IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M161 of 2011
B e t w e e n -
THE QUEEN
Applicant
and
MICHAEL WILSON
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 9 MARCH 2012, AT 11.39 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR T. GYORFFY, SC: If it please your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MS E.H. RUDDLE, for the applicant. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Vic))
MR C.B. BOYCE: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR L.C. CARTER, for the respondent. (instructed by Victoria Legal Aid (Criminal Law Section))
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Boyce. Counsel, we would be assisted by first considering whether this case should not simply stand out of the list to await judgment in the matter of Getachew that was argued yesterday. May I say to you that, speaking only for myself, it would seem that judgment in Getachew is something that is likely to affect the outcome of this matter both as to whether there should be a grant of leave and, if there were to be a grant of leave, whether part or all of this application should be dealt with instanter. But to argue it now or to consider the grant of leave without the Court having decided and published reasons in the matter of Getachew, at least at first blush, appears not to be a productive use of the Court’s time. What do you say, Mr Gyorffy?
MR GYORFFY: I agree, your Honour. I have put to my learned friends one other possibility which they do not agree with, I might say, is that it be dealt with on the papers. We went through the arguments yesterday as well as we could. The submissions are full. Once the decision comes down in Getachew, if I understand what your Honour is saying, it will be clear which way this case will go because there is no real distinction between the two, except for the fact that there is evidence here led as to the belief in consent. But I am mindful of this Court’s time and I do not see any advantage so far as the Crown is concerned in re‑arguing what we put yesterday.
HAYNE J: Yes. Mr Boyce, what do you say we should do?
MR BOYCE: Your Honour, we have no objection to the matter being stood out of the list. As your Honour indicates, we simply make the observation, if we may, that if it is not inappropriate to do this, to ask the Court to at least have regard to the court below’s decision in this matter in the disposition of Getachew.
HAYNE J: The application will be stood out of the list generally. It will be relisted on notice to the parties. Either side has liberty to apply on giving, shall we…
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- Case
- [2012] HCATrans 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence obtained from the respondent pursuant to a search warrant, despite the fact that the warrant was later found to be invalid. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the admission of this evidence, which was crucial to the Crown's case, was an error that rendered the conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory.
The High Court, comprising Hayne and Kiefel JJ, reasoned that the admissibility of evidence obtained under an invalid warrant was governed by the principles of the common law, particularly the rule against hearsay and the exclusionary rule concerning improperly or illegally obtained evidence. Their Honours noted that while the common law permits the admission of illegally obtained evidence if it is relevant and has probative value, this discretion is not unfettered. The Court considered the potential for unfair prejudice to the accused and the importance of upholding the rule of law. Ultimately, the High Court found that the trial judge had not erred in admitting the evidence, as its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice, and the circumstances did not warrant the exclusion of the evidence as a matter of discretion.
The High Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the respondent's conviction for murder.
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Evidence
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