R v Villaluna

[2017] NSWSC 1390

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Villaluna [2017] NSWSC 1390

Hearing dates:

22 September 2017

Date of orders:

12 October 2017

Decision date:

12 October 2017

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Beech-Jones J

Decision:

For the offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm upon Jovi Pilapil, the offender is convicted. The offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 years. Pursuant to s 44(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 the Court sets a non-parole period of 9 years commencing on 30 March 2016, and an additional term of 3 years commencing 30 March 2025 and ending on 29 March 2028.

 

For the murder of Keith Collins, the offender is convicted. The offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 34 years. Pursuant to ss 44(1) and (2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 the Court sets a non-parole period of 24 years commencing on 30 March 2022, and an additional term of 10 years commencing on 30 March 2046 and ending on 29 March 2056.

 The overall sentence is 40 years’ imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of 30 years and an additional term of 10 years. The sentence is taken to have commenced on 30 March 2016. The offender will be eligible for release on parole on 30 March 2046 and his last sentence will expire on 29 March 2056.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – murder – wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm – offender abused and tormented ex-partner – offender followed ex-partner to shopping centre – ex-partner on dinner date – offender stabbed companion to death and wounded ex-partner – murder planned – no remorse – plea of guilty – comparable cases – accumulation and concurrency – sentence for wounding 12 years with non-parole of 9 years – sentence for murder 34 years with non-parole of 24 years

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Cases Cited:

Cahyadi v R 168 A Crim R 41; [2007] NSWCCA 1
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45
Markarian v R (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25
Milat v R; Klein v R [2014] NSWCCA 29
Muldrock v R (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
Mulvihill v R [2016] NSWCCA 259
Pearce v R 194 (1998) CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57
R v Cullen [2015] NSWSC 768
R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383; [1981] HCA 31
R v Maglovski (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 16
R v Mulvihill [2014] NSWSC 443
R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54
R v Thomson; R v Houlten 49 NSWLR 383; [2000] NSWCCA 309
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584; [2001] HCA 64

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Regina (Crown)
Alexander Villaluna (Accused)

Representation:

Counsel:
G O’Rourke (Crown)
A Webb (Accused)

  Solicitors:
Office of Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Churchills Lawyers (Accused)

File Number(s):

2016/98014

Judgment

1. On 2 June 2017 the offender, Alexander Villaluna, was arraigned before Johnson J in this Court on an indictment that contained three counts.

2. The first count of the indictment charged the offender with the murder of Keith Collins at Hornsby on 30 March 2016 (Crimes Act 1900, s 18(1)(a)). The second count of the indictment charged the offender with wounding Jovi Pilapil at Hornsby on 30 March 2016 with intent to murder her (Crimes Act, s 27). The third count of the indictment charged the offender with wounding Jovi Pilapil at Hornsby on 30 March 2016 with intent to cause her grievous bodily harm (Crimes Act, s 33(1)(a)). The offender pleaded guilty to the first and third counts and not guilty to the second count. The Crown accepted his pleas of guilty in full satisfaction of all the charges on the indictment. Proceedings on sentence took place on 22 September 2017.

3. The maximum penalty for the offence of murder is life imprisonment (Crimes Act, s 19A). A life sentence must be imposed if the level of culpability involved in the commission of the offence was so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence (Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, s 61(1), the “Sentencing Act"). The Crown did not submit that a life sentence should be imposed. Although I regard the murder of Mr Collins as a particularly serious instance of the crime of murder I record that I am not satisfied that a life sentence is appropriate in this case. The maximum penalty for an offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm is 25 years imprisonment.

4. Section 54A of the Sentencing Act specifies a standard non-parole period of twenty years for the offence of murder and seven years for the offence of wounding with an intention to cause grievous bodily harm. In fixing a sentencing I am required to be mindful of the two legislative guideposts constituted by the maximum sentence of life and that standard non-parole period (Muldrock v R (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 at [27]; “Muldrock”). However, I am not required to undertake the sentencing exercise by asking whether there are reasons for not imposing the standard non-parole period (Muldrock at [25]). Instead, bearing in mind the two legislative guideposts, I am required to identify all the factors relevant to the sentencing task, consider their significance, and then assess the appropriate sentence (Markarian v R (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 at [51] per McHugh J; Muldrock at [26]).

The Offences

5. Tendered at the sentencing hearing was an agreed statement of facts concerning the murder of Mr Collins and the wounding of Ms Pilapil. The Crown also tendered CCTV footage taken inside the restaurant at the shopping centre where the killing and wounding took place. I will refer to that footage in recounting the events of the evening of 30 March 2016. Counsel for the offender, Mr Webb, tendered a chronology taken from the CCTV footage that traces the offender’s movements within the shopping centre on the evening of 30 March 2016 [1] .

   1. Exhibit 1

6. As at 30 March 2016 Ms Pilapil was 39 years of age and the offender was 45. While they were both born in the Philippines, they met in New Zealand in 2007 where they were both training to be nurses. They commenced a relationship. Ms Pilapil had three children from a former marriage. In 2011 Ms Pilapil gave birth to a son fathered by the offender. In 2013 the offender, Ms Pilapil and the four children moved to Australia.

7. The agreed facts record that during the relationship the offender was controlling and violent towards Ms Pilapil. Thus, it was agreed that the offender was “very possessive and jealous” and that Ms Pilapil “had few friends and rarely went out during their relationship”. The agreed facts also record that Ms Pilapil was subject to “verbal abuse” and “physical assaults” that included choking and punches. The offender threatened to kill Ms Pilapil “if she ever started another relationship”.

8. According to the agreed facts, the relationship between the offender and Ms Pilapil ended in November 2015 as a result of an argument between them during which their young son threw himself in front of Ms Pilapil to protect her from the offender. The offender left the family home. It is apparent from subsequent events that the offender did not accept that the relationship between them had concluded

9. The agreed facts state that, after the offender left the family home, he and Ms Pilapil argued over access to their son and child support. At some point the offender sent Ms Pilapil abusive messages. On 19 January 2016 Ms Pilapil obtained an interim Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (“ADVO”) prohibiting the offender from assaulting, harassing, intimidating or stalking her. This aggravated the offender who was concerned that the ADVO would affect his employment and visa status. In his response to the ADVO the offender stated that Ms Pilapil had not sought the ADVO for her "so-called safety" but "to just plain and simple, to ruin me so, so much more".

