R v Wrigley (No 7)

Case •

[2025] NSWSC 981

•

28 August 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Wrigley (No 7) [2025] NSWSC 981
Hearing dates: 24 July 2025
Decision date: 28 August 2025
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Ierace J
Decision:

(1)    For the offences of stealing the vehicle, destroying the vehicle by fire and stealing the tools, I impose an aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 4 years and 8 months, backdated to commence on 1 June 2024 and which will expire on 31 January 2029, with a non-parole period of 1 year, which expired on 31 May 2025. The indicative sentences are, for stealing the vehicle: 3 years imprisonment; for destroying the motor vehicle by fire: 3 years imprisonment; and for the theft of the tools: 6 months imprisonment.

(2)    For the offence of murder, I impose a sentence of imprisonment of 23 years and 9 months, backdated to commence on 1 June 2025 and to expire on 28 February 2049. I fix a non-parole period of 16 years and 3 months, which will expire on 31 August 2041.

Catchwords:

Crime — Sentence — Murder — Theft and destruction of deceased’s vehicle by fire — Theft of power tools belonging to deceased — Entry of rural premises and multiple application of blunt force using implement or implements to head of deceased while he lay asleep — Vulnerability of victim — Where location of injuries, degree of force and evidence of admissions bespeaks intention to kill — Objective seriousness above mid-range — Where offender’s psychological profile warrants a reduction in moral culpability — Where prospects of rehabilitation are guarded — Finding of special circumstances by virtue of offender’s Type 1 Diabetes condition — Principle of totality in context of existing sentences of imprisonment

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 117, 154F, 195(1)(b)

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 21A(2), 21A(2)(d), 21A(2)(eb), 21A(2)(l), 21A(2)(j), 21A(2)(n), 21A(3)(b), 22A, 30E(6)

Cases Cited:

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA

Droudis v R (2020) 103 NSWLR 806; [2020] NSWCCA 322

NK v R [2025] NSWCCA 73

R v Danishyar [2025] NSWCCA 46

R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566; [2006] NSWCCA 242

R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54

R v Wrigley (No 6) [2025] NSWSC 527

Weininger v R (2003) 212 CLR 629; [2003] HCA 14

Texts Cited:

L Huo et al, “Burden of Diabetes in Australia: life expectancy and disability-free life expectancy in adults with diabetes” (2016) 59(7) Diabetologia, 1437

Category:Sentence
Parties: Rex
Clinton Beau Wrigley (Offender)
Representation:

Counsel:
M Swift (Crown)
N Broadbent SC (Offender)

Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Legal Aid NSW (Offender)
File Number(s): 2023/101184

JUDGMENT

  1. HIS HONOUR: The offender, Clinton Wrigley, was convicted at trial of the murder of Joel Carter (the deceased) on or about 23 January 2023, in the residence of a remote rural property near Nyngan, known as Rosehill. The jury also returned verdicts of guilty in respect of three other counts on the indictment arising from the same incident, which were the theft and destruction by fire of the deceased’s vehicle, which was a white Toyota HiLux (the HiLux), contrary to ss 154F and 195(1)(b) respectively of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and the theft of some power tools that had belonged to the deceased, contrary to s 117 of the Crimes Act (the property offences).

  2. The jury was empanelled on 3 April 2025. The trial before the jury commenced on Tuesday 8 April, following, in all, six days of the hearing of pre-trial issues. The jury retired to consider their verdicts on the morning of Thursday 15 May. The following day, I discharged a juror for misconduct and on Monday 19 May, I determined that the trial would continue with a jury of 11: see R v Wrigley (No 6) [2025] NSWSC 527. The jury returned with its verdicts later that day.

  3. On behalf of the Court and the community, I express my sympathy to the family and close friends of Joel Carter for their loss. The continuing presence of members of his family throughout the trial is testimony to their commitment to his memory. The absence of a victim impact statement by a family member does not give rise to any inference that his death and its circumstances had little or no impact on his family. [1]

    1. The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 30E(6) (the Sentencing Act).

  4. The maximum penalty of the offence of murder is life imprisonment. It has a standard non-parole period, in the circumstances of this offence, of 20 years. The maximum penalties for the other three offences are, for the theft and the destruction by fire of the HiLux respectively, 10 years; and for the theft of the deceased’s tools, 5 years. None of these three offences has a standard non-parole period.

  5. The offender is now to be sentenced for these four offences. In that exercise, I am required by statute [2] to have regard to the purposes of sentencing, which are to adequately denounce and punish the offender and render him accountable for his actions, to deter him and others from committing similar offences, to protect the community, to recognise the harm done to the family of the deceased and the community and, as well, to promote the offender’s rehabilitation. I have regard to the maximum penalties and, in the case of the murder offence the standard non-parole period, as guideposts.

    2. The Sentencing Act, s 3A.

  6. There were significant factual disputes between the parties in the trial, although it is only necessary for the Court to now determine the facts which are relevant to the sentencing exercise, consistently with the jury’s verdicts. These include, to the extent that the available evidence is sufficient for the Court to make findings of fact, [3] the offender’s motive, the weapon or weapons he used to cause the deceased’s death and whether and to what extent the offences were planned. In so doing, findings of fact that are adverse to the offender must be established beyond reasonable doubt, whereas facts that favour the offender are to be established on the balance of probabilities. [4]

    3. Weininger v R (2003) 212 CLR 629; [2003] HCA 14 at [19], [20].

    4. R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [27].

The background to the offences

  1. The evidence in the Crown case was to the effect that the deceased, aged 59, resided alone at Rosehill. The offender, who was aged 37 at the time, was a truck driver and farmhand. Since mid-December 2022, he had been working for a rural contractor whose identity is subject to a non-publication order and who I shall refer to as witness A. The offender had not known witness A before then and it was through working for witness A that the offender met the deceased. Witness A had an agreement with the deceased’s father, Owen Carter, to work four of five properties which he owned, which included Rosehill and a neighbouring property, Neeroc. Those properties are about 20 to 25km west of Nyngan.

  2. The offender and witness A were both camping alongside a shearing shed at Neeroc; the offender in his vehicle, a Toyota Tarago (the Tarago) and witness A slept in the cabin of a prime mover that he left there. For personal transport, witness A had a LandCruiser (the LandCruiser). The offender’s usual place of residence was in Warren with his partner, Natalie Riley. Warren is about 80km (by road) south-east of Nyngan. The offender had been in a long-term relationship with his previous partner until her death in a car accident on 28 December 2020.

