R v Wright

[2025] NSWDC 316

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Wright [2025] NSWDC 316

Hearing dates:

24 June 2025, 27 June 2025

Date of orders:

27 June 2025

Decision date:

27 June 2025

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Before:

Anderson SC DCJ

Decision:

See [96] - [97]

Catchwords:

Sections 111(2) and 154F Crimes Act 1900; joint criminal enterprise; suitability of an intensive corrections order; consideration of De Simoni principles; aggravating factors at s 105A of the Crimes Act 1900

Legislation Cited:

Criminal Code 1995 (Cth)

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Dacre v The Queen (2018) 57 VR 285

Huhyn v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 220

R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383

R v Dugan [1984] 2 NSWLR 554

The Queen v Delphin (2001) 79 SASR 429

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Rex (Crown)
Glynnis Wright (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
Ms H McMillan (Crown, ODPP Dubbo)
Mr J D Ormaechea (Trial Advocate, ALS Dubbo)

Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Aboriginal Legal Service (Offender)

File Number(s):

2024/00182632

Publication restriction:

Nil

JUDGMENT

1. Glynnis Wright appears for sentence on two charges. The first is Count 2, an offence at s 154F of the Crimes Act, being that on 14 May 2024 she did steal a motor vehicle, which carries a maximum of 10 years imprisonment. The second is Count 5, an offence at s 111(2) of Crimes Act that on 14 May 2024 she entered the dwelling of the victim with intent, specifically, intent to steal, in circumstances of aggravation, being that she knew there was a person present at the dwelling. This offence carries a maximum of 14 years imprisonment.

2. There is no standard non-parole period for either offence.

3. The maximum penalties represent the Parliament’s assessment of the seriousness of these two offences.

4. I have considered the timing of the offender’s plea of guilty, which was entered in the Local Court. Her sentence is reduced by 25% below what I would have imposed had she not pleaded guilty at that time.

5. In the careful and detailed written submissions prepared on her behalf by Mr Ormaechea, who appears from the Aboriginal Legal Service, the offender submitted that her plea of guilty also represents her acceptance of responsibility and willingness to facilitate the course of justice. It was also submitted that the plea of guilty is evidence of remorse, a mitigating consideration under s 21A(3)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.

6. I accept the offender has demonstrated a willingness to facilitate the course of justice through her plea and, of course, she is entitled to the discount of 25%. But I do not accept that she is remorseful. The offender’s written submissions were provided prior to the parties receiving the sentencing assessment report, dated 19 June 2025. In that report there is the following statement at p 2,

“Ms Wright disputed the agreed facts by stating she did not steal anything from the victim and that she took the vehicle to escape. When challenged why she then agreed to the facts presented she stated she wanted to get sentencing finalised…Ms Wright claims to have not known the offenders who went to the victim’s property despite admitting to recognising one of the voices.

Despite this claim she did acknowledge driving the co-offenders away from the scene. When challenged as to why she did this if she had not known the co-offenders or planned any involvement, she stated that she would have looked worse had she got out of the car and run off.”

7. And then at p 3 the author of the report says this,

“Ms Wright acknowledged that the incident would have frightened the victim however does not feel responsible for what occurred as she claimed to have not known what was happening or being any part of it. Despite her stated remorse, her pattern of continual disregard of the law as evidenced by her criminal history calls into question the sincerity of this statement.”

8. I agree with that conclusion. The offender also wrote a letter to the Court the day before she was due to be sentenced, in which she expresses her remorse and refers to her difficult childhood. I completely accept her letter so far as it relates to her childhood and I will return to that issue shortly, but I do not accept she is genuinely remorseful in circumstances where she denied responsibility for her actions in the Sentencing Assessment Report. A finding of remorse requires evidence to the requisite standard, that is, on the balance of probabilities and I do not consider that standard has been met.

FACTS

9. The offender and the victim were known to one another. At the relevant time the victim was 77 years of age and the offender was 23. They would send text messages to each other. The offender would often benefit from the relationship with the victim by receiving money, cigarettes and lifts from him and in return the victim would receive unspecified sexual favours and/or at least some attention from her. She had told him her name was Brittany.

