R v Wright
[2018] ACTSC 58
•6 March 2018
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | R v Wright |
Citation: | [2018] ACTSC 58 |
Hearing Dates: | 14 December 2017; 21 February 2018; 6 March 2018 |
DecisionDate: | 6 March 2018 |
Before: | Penfold J |
Decision: | 1. See [76] to [84] below. 2. For the purpose of s 35(3) of the Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 (ACT), her Honour is not satisfied that Ms Wright did not comply with the immediate suspension notice given in July 2017. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – arson – drink-driving – offender intoxicated – whether offences premeditated – arson aggravated by being committed at night and by use of accelerant – whether revenge was motive – whether offence committed in context of domestic relationship is an aggravating factor – separate breach of family violence order. |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 1995 (ACT) Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (Act), s 19 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 68D |
Cases Cited: | R v Brymer [2016] ACTSC 194 R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41; 144 A Crim R 180 R v Wrigley [2015] ACTSC 114 |
Parties: | The Queen (Crown) Alison Margrett Wright (Accused) |
Representation: | Counsel Ms M Kent (Crown) Mr J Sabharwal (Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Rachel Bird & Co (Offender) | |
File Numbers: | SCC 241 of 2017; SCC 242 of 2017; SCC 343 of 2017 |
The offences
Alison Wright has pleaded guilty to four offences as follows:
(a)two offences of arson, arising under s 404(1) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) and carrying a maximum penalty including imprisonment for 15 years;
(b)one offence of contravening a family violence order arising under s 43 of the Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT) and carrying a maximum penalty including five years imprisonment; and
(c)one offence of driving as a first offender with blood alcohol level 4, arising under s 19(1) of the Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 (ACT) and, under s 26 of that Act, carrying a maximum penalty of 9 months imprisonment and a fine of 15 penalty units, currently $2,250, and a default disqualification period of three years, which may be reduced by the court to a period of not less than six months.
That last offence is before me as a related offence for sentencing under s 90B of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) and s 68D of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), and for the purposes of s 68D of the Supreme Court Act, I note that I consider it would be in the interests of justice to deal with that offence in these proceedings.
The incidents
The incidents from which these charges arose took place in July and December 2017.
The following description of the July incident is taken from the agreed statement of facts.
Ms Wright had been in a relationship with one of the victims, Ms Drew, for 20 years until 2012 and the relationship had been resumed for several months in 2014, before the pair finally separated. After that, Ms Wright left the ACT but returned in mid-2017 to stay with her mother.
Following her return, Ms Wright regularly contacted Ms Drew via text messages, asking whether they could meet and walk their dogs together, but Ms Drew declined.
On 9 July 2017, about a week after Ms Drew changed her Facebook relationship status from “single” to “in a relationship”, Ms Wright went to Ms Drew's home in Gilmore, demanding to know the name of Ms Drew's new partner. Ms Wright persisted and eventually Ms Drew provided a fake name so that Ms Wright would leave.
That evening, Ms Wright messaged Ms Drew, asking to talk, but Ms Drew refused, and said she would block Ms Wright's number.
Over the next few weeks, Ms Wright used her mother's phone, and Ms Drew's work email address, to try to contact Ms Drew.
On 27 July 2017, Ms Drew saw Ms Wright's vehicle while walking her dog, then saw Ms Wright walking towards her. She accused Ms Wright of stalking her; Ms Wright said nothing, patted the dog, and walked back to her car.
Later that evening, Ms Drew's new partner, Ms Lenaghan, parked her car in front of Ms Drew's garage, and the pair went to dinner in Ms Drew's car. On their way back at around 8.00 pm, they saw Ms Wright's car driving away from Ms Drew's home. As they approached Ms Drew's home, they saw the boot of Ms Lenaghan's car on fire, and there was also a small fire at the bottom of the metal garage door. Ms Drew put out the fires using a garden hose.