The deceased’s circumstances and relationships

  1. A canvassing of the evidence as to some of the deceased’s circumstances and his relationship with his father, witness A and the family of one of the deceased’s siblings, Guy Carter, is necessary to place in context the murder and admissions that were made by the offender as to his motive for the murder offence.

  2. The deceased was raised at Rosehill with his two brothers. He had three surviving children with his wife, who separated from him in about 2003. He moved back onto Rosehill in about 2015 and from shortly after that time, he lived there alone.

  3. The residence was in considerable disrepair. The deceased used the lounge room as his bedroom. Witness A noticed that the deceased did not lock the house when he was home. The deceased had been a heavy drinker throughout his adult life, no doubt in a large part due to the loss of one of his children when he was an infant in a tragic accident on Rosehill many decades before. It would appear from the evidence that by the time of his death the deceased could reasonably be described as a functioning alcoholic. He worked on Rosehill and Neeroc and had a side-job delivering fuel to rural properties. Members of the deceased’s family and work colleagues attested to the deceased being, by nature, a generous person, but when under the influence of alcohol, he was often aggressive and abusive. Some found that the ideal time to communicate with him was in the early morning, when he was least likely to be affected by alcohol.

  4. According to a statement made by Owen Carter that was read without objection into evidence in the trial, as of January 2023, Owen Carter permitted witness A to agist stock (sheep and cattle) for a fee on Rosehill, Neeroc and two other properties owned by Owen Carter, one being Ardoch, near Warren. He also had a share farming agreement with witness A to plant crops on Rosehill and Neeroc, by which (according to Owen Carter’s statement) Owen Carter received 20 per cent and the deceased and witness A received 40 per cent each. Owen Carter described this agreement as being one that he had “with [witness A] and [the deceased]”, but other evidence in the trial was to the effect that the deceased held a strong view that he had not been consulted as to the arrangement, which he believed had been negotiated exclusively between his father and witness A and which left him financially dependent upon witness A with no say as to how the various affected properties, particularly Rosehill and Neeroc, were managed. As a result, he harboured resentment towards his father and witness A.

  5. On 18 December 2022, the deceased was admitted as an involuntary patient into a mental health facility following an incident in which, while heavily intoxicated and following an argument with his father, he rammed his father’s vehicle with his vehicle and threatened to shoot him. On 19 December, he was transferred to Dubbo Base Hospital and discharged on 22 December. Witness A gave evidence that between Christmas and New Year 2022, he saw the deceased using ice (methylamphetamine) pipes.

  6. In December 2022, witness A resided at Rosehill with the deceased, as did the offender for a period of the time that he worked for witness A. Both men moved out on about 10 January 2023, following an incident that day when the deceased accused witness A of stealing from him, which ended in a brief physical confrontation. Thereafter, they camped at Neeroc.

  7. Another farmhand who occasionally worked for witness A, Dale Herbener, gave evidence that “a month or two” before the deceased’s death, he and the offender were in a sheep yard “getting all them mobbed up”. He said that the offender was doing most of the work, and “[the deceased] left the gates open and mingled them all up again, which made more work” (the sheep yard incident). He was unsure if the offender was there when the deceased opened the gate and let the sheep out, but the offender was angry once he became aware of it and, referring to the deceased, said he would “front him about it”.

  8. One of the deceased’s brothers, Guy Carter, managed Ardoch, until his accidental death in August 2022. Thereafter, Ardoch was managed by Guy Carter’s daughter, Carey Carter, and his partner, Megan Head. Carey Carter gave evidence that, following her father’s death, the deceased would remove work items from Ardoch without notice or permission. On one occasion he broke into a shed at Ardoch and removed generators, batteries and tools. When she confronted the deceased, he said he was entitled to do so, by virtue of his sibling relationship with Guy Carter.

The essence of the parties’ cases at trial

  1. The Crown case comprised evidence of: admissions made by the offender separately to three persons, one of which was captured on a listening device installed by police; evidence of opportunity to the effect the offender was within range of committing the offences in the relevant timeframe; and observations of the offender made by two witnesses that morning that tended to implicate him in the theft of the HiLux and evidence of the offender selling the tools.

  2. On the evening of 22 and 23 January (all subsequent dates in this judgment are for the year 2023, unless otherwise stated), the offender left Neeroc in his Tarago at about 11.30pm. Either in the late evening of 22 January or the early hours of the following morning, he killed the deceased as he lay asleep in his bed in the Rosehill residence, by the multiple application of blunt force to his head, using an implement or implements. The offender stole the HiLux and some power tools that had belonged to the deceased. He destroyed the HiLux by setting fire to it on a backroad between Nyngan and Warren in the early hours of the morning of 23 January and later sold some of the tools. The deceased’s body was not discovered until 25 January.

  3. The offender was arrested on 28 March. His defence at trial, consistent with a notice of alibi that he had served on the Crown, was that he was elsewhere at the time that the deceased was killed. He alleged that from about 11.30pm on 22 January to about 8am on 23 January, he was in the Tarago which was parked in a specified area of bushland just outside the township of Nyngan, other than between about 12.30am and 2.30am, when he walked into the Nyngan township and back again. At trial the defence probed whether someone else may have killed the deceased and committed the other three offences, in particular, witness A, thereby seeking to raise at least a reasonable doubt as to whether the perpetrator was the offender. The offender gave evidence in the trial.

The offender’s actions before and subsequent to the offences

  1. The evidence in the Crown case as to the offender’s whereabouts and activities shortly before and after the offences included expert forensic evidence as to two mobile phones that he was alleged to have used in the early hours of 23 January, one connecting to the Telstra network and the other to the Optus network (the Telstra phone and the Optus phone). That evidence included what, if anything, could be gleaned as to the position of the phones in relation to cell towers and satellites with which they connected, the content and times of text messages and the times of certain voice calls made between those phones and others.