10. In the late hours of the evening of 13 May 2024, and into the early hours of 14 May 2024, the offender and the victim had texted one another multiple times. The victim asked the offender to come over to his house. This led to the offender arriving at the victim’s home at around 1am. The victim let her into the house. The facts state that the offender came and sat on the victim’s bed. He was lying there while she was playing on her phone.

11. After about 10 minutes the victim heard knocking on his front door and he got up to see who it was. There were three people standing on his porch wearing dark clothing, with hoods over their heads and their faces covered. One of those people demanded that the victim open the door, but the victim refused to do so.

12. At this point the offender said that she wanted to leave the house and the victim tried to let her out in such a way so as to prevent the three other people from entering. However, the three unknown people moved closer to the front door and began kicking at it. Eventually one of them cut the flyscreen with what is described as a long thin knife and the three individuals, who I will refer to as the co-offenders, ripped the front door off its hinges and entered the property.

13. Two of the co-offenders began pushing and hitting the victim, causing him to fall backwards. At some point he ended up on the lounge and two of the co-offenders held him down, with one person holding a knife to his face. A third of the unknown co-offenders went with the offender, Ms Wright, into the victim’s bedroom and stole the car keys to his Toyota Camry.

14. The victim tried to access his mobile phone to call police, but the phone was kicked out of his hand by one of the co-offenders, who then picked it up and threw it away. Several items were stolen from the bedroom: the victim’s wallet, which contained about 300 to $400 in cash, a Keno ticket, a Queensland Club Membership Card as well as reading glasses and an engraved silver pen.

15. Two of the co-offenders ran out of the victim’s front door, while the other offender jumped into the Camry. The Camry already had its engine running and the offender, Ms Wright, was at the wheel. The victim ran to the car and attempted to turn the car off, and a scuffle erupted between the victim and the offender, which involved the victim punching the offender in the side of her head, but he was unable to stop both her and the co-offenders leaving the property in his car.

16. The victim suffered some small skin tears to his left foot arch, his left calf and right forearm, but it is not suggested by the Crown that this amounted to actual bodily harm. The offender was ultimately arrested two days later.

OBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS

17. An essential part of the sentencing process is the assessment of the objective gravity of each offence for which the offender is to be sentenced. That sets the perimeters of the appropriate sentence and ensures the sentence imposed is proportionate to the offences committed.

18. The objective seriousness of an offence is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offenders. It is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending itself.

19. The offender pleaded guilty to the two charges on the basis that she was involved in a joint criminal enterprise with the three unknown co-offenders. I want to emphasise that fact because it was not addressed in either Mr Ormaechea’s 22-page written submissions of 19 June 2025, nor his supplementary submissions of 26 June 2025.

20. When I expressly raised the fact that the plea was entered on the basis joint criminal enterprise during sentence submissions, the effect of the joint criminal enterprise was sought to be minimised if not completely side stepped with the offender instead focusing on the principles of R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383. It was submitted on the offender’s behalf that the Court must disregard almost all of the co-offender’s conduct in the victim’s home when sentencing the offender.

21. The General principle for which De Simoni stands for was articulated by his Honour Gibbs CJ, at p 389 where his Honour said,

“A judge in imposing sentence is entitled to consider all the conduct of the accused including that which would aggravate the offence but cannot take into account circumstances of aggravation which would have warranted a conviction for a more serious offence.”

22. The Court accepts the principles referred to at length by the offender in her submissions. The offender will not be punished for an offence for which she is not to be convicted, nor punished for an extraneous offence. The offender’s submission is that the offence at s 111(2) provides that a person is guilty if they enter the dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence and that consequently, she cannot be responsible for any of the conduct by the other offenders and certainly could not be sentenced on the basis of a more serious offence such as an aggravated break and enter offence. It is also submitted that the offender could not be sentenced on the basis of a home invasion. I certainly accept that she could not be sentenced on the basis of an aggravated break and enter or a home invasion.