Police and ACT Fire and Rescue attended, and observed a strong smell of fuel near the garage door. Other observations also suggested the use of an accelerant, and that the fire had started very shortly before the women arrived.
A couple of hours later, police pulled over Ms Wright's car in Chisholm. They found a jerry can in her vehicle with a nozzle attached; Ms Wright had the jerry can cap, and a cigarette lighter, in her pocket. She was breathalysed, and returned a reading of 0.208 (the applicable alcohol limited was 0.05). She was arrested and her licence was suspended, and the next day she was charged with the two arson offences and the Level 4 blood alcohol offence, and granted bail. It seems that she pleaded guilty to the drink-driving offence immediately but not guilty to the two arson offences, until pleading guilty to those charges on 5 September 2017, at which point the matter was committed to this court for sentence.
The Family Violence Order breach occurred in 17 December 2017, three days after the sentencing hearing for the earlier offences was adjourned part-heard.
After the arson incident in July 2017, Ms Drew applied for and was granted a Family Violence Order. Among other things, the order prohibited Ms Wright from contacting Ms Drew.
From around 6.00 pm on 17 December 2017, Ms Drew received several phone calls, which she did not answer, from a phone number identified in her contacts list as Ms Wright's mother. Several voicemails were left, and when Ms Drew listened to them, she recognised them as Ms Wright's voice. She contacted police, who went to her house. Another call was made to Ms Drew from the same phone while police were present.
After Ms Drew made a statement to police, they went to Ms Wright's home, where they found her apparently heavily intoxicated and arrested her.
As noted, that breach offence was committed shortly after this sentencing hearing had begun, and while Ms Wright was on bail in respect of the arson and drink-driving charges with bail conditions including that she not contact Ms Drew.
After her arrest for breaching the Family Violence Order, Ms Wright remained in custody for 13 days before being released to the Canberra Hospital Withdrawal Unit.
Ms Wright was arraigned on the family violence offence on 21 February this year, and pleaded guilty.
So far, Ms Wright has spent a total of 14 days in custody in respect of these charges. The backdating date is agreed as 20 February 2018.
Evidence
As well as the two statements of facts, the following material is in evidence before me:
(a)a map of Ms Drew's suburb and photographs of the damage to the car and garage door;
(b)victim impact statements from Ms Drew and Ms Lenaghan, which were read out in court by the prosecutor;
(c)a pre-sentence report dated 5 December 2017;
(d)a CADAS reported dated 30 August 2017;
(e)a reparation order form, and documents relating to the cost of replacing Ms Drew's garage and to the value of the damage to Ms Lenaghan's car; and
(f)an updated bail progress report;
all of which were tendered by the prosecution.
As well, the defence tendered:
(a)a psychological report dated 22 November 2017 from Ms Wright's psychologist, Wendy Preston;
(b)a letter from Ms Michelle Figaras (a Drug and Alcohol Counsellor from Directions ACT) dated 4 December 2017;
(c)a letter from Ms Wright's GP over the past 12 months, Dr Gerard McLaren, dated 24 August 2017;
(d)two letters of support from Ms Wright's friends, Adam Martin, dated 3 September 2017, and Vicky Quinn, dated 10 December 2017;
(e)a certificate of attendance from the NSW Serious Traffic Offenders Program dated 25 August 2017;
(f)a letter from Ms Wright's mother, Shirley Wright, dated 5 December 2017; and
(g)a letter from Directions ACT, advising that Ms Wright had been admitted to the Arcadia House Transition Program from 4 January 2018 and discharged on 19 February 2018 (the letter gave no information about Ms Wright's progress while in the program or reasons for being discharged).
As well as the material exhibited, Ms Wright gave oral evidence. I shall refer to that where it becomes relevant, but note at this point that her evidence was discursive and, at times, apparently evasive, and suggests a person with a significant capacity for denial and limited capacity to see things from the perspective of others. Obviously, I have no expertise in these areas, but it occurs to me that its presentation might reflect defence mechanisms that Ms Wright developed as a child to deal with the abuse she suffered from her father. She might wish to discuss this with her psychologist at some point.