10. The offender’s controlling behaviour continued after he left the family home. The agreed facts record that around this time the offender sought information from Ms Pilapil's 14-year-old daughter and their son about her including “where she was and who she was with”. Ms Pilapil’s daughter refused to tell the offender where her mother was. Ms Pilapil had previously warned her not to do so.

11. On 3 March 2016 the offender purchased a hunting knife and a camouflage backpack.

12. On 8 March 2016, which was Ms Pilapil’s birthday, the offender arranged an anonymous delivery of flowers to her workplace. He arranged another delivery sometime around 23 March 2016.

13. On 12 March 2016 Ms Pilapil received an e-mail from the offender that said "I want to fuck you up”. He accused her of hiding behind the police and the ADVO. He also accused her of lying about their son and planning to take him to the Philippines. His email concluded, "You really fucked me big time. I am just letting you breathe because of [their son]. Please don't force me".

14. In the meantime Ms Pilapil had commenced using the dating software application “Tinder”. On or about 25 or 26 March 2016, she started communicating via that application with Mr Collins. Mr Collins was 53 years old. He was divorced with four children and three step-children. He ran a successful packaging business on the Central Coast. Ms Pilapil arranged to meet Mr Collins for the first time at a shopping centre at Hornsby on the evening of 30 March 2016.

30 March 2016

15. On 30 March 2016 the offender attended work at Concord Hospital. According to the other staff he “seemed his normal self” although he had recently made, and been the subject of, complaints. The offender was captured on CCTV leaving his work at around at 4.30pm. At the sentencing hearing an image from this footage was tendered. He was wearing a black shirt, a cap, army-type cargo shorts and combat boots. He was carrying the camouflage backpack that was purchased on 3 March 2016 [2] .

    2. Exhibit 4

16. At 5.30pm Ms Pilapil travelled to the shopping centre at Hornsby straight from her work. She had told her children that she was going out for dinner but had not told them who with. She met Mr Collins at a restaurant at the shopping centre. She had previously attended that restaurant with the offender. Ms Pilapil and Mr Collins sat at a table in the rear corner of the restaurant.

17. At about 8.11pm the offender called Ms Pilapil’s daughter and asked her to bring his son downstairs at her home. According to Ms Pilapil’s daughter the offender “seemed normal and calm”. He asked her where Ms Pilapil was but she said she did not know. According to the agreed facts she told him that “maybe [her mother was] with some friends”. The offender's son said he wanted to go upstairs. The offender gave him a hug and left.

18. At about 8.30pm the offender called the hospital where Ms Pilapil worked and asked if she was there. He pretended that he was Ms Pilapil’s rental agent. The staff at the hospital recognised the offender's voice and refused to provide him with any information about Ms Pilapil. They attempted to call Ms Pilapil to notify her, however she did not answer their call.

19. At about 9pm the offender drove to the shopping centre at Hornsby. He parked his car near Ms Pilapil's vehicle. He walked into the shopping centre and entered a different restaurant to that occupied by Ms Pilapil and Mr Collins. He ordered a drink. A waiter at that restaurant observed the offender to be “agitated” and that he “seemed to be in a rush”. The offender was still wearing the clothes he wore when he finished work and was still carrying the camouflage backpack.

20. According to the chronology, the offender walked through another restaurant and then at 9.22pm entered the restaurant in which Ms Pilapil and Mr Collins were seated. By this time Ms Pilapil and Mr Collins had finished eating. They were the only patrons in the restaurant. The CCTV footage shows the offender walked directly to the table at which they were sitting. Mr Collins had his back to the restaurant entrance. The offender walked up behind him, stood slightly to his right side and put his left arm around his shoulder. The CCTV did not record any sound. However, the agreed facts record that the offender leant into to ask Mr Collins "What are you doing with my wife?" According to the agreed facts, the offender behaved so casually that the staff of the restaurant assumed he was a friend of Mr Collins or Ms Pilapil.

21. Ms Pilapil was scared and did not say anything. Mr Collins stood up and told the offender they were just having dinner. The offender straightened up and stepped back. As Mr Collins turned to face him, the offender grabbed at his neck with his left arm and began stabbing him with the hunting knife in his right lower abdomen with vigorous underhand thrusts. My observation of the CCTV footage reveals that at least five stab wounds were inflicted at this point. During the stabbing Ms Pilapil said in a language that the agreed facts refers to as “Philippino” but which was most likely Tagalog, "Stop, we are just having dinner!" However, the offender continued. Mr Collins fell to the ground. After he fell Mr Collins made a number of attempts to sit up but he was unable to stay upright. He was covered in blood.

22. The offender then stepped around the table and grabbed Ms Pilapil. According to the agreed facts, the offender spoke to her for a few moments as he pressed her to the wall before stabbing her in a punching motion under the left breast and in the right arm as she raised it to defend herself. Ms Pilapil slumped back and sat on the ground.

23. The offender then turned and stepped back around the table and stood next to Mr Collins who was still attempting to raise himself off the floor. The offender leant over, knelt on Mr Collins chest as he attempted to roll away and raised the knife before bringing it down in a two-handed grip into his torso. My observation of the CCTV footage reveals that at least another five stab wounds were inflicted at this point. Mr Collins did not move again. The agreed facts record that the offender stood up “and calmly walked out of the restaurant at 9.25pm”. Of all the cowardly and pitiless acts that the offender committed on this day, his actions in returning to finish off a dying man on the ground were the most heinous. The offender interrupted his vicious attack on his ex-partner to stab a defenceless dying man who the offender had never met and only because he dared to have dinner with a woman who did not want to be with the offender anymore.