23. However, it is the aggravated version of the offence at s 111(2) of the Crimes Act which the offender has pleaded guilty to. The particularised circumstance of aggravation in this matter is that the offender knew there was a person present. Section 105A of the Crimes Act defines other potential circumstances of aggravation, as raised with Mr Ormaechea during the sentencing hearing.

24. Justice Simpson in Huhyn v The Queen [2005] NSWCCA 220 at para 29 held:

“It is only common sense that generally speaking the more circumstances of aggravation which are present the more serious will be the offence.”

25. The submission made on behalf of the offender is that none of the other s 105A Crimes Act considerations apply because to do so would breach the principles of De Simoni. This was because the offender’s criminality was complete upon her entry to the premises. The problem with that submission is that it is inconsistent with a plea of guilty on the basis of a joint criminal enterprise and potential application of other s 105A Crimes Act considerations.

26. The significance of a joint criminal enterprise is that each participant is criminally responsible for the acts of the others involved in the furtherance of the enterprise. No doubt this was explained to Ms Wright when she signed the facts on 10 April 2025. By her plea she is acknowledging her role in permitting the others to enter the property and then their role in assisting her in stealing the victim’s car.

27. It is submitted on behalf of the offender that the actus reus for the s 111 offence is complete at the time of entry. A number of cases were put forward to support this proposition, being The Queen v Delphin (2001) 79 SASR 429, Dacre v The Queen (2018) 57 VR 285; and R v Dugan [1984] 2 NSWLR 554. Dacre v The Queen relates to the Commonwealth’s Criminal Code and various terrorism offences involving foreign incursion and acts preparatory to foreign incursion and committing hostile activities. The sections considered there bear no similarity to the offence before the Court and there is no point of principle from that decision that should be applied to the very different offences at 111(2).

28. The other two cases the offender relies upon - being The Queen v Delphin and R v Dugan - refer to the offence at s 111 of the Crimes Act or its interstate equivalent in its simpliciter form, not the aggravated version which is before the Court today for sentence. The difference is important because the aggravating circumstances in 105A of the Crimes Act have a role to play when considering the offender’s criminality.

29. On the offender’s analysis, her criminality stopped as soon as she entered the property. If that was right, then s 105A would have no work to do. It would make no difference to the sentencing exercise whether, for example, the offender intentionally or recklessly inflicted actual bodily harm on any person or deprived someone of his or her liberty. On the offender’s approach to this offence, once the offender was in the property, nothing else matters. I do not accept that given the joint criminal enterprise.

30. The Crown’s submission is that Sequences 2 and 5 are part of a continued course of offending. The offending included when the three unknown co-offenders came into the house and had an altercation with the victim and whilst the offender stole the victim’s items, including his car keys. The offending in sequence 5 ended when the offender stole the car keys and left the house.

31. The intent to commit larceny did not end when the offender entered the victim’s house as she remained in the house when the other unknown co-offenders arrived and the altercation with the victim occurred. The Crown submits - and I accept - that these facts can be contrasted with a situation where the offender entered the premises with intent to steal but upon entering and not being able to steal anything, left. It was submitted that the Crown has provided no authority to support that case, but with respect, it is not a question of authority. That is a plain reading of the facts, remembering the offender’s plea of guilty was entered on the basis of a joint criminal enterprise to the offence at s 111(2) of the Crimes Act, not 111(1).

32. To illustrate the continuing nature of her conduct it is worth re-reading para 11 of the Agreed Facts, under the heading sequence 5, aggravated enter dwelling with intent to commit a serious indictable offence. Here the offender has admitted the following,

“Whilst the other two unknown co-offenders were attacking Mr Kendall in the lounge room the third unknown co-offender and offender went into Mr Kendall’s bedroom and stole the car keys to the Toyota Camry.”

33. In other words, the offender’s conduct is occurring simultaneously with the co-offenders and there is distinct criminality for which she bears responsibility, prior to the stealing of the motor vehicle. I accept the Crown’s characterisation of the offender’s conduct for sequence 5.