Objective seriousness of the offences
Before considering the objective seriousness of the offences, it is appropriate to refer to some of the evidence Ms Wright gave about the circumstances of the arson offences.
She said that she had seen Ms Drew several times during 2017, and thought they were friends, although she now accepted that their friendship was over. On the day of the arson offences, she had approached Ms Drew's home intending to say goodbye to her dog before she returned to the south coast (it seems that this was a dog that had been shared when Ms Wright and Ms Drew lived together). When she saw that Ms Drew's car was in the driveway, she turned and walked back down the laneway where she saw Ms Drew, with the dog, walking towards her home. She patted the dog and Ms Drew asked whether Ms Wright was stalking her.
In cross-examination, Ms Wright agreed that when she had come across Ms Drew at an earlier point, she had pressed Ms Drew for the name of her new partner and said that this was because "Canberra's a small place and I wouldn't want to run into them". She had then rung Ms Drew asking her to delete Ms Wright's family from her Facebook, and Ms Drew had said that she was going to block Ms Wright's phone number. On the next day, she had sent a text message to Ms Drew asking her to block all the phone numbers for Ms Wright's family, and to stay away from her family. She had done this because "that's how I felt at the time". She agreed that she had sent several further texts using her mother's mobile phone, and that when she had approached Ms Drew's home later on in the hope of saying goodbye to the dog, this would, if the dog had come out of the house, have involved her entering Ms Drew's backyard to pat the dog.
In evidence-in-chief, Ms Wright said of the day of the offences that after Ms Drew asked if she had been stalking to her, she, Ms Wright, shook her head, returned to her car and left the area. She then went to a park where she drank quite a lot of beer that she had bought before approaching Ms Drew's home, and then to the home of a friend who happened to live not far from Ms Drew's home. At her friend's home, she said, she planned to do some gardening as a favour for her friend (in cross-examination, she conceded that it would have been nearly dark by the time she reached her friend's house, but maintained that she was going to do the gardening in the dark). Ms Wright's friend was not at home, so she stayed in the driveway drinking for some time, then went to a service station and bought two petrol cans and returned to her friend's place. Finding her friend still not at home, and the backyard inaccessible, she again sat in her car drinking for a time. She said that her next recollection was waking up in her car, realising that her mother would be worried, driving out of the driveway intending to go home, and being stopped soon after by police. Ms Wright maintained that she still had no recollection of the arson offences.
In evidence, she also said that the garage was a free-standing one, not attached to Ms Drew's house, but conceded that the fire could have spread and caused more damage than it did.
Having heard Ms Wright's evidence, and quite apart from her pleas of guilty, I have no doubt that Ms Wright was responsible for the fires. I am not however sure whether she has invented her explanation for the presence of the jerry can of fuel in her car, or whether it is true as far as it goes, and it was the presence of that jerry can that inspired the setting of the fires.
Against that background, I note first that arson is always potentially a serious offence because of the potential for a fire to escape the offender's control and cause damage far beyond anything intended by the offender.
In R v Wrigley [2015] ACTSC 114 (Wrigley), Refshauge J summarised a variety of authorities about sentencing for arson offences, and among other things, noted that aggravating factors included:
(a)that the offence was committed at night;
(b)that the offence involved the use of an accelerant;
(c)that the offence was committed for the purpose of revenge; and
(d)a potential risk of injury to life or serious harm to persons, including firefighters.
It is not disputed that the offences were committed at night and involved the use of accelerant.
