giving evidence (direction in accordance with s 292D Criminal Procedure Act 1989 NSW)

The Crown conceded that this direction was not applicable to these proceedings given they were commenced before the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act applied. However, considering the nature of the matter, I determine it is prudent that I direct myself that trauma affects people in different ways. Some people may show obvious signs of emotion or distress when giving evidence about a sexual offence, but others may not. The absence of emotion or distress does not necessarily mean a person is not telling the truth about a sexual offence, any more than the presence of emotion or distress means they are telling the truth about it.

Danger of convicting the accused based on uncorroborated evidence (direction in accordance with s 294AA Criminal Procedure Act 1989 NSW)

The complainants are not a special class of witness requiring that their evidence be independently corroborated. I am entitled to convict the accused on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant. Professor Barnier and Dr Roberts suggested that corroboration was required to distinguish a complainant’s memory as genuine from a memory that may be false. They did so in a forensic sense, not a legal sense.

Complaint evidence

The Crown sought a full complaint direction for the complaint evidence in respect of MH, who made a contemporaneous complaint to his mother, and for the complaint evidence in respect of Philip Wright, who made a relatively contemporaneous complaint to a friend and colleague, Mr Royal. Counsel for the accused, Mr Pickering did not oppose this.
I direct myself, in relation to complaints made to MH’s mother and Mr Royal, that the fact that a complaint was made bolsters the complainant’s credibility, and I can also use the complaint as proof that the offences alleged occurred. As I will outline in due course, these complaints were vague and in the case of the complaint made to Mr Royal in particular, the complainant had a different account of the complaint than Mr Royal, which I will detail and consider later in the judgment.
Complaints by the other complainants are decades old and have no temporal connection to the alleged offending. As to those complainants, I direct myself that I can use their evidence of complaint in a more limited way, that is, that it bolsters their credibility as witnesses, but I cannot use it as proof that the offences actually occurred. The Crown led the evidence of their complaint for the limited purpose which I have identified.
I must also consider that just because a person says something on more than one occasion, it does not mean that what was said is necessarily true or reliable. A false or inaccurate statement does not become more reliable just because it is repeated.

Context evidence

Some complainants gave evidence that the accused sexually abused them on occasions other than the offences charged. These acts are uncharged. This is context evidence. It has been placed before me for a limited purpose, only to place the complainant’s evidence in what the Crown says is the realistic context. I remind myself my task is confined to considering whether the Crown can prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did commit one or more of the offences on the indictment.
Even if I accept that these uncharged acts occurred, I cannot substitute that evidence for evidence of the charged acts (and convict the accused on this basis). Nor can I use the context evidence as a general disparagement of his character.

The accused is forensically disadvantaged by the delay in proceedings

It is important for me to fully appreciate the effects of the delay in the complaint by the complainants on the accused’s ability to defend himself by testing the Crown’s evidence or bringing forward evidence in his own case, to establish reasonable doubt about his guilt.
There are specific difficulties encountered by the accused in testing evidence brought by the Crown or in adducing evidence in his own case. These are,

There has been a delay in instituting the prosecution of the accused. He was first charged in 2014, and the first allegations are alleged to have occurred in the early 1970s.

The Crown case largely relies on the evidence of the complainants, and not objective records such as documents.

It is possible that human recollection has been distorted since the time of the alleged offences in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

There are matters that may have contributed to the distortion of the recollections of certain witnesses (conversations shortly after the acts alleged between the complainants and their parents, or other people).

The delay has caused those difficulties, and the accused is not responsible for that delay.
These difficulties put the accused at a significant disadvantage in responding to the Crown case, either in testing the Crown’s evidence, or in bringing forward evidence himself to establish a reasonable doubt about his guilt, or both.
The delay means that evidence relied upon by the Crown cannot be as fully tested as it otherwise might have been.
Had the allegations been brought to light and the prosecution commenced much sooner, it would be expected that the complainants’ memories for details would have been clearer. This may have enabled their evidence to be checked in relation to those details against independent sources to verify it, or to disprove it. The complainants’ inability to recall precise details of the circumstances surrounding the incidents makes it difficult for the accused to throw doubt on their evidence by pointing to circumstances which may contradict them. Had the accused learned of the allegations at a much earlier time he may have been able to recall relevant details which could have been used by his counsel in cross-examination of the complainant(s).
Another aspect of the accused’s disadvantage is that had he learned of the allegations at a much earlier time, he may have been able to find witnesses or items of evidence that might have either contradicted the complainants or supported his case, or both. He may have been able to recall with some more precision what he was doing, and where he was at particular times, on particular dates and to have been able to bring forward evidence to support this, and his defence generally.
I should also take into account that because of the delay the accused has lost the opportunity to bring forward evidence from the following sources:

The records of the surgeries from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, including,

Staff lists, which may have assisted in identifying eyewitnesses who were present in and around his surgery at the relevant time (other than family members which gave evidence at the hearing),

Patient records or appointment books that may have recorded the dates on which the complainants attended the surgery, and for what procedures,

Hours of operation and any shut-down periods,

Other witnesses who are now deceased, such as Greg Millen, Bishop Kennedy, or Phillip Wright’s father.

Because the accused has been put into this situation of significant disadvantage, he has been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence. As a result, before I can convict the accused, I must give the prosecution’s case the most careful scrutiny. In carrying out this scrutiny, I am to bear in mind the specific disadvantages faced by the accused which I have outlined, namely, the fact the complainants’ evidence has not been tested to the extent that it otherwise could have been and the inability of the accused to bring forward evidence to challenge it, or to support his defence.

The accused is a person of good character

The accused (other than these matters) has no criminal history. I am entitled to take that evidence of good character into account in his favour when I consider whether the Crown has proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. I am entitled to reason that a person of good character is unlikely to have committed the offences charged. I am entitled to reason that a person of good character is more likely to be telling the truth in their evidence and their interview with police.
The accused’s good character does not provide him with any kind of defence. It is only one of the many factors which I am to take into account in assessing the evidence and determining whether I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt the offence(s) have been proved.

The prosecution suggests the accused told lies (direction in accordance with Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234)

I direct myself regarding evidence brought by the Crown (Exhibit 10 – recorded conversation between Phillip Wright and the accused in 2014). The Crown submit that I would find that that the accused lied in this conversation, about knowing the complainant, and about committing the offences charged.
Whether the accused did in fact lie is a matter for me to decide. To decide that a lie was told, I must be satisfied that the accused said something that was untrue, and that at the time of making the statement, he knew that it was untrue. Saying something that is untrue by mistake or out of confusion or forgetfulness is not a lie.
If I decide that a lie was told, I cannot use that fact in support of a conclusion that the accused is guilty. A lie cannot prove the accused’s guilt, nor can a lie be used in conjunction with other evidence that the Crown relies on to prove the accused’s guilt.
The only use I can make of the fact that the accused told a lie is in my assessment of his credibility.
If I am satisfied that he did lie, then that may be decided by me as having a bearing upon whether I believe the other things that he has said.

