R v WEBB - [2013] SASC 162

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
R v WEBB
[2013] SASC 162
Reasons for Ruling of The Honourable Justice Vanstone
30 October 2013
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE - PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE
Accused on trial for murder - application by defence for exclusion of evidence that within a few minutes of the killing accused told police a lie as to the whereabouts of the victim - whether evidence of lie 'discreditable conduct' within the meaning of s 34P Evidence Act 1929 (SA) - whether evidence lacking in probative value due to the accused having pleaded guilty to manslaughter - whether lie equally referable to realisation of guilt of manslaughter as of murder.
Held: evidence admitted - probative value substantially outweighs prejudicial effect.
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34P, referred to.
R v Heyes (2006) 12 VR 401, [2006] VSCA 86; White v The Queen (1998) 125 CCC (3d) 385, considered.

R v WEBB
[2013] SASC 162
Criminal

VANSTONE J: The accused is charged with murder of his defacto wife and has pleaded guilty to manslaughter, which plea has not been accepted in satisfaction of the charge.
The accused has filed a Rule 15 application seeking exclusion of evidence of conversations between police and himself which took place very soon after the incident giving rise to the charge and at the crime scene, which was his home. In essence, the police witnesses say that when the accused was asked where the victim was, he said that she had left the house. The prosecution alleges that this was a lie, because the accused well knew that the victim was in the bedroom, either dead or close to death.
Mr Crowe, for the accused, argues that the lie is more prejudicial than probative. He submits that, since the accused has pleaded guilty to manslaughter, any consciousness of guilt evinced by the lie is referable to the crime of manslaughter and has no probative value in terms of whether the crime committed was not manslaughter but murder.
Although prosecuting counsel has argued otherwise, I proceed on the basis that this evidence is evidence of discreditable conduct in terms of s 34P of the Evidence Act 1929. I dispense with the requirement of notice given in s 33P(4). If I am to admit the evidence its probative value must “substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect it may have”: s 34P(2)(a).
I note that s 34P covers discreditable conduct irrespective of whether that conduct constitutes an offence, but does not cover conduct constituting the offence: s 34P(1).
The question is first whether the evidence has probative value in terms of the contest in this trial and next, if it does, whether the probative value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect.
Mr Crowe relies on an unreported Victorian decision of R v Heyes (2006) 12 VR 401, [2006] VSCA 86. In that case the appellant was convicted for murder. Evidence of a false story which he provided…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v WEBB

Details

AGLC: R v WEBB [2013] SASC 162
Case: [2013] SASC 162
Decision Date: 30 October 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v WEBB involved a trial for murder, where the accused was also charged with the lesser offence of manslaughter. The defence sought to exclude evidence that shortly after the incident, the accused had told the police a falsehood about the victim's location. This evidence was contested on the grounds that it might be considered as 'discreditable conduct' under section 34P of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), and therefore potentially prejudicial. The key issue before the court was whether the probative value of this evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect, particularly in light of the accused's plea of guilty to manslaughter.

The court examined whether the evidence of the lie was relevant and necessary to prove a fact in issue. It was noted that the lie might reflect an attempt by the accused to conceal the crime, potentially indicating consciousness of guilt. The court considered the impact of the accused's guilty plea to manslaughter, questioning whether the lie could be seen as equally relevant to the realisation of guilt for either the murder or manslaughter charges. The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence, in establishing the accused's consciousness of guilt and the reliability of his statements, outweighed the prejudicial effect that the evidence might have on the jury's perception of the accused's character.

The court's reasoning hinged on the necessity of the evidence to establish the accused's state of mind and credibility at the time of the incident, which was crucial in assessing the gravity of the crime. Despite the prejudicial nature of the lie, the court found that its probative value in determining the accused's intent and credibility was significant enough to warrant its admission. Therefore, the evidence was admitted, and the court ruled that the probative value substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have had.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held: evidence admitted - probative value substantially outweighs prejudicial effect.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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