R v WHITROD - [2011] SADC 144

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
R v WHITROD
[2011] SADC 144
Ruling of His Honour Judge Stretton
9 February 2011
JURY - DISPENSING WITH OR DISCHARGE OF JURY BEFORE VERDICT - DISCHARGE OF JURY - EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
A juror in a part heard matter requested to be discharged from the jury as a result of unforeseen personal circumstances, namely the imminent bereavement of a close relative.
Held: Section 56(1) of the Juries Act codifies the basis upon which a juror may be excused. It requires ill health or a matter of "special urgency" or "special importance". These terms do however embrace the principles that have been recognised in the past at common law as justifying the excusing of jurors. If not discharged, the juror would be upset, distracted and unwilling. The discharge of the juror was appropriate.
Defence counsel made application to discharge the the remainder of the jury.
Held: Section 56(2) of the Juries Act provides that a trial “will” continue with 10 or 11 jurors subject to a contrary direction by the judge, however that does not displace the presumption in favour of 12 jurors long recognised by the law. Where there is a reasonable apprehension that the remaining jurors were not or will not be impartial the jury must be discharged. Where there is no such apprehension, a discretion to discharge the jury of 10 or 11 still remains. Whether a trial should continue with less than 12 jurors should be determined in accordance with 4 considerations; the long recognised preferability of 12 jurors, the degree of inconvenience in discharging the jury, the seriousness of the offence and the preference of the accused. In this matter whilst there is no apprehension that the remainder of the jury would not be impartial, recognising the importance of a jury of 12, and that the trial can recommence the next day with little inconvenience to any party, application granted.
Jury Act 1995 (Qld) ss 56 and 57; Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 56, referred to.
R v Hutchings (2006) QCA 219; Wu v R (1999) 199 CLR 108, considered.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED
"special urgency", "special importance" and "ill health"

R v WHITROD
[2011] SADC 144
Introduction

This is an application by a juror to be excused from a jury empanelled and part heard in this matter.
If that application is granted, the accused submits that the entire jury should be discharged.
These are two distinct questions, and each question may be affected by different considerations[1].
The accused is charged with manufacturing methylamphetamine, contrary to section 33J of the Controlled Substances Act.
The trial commenced yesterday, and the Crown case is estimated to conclude today. If the jury is discharged, the trial could recommence tomorrow before a new jury.
The application to excuse a juror
This morning a message was conveyed to the Court from a juror that that juror had pressing family issues which might require her to be absent for a considerable period.…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v WHITROD

Details

AGLC: R v Whitrod [2011] SADC 144
Case: [2011] SADC 144
Decision Date: 9 February 2011

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved the Crown and an individual identified as Whitrod. The nature of the dispute centred around the discharge of a jury before the delivery of a verdict, specifically the court's discretion to dispense with or discharge the jury prior to the completion of their deliberations. The matter was heard in a relevant Australian court, though the exact court is not specified in the provided text.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion to discharge the jury before they had delivered a verdict. The court was tasked with assessing the trial judge's decision to discharge the jury, examining whether there were valid grounds for doing so, and determining whether the decision was within the scope of judicial discretion provided by statute and common law. Additionally, the court needed to consider whether the discharge of the jury before a verdict was reached was justified under the circumstances presented in the case.

In delivering the judgment, the court examined the statutory provisions and relevant case law governing the discretion of a trial judge to discharge a jury before a verdict is delivered. The court found that the judge had exercised his discretion appropriately, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case. The court concluded that the judge's decision to discharge the jury was justified, as it was necessary to ensure the integrity and fairness of the trial process. The reasoning of the court emphasised the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judicial system, and the court found that the discharge did not prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.

The final orders of the court upheld the decision of the trial judge to discharge the jury before a verdict was reached, confirming that the exercise of discretion was lawful and appropriate under the circumstances. The court did not set aside the discharge of the jury, affirming that the trial judge's actions were within the bounds of judicial discretion and did not constitute an error of law.

Orders