R v Wang

Case

[2019] NSWDC 929

31 July 2019

No judgment structure available for this case.

District Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Wang [2019] NSWDC 929
Date of orders: 31 July 2019
Decision date: 31 July 2019
Jurisdiction:Criminal
Before: Norrish QC DCJ
Decision:

Reckless wounding – 2 years 6 months imprisonment; non-parole period 1 year 5 months

Possess prohibited drug – convicted; no penalty imposed

Catchwords:

SENTENCE – crime – reckless wounding – possess prohibited drug – standard non-parole period - self defence – prior good character – no criminal history – plea of guilty – remorse - Chinese national – justice visa – deportation – time served

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act, 1900.

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999

Criminal Procedure Act

Cases Cited:

Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25

Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39

Thomson and Houlton v R [2000] NSWCCA 309.

Veen (No 2) v R [1988] HCA 14; 164 CLR 465

Category:Sentence
Parties: Regina (Crown)
Mr Shih Chieh Wang (offender)
Representation: Solicitors:
Ms Britten (DPP)
Mr Parsons (Offender)
File Number(s): 2018/00055996
Publication restriction: No

Judgment

  1. Shih Chieh Wang, who was born in August 1994 appears today for sentence in relation to an offence of reckless wounding pursuant to s 35(4) Crimes Act 1900. That offence has a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment and standard non-parole period of three years. There is a related offence to be dealt with on a s 166 Certificate. That is an offence of possessing a prohibited drug, to wit a small quantity of cannabis. The prisoner was arrested in relation to this matter on 19 February 2018 and has been in custody up until the present time.

  2. There is an Agreed Statement of Facts which I will summarise. I will interpret my conclusions arising from the Agreed Statement of Facts at the conclusion of my remarks on sentence.

  3. The prisoner is a citizen of Chinese Taipei. According to the Sentencing Assessment Report, the details of which I accept, he arrived in Australia on 23 December 2017 on a tourist visa, planning to stay in Australia for approximately three months.

  4. On 18 February 2018, he, along with a friend called Kevin Shu, travelled to Harmer Street, Woolloomooloo; a very dangerous area. He had made arrangements via Facebook Messenger to purchase cannabis from a person described as Alexander Xip. The prisoner was proposing to purchase $3,500 worth of cannabis in the context of what I accept to be a background of being a cannabis user. Whether he and Mr Shu were going to share it or not is of no moment. But certainly, I am not able to conclude the prisoner was purchasing the cannabis for the purpose of supplying it to other people.

  5. The prisoner and Mr Shu arrived in Woolloomooloo in darkness at 11.35pm. The prisoner was carrying a backpack that contained not only the cash for the purchase of the cannabis, but his International Drivers Licence, and most importantly, his passport.

  6. They waited at the designated meeting area and eventually, after waiting for ten minutes, they saw a silver Holden Commodore in Harmer Street, Woolloomooloo. The prisoner called over Mr Shu to come with him because he did not want to be alone. Inside that parked car were four males including a person called Corey McNamara, the “victim” of the principal offence to which the prisoner pleads guilty. McNamara was seated in the back seat behind the front passenger seat.

  7. The facts set out in some detail, the comings and goings of getting into and out of the car, which I need not dwell upon. What I point out from that arrangement is ultimately the prisoner either was asked, or was obliged, to hand over his backpack to the occupants of the car in circumstances where McNamara had gotten out of the car, apparently to allow the prisoner, and then Shu, for some reason best known to the occupants of the car, to get inside it.

  8. When the prisoner was outside the car and Shu apparently was sitting inside the car, McNamara, who was standing outside the car holding the door, yelled at Shu, “Get the fuck out of my car.” At this point the facts state - and I will read them from the document,

“The offender (the prisoner) and Shu were attacked by the occupants of the car. The victim swung first at the offender’s chest before another person picked the offender up from behind. The offender was thrown to the ground. The offender was then kicked and punched repeatedly by more than one person. The attack on the offender and Shu stopped and the car was driven out of Harmer Street and into Bourke Street.”

  1. At this point, Mr McNamara had been left behind by his friends, and realising of course that he was alone at that particular point, he started running up Bourke Street.

  2. The facts state that the prisoner saw a knife on the ground and picked it up. He yelled, “Follow me!” to Shu, and chased after the victim, chasing the victim approximately 120 metres away from Bourke Street into Plunkett Street. When Shu caught up, the prisoner and the victim were having an argument; clearly, the prisoner wanted his money back.