  2. The evidence in the trial, insofar as it casts light on the circumstances of the offences, is as follows.

The evening of Sunday 22 January

  1. Witness A gave evidence that at about 6pm on 22 January, he and the offender were alone at Neeroc when the deceased arrived in his HiLux. The deceased’s eyes were bloodshot and he was grinding his jaw. Witness A concluded that the deceased was intoxicated and that he may also have been drug-affected. During their conversation, the deceased said he and some other men had been at Ardoch where they removed a tractor out of a shed. While bringing it to Rosehill or Neeroc, it stopped. Witness A continued:

“He made the comment of that he’s going to be running Ardoch, that [Carey] won’t be share farming it. He’ll be taking it all over. He’ll be running everything, Neeroc, Rosehill … he’s the boss and that [Carey] won’t be running Ardoch.”

  1. Witness A’s evidence was that the deceased also said he had a “ute payment” due, and “I need to get some money”. Witness A replied: “We’ll have to work out something” and put a load of grain in his name. The deceased departed about 6.20pm. Witness A said that the offender was standing with him while the deceased was talking, and commented, as the deceased left: “He’s a fucking idiot with a big mouth”.

  2. Witness A said that after the deceased left, he rang Carey Carter and told her what the deceased had said. Witness A was asked in examination in chief whether the offender was “close or present when you were having the conversation with Carey Carter”. He replied: “At the start, he might have been, but when I was talking to – the rest of the conversation and all the conversations, he wasn’t”. The offender was not asked specifically whether he heard that conversation.

  3. In evidence in the trial, the offender said he was six to ten metres away from the deceased and witness A while they spoke and that he did not hear what they said, although the deceased sounded like he was drunk. He said that he “probably” said something about the deceased having a big mouth.

  4. I am satisfied by witness A’s evidence and the offender’s admissions to witness A on 27 March (see below) that the offender heard the deceased tell witness A that he intended to take over Ardoch and the other properties. I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender heard the phone conversation between witness A and Carey Carter and for that reason, for the purposes of the sentencing exercise, I disregard the evidence of what was said in that conversation.

  5. After the deceased left Neeroc, witness A and the offender drove into Nyngan in the LandCruiser for dinner and a shower at a service station café. While witness A was showering, the offender, unbeknown to witness A, drove in the LandCruiser to a bank and operated an ATM. He drove back to the service station, where he had arranged to meet a person he knew who supplied him with a small quantity of ice. In his evidence, the offender accepted that this occurred, although he denied consuming the ice that night or during the following morning.

  6. Witness A and the offender returned to Neeroc shortly before 11.30pm. At about 11.30pm, the offender said that he was going to look for a stolen quad bike and drove off in the Tarago. Earlier that afternoon, witness A and the offender had learned of the theft of a quad bike a week before from outside a motel. There had been a spate of rural thefts in the area in recent months and the offender had offered that he had an idea as to where it may have been stored by the thieves.

  7. In his evidence, the offender denied that when he drove off in his Tarago he said he was going to look for the quad bike. His version of events was that he drove to Nyngan and that his movements thereafter were as stated in his notice of alibi. His evidence was that he left both of his mobiles in witness A’s prime mover, to be recharged, and forgot to retrieve them, so that they were not with him from that time.

  8. Police evidence as to the time it would take to drive between the Rosehill residence and the Neeroc camping area was not in dispute. Driving at 50-60kph using public roads, it would take about 14 minutes. There were dirt roads on the properties on which a vehicle could drive between those points at the same speed in about 10 minutes.

The first phone call to witness A

  1. The following morning, at about 2.30 to 2.35am, according to witness A, he was woken by a phone call from the offender, who asked him for directions to Warren from a back road, which witness A provided. The Crown case was that, having regard to phone call records, witness A was mistaken as to the time and that the call was at 3.40am. I am satisfied that a call was made in the terms that witness A said and that it occurred at 3.40am. The difference in times was inconsequential to the Crown case.

The evidence of witness B

  1. Witness B gave evidence that in January 2023 he resided in Coonamble, which is about 105km north-east of Warren, and that he was an acquaintance of the offender. At about 3am on the morning of 23 January, he received a phone call from the offender, who asked him to drive out towards Warren until he saw the offender, who would be driving a white utility. Witness B did so and met up with the offender, who was driving a HiLux that he had not previously seen the offender drive. He described a distinctive feature of the vehicle, which was a folded-down sign on the headboard of a type used to indicate to on-coming traffic that an oversized vehicle was following. I note that images of the burnt-out HiLux showed the remains of a structure on the headboard of the tray which were consistent with witness B’s description. Witness B’s description of the vehicle also corresponded with the HiLux as to colour, engine size, year model range and there being a toolbox in the tray, although witness B recalled it being in a different position than it was in the HiLux.

  1. Witness B said that the HiLux was pulling an empty vehicle trailer. The offender asked him to attach the trailer to his vehicle and take it to his father’s place (that is, the offender’s father’s place), which witness B did. He saw the offender drive off in the HiLux back towards Warren. Witness B said that the offender appeared “very shaken up … he just wouldn’t stand still. He just kept moving and shaking and yeah, he just wasn’t right”.

  2. Witness B said that he had driven for between half an hour to 40 minutes from Coonamble before he met up with the offender. His evidence as to when it was that he left Coonamble was imprecise, although in my view his uncertainty was of little moment. He gave conflicting evidence as to how long it was after the phone call that he set out, on one occasion saying it was half an hour after the phone call, and later that it was 10 minutes. He accepted the accuracy of phone records to the effect that he received a phone call from the offender at 4.07am, which he said was the call in which the offender asked him to drive out towards Warren. I am satisfied that the offender first phoned witness B that morning at 4.07am. I am also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence of witness B as to the phone call from the offender, his movements and his observations concerning the offender, the vehicle the offender was driving and the vehicle trailer, is reliable, although not as to times.

The offender asked witness A to pick him up

  1. At about 5.28am, witness A was again woken by a phone call from the offender, who told him that he needed a lift back to Neeroc from the back road from Nyngan to Warren. Witness A looked outside the prime mover cabin and saw that the Tarago was parked nearby. Witness A left Neeroc at about 5.45am in his LandCruiser, intending to find and pick up the offender.

The first observation of the HiLux on fire

  1. At about 5.53am, a driver on the Old Warren Road, between Nyngan and Warren, observed a vehicle that was stationary off the road to be on fire, with no-one around. It was the HiLux. The location was a short distance from a bridge over a creek (the HiLux fire site).