34. The fact that there are multiple aggravating features potentially present via 105A is relevant to the court’s consideration of the objective seriousness of the offending. As it is a joint criminal enterprise, as a general proposition the offender, bears some responsibility for all the conduct that has occurred, but the moral culpability of a particular offender can vary depending on the individual offender’s participation, particularly where it is necessary for each participant to perform his or her assigned tasks, it may be unfair to treat the less active participant more leniently.

35. I consider that this was a joint criminal enterprise that involved some planning, but very little. I find that in circumstances where the victim invited the offender to his house that sometime between receiving that invitation and the arrival of the three unknown co-offenders the offender has arranged for the others to arrive and then participated in the conduct which resulted in the theft of the car.

36. The offender abused her trusted relationship with the victim to gain access to the premises at 1am in the morning and then through her presence and actions, assisted the three unknown co-offenders once they entered.

37. The additional aggravating feature in this matter is that she was in company. The offender did not directly help the co-offenders gain entry to the property and I do not take that into account. I do not find that she is responsible for cutting the flyscreen or kicking in the front door or the damage to the door, she is not responsible for that. She did not assault the victim, but the additional aggravating feature of using corporal violence at 105A(c) is present because of the joint criminal enterprise.

38. The liability of the offender and of the joint criminal enterprise for sequence 2 was that she was the driver of the vehicle and physically drove the car away with the three unknown co-offenders.

39. The offender pushed the victim away as he was trying to get the keys back, one unknown co-offender tried to assist the offender in the stealing of the car by unsuccessfully trying to stop the victim from getting to the offender. That is the Crown’s characterisation of sequence 2 and I accept it.

40. The offender played a critical role in going to the victim’s bedroom and taking his keys so that they could escape the crime. I accept the Crown submission that had the victim not been held down on the couch in the living room the offender and the co-offenders may not have had the opportunity to go into his bedroom, steal the various items including the car keys.

41. There were three co-offenders and as I have said that means she was in company and that aggravates the seriousness of the conduct. The offence was committed at the premises of the victim who was an elderly man of 77 years of age. The offences were committed when the premises were occupied at night time. The value of the stolen property is not specified in the facts beyond the $400 in cash. But no doubt there would have been some sentimental attachment to the pen.

42. The offender’s actions in then getting into the driver seat and driving the victim’s car away demonstrates her role in the offence. The duration of this conduct appears to be relatively brief. The offences occurred close in time one another and was part of a single act of criminality which occurred as I say late at night for a short period of time.

43. The car is obviously a valuable piece of property. The facts are silent as to its precise value, whether it was damaged or whether it was returned.

44. The offender’s conduct is integral to the commission of both offences. I do not use the presence of the knife to aggravate the seriousness of her conduct in any way because I accept that she would not necessarily know or expect that the other offenders would have had the knife.

AGGRAVATING FEATURES

45. I have already mentioned some of these because of their presence via 105A and I am conscious not to double count. I have already mentioned the fact this happened in the offender’s home.

46. At the time of the offending the offender was subject to conditional liberty, she was on a Community Corrections order for three offences involving dishonestly receiving property by deception. A breach of conditional liberty is a matter of aggravation, it reflects an abuse of the freedom granted to the offender by committing further offences, that aggravates the seriousness of her conduct.

47. A further aggravating feature of her conduct is the fact that the victim was 77 years of age. I accept that this makes him a vulnerable person within the meaning of s 21A(2)(l) of Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.

ANTECEDENTS

48. The offender has a lengthy criminal history. She has several items on her adult criminal history and some on her criminal history as a child. At the time these offences were committed she was 23 years of age. Her adult offences are mostly traffic matters, but there are also stalking and intimidation offences, and the three dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception charges that I have referred to.

48. She has received various sentencing outcomes including fines and community corrections orders. This is her longest adult custodial sentence. The offender’s antecedents operate to disentitle her to the lenience that she would have been entitled to had she come before the Court without previously committing any offences.

