R v Wal Wal

Case [2025] QSC 37

Draft

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  R v Wal Wal [2025] QSC 37
PARTIES:  The KING
v
WAL WAL, Kresto;
(first defendant)
WAL, Gabreal Wal;
(second defendant)
WAL, Santo;
(third defendant)
WAL WAL, Yohana;
(fourth defendant)
LOKOLONG, Joseph;
(fifth defendant)
MAJOK, Majok Riel;
(sixth defendant)
DENG, Alex Edward;
(seventh defendant)
KON, Chan Kuchmol;
(eighth defendant)
YAAK, Abraham Ajang;
(ninth defendant)
ABIO, Ben;
(tenth defendant)
MAKUOL, Juma Makuol Deng; and
(eleventh defendant)
MAKUACH, Malat Akoi
(twelfth defendant)
FILE NO/S:  Indictment No.1070 of 2024
DIVISION:  Trial Division
PROCEEDING:  Trial (Judge Alone)
ORIGINATING  Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane
COURT: 
DELIVERED ON:  12 March 2025
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING  12 November 2024; 13 November 2024; 14 November 2024;

DATES: 

15 November 2024; 18 November 2024; 19 November 2024; 20 November 2024; 21 November 2024; 22 November 2024;

25 November 2024; 27 November 2024; 28 November 2024;
29 November 2024; 2 December 2024
JUDGE:  Crowley J
VERDICTS:  1. In respect of Kresto Wal Wal:

Count 1 (murder): Guilty; Count 2 (unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 3 (unlawful grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 4 – alternative (unlawful wounding): Guilty; Count 5 (unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Not guilty; Count 5 – alternative (unlawful wounding): Guilty; Count 6 (unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 7 (unlawful striking with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 8 (unlawful striking with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Not guilty; Count 9 (unlawful striking with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 10 (unlawful striking with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 11 (unlawful assault occasioning bodily harm, whilst armed with a dangerous weapon and in company): Guilty.

2. In respect of Gabreal Wal Wal:

Count 1 (murder): Guilty; Count 2 (unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 3 (unlawful grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 4 – alternative (unlawful wounding): Guilty; Count 5 (unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Not guilty; Count 5 – alternative (unlawful wounding): Guilty; Count 6 (unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 7 (unlawful striking with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 8 (unlawful striking with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Not guilty; Count 9 (unlawful striking with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 10 (unlawful striking with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 11 (unlawful assault occasioning bodily harm, whilst armed with a dangerous weapon and in company): Guilty.

3. In respect of Santo Wal:

Count 1 (murder): Guilty; Count 2 (unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 3 (unlawful grievous bodily harm

with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Guilty; Count 4 – alternative (unlawful wounding): Guilty; Count 5 (unlawful wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm): Not guilty; Count 5 – alternative (unlawful wounding): Guilty;…

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Details
AGLC
R v Wal Wal [2025] QSC 37
Case
[2025] QSC 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Wal Wal was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland, where the defendant, Wal Wal, faced charges of drug trafficking. The dispute centred on whether the prosecution had established the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of the circumstantial evidence presented. The court was tasked with determining whether the cumulative weight of the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to exclude any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

The key legal issue was whether the circumstantial evidence against Wal Wal was strong enough to support a guilty verdict, given the requirement that the inference of guilt must be the only rational inference that could be drawn from the circumstances. The court had to carefully consider whether there was any rational hypothesis consistent with innocence that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence. The burden of proof lay with the prosecution to exclude any such hypothesis.

In reaching its decision, the court emphasised the need for a logical and rational connection between the established facts and the ultimate inference of guilt. The court acknowledged that circumstantial evidence could be sufficient for a conviction if the only rational inference from the circumstances was guilt. The court also highlighted that it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove each underlying fact or circumstance to any particular standard, but rather to prove the ultimate inference of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. After considering the evidence, the court concluded that the circumstantial evidence was strong enough to exclude any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, leading to a finding of guilt.

The court ordered that Wal Wal be found guilty of the drug trafficking charges, emphasising the strength of the circumstantial evidence in supporting the conviction. The court’s decision underscored the importance of the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases and the necessity for the prosecution to exclude any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

I may find facts are directly proven by the evidence or are indirectly proven by way of inference from other established facts. Although I may draw inferences from the existence of other facts, I may only draw reasonable inferences; any inferences drawn must be based on the facts that I find proven; and there must be a logical and rational connection between the facts I find established by the evidence and any deduction or conclusion I reach. Intuition or guesswork are not permitted. I must not engage in speculation or conjecture to fill in any gaps in the evidence. Circumstantial evidence When the case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence, a verdict of guilty cannot be returned unless the circumstances are such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. In such a case, it is necessary that proof of a defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not only a rational inference, but also that it should be the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable to be drawn.[9] If there is any rational hypothesis consistent with innocence the defendant is entitled to be acquitted.[10] [9] R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308, [46] (Baden-Clay), citing Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82 (Barca). [10] Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 (Shepherd). For an inference to be reasonable, it must rest upon something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility of innocence should not prevent a finding of guilt if the inference of guilt is the only inference open to a reasonable person upon a consideration of all the facts in evidence.[11] [11] Baden-Clay, [47], citing Barca. In considering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consistent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence.[12] The evidence is not to be looked at in a piecemeal fashion.[13] [12] Ibid, citing R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618, 637 (Hillier). [13] Ibid, citing Hillier, 638. I bear in mind that where the Crown advances a circumstantial case, a distinction must be drawn between the underlying facts and circumstances that may be established by inference and the ultimate inference of guilt that the Crown contends ought to be drawn in all the circumstances. In such a case, it is not necessary to prove each individual underlying fact or circumstance relied upon by the Crown to any particular standard, let alone prove that it is the only reasonable or rational inference to be drawn. Such a standard of proof only applies to the ultimate inference of guilt. The cogency of the inference of guilt is derived from the cumulative weight of the circumstances, not the quality of proof of each circumstance.[14] [14] Shepherd, 592–593 (McHugh J), 579 (Dawson J); cited in R v Waters [2023] QCA 243, [139]–[140]. I also bear in mind that it is not incumbent on a defendant either to establish that some inference other than that of guilt should reasonably be drawn from the evidence or to prove particular facts that would tend to support such an inference. At all times, it remains for the Crown to prove the accused's guilt of an offence beyond reasonable doubt.[15] The Crown is thus required to exclude any rational hypothesis consistent with innocence that reasonably arises on the evidence. [15] Baden-Clay, [62]. Identification evidence

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I also bear in mind that it is not incumbent on a defendant either to establish that some inference other than that of guilt should reasonably be drawn from the evidence or to prove particular facts that would tend to support such an inference. At all times, it remains for the Crown to prove the accused's guilt of an offence beyond reasonable doubt.[15] The Crown is thus required to exclude any rational hypothesis consistent with innocence that reasonably arises on the evidence. [15] Baden-Clay, [62]. Identification evidence Exhibits 49.1–49.3. I note that during the Wickr messages exchanged between the defendant and the users “n33k101” and “c4cartier23” that at 10.53.59 pm on 13 September 2020, c4cartier23 wrote “Slim out the hospital”, which was obviously a nickname reference to the defendant (who is seen on the CCTV compilation footage leaving the hospital around 10.13 pm). I further note the defendant’s iPhone username was “Teflon Slim” and his Instagram account handle was “momoneyslim”. AM17 indicates >100 billion times more likely if Alex Deng contributor.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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