  3. He was yelling, “Where’s my money, where are your mates? I want my fucking money.” The victim was yelling, “I have no money, I have nothing on me and I don’t know where they are.” The last statement may have been “literally” true, but it is quite clear, if he had wanted to, he could have told the prisoner where those people could be found.

  4. The prisoner pushed the victim to the ground and stood over him, and said to the victim, “You fucking owe me, and I fucking want it back.” The victim said, “Okay, okay, just leave me alone.” The victim got up and had his arms in a defensive stance. He walked backwards towards a car parked in Plunkett Street. The prisoner kept on yelling, “You fucking owe me; I want it I fucking told you,” and then the victim yelled out, “Help, they’re going to kill me.”

  5. I point out at this particular junction the prisoner who had picked up the knife had not produced the knife. It was after the words, “They’re going to kill me” were uttered, the prisoner pulled the knife out of his pocket and stabbed the victim in the thigh. It is the stab wound to the thigh that constitutes the reckless wounding.

  6. A passer-by has given an account where the victim was heard to say, “I don’t have your money, I don’t have your money” and the prisoner said, “Where’s my money, you robbed me, you robbed...” Then the victim said, “I don’t have it. Help, help me, somebody help me, call the police.”

  7. A female witness who spoke to the prisoner after the event or during the event - it is a bit difficult to work out from the chronology of the material within the Agreed Statement of Facts - asked the prisoner, “What the hell is going on?” The prisoner said, “He’s robbed me, he robbed (sic). Call the police.” The woman asked, “Why don’t you call the police?” The prisoner said, “I can’t because he robbed me, he took my money.” The prisoner, after stabbing the victim in the thigh, walked away. She also said at some stage, “Stop man, you’re stabbing someone you know” and he himself walked away. The prisoner left Plunkett Street, heading in the direction of where he had come from, Harmer Street, and then police arrived at the scene.

  8. Police attended and set up a crime scene and they found a second knife - as it is described - a silver knife in the Harmer Street area. That knife was later analysed. The prisoner was excluded as a contributor to the DNA located on the knife. I am not told whether any other DNA profiles were found.

  9. There were a number of injuries observed when the victim was treated at St Vincent’s Hospital. The principal injury was a 4 centimetre laceration on the front of the thigh described as “deep with muscle belly visible.” There were some other minor lacerations and wounds that are described as defence wounds.

  10. The victim underwent two surgeries, one on Monday 19 February 2018, another on 21 February, and he was released from hospital on 23 February 2018. I do not have a victim impact statement. I am assuming that he is fully recovered.

  11. I should point out the victim was charged with offences. The information is not entirely complete, but what I have said about that is a matter on the record. As I understand it, there was a charge of “robbery in company” or “aggravated robbery in company,” which on the facts available to me he clearly committed. He was also apparently charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm in company. To that charge, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a 12 month Community Correction Order.

  12. In the meantime, the prisoner was arrested the day after the relevant events. There is evidence within the statement of facts that the prisoner gave an account to his girlfriend, or a female friend, that he had been “robbed by four guys” and he had hurt one of them. Everything he said to his girlfriend is consistent with the Agreed Statement of Facts.

  13. The prisoner had a head wound of some description. When picked up by a type of share transport organisation, the driver observed the injury to him and asked him whether he wanted to go to a hospital or the police. He said he only wanted to go home. When the prisoner’s property was searched various items were found, including evidence that could link him to the stabbing of the victim. The prisoner had taken a photograph of the victim with the injuries that he suffered, or at least the consequences of injuries that he suffered. That message was sent to what was described as “an associate of the victim”. The message in reply indicated that the message or the photograph had been received and in the reply there was a threat (to the offender) “to hand it over to the police if the offender did not meet with whoever had sent the reply.” Obviously that meeting did not occur.

  14. The prisoner gave an electronic interview to the police and gave an account consistent with the Agreed Statement of Facts. He admitted using the knife once. He used the expression “very panicked at that moment” and “I saw the terrible result.” He said he chased the man because he kept running away and not unnaturally he observed that “if I lost him, my money will be gone.” He told the police that he had seen the second knife on the ground. It is quite clear on the evidence available to me that the two knives that were recovered, or the two knives that are mentioned in the facts, were introduced by persons other than the prisoner and Mr Shu.