It may be that revenge motivated either or both of the offences, although it may also be that jealousy or anger would be a better description of Ms Wright's state of mind, but in any case, I am not convinced that it would be appropriate to infer any kind of “rational” motive given Ms Wright's intoxication. I note in this context that s 31(1) of the Criminal Code precludes self-induced intoxication being considered in deciding whether a fault element of basic intent has been shown, but this does not seem to exclude consideration of intoxication in assessing motive. I cannot conclude beyond reasonable doubt that revenge was the motive for Ms Wright's actions in setting the fires.
I accept that there was no immediate risk to other persons when the fire was started. However, the prosecutor pointed to photographs of the damaged garage in evidence that also showed a nearby timber fence and some dry vegetation – I do not doubt that if the fire had taken hold before it was discovered, it might well have endangered other residents in the area and possibly firefighters.
The prosecutor submitted that the arson offences were also aggravated by being committed in the context of a domestic relationship, relying on R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41; 144 A Crim R 180, in which Adams J (with whom Ipp JA and Sully J agreed), said at [47]:
Crimes involving domestic violence have two important characteristics which differentiate them from many other crimes of violence: firstly, the offender usually believes that, in a real sense, what they do is justified, even that they are the true victim; and, secondly, the continued estrangement requires continued threat. These elements also usually mean that the victim never feels truly safe. … To my mind these considerations emphasis not only the need for general and personal deterrence but also of denunciation in cases of this kind.
That is, both general and specific deterrence, and denunciation, are important for such offences. I am not however sure that this is the same as an offence being “aggravated” by being committed in the context of a domestic relationship.
Given my doubts about whether Ms Wright's evidence for having the jerry can in her car was an invention, or whether it was true as far as it went, I cannot find beyond reasonable doubt that the arson offences were premeditated.
Ms Wright said in evidence that, having heard the police reports and the victim impact statements, she was shocked and mortified at her behaviour, felt sad and sorry, and would take it back if she could.
Ms Drew in her victim impact statement said that the offences had caused her distress, and trust issues. She is constantly vigilant when in public places, and is also reluctant to leave her car out, or to invite visitors to her home because she is afraid that their cars might be vandalised. She is also concerned for her own personal safety and that of her pets, as well as for the safety of her new partner. She has felt the need to install security cameras at her house, and to check them regularly. The offences have also caused her difficulties at work, making it hard for her to concentrate on her job, and she has had to take time off. Her life has been changed, and she no longer feels safe.
Ms Lenaghan's victim impact statement reports a devastating emotional impact, with the offences causing sleep deprivation and emotional stress that has affected her work performance. She had started a new job in the week of the arson offences, and has had to take all her sick leave to deal with the effects of the incidents. She also has ordered security cameras for her house. The car that was destroyed was one she had been fixing up to give her son for his 21st birthday; since the fire, she has not bought another car because she has nowhere secure to store it at her home. This has obviously caused inconvenience in many ways; she mentioned in particular her inability to go to the gym after work, and the impact of this on her physical activity and emotional wellbeing. She too expressed fears for her own safety and that of her family.
There is evidence that replacing Ms Drew's garage door cost her around $2,000 all up, and that both doors had to be replaced, although only one door was damaged in the fire, because the same style of door is no longer available. The evidence valuing Ms Lenaghan's car at something over $12,000 was considerably less straightforward, involving evidence of the rather informal transaction in which she obtained it and of what she had since then spent on repairing and renovating it. However, I note that Ms Wright does not oppose the making of reparation orders.
I consider that the arson offences were somewhere below mid-range seriousness.
The drink-driving offence was a relatively serious example of the offence, given that a level 4 concentration of alcohol involves a minimum of 0.15 gm, and Ms Wright's concentration was 0.208 gm. It was also serious given the significant amount of driving Ms Wright reported during the evening in question, and her actions in, apparently, constantly topping up her alcohol level each time she stopped anywhere. On the other hand, she had no passengers in her car, and police stopped her not because of anything about her manner of driving, but because they were looking for her after the discovery of the fire.