Witness A’s second attempt to pick up the offender

  1. Witness A could not find the offender, having misunderstood the offender’s explanation of where he was. He returned to Neeroc at about 7.10am. His phone was flat, so he recharged it. When he turned his phone back on, at about 7.33am, he noticed he had three missed calls from the offender. Shortly afterwards he spoke to the offender, who told him that he was along the Old Warren Road from Nyngan, which was a road not previously known to Witness A. Witness A drove to that road and picked up the offender at about 8.10am, shortly after receiving a message from the offender that he had just driven past him. The offender was carrying a backpack and a black jemmy bar or crow bar, with a red grip (sometimes called a pry bar by witnesses).

  2. Based on witness A’s information, the pick-up location was later ascertained by police to be about 15km from Nyngan and 12.2km from the HiLux fire site, which was further along that road from Nyngan. The offender’s Telstra phone connected to satellite by GPS on two occasions on the Old Warren Road between the pick-up location and the HiLux fire site. The first was at 7.31am about 6km from the HiLux fire site towards Nyngan and the second was at 7.48am about 6.2km from the HiLux fire site towards Nyngan. Witness A and the offender arrived back at Neeroc at about 8.34am.

  3. On the morning of 23 January, between 4.19am and 7.26am, there were eight voice calls and 15 failed voice calls between either the Optus or Telstra phone, and the phone of Ms Riley. As well, Ms Riley’s phone forwarded texts to the Optus phone at 7.21am (“What road?”) and at 7.26am (“Txt me where”, “I’m comin” and “On my way”).

  4. On 13 February, police stopped the offender while he was driving the Tarago and seized it. Inside the Tarago, police located a jemmy bar with a red grip. A forensic examination of the jemmy bar did not disclose any connection to the attack on the deceased.

The offender’s admissions

  1. The admissions by the offender to others, insofar as they shed light on the circumstances of the offence that are relevant to the sentencing exercise (rather than whether he committed the offence), are as follows.

The admissions to Witness C

  1. Witness C gave evidence that he had known the offender since he was a child. In a conversation with the offender about three weeks after the murder, while the offender was giving him a haircut, the offender told him that he had killed the deceased with a rubber mallet, which he then burned with “the ute”, which he said was on the: “[o]ther side of a bridge” and that “He took ages to pick me up”.

The admissions to Witness D

  1. Another person who knew the offender, who I will refer to as witness D, gave evidence that the offender’s father lived opposite witness D and he would see the offender from time to time when he visited his father. In a statement to police on 16 May 2023, witness D said that before the offender’s arrest, he had made admissions to him as to the offence. He informed police in his statement that the offender had told him that he killed the deceased by repeatedly hitting him on his head, that organic matter was moving through the air and that he kept rolling the deceased over, “because he kept snoring while I was hitting him”.

  2. Witness D was a reluctant witness. He said, improbably, that he had no recollection at all of what the offender had said to him about the killing, but that whatever he had told the police in his statement was the truth. In cross-examination he maintained that position until the last question and answer:

“Q. This statement is a pack of lies, isn’t it?

A. Yeah, yeah, yeah.”

  1. Although on its face the witness’s answer adopted the proposition in the question, it was apparent from the tone of its delivery that he was being sarcastic.

The admissions to witness A

  1. At the request of police, witness A arranged to meet with the offender on 27 March while wearing a listening device, which permitted their conversation to be recorded. The recording was an exhibit in the trial.

  2. The offender admitted to witness A that he had killed the deceased and that: “I didn’t lose no sleep over [the deceased]. He deserved that, like”. The offender told witness A that he had acted alone (Q. “Was it just you?” A. “Yeah”) and that he was not worried by what he had done. He said he burnt his “jeans, gloves and everything … Just covered head to toe … I was covered head to toe, until I threw the match in the ute”.

  3. The offender gave two motives for killing the deceased. He said to witness A:

“Offender:    Just what he used to do like that’s fucking uncalled for... Especially for you, like, you’re making him money … I hate, you shouldn’t have to do sheep work the same sheep work twice in fucking two weeks. It’s fucked.

But no, the main thing that done [the deceased] was his sister-in-law ... the main thing that done that, done it with me, was his sister-in-law ... the way he treated her ... it’s not fucking right, you know? When you lose, lose someone …

Witness A:    Who’s that Megan?

Offender:    Yeah. Guy's partner ... That’s, to me that's, just low ... I lost mine over two years ago now. Still fucked.”

The positioning of the deceased’s body

  1. The deceased’s body was found in his bed which was alongside a wall in the lounge room. He was lying on his left side, facing the wall, with bedding over most of his body consistently with him being asleep when he was attacked, and not shifting his position from then until he died.

  2. One of the deceased’s sons gave evidence that when he and others cleaned up the Rosehill residence after the deceased’s death, a fire poker that the deceased had kept alongside a fireplace in the lounge room, was found to be missing.

The pathologist’s evidence

  1. The pathologist noted comminuted depressed skull fractures on the right side of the deceased’s head above his ear; that is, in that area his skull was completely pushed in with multiple skull fractures in multiple fragments. She described it as “very large”, measuring 18 x 5.5cm. The dimensions of the bruise above it were 12 x 7cm. An internal examination of the skull revealed that the fractures extended into the base of the skull, below that area of the right ear.

  2. There was also an “elongated or L-shaped” fracture of the right cheekbone that measured, overall, 3.2 x 2.5cm. The longer end of the L shape was 3.2cm long and 0.5cm wide, and the shorter length was 2.5cm long and 0.5cm wide.

  3. The pathologist concluded that the injuries were consistent with having been inflicted by multiple blows from a solid blunt object, “most probably” a long solid blunt object, and could have been more than three blows. The force of the blows was “severe”; the deceased would have likely died in a matter of seconds. The pathologist was asked whether a rubber mallet could have caused the injuries. She replied:

“A. Well, the injuries to the right side of the head could have been inflicted by anything in terms of blunt force traumatic injuries, but the one that has a pattern to it is the one on the cheekbone which looks more like something more long and slender. The ones on the side of the head could have been inflicted by a hammer or a mallet hammer or another solid blunt object, but the one on the cheekbone is more consistent with a long solid object such as a pole.

Q. Is that to say that there is a possibility that there may have been more than one implement used to inflict the injuries to [the deceased]? Is that what you’re suggesting is possible?

A. I guess it’s possible.”

  1. The pathologist was shown photographs of the jemmy bar that was recovered from the Tarago on 13 February. She agreed it fitted her description of a “long solid blunt object”.

