R v Wright; Ex parte Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia

The Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia sought a writ of prohibition against Wright J., a judge of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and against the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association and the Overseas Shipping Representatives' Association. The Federation sought to prevent the judge from hearing an application by the associations to vary an order of the Stevedoring Industry Commission. This variation would have permitted the engagement of waterside workers for weekend work in the Port of Melbourne through press and radio announcements, rather than solely through a central bureau as previously mandated.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the proposed variation constituted an "industrial matter" within the meaning of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949, whether such an industrial matter was sufficiently connected to stevedoring operations relating to overseas and inter-State trade to fall within the scope of section 34 of the Act, and whether section 34 itself was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth Parliament's legislative power under section 51(i) of the Constitution. The Federation argued that the proposed method of engagement created compulsory employment relationships, which were outside the definition of industrial matters, and that the power conferred by section 34 was legislative, not judicial, and therefore not amenable to prohibition.

The Court held that the power conferred by section 34 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949 to regulate industrial matters in connection with stevedoring operations relating to overseas and inter-State trade was legislative in character, not judicial. Consequently, a writ of prohibition would not lie to restrain an alleged excess of authority under that section. The Court reasoned that acts which are ministerial, administrative, or amount to the exercise of a subordinate legislative power are not subject to prohibition, even if they involve an excess of authority. Furthermore, the Court found that section 34 represented a valid exercise of the Parliament's legislative power concerning trade and commerce conferred by section 51(i) of the Constitution.

The application for prohibition was dismissed. The Court concluded that the power granted by section 34 was legislative in nature and thus not subject to prohibition. The Court also affirmed the constitutional validity of section 34 as a proper exercise of the Commonwealth's trade and commerce power.