SUBJECTIVE MATERIAL

50. The Court has before it the sentencing assessment report which I have already referred to. In addition to those matters I have already addressed it assesses the offender as a medium to high risk of reoffending. There was a comprehensive report prepared on behalf of the offender by psychologist Anica Spatz dated 17 May 2025.

51. The report includes the results of four psychometric tests. At para 3 Ms Spatz observes that the defendant may have some “Impairment in her ability to retain and accurately recall information.” This observation is consistent with several inconsistencies which appear not only in the report itself but when compared against other objective material. For example, in the sentencing assessment report she accepts no responsibility for the offending, but apparently, she tells Ms Spatz she is highly remorseful and demonstrated shame and remorse. I have already set out my view regarding that issue.

52. Ms Spatz’s report demonstrates that the offender’s childhood was one of profound deprivation. There is a significant history of her both witnessing and being a victim of domestic violence. The report also refers to the persistent physical and psychological domestic abuse she received at the hand of her mother who engaged in severe physical discipline involving beatings to the point of severe bruising, being tied up, cable ties and other harsh punishment following school misbehaviour.

53. There is a reference to a sexual assault by a family member whilst she was in her childhood. Her father spent time in custody and had problems with alcohol abuse.

54. There are some inconsistencies though that the Crown points out when it comes to Ms Wright’s use of illicit substances. As the Crown pointed out in its written submissions, the offender told Ms Spatz that at the age of 13 shew as using methamphetamine and then at 16 cocaine, which remains her primary substance of concern. There is a reference to problematic alcohol use and using heroin. Ms Spatz wrote at para 47,

“At the time of the offending Ms Wright was heavily reliant on illicit substances including heroin, ice and cocaine. She reported using heroin regularly and being under the influence of speed on the day the offences occurred.”

55. This can be contrasted though with the Justice Health records which were tendered on behalf of the offender. At p 30 of the bundle her initial assessment - taken when she was admitted into custody for this offence on 21 May 2024. It tells a slightly different story. In that the offender stated that she last used drugs and alcohol at the age of 13 some 10 years before this offence. The offender told Justice Health she would not consider rehabilitation as she reported having no issues with drugs or alcohol.

56. It may be that she was downplaying her drug use to Justice Health, conversely, she may be exaggerating it to Ms Spatz, but either way it damages her credibility.

57. With respect to the mental health issues at para 50 of Ms Spatz report it states that the offender is,

“Engaging with mental health staff in custody and has an upcoming appointment...and doing everything she can while in gaol to demonstrate her commitment to rehabilitation.”

58. This is inconsistent though with para 29 of the same report which indicates that the offender told Ms Spatz she has had minimal mental health “input” while in custody and is reluctant to fully disclose her experiences due to fears of being monitored.

59. Ms Spatz states that the offender was exposed to a severe level of adverse childhood experiences which and significantly increased her risk of mental illnesses, relationship problems, emotional distress and impulsivity. Ms Spatz concludes that at the time of the offending the offender had several disorders, specifically opioid use disorder, stimulant use disorders of varying degrees, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorder and a major depressive order with psychotic features. Ms Spatz says this from p 17 of her report,

“Ms Wright needs considerable drug and alcohol intervention to prevent relapse. Drug replacement therapy might serve as a valuable treatment component as any substance use would exacerbate her mental health issues, reduce functioning and restart the cycle of addiction.”

60. Further on the same page Ms Spatz states,

“At the time of the interview for this psychological evaluation Ms Wright also presented with active psychotic symptomatology including auditory hallucinations and persecutory delusions, the content of the perceptual disturbances appeared to be congruent with her mood and maybe explained by a schizo effective disorder or a substance induced psychotic disorder. Time, treatment and sobriety will reveal which mental health issue she is experiencing.”

61. And then further down on that page,

“Ms Wright displays several risk factors that elevate her likelihood of future reoffending. These include a longstanding pattern of poly substance use, unresolved trauma from domestic violence and childhood abuse, and ongoing mental health concerns such as depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder and psychotic symptoms.”