A submission concerning the fire poker

  1. As to the means by which the offender killed the deceased, Senior Counsel for the offender submitted that the missing fire poker coincided with the pathologist’s evidence as to the nature of the elongated wound to the deceased’s cheekbone. It was consistent with the offender having opportunistically used the fire poker rather than taken a weapon to the residence with him, which in turn was some evidence that the killing was unplanned.

Findings of fact concerning the offences

  1. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender was being honest when explaining to witness A his motives for killing the deceased. He first referred to the sheep yard incident and then to the deceased’s claim in the early evening of 22 January that he intended to take over the running of his father’s properties including Ardoch, and exclude Guy Carter’s family.

  2. The offender was motivated by feelings of anger and disgust against the deceased, principally because of what he heard the deceased, in a drunken state, say on 22 January. In view of what the offender told witness A, I am satisfied that in the offender’s mind, the deceased’s intention to exclude Guy Carter’s family resonated with his own experience of the plight of a partner left behind by a sudden death. I am satisfied that the offender formed the intent to kill the deceased at some point after he heard the deceased make that assertion.

  3. I am satisfied that the offender attacked the deceased while he slept in his bed and that, based on the location of the injuries, the degree of force used to cause them and his admissions to witness A, his intent was to kill the deceased. Witness D’s evidence of what the offender told him as to the mechanics of the killing is to the same effect as the inferences that may be drawn from the evidence of the pathologist and crime scene examination of surrounding surfaces and, accordingly, I disregard it as having little or no relevance for the purposes of the sentencing exercise.

  4. I note that the offender gave evidence that he did not use the ice he bought earlier that evening and that there was no evidence of the offender having ingested alcohol or drugs that evening. The offender is to be sentenced on the basis that he was not affected by alcohol or prohibited drugs at the time of the commission of the offences.

  5. I am satisfied that the offender acted alone, based on the absence of evidence of there being a co-offender and his admission to witness A that he acted alone.

  6. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender told witness C that he killed the deceased with a rubber mallet. I note that the dimensions of the injury to the deceased’s skull are consistent with the use of a mallet. I am satisfied to the requisite standard that the offender used a mallet to inflict the injuries to the deceased’s skull. I am unable to conclude on the evidence whether the cheekbone injury was caused by the jemmy bar, the fire poker or another implement.

  7. The evidence does not enable me to determine whether the offender had formed his intention to kill the deceased prior to arriving at Rosehill or whether it was formed afterwards. Similarly, although I am satisfied that the offender went to Rosehill that evening with a criminal purpose, I am unable to determine if he intended to steal the HiLux and/or tools or whether those intents were formed after the murder. Mr Herbener gave evidence that he sometimes rode in the HiLux and there were always tools on the back seat, including Milwaukee-brand power tools of the types that were stolen. It follows that the tools stolen by the offender may have been there when he stole the HiLux and in that sense, that offence was opportunistic.

  8. Accordingly, I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that any of the four offences was a planned activity: s 21A(2)(n) of the Sentencing Act. Equally however, by the same reasoning, I do not find, on the balance of probabilities, that any of the offences was not part of a planned criminal activity: s 21A(3)(b) of the Sentencing Act.

  9. After the killing, the offender drove the HiLux away with the vehicle trailer attached to it. The reason that the offender stole the HiLux is not apparent. The evidence does not permit a finding of fact as to the means by which the Tarago was returned to Neeroc. Two of the possibilities on the evidence are that the offender drove it there and returned on foot to Rosehill, or that he loaded the Tarago on to the vehicle trailer attached to the HiLux and drove it to a position proximate to where witness A saw it at Neeroc, in the early hours of 23 January.

  10. I am satisfied that after meeting with witness B, the offender drove the HiLux to the fire site and set fire to it, also destroying items of clothing and the mallet used in the murder. Initially, he attempted to arrange for Ms Riley to pick him up but abandoned that attempt and instead phoned witness A and asked him to pick him up. I am satisfied that the offender made his way on foot from the fire site to where he was picked up by witness A, taking cover as vehicles drove along that road.

Objective seriousness

  1. The murder is a serious example of that offence. The deceased was vulnerable by virtue of his geographical isolation on a remote rural property (s 21A(2)(l) of the Sentencing Act) and he was attacked in his home (s 21A(2)(eb) of the Sentencing Act) while he was there alone, in the middle of the night, and while he slept. The offender would have known from his observations earlier that evening that the deceased was drunk then and that he was a regular heavy drinker, so that he was likely to be alcohol-impaired when the offender arrived at Rosehill.

  2. In assessing the objective seriousness of the offences, I disregard aggravating factors identified in s 21A(2) of the Sentencing Act that are an element of the offence. In relation to the offence of murder, the use of a weapon is of reduced significance in view of it being a common feature of such offences. I also disregard factors that are exclusively relevant to sentencing principles such as retribution, deterrence and the protection of society. [5] As noted, in determining objective seriousness, I do not find that the offences were planned.

    5. R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566; [2006] NSWCCA 242 at [30]-[34] (‘McNaughton’).

  3. The deceased and the offender had only known each other for a matter of weeks, exclusively in a work context, and there was no evidence of any actual physical or oral confrontation between them. While the offender had witnessed the deceased behaving badly towards others and knew of other such instances, the sheep yard incident was the only one that affected him, albeit indirectly. The offender did not stand to materially benefit from the offences, other than by the resale of the tools and perhaps by the relocation of the trailer. The offender’s bizarrely moralistic explanation for his extreme violence in the context of so tenuous a relationship, as expressed to witness A, renders the offence more serious. He expressed satisfaction for having killed the deceased who, in his mind, morally deserved to die.

  4. The Crown initially submitted that the murder offence falls in the high range of objective seriousness, but at the sentence hearing, modified that submission to it being “well above the mid-range”, whereas the offender submitted that it falls around the mid-range. It is unnecessary to classify objective seriousness on a range, but in view of the parties’ submissions, in the interests of transparency I find that it is above the mid-range of objective seriousness.

  5. The offences other than the murder offence were, in my view, in the mid-range of objective seriousness.

The offender’s subjective case

  1. Tendered on behalf of the offender were two reports by a neuropsychologist, and affidavits that were read without objection by his mother, an uncle (Kerry Paul) and a former employer (Chris Murray).