24. Numerous witnesses observed the commission of the offences and provided detailed accounts to police. Those witnesses reported hearing shrill screaming and howling over the period of the assaults. According to the agreed facts, a “number of witnesses commented that the offender seemed perfectly calm.” This is supported by the CCTV footage. The offender’s actions were deliberate and methodical. As he walked out of the restaurant he casually stopped to pick up something from the floor that appeared to be a handbag. He cast a brief backward glance to a mortally wounded Mr Collins on the floor and then walked out.

25. In the meantime Ms Pilapil had run out of the restaurant. She had blood on her side from her wounds. She ran towards the fountain in the concourse area. The offender followed her. He was covered in blood. The offender stopped at the fountain. He had the knife tucked under his arm. He called Ms Pilapil’s daughter at around 9.25pm. According to the agreed facts, the “offender sounded nervous and out of breath to her, not calm like he normally did”. The offender told her that he had seen her mother on a date with someone. She replied that was “OK, she did not mind”. The offender then said "I think I killed the guy. I stabbed your mum". He then terminated the call.

26. According to the agreed facts, the offender asked a bystander "Did you call the police?" When that particular witness said no, the offender said, "No? Call the police and ambulance". Another witness asked "Why don't you put the knife down?" The offender said "No”. He then stood up and returned to the restaurant where he had stabbed Mr Collins and Ms Pilapil.

27. At around 9.28pm the offender walked back into the restaurant. After pacing around the restaurant with his knife tucked up against his arm, he pulled out a chair and sat near Mr Collins’s body at around 9.31pm. Prior to his return a number of no doubt shocked bystanders had attempted to assist Mr Collins and had called “000”.

28. Meanwhile Ms Pilapil ran into a nearby restaurant, where she hid and said "He's going to kill me". The chef told her "Run, just run". She ran into the shopping centre and then to the lifts, selecting a floor randomly. Police later observed blood stains on the lift buttons and spatter on the walls of the lift. They found her in a shop that was being renovated. The builders in the shop were administering first aid. Ms Pilapil was said to have constantly asked after the offender and her children, repeating "It's all my fault".

29. Shortly after the offender sat down next to Mr Collins’s body a police officer, Sergeant Day, entered the restaurant. She saw blood on the floor, walls, tables and chairs and the offender sitting down, covered in blood. The offender was holding a hunting-style knife with a black handle. By this time Mr Collins was “covered in blood from head to toe" and lying face-down on the floor nearby with large pools of blood in a radius of approximately two metres around him.

30. When Sergeant Day told the offender to drop the knife, he passed it from his left to right hand before placing it on the table. He then stood and moved away from the knife as directed.

31. Sergeant Day noticed that the offender had the waist strap of the backpack secured as well as having it over his shoulders when she directed him to remove it. The offender was cautioned then asked "What has happened?" The offender said he didn't know who the deceased man was. He also said "I come here, I find her with that man...I stabbed him". When asked why he had stabbed him, the offender replied "He was with my wife". He was asked where his wife was. The offender said he didn't know. He was asked what had happened to her. He replied "I stabbed her...maybe in the legs". The offender was again asked "Why stab your wife?" and he replied "She was with that man". He stated that they had been separated since November and that they had a four-year-old son who was at the house.

32. A search warrant was executed at the offender’s workplace. The police seized a folder containing screen shots of messages to an account Ms Pilapil had with a dating website before she met him.

Mr Collins’s Injuries

33. The agreed facts record that Mr Collins died from multiple sharp force injuries. He received 11 entry stab wounds and one exit wound. One of the wounds was in the base of his neck, three were in his right elbow or arm area, one wound was on the left upper arm, one was on his left upper chest and one on the left upper back. He had three abdomen wounds, of which one was an exit wound. He had two stab wounds on his right flank.

34. Of these wounds, the most serious injuries resulted from the stab wound at the base of the neck which severed the right subclavian artery and extended into the right lung, causing his lung to collapse and his ribs to fracture; the wound to the left upper chest which extended into the left lung, causing it to collapse; and the two stab wounds to the right flank which extended into the liver.

Ms Pilapil’s injuries

35. Ms Pilapil received a 4cm linear wound to her right breast extending from below the nipple laterally towards the armpit, a 1 x 1cm wound in the middle of the body, a 5 x 5cm haematoma on her right upper arm just above the elbow, a 3cm linear wound on her outer aspect right forearm and a reduced straightening of the right fingers. The nerve and tendon damage to Ms Pilapil’s right arm required surgery twice and ongoing treatment. The wounds under her left breast required one stitch and two stitches respectively. Ms Pilapil has permanent scarring.

Further Findings

36. It is necessary to make certain further findings relevant to the offender’s culpability based on this material. In R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [27]; ("Olbrich") Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Hayne and Callinan JJ confirmed that a sentencing judge may not take into account facts adverse to an offender unless they are established beyond reasonable doubt, and may take into account facts favourable to an offender if they are proved on the balance of probabilities.

37. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender intended to kill Mr Collins. The number and ferocity of the stab wounds and the circumstances in which he returned to stab him after he stabbed Ms Pilapil demonstrate that matter beyond reasonable doubt. However, it also follows from the Crown’s acceptance of the plea to the third count in satisfaction of the indictment and the principle in R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383; [1981] HCA 31 that the offender cannot be sentenced on the basis that he intended to kill Ms Pilapil.

38. It is also necessary to address when the offender formed the intention to kill Mr Collins and harm Ms Pilapil and why. I have already set out his statements to the police. At the sentencing hearing there were two exhibits which contain an explanation from the offender as to the circumstances of the killing of Mr Collins and the wounding of Ms Pilapil.