The accused’s evidence and interview with police (direction in accordance with Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507)

This direction is applicable to the offences concerning the original complainants Phillip and Joseph Wright, SF and ST (Counts 9 to 30), as the accused gave evidence in the original trial concerning these complainants but not in the special hearing concerning the additional complainants (CC, IM and MH).
I direct myself regarding the account of events given by the accused in his electronically recorded interview with police (ERISP) and later in his evidence. The account he gave in both is consistent with innocence. The accused must not be found guilty unless and until I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. He is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt that I may have at the end of my deliberations.
It follows from this, that if I believe the accused’s account given in his interview with police or in his evidence, I must return verdicts of not guilty.
If I find difficulty in accepting the accused’s account given in his interview with police or in his evidence, but think it might be true, then I must return verdicts of not guilty.
If I do not believe the accused’s account, then I must put it to one side. Nevertheless, the question will remain: has the Crown, upon the basis of evidence that I do accept, proved the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

Expert evidence

I direct myself regarding the expert evidence led in this trial. An expert witness is a person with specialised knowledge based on their training, study or experience. They are entitled to express an opinion, unlike other witnesses. The value of the expert’s opinion depends on the reliability and accuracy of the material which the expert used to reach their opinion. It also depends on the degree to which they analysed the material, and the level of skill and experience applied in formulating their opinion. Experts can differ in their experience, but each can be qualified to give an opinion where it is based on their specialised knowledge.
The expert evidence is before me to assist me in considering particular evidence (in this case, memory, the effects of hypnosis on memory, the psychiatric conditions experienced by a particular complainant and its effect on the reliability of his memory).
I direct myself that I am entitled to reject the expert evidence, and that I am entitled to take into account my common sense and my own experiences that are relevant to the issue to which the expert evidence relates.

Crown witness not called (direction in accordance with Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397 at [27])

The wife of ST was not called. Allan Huggins, who is a significant witness concerning the offences against Phillip Wright, was not called in the Crown case. Phillip Wright gave evidence that he made a complaint in 1985 to a highway patrol officer named Peter, who told him to speak to a sergeant at the station (who was unnamed). Phillip Wright gave evidence that he made a detailed complaint to the sergeant identifying the accused. The highway patrol officer and the sergeant were not called. Joseph Wright gave evidence that he made a complaint to a friend called Mel, and her friend as well. Mel and her friend were not called.
I direct myself that I can take the fact that there was no evidence from these witnesses into account in deciding whether the Crown has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. I am not to guess what they would have said had they been called.
If Mr Huggins was called to give evidence in this hearing, I would have to direct myself in accordance with s165 of the Evidence Act, because it is alleged that he was a participant in the alleged criminal activity (counts concerning Phillip Wright).

Tendency evidence

On 10 April 2025 the Crown filed an amended tendency notice. It was an updated tendency notice to the notice previously served on 26 April 2023. The tendency sought to be adduced (contained in the new tendency notice) has been simplified in accordance with the recent decisions of Wardell v R [2025] NSWCCA 26 and AR v R [2025] NSWCCA 22.
The Crown says that the accused had a particular tendency, that is,

To have a particular state of mind, namely a sexual interest in pre-teenage and teenage boys, and

To act on that state of mind, by engaging in sexual activity against pre-teenage and teenage boys whilst performing dentistry or hypnosis (or relaxation) on them within his workplace.

The evidence the Crown relies on in support of the alleged tendencies include each act alleged in the charged offences, and uncharged acts. The Crown ask that I consider all the facts and draw appropriate conclusions from proved facts about the accused’s state of mind.
I must consider whether I am satisfied the alleged tendency exists. If after considering all the evidence at trial, including both uncharged and charged acts, I find that the alleged tendency has been proved, I can then use any proved tendency in my consideration of the ultimate question of whether the Crown has proved the accused committed the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt.
If I am not satisfied that the acts relied on as tendency evidence occurred, I put this evidence to one side, as an unproved act or state of mind must not have any relevance to my deliberations.
If I accept some or all of the evidence said to support the alleged tendency, I must not reason the accused had this tendency, therefore he is a bad person, and therefore he must have committed a specific offence, or all of offences charged.
I must not substitute evidence of the offences charged for evidence of acts relied upon by the Crown as tendency evidence. Evidence of tendency has been placed before me for a limited purpose, and I am to approach it in the way I have outlined earlier and use it for no other purpose.
I cannot convict the accused of a particular offence on the basis of tendency evidence alone. Proof of a tendency is only one of the matters that go to making my final determination. That determination must go to the ultimate question: based on all the evidence I accept, has the Crown proved each element of an offence beyond reasonable doubt?

The Crown case

The Crown called the following witnesses in the special hearing:

Mr CC, complainant.

Ms JLC, the wife of CC,

Ms Wendy Starr, a friend of CC,

Mr SC, the brother of CC,

Ms SHC, the sister of CC,

Ms Kerry Edwards, (formerly Brazel) a former dental nurse at the accused’s practice,

Ms Amanda Laird, a friend of Phillip Wright,

Mr IM, complainant,

Ms Amanda Cosgrove, a former colleague of Mr IM,

Mr CM, the brother of Mr IM,

Mr RM, the brother of Mr IM,

Mr MH, complainant

Ms MCH, the wife of MH,

Ms JH, the mother of MH,

Ms Michelle West, the practice manager of the Grafton Dental Centre.

Mr SH, the brother of Mr MH,

Dr Susan Murray, a doctor who practiced at the Barney Street surgery,

Mr DMCG, tendency witness,

Ms JLH, a former friend or partner of Mr IM, and

Dr Maria Konig, who purchased the Grafton Dental Centre from the accused.

The Crown played the pre-recorded evidence of:

Mr ST, complainant

Mr RT, the brother of Mr ST,

Ms MT, the mother of ST and RT,

Mr SF, complainant,

Mr PF, the brother of SF,

Ms DF, the mother of SF and PF,

Mr JF, the father of SF and PF,

Phillip Wright, complainant,

Ms Cathryn Hardman, the former spouse of Mr Phillip Wright,

Ms Monica Vaughan, a former teacher at the local Catholic School,

Brother Patrick McCarthy, who worked at the local Catholic School,

Brother John Cantwell, the former principal at the local Catholic school,

Sister Mary Talty, a teacher and administrator at the local Catholic school,

Mr Joseph (also known as Eric) Wright, complainant,

Ms Elaine Wright, the mother of Mr Joseph and Mr Phillip Wright,

Ms Trudy Standen, the former partner of Mr Joseph Wright,

Ms Julie McCarthy, a friend and complaint witness for Mr Joseph Wright,

Mr Arjan Wilkie, a complaint witness for Mr Joseph Wright,

Mr OW, tendency witness,

Mr CW, tendency witness,

Ms BH, the mother of Mr OW and Mr CW,

Mr JC, tendency witness,

Mr WC, the father of Mr JC,

Ms CRC, the wife of Mr JC,

Mr MR, tendency witness,

Mr MB, tendency witness,

Ms MRB, the mother of Mr MB,

Mr MHK, tendency witness,

Mr JK, tendency witness,

Mr MG, tendency witness,

Ms LG, mother of Mr MG,

Mr LW, a child who had hypnosis sessions with the accused,

Mr DW, who as a child was treated by the accused, (no relation to LW)

Mr AW, father of DW,

Dr Stephen Hannaford, a doctor who practiced at the Barney Street surgery,

Ms Narelle Niness, a former dental nurse and receptionist to the accused,

Dr Neil Smith, a dentist who worked for the accused, practicing in Walcha and Uralla,

Ms Robyn Wallace, a former dental nurse and receptionist to the accused,

Ms Kim Bath, a former dental nurse and receptionist to the accused,

Mr Phillip Smith, a psychologist who practiced at the Barney Street surgery,

Ms Anne Wilson, former Executive Officer of the Australian Society of Hypnosis,

Ms Margaret O’Brien, expert witness and registered psychologist who has practiced hypnosis,

Dr John Roberts, expert witness and psychiatrist,

Professor Amanda Barnier, expert witness,

Detective Senior Constable Mooney,

Detective Skye Hardy,

The accused, (in the defence case)

Ms IS, the accused’s daughter, (in the defence case)

Mr NS, the accused’s son, (in the defence case)

Mr LS, the accused’s son, (in the defence case)

Ms RS, the accused’s daughter, (in the defence case)

Mrs HS, the accused’s wife, (in the defence case)

The Crown, without objection, tendered 70 documents, namely

Document containing timeline of ages and years of school for Phillip and Joseph Wright,

Image of entrance to the local Catholic High School, showing approximate location of the counsellor’s rooms,

