R v WE (No.5) - [2019] NSWSC 912

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v WE (No.5) [2019] NSWSC 912
Hearing dates: 16 July 2019
Date of orders: 16 July 2019
Decision date: 16 July 2019
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Bellew J
Decision:
See [12]

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – Juries – Practice and procedure – Where accused charged with doing acts in preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act or acts – Where Crown sought to provide jury with a chronology in the nature of a “road map” of the evidence – Where earlier objection was taken by counsel for the accused on the basis that to provide the jury with the chronology would be prejudicial – Where chronology provided – Where further objection taken to a particular entry in the chronology – Desirability of giving all possible assistance to the jury providing such assistance does not prejudice the right of the accused to a fair trial – Entry permitted
Cases Cited: R v WE (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 854
R v WE (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 981
Category: Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Regina – Crown
WE – Accused
Representation:
Counsel:
P McGuire SC and B Anniwell – Crown
J Trevallion and N Bennett – Accused
Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) – Crown
Alexanders Lawyers – Accused

File Number(s): 2016/305103
Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment – EX TEMPORE (REVISED)

The accused in this matter is charged with doing acts in preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act or acts. The Crown's allegation is that that offence was committed jointly with a co-accused, to whom I shall refer as "HG".
The accused's trial initially commenced before me on 8 July 2019. However, the jury in that trial was discharged on 11 July 2019. The circumstances leading to that discharge are set out in a previous judgment. [1]
1. R v WE (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 981.
At the time of the commencement of the previous trial, the Crown indicated an intention to provide the jury with a chronology, which was described at the time as a "road map" of the evidence that the Crown intends to call. Objection was taken by counsel for the accused to that course being adopted.
For the reasons set out in a previous judgment I concluded that the Crown should be permitted to provide the chronology to the jury. [2] I concluded, amongst other things, that the various objections to the chronology taken by counsel for the accused were able to be addressed by the jury being given a clear and firm direction as to how the chronology was to be used. In particular, I concluded that the Crown's provision of the chronology to the jury would not result in any unfair prejudice to the accused. I specifically noted[3] that when the chronology was provided to the jury, the jury would be directed (as they were ultimately directed) in specific terms that the chronology was to be used as a guide to, that it did not constitute, and that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v WE (No.5)

Details

AGLC: R v WE (No.5) [2019] NSWSC 912
Case: [2019] NSWSC 912
Decision Date: 16 July 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v WE (No.5), the appellant was charged with offences related to preparing for or planning a terrorist act. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, with the jury being the fact-finder. The central issue before the court was whether the Crown was permitted to provide the jury with a chronology of the evidence in the form of a "road map". The appellant's counsel objected to the proposed chronology on the grounds that it would be prejudicial to the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The court considered the importance of assisting the jury in understanding the evidence, while also ensuring that the accused's right to a fair trial was not prejudiced. The court found that providing a chronology of the evidence would assist the jury in understanding the timeline of events and the relationship between different pieces of evidence. The court held that the desirability of giving all possible assistance to the jury, provided such assistance does not prejudice the right of the accused to a fair trial, outweighed the appellant's objection. The court further held that a particular entry in the chronology, which the appellant's counsel objected to, was permitted.

The court's decision was based on the principle that the jury should be given all possible assistance in understanding the evidence, provided that such assistance does not prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial. The court held that providing a chronology of the evidence was an appropriate way to assist the jury, and that the particular entry in the chronology did not prejudice the appellant's right to a fair trial. The court's decision was consistent with the principle that the jury should be given all possible assistance in understanding the evidence, and that the accused's right to a fair trial should not be prejudiced in the process.

The final orders of the court were that the Crown was permitted to provide the jury with a chronology of the evidence in the form of a "road map", and that a particular entry in the chronology was also permitted. The court's decision was consistent with the principle that the jury should be given all possible assistance in understanding the evidence, and that the accused's right to a fair trial should not be prejudiced in the process.

Orders