R v Williamson - [1996] QCA 548

[1996] QCA 548

COURT OF APPEAL
PINCUS JA
DERRINGTON J

AMBROSE J

CA 392 of 1996
THE QUEEN
v.

DAVID GUY WILLIAMSON	Appellant
BRISBANE ..DATE 01/11/96
JUDGMENT
011196 T11-12/SJ22 M/T COA253/96

PINCUS JA: Mr Justice Ambrose will deliver the first judgment.

AMBROSE J: This was an appeal against conviction and an application for leave to appeal against sentence. The appeal against conviction was abandoned on the hearing and the only question is whether an application for leave to appeal against sentence ought be granted.

The offences of which the applicant was convicted occurred on 3 January 1996. The offences were committed by the applicant and another man named Chessells. At that time the two of them apparently had consumed alcohol and Mr Chessells apparently in that state considered that the occupants of a house in Maryborough had done something that had an effect on his family.

Mr Chessells and the applicant then travelled by taxi cab to the residence of the person thought to have interfered with the family of Mr Chessells. While in the taxi cab there was an indication that they proposed to do something in the house "to fix" the occupants, to use their language.

The house was broken and entered and the contents of the house, or some of them, were destroyed. It seems that there was a car parked outside the house that was used by a babysitter in the house who was chased away from it by the applicant and that car was also damaged. It seems on the material likely that each of the applicant and Mr Chessells damaged the vehicle.

Mr Chessells pleaded guilty to the three charges brought against both him and the applicant. That is, the first one of burglary and then two wilful damage charges. Mr Chessells, who pleaded

2 JUDGMENT

011196 T11-12/SJ22 M/T COA253/96

guilty, was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a recommendation was made that he be eligible for parole after serving nine months of it.

The applicant, on the other hand, pleaded not guilty and was convicted by a jury and upon his conviction he was sentenced to four years imprisonment on the head sentence, the burglary charge, with nine months concurrent for the wilful destruction charges. No recommendation was made with respect to his eligibility.

Looking at the matter generally on the evidence and indeed on the sentencing remarks made by the sentencing Judge when imposing sentence on Mr Chessells it seems that Mr Chessells was the person whose idea it was to visit this house and do damage to the contents because of what he believed the occupants had done to affect his family. It seems that the applicant went along with him.

According to the taxi driver he attempted to calm Mr Chessells down a bit but on the evidence generally of the babysitter who was unfortunate enough to be in the house when the two of them arrived it was the applicant who chased him and it seems clear on the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Williamson

Details

AGLC: R v Williamson [1996] QCA 548
Case: [1996] QCA 548
Decision Date: 1/11/1996

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Williamson involved an appeal against the sentence imposed on the applicant, David Guy Williamson, following his conviction for burglary and wilful damage. The applicant and a co-offender, Chessells, had broken into a house and damaged its contents, as well as a car belonging to a babysitter. Chessells pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years imprisonment with eligibility for parole after nine months, whereas Williamson, who pleaded not guilty and was convicted by a jury, was sentenced to four years imprisonment for the burglary charge and nine months concurrently for the wilful destruction charges, without any recommendation for parole eligibility.

The legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether Williamson's application for leave to appeal against his sentence should be granted. Williamson argued that the disparity between his sentence and that of Chessells, who received a more lenient sentence due to his guilty plea, was unjust. The Court had to determine whether the disparity was sufficient to warrant interference.

In delivering the judgment, Justice Ambrose noted that both Williamson and Chessells had extensive criminal histories, but found that their culpability was similar, with Williamson being the follower in the commission of the crimes. The Court acknowledged the principle of avoiding disparities in sentences for joint offenders. Despite Williamson's lack of remorse and his assertion of innocence even at the appeal stage, the Court found that the disparity in sentences breached this principle. Justice Ambrose proposed reducing Williamson's sentence to three years, aligning it with Chessells' sentence. Justices Pincus and Derrington concurred, finding the disparity excessive and agreeing that Williamson's sentence should be reduced.

The Court dismissed the appeal against conviction, granted the application for leave to appeal against sentence, and allowed the appeal against sentence. Williamson's four-year sentence was reduced to three years, with no recommendation for parole eligibility, to align with Chessells' sentence. The overall sentence imposed on Williamson remained confirmed otherwise.

Orders