62. The report from Ms Spatz also contains a detailed treatment plan.

63. The Crown points out some inconsistencies in the report when it comes to the procedural history of the matters as understood by Ms Wright, but these are of no significance. Of more concern are the inconsistencies regarding her history of drug use and fundamental issues like her mental health. I do not find that the offender is being deliberately dishonest, but I do find she is an unreliable historian.

64. All of this material when it comes to an assessment of her mental health is critically important. It is a very powerful factor in reducing her moral culpability, not only with respect to the issues of mental health but also issues of childhood deprivation which I will return to.

65. There are two letters from Lives Lived Well a residential drug rehabilitation centre, those letters are dated 5 and 18 June 2025, the letters are from the centre’s Orange office. The Court understands that Lives Lived Well provides support for people affected by alcohol and other drugs and mental health issues and gambling.

66. The letter of 18 June 2025 states that, the offender has been accepted into a six-week residential program that has been run by the course and that she could be admitted into its care on 14 July 2025. The letter explains that the program can be extended for a further six weeks. There is no detail about what the program actually involves, nor does it address apparently the mental health issues that the offender has and which are outlined in detail in Ms Spatz report.

67. I have read those letters and they do demonstrate that the offender believes there is now a drug issue and that it needs to be addressed and critically she is willing to seek assistance. This is very important for my assessment of her rehabilitation.

68. Also tendered on her behalf were three certificates of attainment. There are also Justice Health records and a letter from her father which set out the difficulties he is facing looking after one of the offender’s children. I accept that he does face those difficulties.

69. All of that material has been taken into account in a way that ultimately reduces her sentence. Clearly there are underlying issues which will not be resolved by her continued detention beyond what is necessary for her to be punished in accordance with the principles of s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. One of the considerations of which is the importance of rehabilitation.

MITIGATING FACTORS

70. With respect to the statutory mitigating factors at s 21A(3) based on her criminal history and her mental health issues, I can be cautiously optimistic about her prospects of rehabilitation, given that she now appears to accept the need to obtain rehabilitation.

71. I note that while she will not be attending the rehabilitation course that commences on 14 July 2025, there will certainly be other opportunities for her to do so when she is on parole. I am less confident when it comes to whether she will reoffend. At this stage I cannot be confident she will not do so.

72. I have already touched on issues of moral culpability. The question of a reduction in moral culpability is a reduction from the moral culpability that would otherwise correspond to the gravity of the offending. Where the state of a person’s mental health contributes to the commission of an offence in a material way the moral culpability may be reduced.

73. Consequently, the need to denounce the crime maybe reduced with a reduction in the sentence. It may also have the consequence that an offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence, resulting in a reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed. It may mean that a custodial sentence weighs more heavily on the person. It may reduce or eliminate the significance of specific deterrence. Conversely, it may be that because of a person’s mental illness they present more of a danger to the community. In those circumstances considerations of specific deterrence may result in an increased sentence.

74. It will be observed that none of these principles is stated as an absolute. What is recognised is the potential effect in any given case of the role of a person’s mental health. Too often the mere fact of mental illness being present is advanced to this Court as necessarily calling for a more lenient sentence. There is no such presumption. It remains necessary for the sentencing court to examine the relevant facts in order to determine in the specific case what role if any the mental condition has in the sentencing.

75. In this instance while the offender did not give evidence on sentence, the report of Ms Spatz is very important. There are some inconsistences, but I accept the report generally particularly in relation to the diagnosis. I accept the offender would find custody more difficult because of her mental health issues and that general deterrence plays a lesser role.

76. Specific deterrence does still play a very important role in the sentencing consideration because Ms Wright needs to realise that if her drug use is not brought under control she may well commit more offences in the future, and that is in neither her interest nor that of the community’s.

77. There was a submission made that the offender’s background is one of childhood deprivation and social disadvantage. It is well established that the disadvantaged background of an offender may mitigate the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate.