39. The first exhibit is a pre-sentence report from the Probation and Parole Service. This report records that the offender stated the following when he was asked about the circumstances of the offence:

“[The offender] outlined a history of violence against his partner during the course of their relationship. The offender claimed that he was the main care giver for the family, believing his ex-partner did not contribute adequately to the running of the household. He claimed his ex-partner was unfaithful to him and continued to be active on dating web sites while they were in a relationship. In an effort to control her behaviour the offender stated that on occasions he threatened to kill her, claiming his ex-partner would be “happy to be killed by me” because she blames herself for the issues in their relationship. The offender stated that he had directed his ex-partner not to “force him to do something irrational to hurt her”; in relation to his belief his partner was intending to take their son to the Philippines. When discussing the level of violence perpetrated against his ex-partner at the time of his offending behaviour, [the offender] minimised the injuries suffered by the victim, stating that if he had wanted to kill her “she would be dead”. During the interviews for this report, [the offender] spoke of his partner in derogatory terms, claiming she was a liar and intimated she was an unfit mother. However, at the same time he articulated his profound love for her.

When discussing [Mr Collins], it appears [the offender] became enraged when he saw [Mr Collins] with his ex-partner because his ex-partner had chosen to leave the children at home to spend time with [Mr Collins]. He claimed that this anger escalated when he observed [Mr Collins] was “a white man”. The offender was clear that his offending behaviour occurred in the context of self-defence as he believed when [Mr Collins] stood up from the table he was intending to attack the offender. When discussing if he has considered that he could have managed his anger in a different manner, [the offender] stated he knows no other way as his mother was violent towards him when he was a child.”

40. To the extent that this explanation provides an insight into the offender’s sense of entitlement and ownership of Ms Pilapil then it can be accepted. He regarded her as his property. The offender could not conceive of the possibility that she might be entitled to make her own choices about her life. The offender regarded Mr Collins as simply some intruder upon his domain who he had some right to eliminate.

41. This aspect of the explanation for the offences provided by the offender to the author of the pre-sentence report does not assist him. The offender is an almost textbook example of a perpetrator of extreme domestic violence. General deterrence, denunciation and retribution are significant considerations in the sentencing of such offenders.

42. The second exhibit is a report from a psychiatrist, Dr Furst, dated 21 September 2017, which recounts what the offender told him about the evening of 30 March 2016. The offender stated that he held two nursing jobs at two different hospitals. He said that between jobs he checked on his children at around 8.30pm and found out that Ms Pilapil was not home. The report then states:

“He said he initially thought she was doing overtime, but she was not at the work facility. He described going to Hornsby and seeing her car, “checking out all the restaurants there”. He found Jovi in the restaurant they used to eat in, finding her with another man.

In relation to his alleged actions of stabbing and killing [Mr Collins] and stabbing his wife, [the offender] said, “I asked them. I didn’t understand what they said. Everything was turning grey. Blacking out. Everything turned dark. I cannot think anymore. Like I’m watching a movie.”

He said he was carrying the knife on him because he “always has a knife” when living on the streets for his own protection.

He was not sure if he was angry at the time, stating, “No. This is not happening.” He could not see where Jovi had gone after the events in the restaurant. [The offender] said, “something blind me…I walked towards the fountain. I sit there. Why so much blood? Oh My God. I called my stepdaughter. I told her what happened. Back to the restaurant to wait for an officer to come. I didn’t think about being in trouble.”

He denied having a direct memory of stabbing [Mr Collins] or Jovi following the incident. He said, “afterwards, the memory of it came back. Some images.”

He was unable or unwilling to state why he stabbed [Mr Collins] or Jovi, apart form (sic) saying, “I didn’t intend to do anything like that.”

When asked about jealousy, [the offender] said, “The question is why are they there in our restaurant?”

He had thoughts of ending his life, even prior to his arrest, approximately monthly, including thoughts of cutting his own jugular vein. He described mood-swings in the period prior to his arrest, often triggered by what he believed Jovi did to him, including believing she was unfaithful and had lied to him.

He lamented that his theatre case had finished early that day and that Jovi had “lowered herself lower than a prostitute.” He said, “If that guy did not want to get under the skirt of my wife it would not have happened…if I don’t love Jovi too much…I could let it go or find another girl. I love her too much.”

He said, “I ended up in a car. Bought the knife to protect myself.””

43. The above extract from the pre-sentence report contains assertions by the offender that he acted in self-defence as he allegedly believed that when Mr Collins “stood up from the table he was intending to attack” the offender. Leaving aside any issue as to whether that claim is consistent with the offender’s plea of guilty to murder, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it has no factual foundation and did not represent the offender’s state of mind at the time he killed Mr Collins. The offender walked into the restaurant armed with a knife in an easily accessible position. Nothing that Mr Collins did could possibly be construed as threatening or aggressive. The offender did not relay any concerns about his own safety to Dr Furst.

44. This leads to a consideration of the extent to which the offender’s actions were premeditated or planned. In her written submissions the Crown Prosecutor contended that the offence had “elements of pre-planning and premeditation”. The submissions refer to the offender “doggedly searching for [Ms] Pilapil” and approaching Mr Collins “stealth like” [3] . In oral submissions the Crown Prosecutor embraced the proposition that prior to the evening of 30 March 2016 the offender formed the view that if he found his ex-partner with another man he was going to try and kill them [4] . In his careful submissions Counsel for the offender, Mr Webb, contended that the evidence does support a finding of “extensive premeditation” [5] . He relied on the photograph showing the offender dressed in the army shorts and t-shirt with his backpack when left work that afternoon. He also relied on the statement of the offender to the author of the presentence report to the effect that he became “enraged’ when he saw Ms Pilapil with Mr Collins, the contents of Dr Furst’s report and the offender’s actions after the stabbings, in that he did not attempt to flee the scene or conceal his actions [6] .

    3. Crown submissions on sentence at [21]

    4. T 22/09/2017 at 24.21

    5. T 22/09/2017 at 29.10

    6. T 220/09/2017 at 29.33

45. I have no doubt that when the offender saw Ms Pilapil in the presence of Mr Collins he became angry and compelled to take action. However, that is not inconsistent with his actions being premeditated or planned in the sense contended for by the Crown Prosecutor. The offender’s actions must be considered in the context of his history of violence towards Ms Pilapil as well as his belief that he owned her and that no one else was entitled to see her. Even if one accepted that the offender purchased the hunting knife for self-protection, which I do not, he had no reason to carry it with him when he left work that day much less to take it to the shopping centre at Hornsby. Further, I do not accept that the offender was checking on the children when he attended Ms Pilapil’s home at 8.30pm. Instead, he was checking on his former partner through the children. If he was concerned about their welfare because there was no adult at home he would have stayed with them. Instead he suspected she might be seeing someone else and to use the Crown’s phrase, “doggedly pursued” her. When he found her car at the shopping centre his suspicions that she might be seeing someone else were heightened. They were confirmed when he saw her with a stranger in a restaurant and learnt that they were on a date.

