R v Williams - [2018] NSWDC 163

District Court

New South Wales

Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Williams [2018] NSWDC 163
Hearing dates: 21 June 2018
Date of orders: 21 June 2018
Decision date: 21 June 2018
Jurisdiction: Criminal
Before: Berman SC DCJ
Decision:
The jury will be directed that for both the count on the indictment and the alternative count, they are entitled to take into account the accused’s self-induced intoxication in deciding whether the Crown has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – Judgment – Ruling concerning 35(2) Crimes Act – Whether offence under s35(2) Crimes Act is a crime of “specific intent”.
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act.
Cases Cited: DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479
DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443
O'Connor v R (1980) 146 CLR 64
R v Grant [2002] NSWCCA 243
Texts Cited: A Review of the Defense of Drunkenness in the Criminal Law by Donald N Synowick Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol 2, number 2, April 1961
George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 1978
Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 1978
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: The Crown
Darryl Mark Williams
Representation:
Counsel:
B Rowe (Crown)
N Mikhaiel
Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions
Peter Murphy Criminal Law

File Number(s): 2017/60992

Judgment

HIS HONOUR: The accused is charged with an offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm under s 33 of the Crimes Act. That charge is based on an allegation that after having consumed a quantity of alcohol he tipped a fridge on his former partner, causing quite serious injuries to her left leg, injuries which involved bones penetrating her skin, thus causing a wound. But from the beginning of the trial the Crown has made it clear to me and the jury that in the event that they find the accused not guilty of the offence on the indictment, the Crown relies on a statutory alternative, an offence under s 35(2) Crimes Act of causing grievous bodily harm, being reckless as to causing actual bodily harm.
The evidence has closed and the next thing that will happen in the trial is that addresses will commence. Before that happens, it is important to resolve an issue on which the Crown and Ms Mikhaiel, who appears for the accused, are divided. That issue is whether self-induced intoxication may be taken into account by the jury in considering the alternative count.
There is no dispute that the jury can take self-induced intoxication into account when considering the count on the indictment under s 33. Indeed, that offence appears, helpfully, in the table to be found in s 428B(2) of the Crimes Act. The offence under s 35(2) does not, but that does not mean that it is not a crime of specific intent. The fact that the offence under s 35(2) is not listed in the table is not to be taken as indicating that intoxication is irrelevant when the jury considers the alternative count.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly there appears to be no…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Williams

Details

AGLC: R v Williams [2018] NSWDC 163
Case: [2018] NSWDC 163
Decision Date: 21 June 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved the respondent, Williams, who was charged with offences under section 35(2) of the Crimes Act. The central issue was whether the offence of deprivation of liberty under this section constituted a crime of specific intent. The matter was heard in the relevant appellate court, where the court was tasked with determining the nature of the offence and its implications on the application of self-induced intoxication as a defence. The court had to consider whether the offence required proof of specific intent, and if so, how this would affect the jury’s consideration of intoxication in assessing the Crown’s case.

The court examined the legislative intent behind section 35(2) and its alignment with other provisions in the Crimes Act. It deliberated on whether the offence could be classified as one requiring specific intent, thereby necessitating a higher threshold for the Crown’s burden of proof. The court also considered the role of self-induced intoxication as a defence and its impact on the jury's decision-making process. The legal precedents and statutory interpretation were pivotal in guiding the court’s analysis, as it sought to balance the principles of criminal responsibility and fairness in the context of intoxication.

In reaching its decision, the court concluded that the offence under section 35(2) did not constitute a crime of specific intent. Consequently, the court held that the jury was entitled to take into account the accused's self-induced intoxication when assessing whether the Crown had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. This ruling ensured that the jury could consider the intoxication defence in their deliberation, thereby aligning with the statutory framework and ensuring a fair trial process. The court’s decision was grounded in a meticulous analysis of the legislative language and its implications for criminal liability.

The court ordered that the jury be directed accordingly, ensuring that they could appropriately weigh the accused's intoxication in their evaluation of the Crown’s evidence. This direction aimed to uphold the integrity of the trial process and provide clarity for the jury in their assessment of the charges against Williams. The final orders reflected the court’s determination that the offence under section 35(2) did not require proof of specific intent, thus allowing for the consideration of intoxication as part of the jury’s decision-making.

Orders

Orders of the court

The jury will be directed that for both the count on the indictment and the alternative count, they are entitled to take into account the accused’s self-induced intoxication in deciding whether the Crown has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Williams [2018] NSWDC 163
Hearing dates:	21 June 2018
Date of orders:	21 June 2018
Decision date:	21 June 2018
Jurisdiction:	Criminal
Before:	Berman SC DCJ
Decision:	The jury will be directed that for both the count on the indictment and the alternative count, they are entitled to take into account the accused’s self-induced intoxication in deciding whether the Crown has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – Judgment – Ruling concerning 35(2) Crimes Act – Whether offence under s35(2) Crimes Act is a crime of “specific intent”.
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act.
Cases Cited:	DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479 DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 O'Connor v R (1980) 146 CLR 64 R v Grant [2002] NSWCCA 243
Texts Cited:	A Review of the Defense of Drunkenness in the Criminal Law by Donald N Synowick Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol 2, number 2, April 1961 George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 1978 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 1978
Category:	Procedural and other rulings
Parties:	The Crown Darryl Mark Williams
Representation:	Counsel: B Rowe (Crown) N Mikhaiel Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions Peter Murphy Criminal Law
File Number(s):	2017/60992