The Forensic Neuropsychologist’s reports

  1. The offender was assessed by Dr Melissa Hughes, a Forensic Neuropsychologist, on 19 September 2024 and again via audio visual link on 1 July 2025. Dr Hughes took a history from the offender, which is to the following effect.

  2. The offender is an Aboriginal man, who I note is now aged 40. He was born in Dubbo and has an older sister. His father was physically violent towards his mother “constantly through his childhood”, which was related to his father’s alcohol consumption. His father had hurt him as well on occasion, which the offender dismissed as because he was “causing trouble”. His parents separated when he was aged 23. He communicates infrequently with both of them, although I note that his mother and sister were present in court throughout his trial, which was tangible evidence of their continuing support of him. He has a supportive relationship with his current partner, Ms Riley, as well.

  3. The offender thought he was diagnosed when a child as having an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) for which he was medically treated (Ritalin). This was corroborated by his mother. His medication ceased when he was in high school, for unknown reasons. His schooling did not go well. He had multiple suspensions for fighting and was disinterested in his schoolwork. He had been placed in “support classes”. When in Year 4, he was sexually abused by a teacher, and thereafter hated school. In 2024 he initiated a claim for damages. He had few friends and left school during Year 10, having been told that if he did not leave, he would be expelled.

  4. Dr Hughes took a history of solid but itinerant employment since the offender left school. He started, but did not complete, a carpet-laying apprenticeship after a dispute with his boss. His solid work record is supported by his mother, Mr Paul and Mr Murray.

  5. The offender has a history of “heaps of head-knocks”, twice losing consciousness, but no consequent issues. He has no known mental health issues or a history of contact with mental health professionals.

  1. The offender gave a history of significant alcohol and drug use. Dr Hughes stated: “Alcohol use was noted to have been variable and ‘on and off’, describing periods where he had drunk a large but unquantifiable amount seven days per week and then ceased for nine years”. He resumed drinking several years prior to his arrest, consuming a six pack of full-strength beer each night. As to his drug use, he used cannabis from around 2003 to 2019 and had been using ice for about 10 years prior to his arrest, around 1 to 4 points daily. For the last 12 months of his remand he had received monthly injections of buprenorphine. Since his former partner’s death, he had tried a drug rehabilitation program, but in his words, he was not ready for it. He now felt motivated to abstain from drugs and, in the July 2025 interview, said he had been drug-free since at least Dr Hughes’ September 2024 assessment of him. I note that the offender has no disciplinary entries on his prison record which is consistent with his claim of not using drugs in prison.

  2. The offender told Dr Hughes that he was a poor money-manager, subject to impulsive spending and falling into debt.

  3. In her July 2025 report, Dr Hughes reported that the offender said he is being held on protection at his request, fearing violence from other prisoners.

  4. As to the offender’s history, in her September 2024 report, Dr Hughes stated:

“Relevant background information provided by [the offender] included reported diagnosis of ADHD during childhood and associated behavioural issues and poor engagement in formal schooling from a young age and poor literacy as a result. He describes a learned and long-term tendency to keep himself busy to manage symptoms of ADHD, including his indicated impulsiveness, irritability and tendency to overthink. He reports history of several minor head injuries, variable substance use (alcohol, cannabis, Ice) … He also describes ongoing grief regarding the loss of his fiancé and grief and frustration with not having contact with his two young sons. No collateral records pertaining to [the offender’s] health, academic or other background were available.

…

Clinical observations and psychometric performances are not inconsistent with [the offender’s] reported diagnosis of ADHD and further exploration of same (which was beyond the scope of the present assessment) could be considered. His history of limited engagement in schooling, repeated head injuries and history of substance use may also likely have contributed to his current cognitive profile.”

  1. In her September 2024 report, Dr Hughes said that she had been requested to determine whether the offender had any intellectual or cognitive deficit that was relevant to the issue of admissibility of police interviews. She assessed the offender’s intellectual functioning with the benefit of appropriate psychometric instruments. In her July 2025 report, as to the offender’s intellectual and cognitive functioning, Dr Hughes succinctly stated:

“At neuropsychological assessment in September 2024, [the offender’s] engagement with assessment tasks was variable and appeared effortful for him, particularly as he fatigued over duration of testing. Results were variable, although many were within Low Average ranges, and therefore not strongly suggestive of intellectual or cognitive impairment. Although his variable engagement warrants some caution, results did suggest relative weakness in verbal abilities and inefficiencies or difficulties in areas of executive functioning (e.g. impulsivity) and complex attention, which could have had some impact on his ability to regulate and adequately engage on other tests and more broadly. His cognitive profile is likely multifactorial, with contributions from possible ADHD, repeated head injuries, history of substance use, [adverse childhood experiences], mood, and limited education.”

  1. Dr Hughes was unable to explore the offender’s explanation for his offending, in view of his continuing position that he was innocent. He also denied criminal responsibility for some of his other prior and subsequent offences, including some to which he had pleaded guilty. Nevertheless, Dr Hughes opined that his variable engagement with her suggested “inefficiencies or difficulties in areas of executive functioning (e.g. impulsivity) and complex attention”. Dr Hughes stated:

“… the nature of his relative cognitive weaknesses in verbal abilities, complex attention and regulation skills, which would have been further weakened due to intoxication around the time of the offences, would be very relevant to appropriate reasoning, decision-making and impulse control, particularly if emotionally heightened. The combination of his weaker verbal abilities, impulsivity, and exposure to violence as a way of managing conflict from a young age would also likely be relevant to dispute resolution, developing a tendency to resolve conflict physically and immediately. He also appears to have [a] history of distrust of authority figures, likely related to his childhood experiences.”

  1. The history that Dr Hughes took from the offender did not include a version of the events of 22 and 23 January, so I disregard the premise that the offender’s skills would have been “further weakened due to intoxication around the time of the offences”.

The offender’s physical health

  1. Dr Hughes reported that the offender told her that when he was aged 22, [6] he was diagnosed with Type 1 Diabetes, and, accordingly, is insulin-dependent. The offender has instructed his solicitor that before his arrest for the current offences, he self-injected insulin four times daily and exercised regularly, which assists in the control of his blood-sugar levels. In prison, he self-injects three times daily. Insulin is not available “on demand”, so he must watch his diet. Adequate exercising opportunities are limited, particularly during lockdowns, which are frequent. Material that explains the nature and treatment needs of persons with Type 1 Diabetes has been tendered, as well as a medical journal article that examines the life expectancy, and disability-free life expectancy (DFLE), of persons with diabetes. [7] I note that the study is not confined to persons with Type 1 Diabetes. The authors of the study conclude that there is a “modest reduction” in life expectancy from those without that diagnosis, but in terms of DFLE, the difference with the rest of the population is “substantial”.

