R v Williamson - [2000] VSCA 5

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL Not Restricted

No. 81 of 1999

THE QUEEN

Appellant

ANN DENISE WILLIAMSON

Respondent

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JUDGES:	PHILLIPS, C.J., CHARLES and BUCHANAN, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	21 September 1999
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	15 February 2000
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2000] VSCA 5	1st Revision – 10 March 2000

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Criminal law – Conviction – Murder – Victim's body not found – Whether manslaughter open on evidence – Defence request for manslaughter direction – Jury question as to murderous intent – Whether judge obliged to direct as to manslaughter – Whether murder verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory.

Criminal law – Uncharged acts – Propensity – Evidence of discreditable conduct by accused – Adequacy of judge's directions – No exception taken at trial.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr. W.H. Morgan-Payler, Q.C. Mr. K.G. Gilligan	P.C. Wood, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Applicant	Mr. D. Grace, Q.C. Ms. M. Marich	Pryles & Defteros

PHLLIPS, C.J.:

I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of Charles, J.A., in draft form. I concur in the conclusions his Honour has reached and I would subscribe to his reasons therefor.

CHARLES, J. A.:

The applicant, who was born on 3 September 1947, was arraigned on 15 February 1999 in the Supreme Court at Melbourne on a single count of murder and pleaded not guilty. After the calling of evidence upon a voir dire, the trial of the applicant commenced before a jury on 17 February. The judge began his charge to the jury on 15 March and on 19 March the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder. On 15 April the judge sentenced the applicant to be imprisoned for 18 years, and fixed a non-parole period of 13 years.

The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. The grounds upon which the application in relation to conviction is brought, omitting those grounds abandoned during the appeal, are as follows –

2.The judge erred in his charge to the jury in failing to leave the alternative count of manslaughter for the jury’s consideration.
3.Following the question by the jury in which the jury sought “the definition of a conscious, voluntary and deliberate killing”, the judge erred in failing to leave the alternative count of manslaughter for the jury’s consideration.
6.The judge erred in failing to provide the jury with appropriate directions and warnings as to the use it might make of the evidence of the events of 25 January 1997.

7. The verdict is unsafe and unsatisfactory.

The sole ground of the application for leave to appeal against sentence is that the sentence was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances of the case.

It is necessary now to set out in some detail the prosecution case at the trial. Before her death the deceased woman, Mrs. Edith Eberts of 2/36 Brighton Road, Balaclava, had been involved in a relationship with one Robert Mock. Mock in turn had at various times been…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Williamson

Details

AGLC: R v Williamson [2000] VSCA 5
Case: [2000] VSCA 5
Decision Date: 15 February 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Williamson, was convicted of murdering his wife, whose body was never found. The primary dispute in this case was whether the trial judge was obliged to direct the jury to consider a manslaughter charge, and if the failure to do so rendered the murder verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory. Additionally, the case involved the admissibility and effect of evidence of the appellant's discreditable conduct, which was argued to be prejudicial and not relevant to the charge of murder. The High Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the decisions made by the lower courts in this matter.

The legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge should have directed the jury to consider manslaughter as an alternative to murder, particularly in light of the absence of the victim's body and a question from the jury regarding murderous intent. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the discreditable conduct evidence were adequate and whether the failure to object to these directions at trial precluded the appellant from raising them on appeal. The court also needed to determine if the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted and if its inclusion was prejudicial to the appellant's case.

The court found that while the judge was not strictly obliged to direct the jury to consider manslaughter, the failure to do so, in light of the circumstances, could render the murder verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory. The court determined that the trial judge should have provided a direction on manslaughter to the jury, given the absence of the victim's body and the jury's question about murderous intent. However, the court concluded that this error did not render the murder verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory, as the evidence of the appellant's guilt was overwhelming. Regarding the discreditable conduct evidence, the court held that the trial judge's directions were adequate and that the appellant's failure to object at trial precluded him from raising the issue on appeal. The court also found that the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted and did not prejudice the appellant's case.

The High Court of Australia upheld the appellant's conviction and sentence, dismissing the appeal. The court found that the trial judge's failure to direct the jury on manslaughter did not render the murder verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory, and that the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted and did not prejudice the appellant's case. The court also held that the appellant's failure to object to the trial judge's directions on the discreditable conduct evidence precluded him from raising the issue on appeal.

Orders