46. One of the most disturbing aspects of the CCTV footage of the offender’s cowardly attack on Mr Collins, is the complete absence of any hesitation on the offender’s part in executing him. When the offender realised that Mr Collins was on a date with Ms Pilapil, he killed him without further thought. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender was not suddenly enraged to take spontaneous action but instead was simply putting into effect something he had already determined to do for some time, namely kill any man that he thought was showing a romantic interest in his ex-partner. A similar lack of hesitation is evident in the offender’s attack on Ms Pilapil. Although he may not have intended to kill her, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that for some time he had determined that he would severely harm her if he ever found her with another man. The offender wanted Ms Pilapil to live because in a twisted way he still had feelings for her. However, the offender wanted Ms Pilapil to know that he owned her and would punish her if she saw someone else.

47. It follows from this that, to the extent that the versions given by the offender to the author of the pre-sentence report and Dr Furst were meant to suggest that the offender’s actions were merely a spontaneous response to discovering Ms Pilapil in Mr Collins’ presence or that he somehow “black[ed] out” and cannot remember events, then I reject them.

Other aggravating features of the offences

48. In her written submissions, the Crown Prosecutor referred to various features of both offences which bear upon an assessment of their objective seriousness. I have already addressed some of those matters, namely the ferocity of the attack and the level of planning involved (Sentencing Act, s 21A(2)(n)). The Crown Prosecutor referred to the fact that both offences involved the use of a weapon, namely a knife (Sentencing Act, s 21A(2)(c)). That has already been addressed, although given that the offence is murder, the fact that a knife was used does not add much to a determination of the objective seriousness of the offence (Milat v R; Klein v R [2014] NSWCCA 29 at [95]). The Crown Prosecutor also referred to the fact that the offences were committed in a public place in circumstances that would have caused great distress to members of the public and which posed a threat to their safety (Sentencing Act, s 21A(2)(i)). That contention should be accepted.

49. With the possible exception of mental impairments that are related to the offending, an assessment of the objective seriousness of an offence carrying a standard non-parole period should be undertaken “without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offender” but instead should be “determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending” (Muldrock at [27]). I have canvassed the objective features of both offences. The offender intended to kill Mr Collins and for some time he planned to kill anyone he found in his position. The attack was savage, cowardly and undertaken without hesitation. His victim did nothing more than meet a woman for a dinner date. In the period between when he was first stabbed and when he died from loss of blood, Mr Collins must have been terrified as he realised his life was ebbing away. The offender’s murder of Mr Collins was well above the middle of the range of objective seriousness for the offence of murder.

50. The same considerations affect the assessment of the objective seriousness of the stabbing of Ms Pilapil. The attack upon Ms Pilapil (and Mr Collins) was a product of the offender’s twisted belief that she was his property. It was planned in the sense that he intended to seriously hurt her if he found her with another man. It was preceded by years of physical torment and threats. He attacked her in defiance of an apprehended domestic violence order. Like Mr Collins, Ms Pilapil was completely defenceless. She was much smaller physically than the offender. After the attack she was bleeding yet forced to run for her life through a suburban shopping centre. While she did so, the offender rang her daughter and callously but simply told her that he had killed a man and stabbed her mother. The offender’s stabbing of Ms Pilapil was well above the middle of the range of objective seriousness for the offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.

Victim Impact

51. I have described the attack on Ms Pilapil and the injuries she suffered. No victim impact statement was provided by Ms Pilapil. I do not treat that circumstance as suggesting that the attack did not have any ongoing impact on her (Sentencing Act, s 29(3)). There are many possible reasons for Ms Pilapil declining to take any further part in these proceedings, including an understandable desire on her part not to relive such a traumatic event.

52. Even though not much has been said about Keith Collins to this point, it must be emphasised that he is not simply some bit player in a discussion of the escalating pattern of the abuse of Ms Pilapil perpetrated by the offender. To the contrary, his suffering and death is at the very heart of the proceedings. Keith Collins was a completely innocent victim of a horrendous crime. He had no warning of the risk he faced and had no opportunity to defend himself.

53. Victim Impact Statements were read in Court by Mr Collins’ sister, Audrey Jenkins, his eldest son, Thomas Collins, and his daughter, Aisling Collins.

54. The description of Keith Collins that emerged from all of these statements is of a man with exceptionally strong family ties who made a deep and lasting contribution to the Central Coast community in which lived. In addition to his four children and three stepchildren, he had a grandson, mother, niece and nephew. In his business he employed a large number of young people who were promoted to management and leadership roles. He managed and coached junior football players at his local junior football club in Terrigal. Successful communities are built by such people. They should not be defined by how they died but by how they lived.

55. Ms Jenkins told the Court that on 3 March 2016 she was at work when she received the telephone call that broke “her heart into a million pieces”. Ms Jenkins and her husband carried the terrible burden of not only telling their own children of their uncle’s death but advising Mr Collins’ mother that her son was dead. No parent should be put through such an ordeal. Ms Jenkins described in detail the ongoing trauma for her and her family from dealing with Mr Collins’ death and its aftermath, including viewing Mr Collins’ body and their exposure to the publicity surrounding his death. The extremely violent murder of someone so close to them in a public place because of his tenuous connection to someone he had just met, has shaken their sense of personal security as well as their belief that public spaces are safe and that the world is a rational place.