Ms Wright's breach of the family violence order was relatively minor in terms of the nature of the contact involved (phone calls and voicemails rather than confronting Ms Drew in person), but was aggravated by the repeated attempts at contact, and by the fact that the attempted contact was also in breach of Ms Wright's bail conditions. Overall, I consider this offence to be of mid-range seriousness.
Subjective circumstances of the offender
I have also had regard in this sentencing to Ms Wright's subjective circumstances.
Ms Wright is now 50 years old and has no criminal history.
She was born in New South Wales and lived with her family in a number of different places before they settled in the ACT when she was 16 years old.
Ms Wright describes her childhood as dysfunctional and unhappy, involving physical, emotional, and sexual abuse by her alcohol-dependent father until she was 14. The generally abusive circumstances of Ms Wright's childhood were confirmed by her mother, although her mother said she had become aware of the sexual abuse only fairly recently, and did not remember Ms Wright as a teenager reporting sexual abuse by her father.
Ms Wright has a Diploma in Information Technology and a Certificate IV in Aged Care/Home and Community Care from CIT. She has worked in various industries, and more recently in aged care facilities, but has been on leave for some time now.
Ms Wright's substance use history includes:
(a)cannabis from the ages of 15 to 30, which she stopped after family members expressed concern at the effect it was having;
(b)occasional ecstasy use, between ages 25 and 30 in social settings; and
(c)one use of amphetamines at the age of 18.
However, it is Ms Wright's alcohol use that is of most concern.
Ms Wright started drinking at age 13, but she says that her issues with alcohol use became obvious in her early twenties. In this period, she engaged in binge-drinking on most weekends, and estimated that in 2001, her drinking increased to almost 17 standard drinks per day. In the 12 months preceding the current offences, Ms Wright estimates she drank 25-30 standard drinks per day, but since she was bailed, she estimates she has consumed 9 standard drinks once or twice a week, noting that this increased to 25 standard drinks on two occasions in early October and late November 2017, for reasons which are not explained. She started to seek assistance from her general practitioner to address her alcohol issues in July 2017. I shall refer to this matter again in the context of rehabilitation.
Although Ms Wright is currently single, she was with her de facto partner, one of the victims in this matter, for over 20 years. Before that relationship began, it seems she had been admitted to Canberra Hospital after an earlier relationship broke down in 1992, but was discharged on that occasion without formal diagnosis.
In 2001, Ms Wright was a victim of workplace bullying, which has contributed to the depression and anxiety from which she is currently suffering and for which she is currently receiving treatment, including medication.
In 2005, she was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, but required no further treatment at that time.
Since June 2017, Ms Wright has been on daily antidepressants. Her clinical psychologist, Ms Preston, assessed Ms Wright's depression as severe to extremely severe, and her anxiety as moderate. Ms Wright has commenced cognitive behaviour therapy to address these issues.
Ms Wright provided a reference from the President of the South Coast Fishing Club of which she has been a member for some years. Adam Martin said that Ms Wright was well respected in the local community, especially for her willingness to contribute to the fishing club by her volunteer work, including in the stressful position of Weigh Master for many years. He mentioned Ms Wright's expressions of remorse about her drinking.
Another reference was from Vicky Quinn, a Canberra friend who says that Ms Wright's offences were out of character, although she concedes that Ms Wright has a serious drinking problem. She described Ms Wright's expressions of remorse and also her selflessness in helping friends and strangers.
It is clear, as Ms Wright conceded in her evidence, that "being blind drunk is not a defence", and I am also satisfied that it provides no mitigation in this case. Furthermore, it is clear from Ms Wright's blood alcohol level when arrested shortly after the fire that she was extremely intoxicated when the fire started, and it may not matter whether she remembers the offences or not. Her intoxication does not seem to reduce her culpability, and she is a real danger to the community if she becomes so intoxicated that she cannot recall what she has done; it may be that she is more of a danger in that case than if her level of intoxication still allowed her some understanding or memory of what she had been up to.