Diagram drawn by Phillip Wright of the layout of the counselling room,

Diagram drawn by Phillip Wright of the layout of the accused’s dental surgery on Barney Street, Armidale,

Image of 117 Barney Street Armidale, identified by Mr Wright as location of counsellor’s town clinic rooms,

Diagram drawn by Phillip Wright of the layout of consulting room,

Bundle containing extracts from year books from the local Catholic High School with references to Phillip Wright,

Bundle of Google Maps depicting Barney Street,

Bundle of photographs with corresponding street maps relating to Barney Street area,

Disc containing recorded conversation between Phillip Wright and the accused in August 2014,

Photograph of the accused shown to Joseph Wright,

Accused’s electronically recorded interview with police (ERISP) dated 24 September 2014,

Diagram drawn by accused depicting layout of surgery during ERISP,

Drawing of layout of the accused’s dental surgery drawn by SF dated 21 October 2014,

Screenshot of Google Maps depicting property on Barney Street Armidale, signed by SF on 21 October 2014,

Diagram drawn by JC depicting layout of Barney Street surgery signed 25 February 2015,

Diagram drawn by OW depicting layout of Barney Street surgery signed 5 November 2014,

Google Maps image depicting location in South Street, Walcha, marked by MB, and signed 20 October 2014,

Diagram drawn by CW depicting layout of Barney Street surgery signed 2 December 2014,

Diagram drawn by CW depicting layout of “Hypnotherapy room” signed 2 December 2014,

Code of ethics of the Australian Society of Hypnosis,

Document containing definitions of hypnosis,

Article authored by Professor John F. Kihlstrom titled “Hypnosis and memory”

Records of cheques (for dentistry expenses) from SF’s family,

Copy of the weekly planner for October 1983 for BH (the mother of CW and OW),

Photocopy of redacted diary entry of BH,

Document showing payments to the accused from JC’s family,

Diagram drawn by DW, depicting room containing dentist chair, signed 21 September 2016,

Diagram drawn by Narelle Ninness, depicting layout of Barney Street surgery, signed 11 November 2014,

Bundle of photographs depicting Narelle Niness outside and inside the dental surgery in the 1980s,

Article with heading “Dentist visits Uralla” depicting picture of the accused and Narelle Niness, undated,

Diagram drawn by Robyn Wallace, depicting layout of Walcha surgery, made on 27 August 2014,

Diagram drawn by Robyn Wallace, depicting layout of Barney Street surgery, made on 27 August 2014,

Diagram drawn by Robyn Wallace, depicting layout of Uralla surgery, made on 27 August 2014,

Diagram drawn by Kim Bath, depicting layout of Barney Street surgery, signed 20 October 2014,

Diagram drawn by Kerry Edwards, depicting layout of Barney Street surgery, signed 9 September 2015,

Two maps shown to Detective Skye Hardy showing distance from Armidale to Uralla, and Armidale to Walcha,

Two pages from a Yellow Pages book shown to Detective Skye Hardy with references to the accused’s name under section for dentists,

Bundle of school records relating to student JC from 1986 to 1991,

Document titled “medical benefits schedule book – amendments – schedule fees as of 1 November 1982”,

Notice of Alibi pursuant to s150 of the Criminal Procedure Act providing notice of an intention to adduce evidence regarding accused practicing dentistry in Walcha on Tuesdays (from April 1981 until early 1982, and again from early 1983 onwards), in Uralla on Thursdays (from March 1981 onwards), and coaching soccer on Wednesday afternoon from 4pm to 5:30pm,

Table with summary of allegations, age and school year of complainants,

Map depicting Armidale, Uralla and Walcha,

Diagram drawn by CC, depicting location of accused’s caravan in Walcha, signed 2 November 2017,

Google Map depicting Walcha,

Photographs depicting accused’s caravan in South Street, Walcha,

Diagram drawn by CC, depicting location of accused’s surgery in South Street, Walcha, signed 2 November 2017,

1 page of Facebook messages between Wendy Starr and CC, regarding seeing accused at rugby game,

1 page of Facebook messages between Wendy Starr and CC, containing further conversation regarding seeing accused at rugby game,

Statement of Dr Cristy Norton dated 20 July 2017, (dentist who saw ST in 2001 and made notes about his dental condition),

Statement of Jessica Wilson dated 21 April 2016, practice manager of dental clinic which ST visited in 2001,

Statement of VF, wife of SF, dated 21 October 2014,

Diagram drawn by IM, depicting Barney Street surgery, signed 28 July 2015,

Diagram of the room which contained a dental chair or bed in the Barney Street surgery drawn by IM and signed 28 July 2015,

Statement of GM (brother of IM) dated 9 September 2015,

Diagram drawn by MH depicting location of the accused’s Grafton surgery on Prince Street signed 16 May 2018,

Bundle of three aerial photographs depicting locations referred to by MH in his evidence,

Diagram drawn by MH depicting internal layout of the accused’s Grafton surgery dated 16 May 2018,

Bundle containing messages between Phillip Wright and MH, showing MH’s initial contact with Phillip Wright regarding the allegations against the accused,

Statement of Barbara Clare, dental nurse and office manager of dental practice in Grafton, dated 11 September 2018,

Bundle of dental records relating to MH,

Statement of Mrs EC, mother of JC, dated 25 February 2015,

Bundle of 7 pages containing expenditure records made by the mother of JK, containing reference of payment to the accused in July 1976,

Copy of Exhibit 8 (bundle of Google Maps depicting Barney Street, Armidale),

Statement of JLH, dated 4 November 2018,

Transcript of the evidence of IS (the accused’s daughter), dated 25 September 2017,

Calendar for January and February 1973,

2 documents: an Article from the Armidale Express titled “retired dentist [WS]” found guilty of molesting boys in the 1980s, and document printed 13/12/2019 showing comment section of Facebook post made on 1/11/2017 by Armidale Express referring to accused’s conviction, showing comment from CC,

Curriculum vitae of Professor Amanda Jane Barnier, and

Agreed facts, signed by the Crown and the accused.

The accused, without objection, tendered 50 documents (from the original trial), namely

Extract from local Catholic High School yearbook in 1980 containing reference to appointment of Mr Huggins as school counsellor,

Image of 101 Barney Street Armidale,

Aerial maps of Armidale in early 1970s, one zoomed in,

Aerial map of Armidale in the early 1970s, marked by witness Phillip Wright,

Document of transfer referring to transfer of Mozeley’s Squash Tennis and Fitness Centre, indicating that the centre was at 95 Barney Street,

Company registration details for Mozeley’s Squash Tennis,

Statement of Nathalie Heaton dated 18 November 2014,

Image of 119 Barney Street in the 1980s,

Statement of Mr Brett Warden dated 4 June 2014 with annexures,

Article from Uralla times dated 13 August 1981 containing image depicting the accused and Narelle Niness,

NSW Death certificate for Gregory John Millen, date of death 21 October 1983,

NSW Death certificate for Henry Joseph Kennedy (Bishop Kennedy), date of death 3 September 2003,

Letter from Land and property information NSW to NSW police, regarding historical ownership search on HS and WS, for period 1 January 1973 to 31 December 1989,

Letter from Land and property information NSW to NSW police, regarding ownership search on HS and WS’s ownership of 119 Barney Street Armidale, for period from 1 January 1979 to October 1989,

Image depicting view of a street,

A document containing names of practioners of hypnosis,

Notice from [WS] of sale of the clinic to Robert Dewhurst, dated 1 April 1986,

Note from [WS] that Neil Smith (dentist) is now residing in Walcha and visiting Uralla at certain days,

Article titled “Dentist for Uralla” dated 25 February 1981 with mention of accused practicing dentistry in Uralla,

Surveyor’s report relating to Barney Street, Armidale property dated 1 April 1966,