56. Thomas Collins is not just Keith Collins’ son, he is the father of Keith Collins’ grandson. Thomas described his father’s joy at the birth of his grandson in 2014. Thomas recounted how his then partner and now wife drove to his workplace on 31 March 2016 to bring the awful news of his father’s death. In turn Thomas told the staff of his father’s business of his death. Thomas attempted to run the business but it was eventually liquidated. Like his aunty, Keith Collins’ death has shattered Thomas Collins’ sense of personal safety. He says that he is in a “constant state of worry that something else would happen to my family”. His physical and mental health has suffered. Thomas Collins concluded his statement by stating that “the world lost a friend, a mentor, a shoulder to lean on and I lost my Dad”.

57. Aisling Collins’ victim impact statement was especially powerful. At the time her father was murdered, Aisling was 16 years old and living with him. She told the Court that when he died she “had to pack up our home with all our beautiful memories and say goodbye forever” as well as plan her father’s funeral. Aisling Collins described her pain and suffering in stark terms. She said the pain of losing her father “has hurt me to the core of my being”, that she has “anxiety [and] panic attacks” and is angry “about the horrific, terrifying way my Dad died”.

58. Of all the ages to lose a parent especially in these circumstances, 16 is arguably the worst. By this age deep bonds have often formed between a child and their parents. Parental support can be vital in helping teenagers navigate the many stresses and transitions of the mid to late teens. Instead of having her father to help and guide her, Aisling Collins is left to believe that she “will never live an ordinary life”. She describes her “sadness” as “never ending” and that her “world view and belief in the goodness of people has changed”.

59. All this suffering was a consequence of the offender’s actions.

60. The relevance of this material to the sentencing of the offender is prescribed by s 28(4) of the Sentencing Act, namely that the harmful impact of the death of Mr Collins on his immediate family is an aspect of the harm done to the community. A recognition and consideration of such harm is one of the purposes of sentencing (Sentencing Act, s 3A(1)(g)).

The Offender’s Circumstances, Remorse and Prospects of Rehabilitation

61. I have referred to that part of Dr Furst’s report which sets out the offender’s account of the offences. The offender is 45 years old. Dr Furst set out the offender’s personal history including his upbringing and education in the Philippines, his work on a US naval base, his move to New Zealand in 2003 to study nursing and his relationship with Ms Pilapil. Based on the reports of his “episodic mood-swings and anger issues over a lengthy period” prior to committing the offences, Dr Furst diagnosed the offender as suffering from a major depressive disorder with psychotic features. Dr Furst found that he was fit to be tried and did not have a mental illness or defence. Dr Furst found no indication that the offender was suffering from a major mental illness at the time of the offences which would have affected his ability to perceive events, understand right from wrong or control his actions. Dr Furst also found that given the offender’s depression and rigid personality he is at a “greater risk over the long term” of becoming “demoralised, self-harming and/or suicide[al]”. Dr Furst concluded the offender was “likely to find a lengthy prison sentence demoralizing and detrimental to his longer term mental health” such that a custodial sentence is likely to be “more onerous for [the offender] than the average inmate”.

61. The offender’s second oldest sister, Ms Ada Villaluna-Eriksson, gave evidence on his behalf. She works as a nurse in California where she has resided for 35 years. Ms Villaluna-Eriksson confirmed much of the family history given on the offender’s behalf to Dr Furst. She stated that the offender is the youngest child of a family of nine whom she describes as “dirt poor”. Both the offender’s parents died before he was 15. Ms Villaluna-Eriksson stated that since he has been in custody, the offender had revealed that he was sexually assaulted when he was seven [7] . Ms Villaluna-Eriksson said that four of the nine children have now passed away and that her brother has already had a “heart attack and a stroke” [8] . Ms Villaluna-Eriksson stated that the offender had not had any “trouble” with the police in the Philippines [9] . She noted that at one point her brother worked at a US navy facility and received a character reference from the commanding officer that supported an application he made to become a US citizen. She stated that her brother retains the “full support” of his family members. Ms Villaluna-Eriksson offered her family’s apologies and condolences to Mr Collins’s family.

    7. T 22/09/17 at 16.28; 19.16

    8. Exhibit 5

    9. T 22/09/17 at 14.49

62. In cross examination Ms Villaluna-Eriksson stated that she left the Philippines when she was 24 years old and her brother was ten. She did not see him again until she travelled to Australia around the time he was arrested [10] . Ms Villaluna-Eriksson now speaks to the offender once or twice a week on the phone [11] . Ms Villaluna-Eriksson said that the offender expressed how “he was sorry for everything that happened” and that he said he “blacked out”. She could not remember discussing with the offender the reason why he attacked Mr Collins or Ms Pilapil [12] .

    10. T 22/09/17 at 18

    11. T 22/09/17 at19.50

    12. T 22/09/17 at 20.15; 20.18; 20.34

63. Mr Robert Dundas also gave brief oral evidence. Mr Dundas assists an Anglican pastor in conducting services for inmates at Long Bay which the offender attends [13] . Mr Dundas has observed the offender to have a demeanour that is “solemn” and “down”. Mr Dundas said that the offender “always impressed me as someone in deep anguish” [14] . Mr Dundas has not discussed the offences with him.

    13. T 22/09/17 at 21.27

    14. T 22/09/17 at 22.16

64. The difficulties in the offender’s upbringing including the possibility that he may have been sexually assaulted in his childhood are matters to note but they do not weigh much in an overall assessment of the appropriate sentence for murdering Mr Collins and wounding Ms Pilapil. Those matters provide little insight much less any possible justification for his sustained abuse of Ms Pilapil and his actions on the evening of 30 March 2016. Dr Furst’s conclusion that the offender suffered from a depressive disorder can be accepted but that does not diminish the criminality of his actions to any substantial degree. His mental illness did not contribute to his commission of the offence and it does not operate to reduce the need for general or specific deterrence (Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 at [177]). I accept that a custodial sentence will weigh heavily upon the offender (De La Rosa id). That said prisoners facing long sentences of the kind under consideration in this case are almost invariably depressed. This is especially the case for those prisoners who have perpetrated extreme acts of domestic violence and destroyed or nearly destroyed the very family that they thought they wanted to preserve (see for example R v Maglovski (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 16 at [92]).