78. I accept that there has been relevant disadvantage and this serves less in her moral culpability as does her mental health issues. Her moral culpability is significantly reduced for these reasons. The subjective material relating to her history of abuse is compelling.

AGE AND YOUTH

79. It is submitted that the offender’s relatively young age at the time of these offences should be considered. The case law is replete with statements of principle that apply in sentencing juvenile offenders. They include that considerations of general deterrence and retribution may give way to the rehabilitation of a youthful offender.

80. That is not to say that general deterrence and retribution should be ignored as there is always a significant public interest in deterring anti-social conduct. The emphasis though to rehabilitation as opposed to general deterrence and retribution may be moderated in certain circumstances where the crime has some premeditation. The younger the offender the greater the weight that might be afforded to the element of youth.

81. If immaturity is a significant factor in the offending, the criminality of the offender will also be less. This provides a counterpoint to the need to denounce punish and hold the offender accountable.

82. Here the offender was 23 years of age at the time of the offending so she was not a juvenile, but she is still quite youthful and she is entitled to have that immaturity considered as I find that it is likely to play a role in her conduct particularly when considered in the context of her background of childhood deprivation.

VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT

83. The victim has prepared a victim impact statement for the Court, which refers to his physical injuries and the fact that he now suffers from a lack of sleep, he is hypervigilant about noises that he hears. He has flashbacks and paranoia, he is less trusting and fearful about leaving the house at night. I take all those matters into account when I consider s 3A(g) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. I also take into account the other matters of s 3A all of which pull in different directions.

SENTENCE COMMENCEMENT DATE

84. The parties agree that the offender has spent a considerable period of time in custody already. Her sentence will be backdated to commence on 22 December 2024.

TOTALITY

85. As there is more than one offence before the Court for sentence I must consider the principle of totality. This principle is a recognised principle of sentencing that requires the aggregation of multiple sentences to reflect a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved.

86. Here there are two different offences, but it is the same victim for each and it is on one occasion, and they all occurred within a very short space of time. I intend to impose an aggregate sentence and there will be a large but by no means total degree of concurrency.

87. Having considered all possible alternatives I am satisfied that the threshold at s 5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act has been crossed and that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate.

88. I make a finding of special circumstances relying on the offender’s still relatively young age, the fact that this is her first time in an adult correctional environment, her identified mental health issues and her need for drug rehabilitation which will be better obtained in the community. I will set the non-parole period at 50%.

INTENSIVE CORRECTION ORDERS

89. It was submitted that the offender would receive an aggregate custodial sentence that would be less than three years and that she would be suitable for an intensive corrections order. I agree the aggregate sentence would be less than three years and I have considered whether an ICO would be appropriate.

90. When considering an ICO, s 66 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act must be considered. It refers to the paramount consideration of the court being that of community safety. There is also the consideration of whether making the order or serving a sentence by way of fulltime detention is more likely to address the offender’s risk of reoffending. The other factors of s 3A also apply as well as other relevant common law principles.

91. I have considered the submission made on behalf of the offender, but in my view given the objective seriousness of the two offences, the fact that they were committed while the offender was on a bond and her already lengthy history of offending, leads me to conclude that an ICO would not be appropriate because of s 66.

92. I intend to impose an aggregate sentence and I am required to indicate what the individual sentences for each offence will be. As I have already said she is entitled to a 25% discount for her plea of guilty. The indicative sentences are as follows,

93. In respect of sequence 5, the aggravated enter dwelling charge, an indicative sentence of 18 months.

94. With respect to sequence 2, the steal vehicle charge, I indicate a sentence of 12 months.

95. Ms Wright I will now make the following orders.

ORDERS

96. You are convicted of each of those two offences. I impose an aggregate sentence of one year and 10 months that is 22 months, that will commence on 22 December 2024 it will expire on 21 October 2026.

97. The non-parole period will be 11 months, that is it will expire on 21 November 2025.

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Decision last updated: 15 August 2025