Curriculum vitae of Dr John Roberts,

Report of Dr John Roberts dated 30 June 2017,

Report of Dr John Roberts dated 4 August 2017,

Report of Dr John Roberts dated 8 August 2017,

Report of Dr John Roberts dated 30 August 2017,

Letter addressed to Dr John Roberts, from Crown Solicitor’s Office NSW, dated 8 September 2017,

Bundle of documents titled “Matter of Joseph Wright and reported historical offences, Amanda Jane Barnier, PhD 25 July 2017,”

Document titled “Complainant material” containing index of materials from complainants,

Photograph of tree outside 119 Barney Street,

Two photographs depicting outside of 119 Barney Street,

Bundle of documents containing plans of Barney Street,

Computer generated layout of 119 Barney Street,

Photograph of dental room inside Barney Street Surgery, depicting accused in a surgical mask,

Photograph of painting inside Barney Street Surgery,

Photograph of window inside Barney Street Surgery,

Photograph of rear of Barney Street Surgery,

Bundle of Google Maps depicting Armidale area,

Invoice from Newell’s music centre for purchase of piano, addressed to the accused at Barney Street Surgery,

Bundle of dental records relating to SF,

Bundle of dental records relating to DF,

Extract from Armidale express, article titled “Squash finals” dated June 27, 1983, with reference to the accused and a semi-final on Wednesday at 7.30pm,

Extract from Armidale express, titled “meetings” dated February 26, 1982, with reference to meeting of referees on March 2, 1982,

Receipt from Mozeley’s Squash Centre addressed to the accused,

Photograph depicting accused and his son, NS, as well as other children in 1976 or 1977,

Sketch of Barney Street surgery drawn by IS,

Sketch of Barney Street surgery drawn by NS,

Sketch of Barney Street surgery drawn by LS,

Sketch of Barney Street surgery drawn by RS,

Sketch of Barney Street surgery drawn by HS, and

Annexure to affidavit containing image of plaque for Armidale Fire Station, as well as letter regarding location of Armidale fire station.

And in the special hearing, tendered two documents, namely,

Image of the Royal Café in Walcha, and

Extract from appointment book containing references to dental work performed on CC in Walcha.

Agreed facts

For the purposes of these criminal proceedings, the accused, upon the advice of his lawyer and the Crown have agreed upon the following facts pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW):

CC and Exhibit BBB

CC, the complainant in relation to Counts 1 to 8 on the indictment, was born in Walcha, NSW, on [redacted] 1961.
CC continued to reside in Walcha with his family until he was 18 years of age. His father’s name was NC and his mother’s name was HC.
CC had 3 siblings:

SC - brother

SHC – sister

KC (now deceased) – brother.

Exhibit BBB is an extract from what appears to be an old appointment book relating to dental records between 1 February 1972 and 4 August 1973. Some of the records are identified as relating to Walcha, while the locations of the majority are not identified.
The appointment book was provided to the accused’s legal representatives in January 2019.
Entries of relating to CC appear on the following dates:

9 January 1973

16 January 1973

13 February 1973

15 February 1973

27 February 1973.

The following dates concern entries associated with the family members of CC:

5 October 1972 (KC)

1 March 1973 (KC and HC – mother)

15 March 1973 (KC)

20 March 1973 (KC)

22 March 1973 (SC)

27 March 1973 (KC)

3 April 1973 (SC)

5 April 1973 (SC)

Allan Huggins and 117 Barney Street, Armidale

The property at 117 Barney St, Armidale is depicted in a photograph marked Exhibit 5.
Throughout the relevant period the property located at 117 Barney St, Armidale was occupied by Dr David Breusch, who conducted a medical practice at the location.
Dr Breusch joined a group general practice at the location in May 1975. From December 1979 to June 1997, he operated as a sole practitioner from the location.
Dr Breusch gave evidence in the trial concerning Allan Huggins that the premises at 117 Barney St was constructed in the 1930’s as a doctor’s residence with a surgery attached. Viewed from the roadway on Barney St, the surgery attached was the location on the left side. That evidence was not challenged.
Dr Breusch also gave evidence that at various times during the period he occupied the premises he sublet the surgery to different medical specialists, and a child psychologist/counsellor named Allan Huggins.
Allan Huggins operated from the location on a part-time basis. Dr Breusch’s recollection was that it was for a period of 2 to 3 years.
Allan Huggins formally commenced at the [local] Catholic High School on 17 March 1980.
Allan Huggins maintained appointment diaries from 1979 to 1985 (inclusive) that came into the possession of NSW Police during the course of investigations carried out.
Additionally, evidence adduced in the Huggins trial (including the diaries referred to above) suggests that Huggins operated his practice from other locations in Armidale during the relevant period, including at the [local] Catholic High School, and a clinic operated from 148 Marsh St, Armidale.
The diaries indicate Allan Huggins operated from 117 Barney St, Armidale including between 1980 to 1983 (inclusive).
The first noted entry relating to Philip Wright was 1:30pm on 24 October 1980 at 117 Barney St, Armidale. The notation accompanying the appointment was “(Prelim. Full Psych Testing)”.
The last noted entry relating to Philip Wright was at 2pm on 17 October 1984 at [the local] High School.
The diaries record Philip Wright seeing Huggins on 5 further occasions at 117 Barney St, Armidale in November 1980. There are no further entries in 1980 relating to Philip Wright.
On 5 August 1981 the diary records an appointment with Philip Wright at the [local] Catholic High School. There are no further appointments appearing in the diary for Philip Wright in 1981 or 1982.
In 1983 the diary records the following summary of appointments with Philip Wright at the [local] Catholic High School:

6 appointments in March;

3 appointments in April;

2 appointments in May;

3 appointments in June;

4 appointments in July;

3 appointments in August;

3 appointments in September;

2 appointments in October; and

1 appointment in November.

In 1984 the diary records the following summary of appointments with Philip Wright at the [local] Catholic High School:

3 appointments in February;

3 appointments in March;

1 appointment in April;

2 appointments in May;

1 appointment in June;

1 appointment in July;

2 appointments in August;

2 appointments in September; and

2 appointments in October.

The Police did not locate diary entries in relation to Joseph Wright.

THE EVIDENCE

The evidence of the tendency witnesses

Crown submissions on tendency evidence

The Crown correctly submitted that I would deal with the tendency evidence using a three-step process.

The first step was for the Crown to identify the evidence it relies upon (see tendency notice identifying the evidence relied upon by the Crown in support of alleged tendency),

The second step is that from that evidence, I am to determine whether a tendency has been established,

Thirdly, if I am so satisfied then the evidence can be used in my consideration the accused’s guilt to the offences on the indictment,

The Crown referred me to the evidence of the accused's sons, LS and NS, who gave evidence that the accused, their father, engaged in some relaxation techniques with them but that they were not massaged or asked to remove their clothing. The Crown submitted that I would draw an inference (adverse to the accused) from the fact that the accused's sons were subject to relaxation techniques that did not involve the removal of clothing and physical contact, but the complainants and tendency witnesses were.
The Crown referred me to the evidence of witnesses who were subject to hypnosis by the accused that did not involve the removal of any clothing or massaging (for example, Kim Bath, Narelle Ninness and LW). The Crown submitted that I would draw an adverse inference from this evidence, as on the evidence, only teenage boys were massaged by the accused which the Crown says arises from his tendency to have (and act upon) a sexual interest in teenage and pre-teenage boys. The Crown submitted they were credible witnesses who had no ulterior motives and should be believed. They gave evidence which was personal and embarrassing. There was no association or collusion between them.