  15. The prisoner has no prior criminal convictions in Australia and I am not advised of any criminal convictions in another country. As I said, he has been in continuous custody since his arrest and in the custody records I see no record of any custodial infringements. It must be quite a disturbing experience to come from a foreign country and to find yourself in gaol for an extended period of time.

  16. In the defence case I have a psychological report and I have an affidavit from the person described as the prisoner’s “girlfriend.” I am mindful of the matters raised by the Crown, as we always are, of the circumspection that one should have in relation to hearsay representations that are not subject to the test of cross-examination. But frankly, in this particular matter, there is hardly anything of any great controversy in the material so far as the prisoner’s assertion of his background. It is worth noting in relation to the report that the psychologist does not find any psychological or psychiatric illness or disability that could be causally connected or even related to the offending. This is not a psychological report where out of the blue, 30 years after his birth, an offender gives an account of all sorts of mental illnesses and disabilities that have never been previously diagnosed or treated. In fact there is nothing, as I said, of controversy and I am prepared to accept the general gist of what the document sets out as far as the history of the prisoner. I bear in mind that there is a fairly incomplete Sentencing Assessment Report which provides much the same history, except there is greater detail in the psychological report.

  17. I now turn to the personal circumstances of the prisoner, which is what I am most interested in, given the context of the facts being clearly set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts. The prisoner has one brother. His parents, as I understand it, are alive. His mother is approximately 46, his father 48 and they live in Taiwan or Taipei. His father owns a trucking transport company. The prisoner comes from what is described as a ‘pro-social’ family. He had no history of childhood trauma. He was an average student at school but he has been very interested in music for a long period of time and has, for a number of years, been performing modern music in Taipei and is anxious to pursue his career. He has written a number of songs. He recorded a particular song that apparently received 30 million ‘YouTube’ views arising out of a live performance that he gave. He has been a user of cannabis since he was 21 years of age and regularly used that drug, a matter that I accept in the context of both his possession of cannabis at the time of his arrest and the circumstances of him coming into contact with these thugs from Woolloomooloo or the Eastern suburbs that attacked him and his friend and stole his money and his passport. He came to Australia, as I would understand it, because he knew people here. He has, it is said, significant tattoos on is hands, arms, neck and upper chest which are described as all “artistic and of musical style in genre.” Apparently it is common place within his community and within the music community particularly, to be so tattooed. He was subject to various psychometric testing. There was no psychological or psychiatric disorder discovered. He was described as a “well-functioning individual” and he has been so for a number of years. The psychological assessment included psychometric testing which has its various methods of cross checking, reveals nothing in the nature of aggressive behaviours or antisocial personality traits. He is assessed on the basis of the tests undertaken by the psychologist to be of “low risk” of re-offending. He may have had, on the basis of the history he gave, a cannabis use disorder but the psychologist, not unreasonably, says the specifics of any diagnosis is not possible. He may need some counselling in relation to his use of cannabis as he has discovered the use of cannabis in Sydney can be a very dangerous occupation.

  18. The affidavit from his girlfriend reflects upon his time in Sydney. They met in circumstances where they connected though a dating app. She knows something about his background and his involvement with music. She speaks of him as being a relatively calm “nice” person and she is aware of his involvement with the promotion of his music in Taiwan and hopefully, on his part, in Australia. She saw the injuries to him after the “fight” which is referred to in the statement of facts. She said that when she saw him he was “bleeding heavily” and complained of being “very sore.” She observed injuries to his legs and she saw what appeared to be “slash wounds” to his legs of which there were three in number. She has visited him whilst in custody. He does not seem to have been unbalanced by his experience of being in a foreign gaol.

  19. I have received both oral and written submissions from the Crown and the defence. Both parties have largely identified matters that I should take into account in my assessment of the objective facts and I have taken those matters into account as I have from the oral submissions and I will make some comment about the matters raised.

  20. The Crown points out, and I do not criticise the observation, that claims of “self-defence” by the prisoner are not established from the Agreed Statement of Facts. But it seems to me with the greatest of respect to the Crown as I tried to point out in the course of oral submission that the use of the expression “self-defence” has got to be seen in the context of the situation that the prisoner found himself and of course making some allowance for the prisoner’s cultural background being very different from that in Australia. I should say, although I did set it aside to some extent, the Sentencing Assessment Report itself reflects upon the prisoner’s reference to “self-defence”. The reporter seems to interpret that claim as reflecting “a lack of accountability for his offending behaviour.” With the greatest respect to the author of the report I do not see it that way, I feel that I am in a better position to judge the matter bearing in mind I am a judge and I am required to consider all the material available to me. The report notes some “remorse and regret” by the prisoner for his actions.