    6. I note that his instructions to his solicitor are that he was diagnosed when he was aged 17, which is corroborated by his mother in her affidavit.

    7. L Huo et al, “Burden of Diabetes in Australia: life expectancy and disability-free life expectancy in adults with diabetes” (2016) 59(7) Diabetologia, 1437-1445.

The affidavit of the offender’s mother

  1. The offender’s mother stated that she thought the offender’s use of ice escalated after his former partner’s death. He cared for his children, who were then aged 8 and 2 years old, until December 2021 after he was charged with offences including possessing ice. The children were removed from his care and placed in the care of their maternal grandmother. The offender was only permitted supervised access. The offender’s mother continued: “Towards the end of 2022 [the offender] was required to submit to drug testing in relation to the Care Proceedings but he wasn’t attending, and he continued to take ice”. He has not had any contact with his children since his arrest for the current offences.

The application of relevant sentencing principles

The offender’s moral culpability

  1. It was submitted on behalf of the offender that his moral culpability was reduced by his psychological profile, in particular, the deficiency in his executive functioning that exposed him to acting impulsively. It was conceded that the extent to which his background may have a bearing on that limitation is difficult to discern, in view of competing positive and negative aspects of his subjective case. He has a supportive family, but he has had adverse childhood experiences as well. It was submitted that the offender’s long-term use of ice was an addiction, but he nevertheless maintained a solid work record, although of a manual nature. I note that Dr Hughes did not diagnose the offender as having a drug or alcohol use disorder.

  2. The murder offence is perhaps best understood in the context of the offender’s background of underlying childhood exposure to violence and sexual abuse and his cognitive profile of deficient executive functioning, against which his partner’s death and then his loss of custody of his children prompted and accelerated a spiralling into criminal activity, fuelled in part by his long-term use of alcohol and ice; although he was not under their influence at the time he committed these offences. This combination of factors facilitated his slide into a mental state in which an act of extreme violence against a person he barely knew was justifiable and not to be regretted. That contribution of childhood factors and long-term drug and alcohol use to the offences reduces his moral culpability, but not to a significant degree.

  3. The reach of the consequences of a finding that an offender’s moral culpability is reduced extends to considerations of the weight to be attached to sentencing factors such as general and specific deterrence, protection of the community, retribution, promotion of rehabilitation and a finding of special circumstances. [8]

    8. NK v R [2025] NSWCCA 73 per Yehia J (Ball JA and Fagan J agreeing) at [101]-[102].

Specific and general deterrence and protection of the community

  1. The offender has a record of criminal offences committed before and subsequent to these offences and was on conditional liberty for multiple offences at the time of these offences (ss 21A(2)(d) and (j) of the Sentencing Act). Those matters, although irrelevant to the determination of the objective seriousness of the offences, are relevant to considerations of retribution, specific deterrence and the protection of the community. [9]

    9. McNaughton at [31]-[34].

  2. The offender’s criminal record dates from his early twenties, with no entries for offences of personal violence. There is a break in his offending between June 2014 and December 2020 which ended when he committed a break, enter and steal offence the day after his long-term partner was killed. Thereafter, he committed offences of goods in custody, firearm offences and other housebreaking offences, two offences of steal motor vehicle in October 2022 and again in December 2022, and in February 2023, an attempt to dispose of property, destroy or damage property and possessing a prohibited drug.

  3. At the time of the current offences, the offender was subject to five community correction orders. Three commenced on 20 October 2022 for the break, enter and steal offence committed in December 2020 and possessing housebreaking implements and having goods in custody, both committed on 13 December 2021. The other two community correction orders were for two counts of possessing an unregistered firearm, committed in April 2021. Specific deterrence warrants significant weight in respect of all four offences. The persistent nature of the offender’s property offending, which is likely drug-use related, bespeaks a need for personal deterrence from like offending to be reflected in the sentencing exercise in respect of the three property offences and, in view of my finding as to its probable nexus with his long-term drug and alcohol use, the murder offence as well. As noted, it is appropriate to modify that weight in view of the offender’s degree of moral culpability.

  4. General deterrence and the protection of the community, although attenuated by his reduced moral culpability, are of significance in the sentencing exercise, particularly for the murder offence, in view of the nature of the deceased’s vulnerability, noted above at [66].

Remorse

  1. There is no evidence of remorse, which is unsurprising in view of the offender’s denial of committing the offences. There is, however, evidence in the form of what the offender told witness A that he did not regret the murder offence. His sale of the deceased’s tools in the weeks following the offences also suggests that he had, at least, a continuing indifference to what he had done to the deceased.

The offender’s prospects of rehabilitation

  1. The theft of the HiLux, its destruction and the theft of the tools are unremarkable in the context of the nature of the offender’s prior and subsequent criminal offending. There is a likely link between the theft of the tools and the offender’s need for funding of his ice use, although as noted earlier, the reason he stole the HiLux is unclear.

  2. As to the murder offence, there is no forensic expert evidence of the offender’s likelihood of recidivism with an offence of serious violence. It is apparent, however, that the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation hinge upon whether he can maintain his early steps in prison to cease using prohibited drugs, in particular, ice, whether he resolves his issues of grief arising from his long-term partner’s death and the loss, which is hopefully temporary, of a relationship with his children.

  3. The offender’s personality, as described by Dr Hughes, and the manner in which he engaged with her, mitigates against him seeking out, or co-operating with, a psychologist or other mental health care professional while in prison, although I would not exclude the possibility that over time he becomes more amenable to accepting professional assistance. The absence of prior and subsequent serious offences of violence is a positive indication of his capacity to live a life of at least non-violent offending. I conclude that the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation and not reoffending with either serious violence or property offences are guarded.

Special circumstances

  1. It was submitted that the Court would make a finding of special circumstances because of the impact of imprisonment on the offender’s management of his Type 1 Diabetes diagnosis and his need to participate in intensive community-based rehabilitation on his release.