65. Six potential matters of mitigation are raised by the material tendered on behalf of the offender.

66. The first matter is whether the offender does not have a record or any significant record of prior convictions and the second matter is whether the offender was, prior to the offences, a person of a good character (the Sentencing Act, s 21A(3)(e); s 21A(3)(f)). I accept the first matter but not the second. The offender does not have any convictions in New South Wales and there is no evidence that he has previously been convicted of an offence elsewhere. In relation to his character, Mr Webb submitted that he had a good work record and had made a substantial contribution to the community [15] . However, given that it is agreed that he perpetrated acts of domestic violence and abuse towards Ms Pilapil over a sustained period prior to committing the offences, he cannot be sentenced on the basis that he was of prior good character.

    15. Defence sentencing submissions at [20(a)]

67. The third matter is whether the offender is remorseful for the offences. Subsection 21A(3)(i) of the Sentencing Act provides that the remorse shown by an offender is a mitigating factor, but only if:

“(i) the offender has provided evidence that he or she has accepted responsibility for his or her actions, and

(ii) the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his or her actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both) ..."

69. The evidence of Ms Villaluna-Eriksson and Mr Dundas might be construed as supporting a contention that the offender is remorseful. However understandably neither of them probed the offender to ascertain the nature of his apparent regret. The author of the pre-sentence report interviewed the offender sometime between June and September 2017. The report includes the following:

“Attitude to offending

[The offender’s] account of the offence suggests he does not take responsibility for his offending behaviour. He attributed blame to [Mr Collins], stating his offending behaviour was an act of self-defence. He attributed blame to his ex-partner for meeting with [Mr Collins] and leaving the children at home. Despite prompting, [the offender] appeared unable to express any empathy for either of the victims or their families. He expresses self-concern when discussing the offences stating that his life, rather than the victims, had been adversely affected as he is now in custody. He likened the effect on [Mr Collins] as being ‘just like me’ stating that ‘I’ve lost my life too’ regarding being unable to see his family.”

70. Tendered on behalf of the offender was a two-page typed statement signed by him which recorded that on 5 April 2017 he was asked by his Counsel to “write a letter of apology” for his crimes. He commences by stating that “[a]t first I said to myself that I could never do it because I am still angry at what happen[ed] to me”. He then states that he drew inspiration from certain biblical passages and that he was “blinded” by his love for Ms Pilapil and his “strong desire to protect my kid and my family”. He asks for “forgiveness” and “compassionate grace” from the Court and the “orphans of Keith Collins”, stating “[h]is life; my life is over”. He refers to the loneliness of his prison life before expressing “deepest sympathy and condolence” for the “family of the slain”. He concludes by stating that “I am really sorry for what I’ve done”. This is the only express statement of sorrow or regret for his own actions. His letter makes no reference to regret for stabbing Ms Pilapil.

71. Even when his Counsel sought to focus the offender’s mind on the issue of remorse, the offender only produced an expression of self-pity rather than any real acknowledgement of the loss and suffering he has caused. I have no doubt that the offender regrets his own circumstances. However, that is qualitatively different to remorse for his actions and the hurt they inflicted. The pre-sentence report indicates that he still blames Ms Pilapil and even Mr Collins for creating that outcome. Even allowing for the offender’s plea of guilty, I am not satisfied that he is remorseful for his actions in any relevant sense. Instead he is awash with self-pity and anger borne of his sense of entitlement to control Ms Pilapil and kill anyone who came close to her.

72. The fourth and fifth mitigating factors are whether the offender is unlikely to reoffend and whether the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation whether by reason of his age or otherwise (the Sentencing Act, s 21A(3)(g); s 21A(3)(h)). Given the length of the likely sentence and thus the likely age that the offender will be upon his release an assessment of his prospects of reoffending at that time is a difficult task. Mr Webb’s submissions on these issues referred to some of the statements made by the offender which it was contended suggest that he acknowledges the wrongfulness of his actions. I have already addressed that topic. It suffices to state that, given the offender’s conduct and his attitude to his offending, I am not satisfied that these mitigating circumstances have been established. To the contrary, the offender presents as having significant prospects of reoffending in the unlikely event that he ever forms another relationship.

73. The sixth matter concerned the offender’s health. Justice Health records were tendered which referred to the offender suffering from hypertension. Ms Villaluna-Eriksson’s evidence suggests there is a family history of heart attacks and strokes. However, there is nothing to suggest that his condition cannot be adequately managed by Justice Health.

The Offender’s Plea of Guilty

74. Subsection 21A(3)(k) of the Sentencing Act provides that the entry of a plea of guilty is a mitigating factor. Subsection 22(1) expands upon this, requiring the Court to take into account the fact of the plea, the timing of the plea and the circumstances in which the plea was entered with the consequence that the Court may impose a lesser penalty than it would have otherwise imposed. It is common practice to quantify the reduction of a sentence imposed on an offender because of a plea of guilty (R v Thomson; R v Houlten 49 NSWLR 383; [2000] NSWCCA 309 at [160] per Spigelman CJ; “Thomson”). Two factors affecting the level of discount afforded are the timing of the plea and the likely length and complexity of the trial that the plea avoided (Thomson at [154]).

75. In relation to the timing and circumstances of the plea, as noted the offender entered his plea of guilty on 2 June 2017. He was arrested on 30 March 2016 and committed for trial in this Court on 24 November 2016. He was due to be arraigned in this Court on 10 February 2017 but his matter was adjourned while his legal representatives sought a psychiatric report. The proceedings were adjourned again for the same reason on 7 April 2017. Mr Webb submitted that it was reasonable to wait for a psychiatric report before entering a plea of guilty to a charge as serious as murder. He noted that once the report became available in April 2017 the plea was entered following short negotiations with the Crown and on an occasion when members of Mr Collins’ family were available to attend. I accept that submission. Otherwise I note that the trial that would have ensued had the plea not been entered would have been likely to be of reasonable length but generally uncomplicated. Although the Crown case was almost completely proven by the CCTV footage, many witnesses would still need to have been called.