Either way, personal deterrence will be particularly important in this sentencing.
Rehabilitation is also of major significance.
Rehabilitation
Ms Wright gave evidence in December 2017 that as a result of counselling, she had made some progress in not drinking at all on some days, and had managed up to three or four days without alcohol, but she still had lapses where she drank excessively and then couldn't remember what had happened.
In August 2017, Ms Wright completed a NSW Serious Traffic Offenders Program.
Subsequently, and following a recommendation from Directions ACT that she do a 12-week residential rehabilitation course at Arcadia House, Ms Wright entered the Withdrawal Unit at Calvary Hospital for a 7-day detox, from which she moved to Arcadia House for residential rehabilitation, but she left on 20 February after little more than six weeks.
The bail progress report recorded:
(a)that although Ms Wright had returned negative results to all breath tests while she was in the Arcadia House program, she had been exited from the program for "her failure to comply with program rules and her below average engagement with the program";
(b)that after leaving Arcadia House, Ms Wright had reported as required for bail supervision, and had produced negative results for four subsequent breath tests; and
(c)that she had attended Karralika on 23 February for alcohol and drug counselling, and had also been assessed for a residential rehabilitation program.
Without going into details about the discussion earlier during today’s hearing, I take it from that discussion that Ms Wright was briefly uninspired, or disinclined, to complete a full residential rehabilitation program, but that she has found it in her to seek to commit to such a program from here on.
Other sentencing considerations
Ms Wright has no income while she is not working. She owns a car and a house, and has a mortgage; she is currently living on her savings. However, as I have already mentioned, she did not oppose the making of reparation orders in the amounts claimed by Ms Drew and her new partner.
Ms Wright said that her mother's health had not been good and she had been hospital three times in the last three months; Ms Wright or her brother had been taking their mother to hospital. However, she told the pre-sentence report author that she intends to move back to the South Coast when these matters are finalised, and has not submitted that she is needed to help with her mother's ongoing care.
I have already noted the importance of personal deterrence in this matter; general deterrence will also have a significant role, especially given that many arson offences are planned, rather than spontaneous responses to emotional stress.
Plea of guilty
Ms Wright's pleas of guilty to the arson offences, which she has entered despite her claim not to be able to remember the offences, came only six weeks after they were committed, albeit after a brief of evidence had been prepared in response to the pleas of not guilty.
She entered very early pleas to the drink-driving offence and the offence of breaching the family violence order.
All the pleas can be seen as evidence of remorse, and also have utilitarian value. I note in particular the value of sparing Ms Drew and her new partner from having to give evidence. All the pleas will be recognised by sentencing discounts, varying slightly depending on how early the relevant plea came.
Other matters
As well as the matter of Wrigley, which I have already mentioned, the cases of R v Slater [2015] ACTSC 323 and R v Brymer [2016] ACTSC 194 were drawn to my attention. Without going into any details, I mention that I consider that the offence in each of those cases was somewhat less serious than the offences in this case (although one of them did involve the destruction of a vehicle of relatively low value), and I note that specific deterrence was not seen as significant in any of those cases, in contrast to the current case. The sentences all consisted of prison terms that were immediately suspended, and ranged from 4 months suspended for 12 months, through to 10 months suspended for 3 years and 9 months suspended for 12 months.
I am satisfied, and the parties seem to agree, that prison terms are the only appropriate sentences for these offences. Defence counsel submitted that immediate custodial time was not required, and the prosecutor did not wish to be heard against that submission. However, I made it clear that the suspension of the sentences would involve a requirement for Ms Wright to complete a residential rehabilitation program aimed at her alcohol abuse.
Sentence
Ms Wright, please stand. I record convictions on two offences of arson, one offence of contravening a family violence order, and one offence of driving as a first offender with level 4 blood alcohol level.