  21. The report I think, somewhat unfairly claims that the prisoner “lacks victim empathy attributing blame to the victim”. With the greatest respect to that analysis, if the victim and his mates had not bashed up the prisoner and stolen his backpack, the victim would not have been chased up the street. If the victim and his mates had not brought knives to the confrontation then the prisoner would not have had a knife to cause any injury to the victim and that should be clearly understood as the agreed facts made clear. He is assessed by Community Corrections I point out as being “medium to low risk of reoffending”.

  22. To come back to the learned Crown’s submissions she noted various matters that I have already referred to from the facts. She referred me to the “purposes of sentencing”, the need for weight to be given to general deterrence.

  23. Learned counsel for the prisoner provided some authorities dealing with the task I have to undertake of assessing the objective seriousness of the offending. I need not dwell upon the particular authorities. Of course there is at the foundation of fact finding in a sentencing proceeding, the analysis of the matter in Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25, particularly Justice McHugh’s observations at [51] and the statutory provisions required to be considered which I will come to shortly.

  24. Counsel for the accused undertakes an analysis of the facts; I have taken that into account. Both the parties agree that although there was some delay in the matter being disposed of in Local Court to be forwarded to this Court for sentence, the prisoner is entitled to a discount for the utilitarian benefit of the plea of guilty and I am prepared to accord him a discount of 25% in accordance with the authority of Thomson and Houlton v R [2000] NSWCCA 309. I am required to take into account the time that he has been in custody which I do. It is a practical consideration in the way in which I propose to dispose of the matter.

  25. Reference is made to the personal or subjective case of the prisoner and it is submitted that I should make the finding of “special circumstances” which I am prepared to do.

  26. In relation to the issue of statutory principles, although the Crown did not specifically refer to the provision, it is s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999 (“the Act”). The various “purposes of sentencing” may be thought to come into play in this particular matter. But as the High Court in Veen (No 2) v R [1988] HCA 14; 164 CLR 465 pointed out when the majority identified four of the seven purposes of sentencing now in s 3A of the Act, the purposes of sentencing are like guideposts; sometimes they point in opposing directions.

  27. There is a need for an adequate punishment to prevent others, as well as the prisoner, from further offending, to protect the community from the offender to the extent that it might be thought that he is a danger to the community, which I do not think he is, make him accountable for his actions, denounce his conduct and recognise the harm done to the victim, as well as promoting his rehabilitation.

  28. I agree in the circumstances that the s 5 threshold has been passed. I am required also to have regard to s 21A of the Act, which I will come back to shortly, and of course with regard to the reckless wounding matter which has the standard non-parole period of three years, I am required to firstly have regard to s 54A of the Act. That provides for the purposes of sentencing an offender, the standard non-parole period represents the non-parole period for an offence in the Table of the Division “in the middle range of objective seriousness” taking into account only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence.

  1. Section 54B(2) provides that the standard non-parole period is a matter to be taken into account by a court in determining the appropriate sentence for an offender without limiting the matters that are otherwise required or permitted to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence. The legislation of course was amended to reflect the decision of the High Court in Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39, particularly at [20]-[30].

  2. Coming back to the facts of this matter, whilst the use of the knife in a physical confrontation is a serious matter prima facie, having regard to the task required of me pursuant to s 54A(2) of the Act and the matters that can be clearly found from the Agreed Statement of Facts, I classify this offence as substantially below the middle range of objective seriousness. But obviously not at the lowest level.

  3. There are a number of features of the facts and the relevant matters required to be considered pursuant to s 21A of the Act that leads me to this conclusion. I am mindful of the fact of course that this matter arose out of an illegal transaction in which the prisoner was a willing participant. However, as I said earlier, there is no reason to believe, having regard to the prisoner’s personal circumstances, that the purchase of the cannabis was anything for other than the purchase for the use of the prisoner and perhaps the person Shu. I note the prisoner, in the course of the altercation before the stabbing, was robbed of $3,500, his international driver’s licence and his passport, all valuable commodities for a person who was a visitor to our country. He was dealing with a situation in a foreign country that was perilous to his safety that he obviously did not contemplate.

  4. He was attacked without any provocation on his part and set upon by four people who had taken his backpack, obviously with the intention of not returning it. I note that the prisoner was first struck by the victim standing at the doorway as a gatekeeper to the people inside the car.

