R v Vincent - [2020] ACTSC 279

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:	R v Vincent
Citation:	[2020] ACTSC 279
Hearing Date:	6 October 2020
DecisionDate:	11 November 2020
Before:	Burns J
Decision:	See [24]
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – PRE-TRIAL APPLICATION – Application to adduce coincidence evidence – dishonestly receiving stolen property – whether the evidence has significant probative value – whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence
Legislation Cited:	Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 313, 324 Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 98, 101
Cases Cited:	R v Gale; R v Duckworth [2012] NSWCCA 174; 217 A Crim R 487 R v Kandola [2016] ACTSC 395 R v MR [2013] NSWCCA 236
Parties:	The Queen (Crown/Applicant) Christopher Lee Vincent (Accused/Respondent)
Representation:	Counsel S McFarland (Crown/Applicant) J Purnell SC (Accused/Respondent)
Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown/Applicant) JDR Law (Accused/Respondent)
File Number:	SCC 121 of 2020; SCC 122 of 2020

BURNS J:

The present application came before me for hearing on 6 October 2020. At that time the accused, Christopher Vincent, was due to stand trial commencing on 16 November 2020 on a single charge alleging that between 15 February 2020 and 27 March 2020 he dishonestly received stolen goods. Subsequently, on 23 October 2020 the Crown successfully applied to vacate the trial date. One of the reasons for the application to vacate the trial date was that on 20 October 2020 the Crown filed a fresh indictment charging the accused with nine counts of receiving stolen property in the period between 15 February 2020 and 28 March 2020. The fresh indictment also contains nine counts alleging that Megan Joy Young was knowingly concerned in the offences of receiving stolen property.

By an application in proceeding dated 19 August 2020, the Crown seeks to be permitted to adduce coincidence evidence at the trial of the accused, as notified in the Notice of Intention to Adduce Coincidence Evidence dated 17 August 2020 (the notice). I note that the notice is in fact dated 19 August 2020. The application came before me on 6 October 2020, at which time I heard submissions by counsel for the Crown and Senior Counsel for the accused.

I will use the term “coincidence evidence” to describe the evidence the Crown proposes leading, although the term may be misleading. The proposed evidence is led not to establish a coincidence, but to negative any realistic prospect of coincidence.

The notice

The notice sets out the particulars of two incidents. Incident 1 relates to 24 December 2019 when police executed a search warrant at premises at [redacted] in Kambah, ACT. The accused was present at that address when police attended. At that address, police located a large quantity of assorted tools, other building/hardware equipment and bicycles. Police were able to identify some of that equipment as stolen property belonging to a nominated individual. The accused was charged with an offence of receiving stolen property with regard to the property police identified as belonging…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Vincent

Details

AGLC: R v Vincent [2020] ACTSC 279
Case: [2020] ACTSC 279
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Vincent, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory dealt with an application by the Crown to adduce coincidence evidence in a criminal trial. The accused, Christopher Vincent, faced charges of dishonestly receiving stolen property. The Crown sought to introduce evidence from two separate incidents where stolen property was found at the accused's residence. The application to adduce coincidence evidence was made under the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), which requires that the probative value of such evidence substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect.

The court examined whether the evidence of the two incidents involving stolen property had significant probative value, as required by s 98 of the Evidence Act. The Crown argued that the striking similarities in the nature and location of the stolen goods, along with the short time interval between the incidents, made it improbable that the events occurred by coincidence. The accused's counsel contended that the prejudicial effect of the evidence would prevent a fair trial. The court found that the similarities in the events and circumstances were sufficient to make it improbable that the events occurred coincidentally, thereby satisfying the requirements of s 98.

Furthermore, under s 101 of the Evidence Act, the court assessed whether the probative value of the coincidence evidence outweighed the potential prejudicial effect. The court concluded that the significant probative value of the evidence in proving the accused's possession of stolen goods and his knowledge that the goods were stolen, coupled with the likelihood that judicial directions could mitigate any prejudicial impact, meant that the evidence should be admitted. The potential for unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence.

The final orders of the court permitted the Crown to adduce the coincidence evidence in the trial to establish that the accused was the person who received the stolen goods and knew they were stolen. These reasons for judgment were to be kept confidential until the conclusion of the accused's trial.

Orders