Cross-examination of the complainant

I accept the following which emerged in the course of the cross-examination of the complainant:

The complainant’s account of his first visit to the South Street surgery (Count 5) is unreliable because a strong feature of his evidence was that he met Robyn Wallace, the accused’s dental assistant and receptionist, who he described as pretty and a few years older than him, for the first and only time when he attended the South Street surgery for the first time. He was able to use the meeting of Robyn Wallace as a marker around which he could pinpoint the date and location of the other appointments (and offences). Robyn Wallace was an employee of the accused at one stage, but she would have been nine years old at the time the complainant alleges Count 5 occurred. Kerry Edwards was the accused’s receptionist and dental assistant at the time, and she gave evidence that she remembered the complainant, but said that the procedure described by CC would have required her presence and assistance as it was a major procedure. His unreliability in this regard affects the reliability of his evidence of the other offences.

The complainant did not tell anyone about what he says happened with the accused until seeing the post on Facebook made by Ms Starr in October 2017, after the accused had been convicted, and in turn, sending her a message on Facebook telling her that he was a victim too. At that stage they had not seen each other since school and were friends on Facebook. It is, as suggested in cross-examination, strange that he would disclose something this serious to a Facebook friend that he had not seen in many years, and he would not tell his wife of many years or other family members or friends. I accept that his wife said she did not find it strange that he would tell Ms Starr before he told her, but it remains strange and implausible, nonetheless.

There were several inconsistencies between what was said in his statements to police and the evidence he gave in Court. Significantly, in his statement, he told police that no cap was placed on his tooth in the first appointment with the accused, and the tooth was only cleaned and the cap placed on the second appointment. His evidence in Court, by contrast, was that a cap was placed on the first appointment. His statement makes no mention of a temporary cap being placed on his tooth at any stage, or a mould being taken, while these procedures were detailed in his evidence. The lack of detail in his statements compared to the detail included in his evidence suggests the witness engaged in innovation or reconstruction in the intervening period between his statement and his evidence in Court. This is reflected in the appointment book, (Exhibit BBB) which refers to him seeing the accused for a dental filling procedure, with no reference to the procedures detailed by him in his evidence (during which it is alleged the offending took place, almost simultaneously).

The accused’s appointment book

Most significantly, independent evidence contradicts the account given by the complainant. Extracts from the accused’s appointment book from this period, including for the Walcha practice, were tendered by the defence. They became Exhibit BBB. The complainant denied ever having a filling done by the accused. Exhibit BBB refers to two fillings being performed by the accused, one on 13 February 1973 and the other on 15 February 1973. There is no mention of broken teeth, moulds or caps. The defence acknowledged that these were not the complete dental records of the complainant, but the records place the first meeting of the accused and the complainant in February 1973, not between June and August (the winter rugby season) which was his evidence. There are no records of him attending for a broken tooth or attending at all in June or July 1973. Thus, the most important aspect of this complainant’s evidence is undone. On the complainant’s account, he came to be treated by the accused, over numerous appointments, because his teeth were damaged in a rugby accident in the winter of 1973. Numerous aspects of his evidence of this first appointment (when Count 1 and 2 is alleged to have occurred), such as him wearing the school winter uniform, which included the jumper and long grey pants, and the dental procedures he required, follow from the fact that he was being treated by the accused for the rugby injury suffered in the winter of 1973. This is also the foundation on which it is alleged that the subsequent offences (Counts 3,4,5,6,7 and 8) as these are alleged to have been committed in the course of further dental treatment and related follow up arising out of the rugby injury.
CC had no memory of a tooth extraction having been performed. The tooth extraction took place on 27 February 1973.
Agreed facts (Exhibit 70) were tendered at the close of the Crown case (about two months after this complainant gave evidence) which indicate that records held by the accused for the period February 1972 and 4 August 1973 contain entries for this complainant for the following dates:

9 January 1973

16 January 1973

13 February 1973 (put to the complainant in cross-examination)

15 February 1973 (put to the complainant in cross-examination)

27 February 1973 (put to the complainant in cross-examination)

The complainant’s evidence that he had a total of five appointments with the accused is borne out by the evidence (the agreed facts). He gave evidence that the appointments were held on a Tuesday or Thursday (although his firm position at one stage of his evidence was that they were on a Thursday). So is his evidence that the first two appointments were a short time apart (on his evidence, two weeks, and in the agreed facts, it was one week). This is the extent to which his account is borne out by the records.
I acknowledge that Exhibit BBB (which appears to be an appointment book and not patient cards) are not complete and only show records to 4 August 1973. I also direct myself that trauma (occasioned by an experience of sexual assault) can affect people in different ways and very often the evidence of a truthful witness can contain inconsistencies: s 293A Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). Notwithstanding, I consider the evidence of this complainant to contain considerable inconsistencies that are not understandable in the circumstances, and which raise reasonable doubts about the guilt of the accused. The central pillar of his evidence was his account of the rugby injury in the winter of 1973 (between June and July) which resulted in his attendance upon the accused for three appointments, one or two weeks apart (where Counts 1 to 5 are alleged to have occurred), in which he was treated for a specific injury, and then two further appointments which were six months apart. This account is completely contradicted by the records, even if they do show he attended on the accused for at least five appointments; it was for the period between 9 January and 27 February 1973. I do not consider that the agreed facts support his account.
I also consider it appropriate to direct myself that the accused is forensically disadvantaged in this regard. He faces a specific forensic disadvantage in the fact that patient records are not available to him, only an appointment book (Exhibit BBB). The delay in proceedings has deprived him of the opportunity to bring forward evidence (dental records from the Walcha practice from 1974,1975 or 1976) in his own case, that could establish reasonable doubt about his guilt.

The evidence of Kerry Edwards

Ms Edwards gave evidence (contrary to CC) that the caravan had a reception. The caravan was an open area which would have made it very difficult for the accused to touch the complainant in the manner alleged.
I accept the evidence of Ms Edwards. Her evidence contradicts the evidence of the complainant that there was no receptionist or reception area when he visited the accused for the first two or three appointments in the caravan, and her evidence also makes his allegations implausible. I do not accept that the accused would have engaged in the brazen acts alleged by this complainant in an open area, in which the receptionist or assistant, and potentially other patients were present in a small waiting area.

Complaint

Finally, I do not accept CC as a credible and reliable witness considering evidence given by his wife of over 30 years of how she came to know of the allegations and how the accused dealt with knowledge of the accused’s conviction from news or social media. Her evidence gives me the impression that upon seeing the article shared or posted by Ms Starr on Facebook, the complainant began vigilantly searching the internet for information about the accused and made a hasty disclosure to Ms Starr which may or may not have been entirely serious.

Unreliability of CC’s memory

It is clear from the evidence that the complainant’s memory was vague. There is a real possibility that he saw news of the dentist and started to retrace his steps and tried to fill in details of his vague memory with things that he had read about the accused. He engaged in research and “putting things together” based on what he read on the internet. There was no spontaneous realisation during the dinner conversation in 2015 where the dentist from Armidale was mentioned that had been abusing children. JLC gave the following evidence.

“Q. What was [CC] like after he'd done that as far as you could observe?
A. Look, after he realised and put it altogether and worked out - once he saw that Facebook thing and started, I suppose, reliving and recalling what had happened.
Q. Sorry, just to interrupt.
A. Sorry?
Q. Just obviously don’t tell us about what you think he was thinking--
A. No, okay, yep.”
(Transcript 12/3/25, p.99(27))

She said that her husband was angry, sad and depressed after the conversation in November 2017. Things at home became very tense. She said he was “hypervigilant, searching on the computer, looking for newspaper articles, anything that he could find on the news or whatever about, about him (the accused)” (Transcript 12/3/25, p.99(47)). She said that her husband what to be “on top of it,” and that he was tracking the accused.
For these reasons, chiefly, the facts brought to light by Exhibit BBB of his first meeting with the accused, I do not accept that this complainant is a credible and reliable witness and the evidence given by him in support of the allegations is implausible. I direct myself that the Crown case relies exclusively on the evidence of a single witness for the counts concerning this complainant. I have scrutinized the evidence of this single witness carefully and cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offences occurred. His evidence contains significant and insurmountable inconsistencies.
Accordingly, I find the accused not guilty of Counts 1 to 8.