  5. I am satisfied the prisoner has suffered physical injury from that attack, although what precise effect it had upon his senses I am unable to conclude. I bear in mind the knife used was not the prisoner’s. It seems clear on the facts that it was in the possession of one of the four attackers. It is true the prisoner chased the victim over a distance of some 120 metres, but he first of all demanded his money, did not produce the knife and wanted to know where the mates of his assailant were. As I point out, the prisoner was not threatening the victim with the knife at this stage and the wound he struck was in the thigh, only doing so after the victim had refused to give him information that was vital to the prisoner recovering his valuable property.

  6. The crime was, by reference to s 21A(3) of the Act, provoked by the victim, particularly by his obvious participation in the rip-off of the prisoner and the unprovoked attack upon the prisoner was commenced by the victim. The offence the prisoner committed was unplanned and in my view was spontaneous in the context of the prisoner’s previous experiences.

  7. The Crown has pointed out a number of occasions there has been reference to the accused to the fact that was “acting in self‑defence”. The use of the expression “self-defence” is to be seen not as a legal assertion by the prisoner, but a statement of the general description of the circumstances that he had just endured. I do not for a moment believe that the prisoner would have been aware of the nuances of Part 11, Div 3, Crimes Act, 1900. I should point out that the context of the offending is not only set out in the Agreed Facts. It is also supported by the contemporaneous statements made by the prisoner in the presence of independent witnesses. I have already referred to parts of those representations.

  8. One of the representations he made, at which point I am not sure by reference to the Agreed Statement of Facts, was “call the police”. He also peculiarly when asked why he did not do that said, “I can’t because he robbed me, he took my money”, which on one view of it does not make a great deal of sense.

  9. In assessing the objective seriousness of the offending, that is the principal offence, noting the treatment given to the victim, the only wound which the prisoner is responsible for is the wound to the thigh. The victim had some other injuries consistent with defence injuries, some not. There is also reference to what I would describe as the second knife and the absence of any DNA of the prisoner as a contributor. It seems to show that the attackers of the prisoner were in possession of knives at the time of the attack upon him. I note the observations of the female partner of the prisoner as to certain injuries that he had on him, apart from the injury to the head.

  10. I appreciate in the analysis of this matter that the actions of the prisoner were in part driven by anger. But that anger is to be understood in the consequence of what occurred before and reflects upon “the heat of the moment” after the conduct of the victim and his friends towards the prisoner.

  11. The prisoner did not in reality have a great deal of time to reflect upon his conduct in the circumstances. I have also taken into account the photograph taken by the prisoner of the injury to the victim. But that action has to be seen in the context of the foregoing and it was something done after the relevant event in any understanding of the facts. I also note that the prisoner would appear to have desisted, once told by his friend Shu to stop.

  12. There are a large number of mitigating factors, in the absence of any aggravating factors arising under s 21A(2), that are personal to the prisoner. The mitigating factors already identified, provocation and lack of planning are relevant to the assessment of the objective facts. The prisoner did not have any record of previous convictions. I accept the prisoner was a person of good character in the context of his background. I accept that the prisoner is unlikely to re‑offend. His incarceration in Australia will be a salutary experience. He has good prospects of rehabilitation, accepting the assertion that he comes from a pro‑social background. Although the prisoner has expressed remorse, noting the terms of s 21A(3)(i), I cannot conclude that the remorse required to be established has been, on balance. His plea of guilty is a mitigating factor for which he receives a discount for the utilitarian benefit of the plea.

  13. One matter I take into account, although not significant, is the shameful delay in this matter being resolved. The prisoner was committed for sentence on 20 November 2018. Putting aside the delay in the committal which I have noted, the final resolution of the matter in late July 2019 I regard as a matter for shame for our criminal justice system, particularly the fact that the prisoner is a foreign national.

  14. I have taken that into account as a relevant factor, and that he has been in remand custody as a foreign national with limitations upon his understanding of English. He did not come here to this country to commit this crime. Although he has a female friend who has visited him, he is separated from family and his culture whilst in custody. Of course while he is on remand, he is denied opportunities to participate in programs that are available for sentenced prisoners.

  15. I should point out only two weeks ago I sentenced a Chinese national in relation to a very large cigarette importation conspiracy and it was the learned Crown Prosecutor to his credit who pointed out to me that although the prisoner had pleaded ‘not guilty’ and his trial took two years to get on, by the time he came to be sentenced he was two years three months in remand custody without any opportunity of access to work or access to programs, a matter I was obliged to take into account.