  2. I accept that the offender’s experience of prison is more difficult because of his daily need of treatment and monitoring of his Type 1 Diabetes and that, particularly if his diabetes is not managed optimally, his expectation of DFLE is significantly more limited than for persons without a diabetes diagnosis. I find special circumstances is established for those reasons. The length of the parole period will be sufficiently long to provide supervision in the community to ensure the offender’s participation without requiring an adjustment for that reason alone.

  3. It was also submitted that special circumstances are established by reason of the offender being on protection. In the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that this basis is made out. The offender’s concern that prompted him electing to go into protection was a perceived danger posed by particular prisoners and classes of prisoners. In my view, that possible danger will likely vary depending upon the correctional centre, or part of a correctional centre, in which he is held from time to time, over his sentence. It cannot be assumed, on the evidence, that the offender will remain on protection for an extended period.

Totality: the commencement date of the sentences

  1. The offender was arrested for these offences on 28 March 2023, which is a remand period of 2 years and 5 months. On 2 June 2023, he appeared in the Local Court at Lightning Ridge for sentence for a count of possessing a prohibited drug, which was located in his Tarago when it was seized by police on 13 February 2023. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months, commencing on that date (2 June 2023) and concluding on 1 December 2023. That offence breached the five community correction orders mentioned earlier. For each of those five offences, he was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 6 months, backdated to commence on 17 December 2022 and concluding on 16 June 2023. The back-date was occasioned by the offender having been remanded in custody for five and a half months in 2021 for some of those five charges.

  2. On 23 May 2024, the offender was sentenced for offences of attempting to dispose of stolen property, knowing it was stolen, and attempting to dispose of two stolen motor vehicles, knowing they were stolen. He received an aggregate sentence of 18 months imprisonment, backdated to commence on 2 June 2023 and conclude on 1 December 2024, with an aggregate non-parole period of 12 months, concluding on 1 June 2024 (the 23 May 2024 sentence).

  3. On 31 July 2024, the offender was sentenced for a count of destroying or damaging property and two counts of stealing a motor vehicle, for which he received an aggregate sentence of 15 months, commencing on 1 June 2024 and to conclude on 31 August 2025, with an aggregate non-parole period of 9 months, concluding on 28 February 2025 (the 31 July 2024 sentence). The facts, as found for sentence, were tendered in this sentencing exercise.

  4. Accordingly, all of the 2 years and 5 months of remand custody on the current offences is also referable to sentences of imprisonment for the offences for which the offender has been sentenced since his arrest, although the last 6 months of remand custody is not referable to a fixed sentence or non-parole period.

  5. I have previously noted authority to the effect that when a custodial sentence is to be imposed which will be cumulative upon, or which will overlap with, an existing custodial sentence, the existing sentence must be taken into account in a way that the total period to be spent in custody adequately and fairly represents the totality of criminality involved in all of the offences to which that total period is attributable, and that a considerable degree of flexibility in the exercise of the sentencing discretion is permitted in order to achieve that objective, including by structuring the fresh sentence to be partially, or sometimes wholly, concurrent. [10]

    10. R v Danishyar [2025] NSWCCA 46 per Ierace J (N Adams and Chen JJ agreeing) at [39], [40].

  6. It was submitted on behalf of the offender that the sentence should be substantially backdated, in view of the similar nature of the offences to the ones for which he is now to be sentenced and a disproportionate non-parole period ratio as the current sentences now stand. The non-parole period ratio for the 31 July 2024 sentence was 60 per cent following a finding of special circumstances, but since it commenced on the expiration of the non-parole period of the 23 May 2024 sentence, the combined sentences had a non-parole period ratio of 77 per cent.

  7. I accept the latter submission. I will fix an aggregate sentence for the property offences, backdated to commence on 1 June 2024, which is the commencement date of the 31 July 2024 sentence, and significantly adjust downwards the aggregate non-parole period, so as to maintain an appropriate ratio of the overall non-parole period to the total sentence. An assessment of the non-parole period ratio for the combined sentences for the four offences will be 69.7 per cent. For the entire period of imprisonment, that is, from the date of his arrest, that ratio will be 70.4 per cent.

Facilitation of the administration of justice

  1. It is open to the Court to take into account the degree to which the administration of justice has been facilitated by the defence, whether by disclosures made pre-trial or during the trial or otherwise, although any lesser penalty imposed must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence: s 22A of the Sentencing Act.

  2. In my view, although the Crown resisted such a finding, I am satisfied that the approach taken by the defence considerably reduced the length of the trial. The cross-examination of all witnesses was concise and, with the exception of challenged forensic evidence and the evidence of witness A, relatively brief. In circumstances where the sentence would be thus reduced significantly, the reduction should be specified: Droudis v R (2020) 103 NSWLR 806; [2020] NSWCCA 322 at [105]. I will reduce each of the two sentences I am about to impose by 5 per cent, mindful that the final sentences must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offences.

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)

  1. I am required by the terms of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) to make the offender aware of the potential application of that Act as he approaches the end of his sentence for the offence of murder.

  2. The State can apply to the Supreme Court for an order that he continue to receive supervision or be held in detention at the end of his sentence, if the Court determines he would pose an unacceptable risk of committing a serious offence if released back into the community or released without supervision.

  3. It is therefore appropriate for the offender to take advantage of any opportunities for rehabilitation that may become available to him in prison.

The sentences

  1. I make the following orders:

  1. For the offences of stealing the vehicle, destroying the vehicle by fire and stealing the tools, I impose an aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 4 years and 8 months, backdated to commence on 1 June 2024 and which will expire on 31 January 2029, with a non-parole period of 1 year, which expired on 31 May 2025. The indicative sentences are, for stealing the vehicle: 3 years imprisonment; for destroying the motor vehicle by fire: 3 years imprisonment; and for the theft of the tools: 6 months imprisonment.

  2. For the offence of murder, I impose a sentence of imprisonment of 23 years and 9 months, backdated to commence on 1 June 2025 and to expire on 28 February 2049. I fix a non-parole period of 16 years and 3 months, which will expire on 31 August 2041.

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Endnotes



Decision last updated: 28 August 2025

Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

9

Statutory Material Cited

3

R v Hoar [1981] HCA 67
Droudis v R [2020] NSWCCA 322
Droudis v R [2020] NSWCCA 322