IM – Count 31, 32 and 33

IM made a statement to police in July 2015. He was not called as a witness in the original trial. No explanation has been given for the failure to call him in the original trial. In assessing his reliability, I consider the following matters, which I have determined to be significant inconsistencies in the evidence of IM.

Inconsistencies

He gave a description of the accused which included (amongst other things) that accused spoke with a thick European accent. The accused was born and educated in Australia. I have listened to the accused’s evidence in the original trial (which was played over several days) and watched his ERISP. He does not have an accent let alone a thick European accent.
He referred in his account to what occurred before the alleged touching by the accused in his evidence, when he described his shirt being removed. There was no mention of his shirt being removed in his statement to police in 2015. I consider the absence of this detail from his statement a matter which raises the possibility that it was a recent invention and not a genuine memory which surfaced when he gave evidence in the hearing.
It was his evidence that he was told to “wake up” at the end of the session. The words “wake up” did not appear in any of his statements. Later in evidence he said he was told to get up.
There was an inconsistency between his 2015 and 2020 statements. In his first statement he said that the second and third appointments were the same as the first, the only difference was that the accused would change the place that he would feel relaxed. In the 2020 statement, he said this was a “misunderstanding” and on the first occasion, the accused suggested a beach or ocean and on the second or third occasion he did not suggest anywhere specific. He refused to accept that this was different to his evidence in court.
He could not describe how the accused’s hand (as he described earlier in his evidence, specifically the accused’s palm) came to be in contact with his testicles given the logistical difficulty as it was his evidence that he was lying on his stomach throughout the entire massage.
In evidence-in-chief, he said he had up to two visit appointments with the accused. He had told police it was two or three appointments with the accused. At paragraph 14 he said two or three further visits. In cross-examination he said, “at least two”. He gave multiple versions of the number of appointments he had with the accused. This could be on account of genuine uncertainty or invention, but it is a matter which diminishes his reliability as a witness.
He said none of his brothers were treated by the accused. His brothers gave evidence in the hearing and said that they were treated by the accused. I will not speculate about why the witness gave this evidence, but his inability to recall whether his brothers attended the same dentist is a matter which diminishes his reliability. It was a relevant question which was asked of all the other complainants. It was the case that the accused was a family dentist for most of the complainants, and their siblings gave evidence of matters which either corroborated or contradicted their experiences of the accused and the surgery.
He described a chair that would be able to be made flat so he could lay down. This was the chair on which the offences are alleged to have occurred. In his statement, there is no reference to the chair being flat or to him lying down. It was described as a “dentist chair”. He agreed in cross-examination that he did not say the chair was flat in his statements. Considering the importance of this detail, I consider this inconsistency to be a matter which significantly diminishes the credibility and reliability of this witness.
In cross-examination he said it was possible that the accused counted down to 10 on the first appointment where hypnosis was performed. This was an important feature of the evidence of other (complainant and non-complainant) witnesses as counting is central to the hypnosis procedure (as practiced by the accused). In evidence in chief, he made no reference to the accused counting down. There was no reference to counting down in his statement. The counting speaks of recent invention. I consider the absence of this detail from his statement and his evidence a matter which raises the possibility that it was a recent invention and not a genuine memory which surfaced when he gave evidence in the hearing.
In evidence-in-chief, he spoke of a massage to the middle of his back. In his statement he said on numerous occasions “lower back”. When challenged about the differences the witness became evasive. As a judge of the facts, I am entitled to consider matters such as the way a witness gives evidence and the impression they make on me. His evasiveness about this topic and others raises doubt about his honesty.
The complainant said he was required to lie on his stomach and had to lift his head up to be induced into hypnosis. Physically this would have been uncomfortable. He was not aware of a hole in the table/chair for his face. It is difficult for me to accept that he was made by the accused to lie down on his stomach for 45 minutes as part of a relaxation or hypnosis therapy where the goal of the treatment was to make the witness calmer and more relaxed.
He told the police that he had spoken to Mandy Cosgrove before he made his statement. In evidence-in-chief, he was firmly of the view that he spoke to police then Ms Cosgrove. The versions are inconsistent. The evidence of Ms Cosgrove does not support the account given by the complainant. Her evidence suggests that their first conversation occurred sometime after he had already made a statement to police (July 2015), and naturally before she gave a statement to police in September 2015, as she mentioned they had discussed the complainant’s recent breakup with his girlfriend in first conversation (which occurred some weeks before he first gave a statement in July 2015). One account given by the complainant (in his first statement) is that he had already spoken to Ms Cosgrove. A second account (given in his evidence-in-chief) is that he had spoken to her after his statement, and that he needed to release the intense emotions involved in the interview process with police. Ms Cosgrove is clear that he did not mention reporting the matter to police in the first conversation. His evidence is inconsistent.
In cross-examination, he said of JLH, “I can’t recall what I have actually said to her or the circumstances that I told her”. I determine that if he had made a truthful complaint, he would have remembered what was said and the circumstances in which he told her.
The complainant originally characterised the touching as an “attempt” or “a massage,” then he proceeded to say as his evidence progressed that the accused’s hands were there (on his testicles) for a few minutes. This is a shift, escalating the conduct of the accused from his original assertion. The complainant used the words “I think” which suggest uncertainty on his part.
The complainant said that his appointments with the accused were held around 4:30pm. His mother would wait for him in the waiting room. There were staff at the surgery and no doubt other patients. The complainant said he felt violated, hurt and knew what was happening was wrong yet he made no complaint to his mother, who was waiting for him in reception or a staff member.
The complainant gave evidence that the accused used a fob watch for the induction process of hypnosis. Phillip Wright, PF, ST, LW, Robyn Wallace, Kim Bath, MB, MRB, OW, CW, JC, MR, CC, SHC, Wendy Starr, CM, MH, SH, JK and MG were all subject to hypnosis (or relaxation) therapy in similar circumstances. None of them allege the use of a watch for induction. There is no mention of the fob watch being used during hypnosis that was performed in the second and third sessions in his 2015 statement. It first arose in his 2020 statement. The addition of the detail of the watch (against a background of overwhelming evidence that this was not the practice of the accused) is again a detail which raises the possibility that this witness was not forthcoming and engaging in the invention of details to bolster the credibility of his account.

Issues with credibility brought to light by evidence of JLH

In JLH’s evidence about the false report to police, she admitted that what she did was horrible. She acknowledged that it was a mistake which she rectified shortly after the false report by returning to police and telling them that her complaint was false. I find that she did this with the knowledge of the consequences (which would have been potentially criminal) of admitting to police that she had made a false complaint. The police had not believed her original complaint and neither man was arrested or placed into custody. There was no serious impetus for her to return to police and make the admission, other than to set the record straight and make sure that the police knew the truth. I find this rehabilitates the damage to her credit as a witness suffered by the fact of the false complaint. It would have been easy for her to maintain the lie about AN and JR, but she chose not to do so, at the cost of her credit and reputation. She admitted in evidence that making the false complaint was a serious mistake because she nearly ruined people’s lives. She appreciated the gravity of making a false complaint. She told police that she was not on methadone at the time she made the initial false report and was experiencing withdrawals because she had not taken it for two weeks. Methadone withdrawal is a serious and debilitating condition mentally and physically. She was in this condition against a background of emotional trauma and mental health conditions arising out of discovering her father’s body. I find that she is much less morally culpable for the false statement to police in 2009 than a person who makes a false complaint to police out of malice or dishonesty, and who does not go on to make amends by admitting to police shortly after that their report was false.