Under s 19 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), I order that you pay $1,733.16 to the complainant, Ms Drew, and that you pay $12,093.67 to the complainant, Ms Lenaghan. Your solicitor will explain to you that those payments are to be made into court, not directly to the complainants.
I now sentence you to imprisonment as follows:
(a)for the first arson, being the one relating to the garage – to 12 months imprisonment, reduced from 15 months for your plea of guilty;
(b)for the second arson – to 14 months imprisonment, reduced from 18 months;
(c)for contravening the family violence order – to 4 months imprisonment, reduced from 6 months; and
(d)for driving as a first offender, with a level 4 blood alcohol – to 3 months imprisonment, reduced from 4 months.
The two arson sentences are to run concurrently, and the family violence sentence and the drink-driving sentence are each to add one month to the total sentence, giving a total sentence of 16 months imprisonment. There will be backdating to account for the 14 days you have already spent in custody.
The dates are as follows:
(a)the first arson sentence will run from 20 February 2018 to 19 February 2019;
(b)the sentence for the arson relating to the vehicle will run from 20 February 2018 to 19 April 2019;
(c)the sentence for the family violence order breach will run from 20 January 2019 to 19 May 2019;
(d)the drink-driving sentence will run from 20 March 2019 to 19 June 2019.
Now, as I said, that will give a total of 16 months, backdated by 14 days.
The automatic licence disqualification will be reduced from three years to two years and three months, and as we have already discussed, the three-month suspension that you have already served will be deducted from that, so the remaining licence disqualification will run for the same period as your good behaviour order (that is, two years). So that provides, in a sense, another incentive for you to deal with your alcohol abuse properly, and finally, in the next two years. The disqualification obviously will run from today, it is not backdated.
The sentence will be suspended with immediate effect, and I now order you to sign an undertaking to comply with your good behaviour obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 1995 (ACT) for two years.
The good behaviour order is subject to the conditions:
(a)that you give security in the amount of $1,000 for your compliance with this good behaviour order (that doesn't require a cash surety, but an undertaking);
(b)that, for such period not exceeding two years as Corrective Services considers necessary, you accept the supervision of ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions of the Director-General or her delegate;
(c)that you undertake such counselling, courses, programs, or treatments as directed by your supervising officer, including in particular a residential rehabilitation program aimed at alcohol abuse; and
(d)finally, that on or before 4.00 pm tomorrow (7 March 2018), and I would recommend that you do this today, you attend Corrective Services at Level 1, 249 London Circuit to arrange your supervision.
You will be given a written copy of the good behaviour order, and it will probably be read to you by the court officials, but in short, what it means is that for the next two years, you need to keep out of trouble, keep in as much contact with Corrective Services as they require, comply with your supervisor's directions generally and, in particular, that you complete a residential rehabilitation program for alcohol abuse. If you commit another offence during that time, and that of course would include any breach of a family violence order, or if you otherwise breach your undertaking, you may find yourself back before this Court to be re-sentenced for these offences as well as possibly losing your $1,000 security and, depending on exactly how you've breached that undertaking, you could well find yourself serving some or all of the remaining part of your sentence, that's nearly 16 months, in full-time custody.
Now, one thing I should probably say at this stage is that there may be scope – and if you are interested, you should talk to Corrective Services about this – there may be scope for transferring this to New South Wales if you wish to return back to the South Coast. I am not sure exactly how that is working at the moment, sometimes it seems to work better than other times. You should talk to Corrections about that. If you have any other questions about the order, please ask the court officials or your lawyers.
Ms Wright, the other thing I would say to you, is that I think it would be worth perhaps expanding your dealing with your psychologist, or another psychologist, to talk about some of the terrible things that have happened to you in your very early life, because I think until you somehow address those, rehabilitating yourself today will be much more difficult. You may sit down.
| I certify that the preceding eighty-seven [87] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice Penfold. Associate: Date: 14 March 2018 |
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