NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
CITATION: R v W [2002] NSWCCA 192 revised - 27/05/2002
FILE NUMBER(S):
60478/01
HEARING DATE(S): 10 May 2002
JUDGMENT DATE: 24/05/2002
PARTIES:
W - Applicant
Regina - Respondent
JUDGMENT OF: Sheller JA Levine J Simpson J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 01/11/0242
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Shadbolt DCJ
COUNSEL:
A Haesler - Applicant
M Bracks - Crown
SOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Commission - Applicant
DPP (Cwlth) - Respondent
CATCHWORDS:
knowingly involved in importation of not less that a traffickable quantity of methylamphetamine
plea of guilty
discount on sentence for guilty plea
assistance to authorities
discount for assistance 25%
discount inadequate
any lesser sentence an affront to community standards
non-parole period
ratio of non-parole period to head sentence
ratio ordinarily 60% to 66-2/3%
ratio of 75% requires explanation
ratio not justified
non-parole period reduced
LEGISLATION CITED:
Customs Act 1901 (Cth)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
DECISION:
Refer paragraph 41
JUDGMENT:
IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL
60478/01
SHELLER JA
LEVINE J
SIMPSON JFriday 24 May 2002
REGINA v W
Judgment
SHELLER JA: I agree that the seriousness of the offence charged and the level of the applicant’s participation in it together with the other matters that Simpson J has recounted are such that this Court cannot interfere with the head sentence imposed by Shadbolt DCJ. I also agree for the reasons her Honour has given that the sentencing judge erred in fixing the non-parole period at 75 per cent of the head sentence. I agree with the orders that Simpson J proposes.
LEVINE J: I agree with Simpson J.
SIMPSON J: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against a sentence imposed on him in the District Court by Shadbolt DCJ on 22 June 2001 following the applicant’s plea of guilty to a single charge of being knowingly involved in the importation of not less than the traffickable quantity of methylamphetamine, brought under s233B(1)(d) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). That statute provides a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years for the offence. Shadbolt DCJ sentenced the applicant to imprisonment for seven years, with a non-parole period of five years and three months, to commence on 10 December 2000, the date of the applicant’s arrest. In doing so his Honour said that the sentence he would otherwise have imposed had been reduced by 50% by reason of the applicant’s timely plea of guilty and accurate information relevant to the prosecution of other offenders that the applicant had given to the authorities. He further stated that 25% of that figure was attributable specifically to the assistance given, half of that for assistance already given and half for assistance anticipated in the future. A little later, in compliance with s21E of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), his Honour said that, but for the assistance anticipated in the future, the sentence would have been eight years and nine months with a non-parole period of six years and three months.
The assistance given,…
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- AGLC
- R v W [2002] NSWCCA 192
- Case
- [2002] NSWCCA 192
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court acknowledged the applicant's extensive assistance to the authorities, which was deemed to be of very high value. Despite this, the court found that the discount for the guilty plea and the assistance already provided was adequate, and that a lesser sentence would be an affront to community standards. The court also considered the objective seriousness of the offence, the large quantity of narcotics, and the applicant's significant role. Given these factors, the court upheld the sentence, including the non-parole period which was set at 75% of the head sentence. This decision was justified by the court, which considered the applicant to be a professional criminal with a history of involvement in similar criminal activities.
The court's reasoning highlighted the importance of community standards and the gravity of the offence in determining the sentence. The applicant's past criminal activities, even though not resulting in prior convictions, were taken into account in setting both the head sentence and the non-parole period. The court emphasised that the non-parole period should generally fall within the range of 60% to 66-2/3% of the head sentence, but in this case, the circumstances warranted a higher ratio of 75%. This decision was based on the applicant's professional criminal status and the need to maintain community confidence in the criminal justice system.
The final orders of the court upheld the sentence imposed, including the non-parole period set at 75% of the head sentence, reflecting the gravity of the offence and the applicant's significant criminal history.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Not without a great deal of hesitation, I have come to the view that, having regard to those two circumstances, any sentence less than the head sentence imposed would constitute an affront to community standards. Accordingly, notwithstanding my view that, ordinarily, having regard to the level and the value of his assistance, the applicant would have been entitled to a more extensive discount on sentence, the other circumstances (the generous discount for the plea of guilty, the starting point when viewed against the statutory maximum and the judge’s finding as to the gravity of the crime itself) require that the sentence be upheld.the ratio of the non-parole period to the sentence The second ground of the application concerned the proportions between the non-parole period and the head sentence. In this case the non-parole period is 75% of the head sentence. In written submissions both the Crown and counsel for the applicant agreed that the authorities establish that (in the words of the Crown’s written submissions):“It is generally appropriate for the ratio of the non-parole period to head sentence, duly adjusted after having regard to s16G of the Crimes Act 1914 all other relevant subjective factors, to be approximately sixty per cent to sixty-six and two thirds per cent: R v Bernier (1998) 102 A CrimR 44. A non-parole period in the region of seventy-five per cent should be reserved for the worst class of case: R v Paull (1990) 20 NSWLR 427 at 435, R v Silgado-Silva (NSWCCA, unreported, 28 September 2001).” Counsel for the applicant referred also to the decision of this court in R v Bugeja [2201] NSWCCA 196; unreported, 11 May 2001 in which Adams J expressed the view that significant departure from the usual proportion would require comprehensive explanation. On the application of the principle, however, counsel parted company. The Crown argued that the objective seriousness of the offence, the large quantity of narcotics and the important role undertaken by the applicant justified and even required such a departure. What his Honour said, in explanation for the course he took, was this:“I have had regard in setting that non-parole period of three quarters of the head sentence to the fact that this prisoner came to this country on several occasions for the purpose of committing crime or assisting in their commission in the sense of being an accessory after the fact. I regard him as a professional criminal and any lesser non-parole period would not in his case be appropriate.” It seems to me that the circumstances there referred to are circumstances relevant both to the head sentence and to the fixing of the non-parole period. As counsel for the applicant pointed out, the factual foundation for the observations contained in that passage emerged from the information given by the applicant. It therefore, on the one hand, afforded him an entitlement to a discount, while at the same time being used to increase the non-parole period. Further, counsel for the applicant submitted that the reasoning extracted above suggests that the applicant was punished more harshly by reason of offences committed in the past. It is plain that, notwithstanding the fact that he had no prior criminal convictions, the applicant was precluded from putting himself forward as a person of good character. He therefore was not entitled to claim leniency on that account. But that circumstance applies equally to the selection of the head sentence as to the selection of the non-parole period. Indeed, that was taken into account in his Honour’s recitation of such subjective factors as were before him. His Honour said:“It is not maintained by his counsel that he is a person of good character but only that he is a person of no convictions in this country until this date.”