It was then put to her that she did not like IM. She responded, “I’ve got nothing against him. I’m here to tell the truth about what I heard and what he said to me that night” (Transcript 15/5/25, p.547(35)).
At first blush, there appear to be serious issues with the credit and reliability of JLH as a witness. A careful scrutiny of her evidence, in light of significant inconsistencies and issues with reliability and credibility which I have found in my determination of the evidence of IM, show these issues of credit and reliability are understandable and surmountable in the context of JLH’s struggles with trauma, mental health, and her failure to take prescribed medication. I accept that there is a real possibility that there is truth in the evidence of JLH, particularly regarding the following matters.

IM pressured her to live with him shortly after they met on a dating site so that she could nominate him to be her carer (for the purposes of her disabilities) so he could receive Centrelink benefits, and that this was done dishonestly, because he did not perform the functions required of a carer. IM agreed that they were in a relationship for 12 months and lived together for this period. I find it strange that they would live together after such a short time, especially given JLH’s special needs because of her disability, unless there was the (dishonest) financial motive on the part of IM.

Secondly, that she came to discover, based on things that he had said in the period leading up to their separation, that he had heard about the accused being charged and intended to make allegations on the basis that he had been treated by the accused as a child, and these allegations were not true. I find that her evidence about IM saying he would make false allegations against the accused to get money is consistent with her evidence about his attitude and behaviour towards the issue of the disability support pension. That is, that he was a person who made false allegations to gain financial benefit.

There are issues with the details of the evidence given by JLH. She placed the beginning of the relationship in May 2013, and her moving to Armidale in June 2013, which meant the relationship ended on her account around June 2014, over a year before IM gave his statement to police in July 2015, and well before any news of the accused’s charges would have been public. I am, as a judge of the facts, entitled to accept part and reject part of a witnesses’ evidence, as I see fit. I find it is understandable that she would be confused about the timeline of events and years in which events occurred (in light of the significant trauma she has experienced in her life), and she eventually corrected her evidence by agreeing that she remained with IM for some months after they saw Dr Murphy together in August 2014. I accept her separation from IM was clearly not an amicable one, and I accept that this is an available motive for her to lie, but do not accept that this was the underlying motive of her evidence in the hearing. Acrimonious separations are very common. It does not follow that a person who has had an acrimonious separation (particularly when it was over 10 years ago) must be lying when they give evidence about what they saw and heard in that relationship.
There is a real possibility that the evidence given by JLH was truthful. This raises significant doubts about the truthfulness and accuracy of the evidence of IM.
Finally, I found IM to be untruthful and evasive when he was asked about his relationship with JLH and whether they had a conversation about the accused. In his evidence he agreed it was possible that they could have discussed the accused (between June 2014 and June 2015), but he did not recall the specifics of this conversation. I do not accept that this was a truthful response. In circumstances where he described keeping the allegations secret from his family for years, because he was afraid and ashamed, and being able to remember the detail and circumstances of his disclosure to Ms Cosgrove, it is not plausible that he would not be able to recall any details about the conversation he had about the accused with his partner at the time, JLH. It suggests he was not forthcoming in his evidence to the Court about the nature of the relationship he had with JLH and what he might have said in relation to the topic of the accused because that evidence would be detrimental to his credit.
If there is truth in IM allegations’, that truth is overshadowed by the doubt raised by the significant and numerous inconsistencies contained in his evidence, the fact that he was not forthcoming in his evidence regarding JLH, and her evidence that he had engaged in dishonesty for a financial benefit and spoken about this during their relationship. Accordingly, I find the accused not guilty of Counts 30,31 and 32.

MH – Count 34 and 35

The complainant did not make a statement to the police until May 2018. Due to the delay in complaint, the accused was not interviewed by police about the complaint, nor was he able to deny it when he gave evidence in the original trial. The delay in complaint has put the accused at a significant forensic disadvantage. He has dementia. It is understandable why he has not given evidence before me in the special hearing. This does not reverse the onus of proof. The Crown must demonstrate that MH is an accurate and reliable witness and that I should accept his evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
The complainant could not remember “the name of the accused or any real details” before he started searching for details about the accused after the incident with his children had occurred. He said he found a news article about Phillip Wright and his dealings with the accused. He contacted Philip Wright through Facebook and just had a bit of a chat with him on Messenger. I consider his evidence of the interaction with Phillip to be a concerning matter.

Contamination as a result of communication with Phillip Wright

Professor Barnier gave evidence in the hearing that discussion has a contaminative influence on memory. This is particularly so when the memory is from a long time ago, and there are some uncertainties regarding the memory whereby details can be incorporated from another person’s account, that they believe to be more credible in order to fill gaps in their own memory (Transcript 19/9/17, p.1720-1721). It was Professor Barnier’s opinion that with regard to witnesses’ testimony it is more likely that they will incorporate external information through the media, conversations with professionals, friends, family or things online to the point where they believe it is their own memory (Transcript 19/9/17, p.1721-1722). I am concerned that when the complainant said, “I didn’t know, I couldn’t remember at that stage his name, or any real details…” (Transcript 8/4/25, p.341(8-20)). It suggests his lack of memory has potentially been influenced by discussions with Philip Wright and the complainant has incorporated external information to the point where he believed it is his own memory.
I am concerned that the complainant spoke about Philip Wright riding his bike to the surgery and locking his bike up and that he said that hearing this caused him to remember that he did the exact same thing (Transcript 8/4/25, p.342(7-11). It is clear from the evidence that Philip Wright could not have locked his bike onto the Armidale surgery fence, as he described in his evidence, as it was brick as opposed to iron mesh. The fact that the complainant has a similar memory locking his bike up at the Grafton surgery suggests that he has incorporated external information (from Phillip’s account) to the point where he believes it is his own memory. It was Dr Roberts evidence that discussion between two people on the topic of memory can distort memory, which is referred to as “contamination” whereby information imparted on the other alters the recollection of the person concerned, but not by any malicious intent (Transcript 15/9/17, p.596-598).

Dental records

Mr Pickering submitted that the complainant is an unreliable witness. The complainant was not sure how many times he saw the accused for dental work. Exhibit 61 is the dental records of the complainant. Those records demonstrate that the complainant attended upon the accused between 19 August 1986 through to 6 October 1994.The offences are said to have occurred between May 1990 and January 1991. Mr Pickering submits that the complainant’s attendance upon the accused until October 1994 is not consistent with the complainant being abused in the manner alleged. In his evidence, the complainant said that after the third appointment (sometime between 4 May 1990 and 7 January 1991) he had with the accused, he told his mother that he did not wish to continue seeing the accused, and that he was touched by the accused, but that he could not remember if he actually stopped seeing the accused after this. His mother, JH gave evidence that this complaint was made in the terms described by the complainant, and she did stop sending him to the accused.

Complaint

Mr Pickering was critical of the complaint made by MH to his mother, JH. He submitted that it lacked detail and did not disclose anything other than that the dentist touched him, which was normal as touching is incidental to the relaxation massages that the accused would perform. He said that when the complaint was made the complainant’s mother did not recall him being emotional. He submitted that JH gave evidence that MH was not emotional when he made a complaint to her. I do not consider that one must be visibly emotional for a complaint of sexual assault to be accepted as genuine. Trauma affects people in different ways, and some people will be emotional when disclosing their experiences sexual assault and some will not, even to a close family member. There is no ‘normal’ reaction to sexual assault, or a normal way to speak about sexual assault. I also note that accounts given by him and his brother regarding complaint, or lack of complaint to their mother differ. I direct myself that it is common for there to be differences in complainants’ accounts of matters such as complaint in the context of sexual offences, particularly given the significant passage of time in this matter. I do not consider the differences in their accounts to be a matter which significantly detracts from this complainant’s reliability, and ultimately, complaint evidence is one of many matters I am entitled to take into account in considering the accused’s guilt to these offences.