  16. I appreciate the circumstance of the prisoner being bail‑refused given that he was a visitor to this country, however I would have thought he would not have been able to leave the country if he wanted to whilst he was on bail without his passport. It is a constant concern of Australians that our nationals, when travelling overseas and charged with criminal offences, are treated fairly. Usually commentary focuses upon the standards in other countries which do not apparently match the standards of our own.

  17. I am not in any way making criticism of any party to the proceedings, but the length of time that it has taken for this matter to be concluded reflects very poorly upon our system of justice. This is particularly so when the agreed facts it would seem show that the instigators of the whole affair were Australian citizens or Australian people. I also bear in mind that the Australian person who was “the victim” in the matter ended up being prosecuted for a relatively minor offence and given a 12 month Community Corrections Order.

  18. Of course no issue of parity arises and I am denied detailed facts about the victim. I did ask for his criminal history and that was denied me. I am not going to be concerned about that. It would not matter to me if he had no criminal history at the end of the day. But the truth of the matter is that this prisoner was the victim of a robbery in company in circumstances where he not only lost a substantial amount of money and was injured. He also lost other very valuable property.

  19. The fact that the victim was finally sentenced for the crime committed against this prisoner was one that carried a far less substantial maximum penalty than the one with which this prisoner is now charged is one thing, but the fact that on the agreed facts available to me that the victim was prima facie guilty of a criminal offence far more serious than the offence for which I am sentencing this prisoner is another matter altogether.

  20. I bear in mind from what I understand that the other offenders, the other Australians who set upon the prisoner and Mr Shu, appear to have escaped prosecution altogether. The prisoner might well in these circumstances feel that he received the worst end of the bargain legally, morally and factually. Be that as it may, what I am required to do is sentence him for what he did in a proper context, having regard to all the circumstances as I understand them to be.

  21. Bearing in mind he has now been in custody for over one year five months it is my view that he has been in custody long enough. It is my view that I should make a finding of “special circumstances”. Should he be released to parole, as I have an expectation that he will, although more likely he will be deported, I would expect firstly that he would need an extended period of time to adjust to community living. He would need some counselling in relation to his associates and particularly the use of cannabis.

  22. In my view in the context of a sentence of two years and six months, one year and one month is the bare minimum period of time that I would regard as appropriate for the period of supervision for a person who at 24 or 25 years of age was being released from prison, having served his first term of imprisonment. I have not forgotten the related matter on the s 166 certificate. I discussed that very briefly with learned counsel for the prisoner and learned counsel for the Crown.

  23. The fact that a matter is a related matter it therefore requires, pursuant to s 167 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a discrete penalty to be imposed. Even allowing for the context in which that charge comes forward, in my view having regard to the period of time the prisoner has spent in custody, it is not a matter that requires the imposition of a fine. It certainly is not a matter that requires the imposition of any term of imprisonment. I propose to convict the offender but pursuant to s 10A of the Act, order no further penalty.

  24. Mr Wang can you stand up please. In relation to the charge of reckless wounding you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of imprisonment comprising of a non‑parole period of one year five months commencing on 19 February 2018 and expiring on 18 July 2019. I fix a balance of sentence of one year one month expiring on 18 August 2020. That means your non‑parole period has expired. You can sit down.

  25. In relation to the offence of possess a prohibited drug you are convicted. Pursuant to s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, no further penalty is to be imposed. I have requested in advance as a matter of urgency, if it can be done, that my remarks on sentence be transcribed so I can revise them immediately, and they can be forwarded, if need be, to the Parole Authority, Corrective Services Department and the Department of Immigration.

  26. Mr Wang I apologise for there being no interpreter present but the order that I’ve made in relation to the matter is that your minimum sentence is one year five months. It starts from the day you came into custody. Your non‑parole period has expired. It expired on 18 July. The balance of sentence is one year one month. What the Corrective Services do about that matter… they’ll have to consult the Parole Authority, but you may be released to Immigration detention. Do you have an understanding that you may be deported?

  27. OFFENDER: I know I will get deported.

  28. HIS HONOUR: You’ll be deported because your visa has expired and you’ll be on, what I understand would be, a justice visa at the moment. But I trust that that matter can be attended to as quickly as possible.

Thank you very much. You’re excused, Mr Wang.

**********

Decision last updated: 21 August 2020

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Cases Cited

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Statutory Material Cited

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Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25
Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39