Inconsistencies

Mr Pickering referred me to portions of this complainant’s evidence and submitted there are significant inconsistencies therein. These are,

In evidence, the complainant said he did not see the accused after he had a conversation with his friend DMCG. At [22] of his police statement, he had said that he did see the accused after he had a conversation with DMCG.

The sequence of events given in court by the complainant was different to the sequence of events contained in his statement cf [19]-[20] of his police statement.

The complainant said that he attended upon the accused for hypnotism to improve his school grades. This evidence is not supported by his mother.

There was a considerable difference between the account given by the complainant and his wife about the “triggering” event involving the video of children. Mr Pickering submitted that it was possible that the complainant fabricated the allegations to repair or recover his relationship with his relatives after his outburst. I do not accept this submission.

Mr Pickering submitted that this complainant’s evidence was based on assumptions and that he had clearly engaged in the reconstruction of events in his memory.

Determination

I have directed myself that people may not recall all the details of a sexual offence or may not describe it the same way each time, and trauma may affect people differently, including how they recall events. It is common for there to be differences in accounts of a sexual offence, and both truthful and untruthful accounts of sexual offences may contain differences. It is for me to decide whether any differences in the complainant’s account are important in assessing the complainant’s truthfulness and reliability.
I had the advantage of seeing the witness give evidence. Although I have some concerns about the influence of Philip Wright upon the complainant, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the witness was both a truthful and reliable witness. His manner when he gave evidence was matter of fact. His responses were prompt, and he was not argumentative, tangential or evasive. He was forthcoming in every aspect. His account of how he was triggered by the incident involving his children to recall his own memories of being sexually touched by the accused struck me as genuine. He painted himself in an unflattering light when he gave evidence of how he reacted to the video of the children. This account was supported by his wife. He became unreasonable, withdrew from his wife, and lashed out at his relatives. He disclosed what had happened to his wife and continued to be troubled for a few days. He told his wife in some more detail what had happened with the accused a few days after the initial disclosure. This evidence is consistent with the behaviour of someone who has experienced a sexual assault in the past and becomes suddenly triggered by an event. His sudden and emotional disclosure was motivated by a protective instinct over his children who he wanted to ensure did not go through the same thing that he had gone through, some 36 years before.
Errors in the sequence of events are not uncommon when retelling events that occurred over 36 years ago. Especially where the statement to police did not occur until 2018. Although there were inconsistencies, they are not substantial enough for me to reject all or part of the evidence of the complainant.
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies identified by Mr Pickering, and the risk that his account has been contaminated by the evidence of Phillip Wright, which I consider to be minimal in light of the strong impression he made on me as a witness, I accept beyond reasonable doubt this complainant’s evidence that the accused asked MH to roll over and massaged his arms and chest and while he was sitting with MH, MH was laying on his back and the accused put his hand on top of his penis or his hand was directly underneath his penis (Transcript 8/4/25, p.335). This is Count 34.
I accept beyond reasonable doubt his evidence that the accused massaged MH’s bottom. He asked MH to roll over and was resting his hand on his penis. He then massaged him down towards his groin and underneath his penis. The massaging was underneath his pants, not on top of them (Count 35).
I considered the evidence in respect of each court separately, as required by law. I am entitled to enter verdicts of guilty for some offences and not guilty for other offences if I consider that there is a logical reason for this outcome. I do so and have outlined the detailed reasons for the verdicts in my determination.
I find that on the limited evidence available, the accused committed Counts 34 and 35.

Concluding remarks

To disbelieve some of the allegations goes against the instinct of any human being including myself. The violation of a child is rightly regarded as one of the most abominable crimes in our society and naturally provokes emotion and sympathy, even when it is only alleged. This case in particular involved witnesses who had no doubt suffered some unimaginably difficult childhood experiences which resulted in wounds which were still present when they gave evidence as adults. I commend them for their fortitude.
The task of putting this emotion and sympathy to one side and carefully scrutinising the evidence and acting in accordance with the directions prescribed by the law is a difficult and solemn one. A judge of the facts cannot be swayed by anything other than the evidence led before them as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. I have carefully and unemotionally considered the evidence and applied the directions prescribed by law and cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offences charged, except in the case of Counts 34 and 35, and I have outlined my reasons for this verdict.

Orders

Verdicts of not guilty are entered in relation to Counts 1 to 33 on the indictment.
In relation to Count 34 and 35, on the limited evidence available, I find the accused committed those offences.
I continue the accused’s bail.
I will sentence the accused at a date mutually agreed by the parties.

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Amendments

19 June 2025 - formatting error corrected 19/6/25

20 June 2025 - formatting error corrected 20/6/25

23 June 2025 - minor errors corrected 23/6/25

Decision last updated: 23 June 2025

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v WS [2025] NSWDC 219
Hearing dates:	March: 10,11,12,13,14,17,18,19,20,21,24,25,26,27,28and 31. April: 1,2,3,4,7,8,9,10,15,16,17,24,28,29 and 30. May: 1,2,5,6,12,13,14,15,16,19,20,21,22,26,29 and 30. June: 2,3,4,5,6,10 and 11.
Date of orders:	18 June 2025
Decision date:	18 June 2025
Jurisdiction:	Criminal
Before:	Grant DCJ
Decision:	1. Verdicts of not guilty are entered in relation to Counts 1 to 33. 2. In relation to Counts 34 and 35, I am satisfied on the limited evidence available that the accused committed the offences charged.
Catchwords:	CRIME – Special hearing – previous trial – retrial ordered by Court of Criminal Appeal – subsequent finding of unfitness – Director elected special hearing – historical allegations said to have occurred between 1973 and 1991 – tendency evidence – allegations that the accused in part used hypnosis (or relaxation therapy involving massage) on complainants – expert evidence on memory and hypnosis – accused gave evidence in original trial – three further complainants subsequent to grant of re-trial
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW)
Cases Cited:	AR v R [2025] NSWCCA 22 Banditt v The Queen [2005] HCA 80 Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14 Jovanovic v R (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507 Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397 R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40 R v WS [2021] NSWCCA 124 R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82 Wardell v R [2025] NSWCCA 26 Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Rex (Crown) WS (Accused)
Representation:	Counsel: Mr W Martin (Crown) Mr T Pickering (Accused) Solicitors: Mr S Rose and Ms S Tam (Crown) Ms E Hurcum (Accused)
File Number(s):	2014/00280784
Publication restriction:	Pursuant to s 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), there is to be no publication of any information, picture or other material, that identifies or is likely to lead to the identification of a complainant. Identifying information has been removed from this version of the judgment to comply with the statutes. The complainants Phillip and Joseph Wright have expressed their wish not to be subject to the non-publication order.

Old count (trial before Syme DCJ)	New count (special hearing before Grant DCJ)
N/A, additional complainant (CC)	Counts 1 to 8 (CC)
Phillip Wright
Count 1	Count 9
Count 2	Count 10
Count 3	Count 11
Count 4	Count 12
Count 5	Count 13
Count 6	Count 14
Count 7	Count 15
Count 8	Count 16
Eric (Joseph) Wright
Count 9	Count 17
Count 10	Count 18
Count 11	Count 19
Count 12	Count 20
Count 13	Found not guilty, not applicable in these proceedings
Count 14	Found not guilty, not applicable in these proceedings
Count 15	Count 21
Count 16	Found not guilty, not applicable in these proceedings
Count 17	Found not guilty, not applicable in these proceedings
Count 18	Count 22
Count 19	Count 23
Count 20	Count 24
Count 21	Count 25
Count 22	Count 26
Count 23	Count 27
ST
Count 24	Count 28
SF
Count 25	Count 29
Count 26	Count 30
N/A additional complainant(s) (IM and MH)	Count 31 to 33 (IM) Count 34 and 35 (MH)