76. Overall, I quantify the relevant discount for the plea at 15 per cent. In applying that discount some rounding has been adopted.

Comparable Cases: Murder

77. The Crown Prosecutor’s written submissions referred to the statistics produced by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales recording the range of sentences imposed for murder. The submissions noted that of the 254 sentences imposed for murder between January 2008 and December 2016 all of the offenders received a custodial sentence and those sentences ranged between sentences of less than ten years to life imprisonment. The written submissions acknowledged the limitations on the use of these statistics. Given the range of circumstances that constitute the crime of murder they are of no assistance.

78. The written submissions also provided a table of cases in which an offender was sentenced for a murder that was committed in circumstances arising out of an abusive domestic relationship and which “involved elements of pre-planning and/or premeditation and an intention to kill”. Again, the written submissions acknowledge the limitations on the use of such cases. In particular such sentences can “provide guidance” to sentencing judges and can “stand as a yardstick against which to examine a proposed sentence” but they do not fix the boundaries within which sentencing judges are obliged to act (Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 at [53] – [54] “Hili”). A consideration of such cases requires an “examination of the whole of the circumstances that have given rise to the sentence” so that the “unifying principles” may be ascertained (Hili at [54] citing Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at 606; [2001] HCA 64 at [59]).

79. I have considered the cases referred to by the Crown. I will mention two of them. In R v Cullen [2015] NSWSC 768 (Cullen”) Harrison J sentenced the offender to imprisonment for 30 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 22 years and 6 months. The offender in Cullen stabbed his wife and then himself after their marriage broke up. He had assaulted her earlier that day and had forced her into the boot of his car. He drove to a fishing store, purchased two fishing knives and stabbed her to death that afternoon in what the sentencing judge described as an attack of “awful brutality” (at [37]). The offender formed the intention to kill no later than when he purchased the knives some hours before he killed her (at [15] to [20]). The offender was 52 years of age and had a criminal record but not one which was of significance to the sentencing exercise (at [28] to [29]). His Honour found that the offence was well above the middle of the range of objective seriousness (at [35]) and that there was no evidence of remorse.

80. In R v Mulvihill [2014] NSWSC 443, Fullerton J sentenced the offender to a term of imprisonment of 29 years with a non-parole period of 22 years following a trial. An appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed: Mulvihill v R [2016] NSWCCA 259. The offender had an extra-marital affair with the deceased. He stabbed her after she ended their relationship. He displayed obsessive behaviour towards her and eventually confronted her at her home. She died of stab wounds and suffered blunt force injuries. The sentencing judge found that the offender had gained entry to her home not with an intention to kill her but instead with an intention to harm or threaten her. He then formed an intention to kill as events unfolded (at [59]). There was evidence before the sentencing judge of the offender having committed previous instances of domestic violence against other women (at [64]).

81. One premise of the Crown’s reference to the cases in its table is that there is no difference in substance between the offender killing an effective bystander such as Mr Collins and the killing of an ex-partner. I accept that premise is made good in this case especially as Mr Collins was in no greater position to defend himself against the offender’s attack than Ms Pilapil. Otherwise the circumstances and outcomes of these cases and the other cases referred to by the Crown only serve to illustrate the interplay of various factors that can affect a determination of the appropriate sentence in a case of murder that arises out of a breakdown of a domestic relationship. These factors include the extent of premeditation, the circumstances of the killing and the offender’s subjective case. Given that this offender had planned for some time to kill any man in the presence of his ex-partner, the manner and place in which he killed Mr Collins and the complete absence of remorse, this offender’s circumstances are generally worse than the two cases I have mentioned. In the end result the only substantive matter in his favour is his entry of a plea of guilty.

Concurrency and accumulation

82. As the offender has pleaded guilty to two offences both of which require the imposition of custodial sentences, it necessary to consider whether the period of each sentence should be partly or wholly concurrent.

83. The starting point for the imposition of an appropriate sentence is the necessity to "fix an appropriate sentence for each offence” (Pearce v R (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57 at [45], “Pearce”). The second stage of the sentencing process noted in Pearce at [45] is to consider "questions of cumulation or concurrency, as well, of course, as totality". In this case, that means that in determining the penalty for each offence and structuring the overall sentence the Court should ensure that the combined effect of all the sentences reflects the total criminality of the offender's conduct (see Cahyadi v R 168 A Crim R 41; [2007] NSWCCA 1 at [27] per Howie J).

84. The murder of Mr Collins and the wounding of Ms Pilapil were distinct crimes with no overlapping elements. Each concerned a separate victim who suffered a grievous breach of their human rights. It follows that there should be a substantial degree of accumulation between the two sentences. However, the need to consider totality and the fact that the offences arose out of the one incident and occurred within minutes of each other, suggests that some concurrency is warranted. With sentences that are partly concurrent sometimes the ratio between the non-parole period and the total sentence for one of the offences needs to be varied so as to ensure that the total effective non-parole period is not disproportionately large compared to the total effective head sentence. This is such a case and to that extent only I find “special circumstances” for the murder offence (Sentencing Act, s 44(2)).

Conclusion

85. Keith Collins was brutally stabbed to death by the offender in a public place for no reason other than he attended a dinner date with the offender’s ex-partner. Ms Pilapil was viciously wounded at the same time and for the same reason. These were cowardly and vicious attacks. They followed years of torment of Ms Pilapil by the offender. As I have stated, the offender believed he owned Ms Pilapil. His actions were premeditated in that for some time he had determined that if he found Ms Pilapil with another man the offender would kill him and seriously harm her. In cases such as these general deterrence, retribution and denunciation are the dominant sentencing criteria. Perpetrators of extreme domestic violence can expect to spend most of the rest of their lives in prison. Leaving aside his plea of guilty, there is very little reason to afford this offender any leniency.

86. As the offender was taken into custody on 30 March 2016 it follows that his initial custodial sentence should commence from that date.

87. Mr Villaluna, both the offence of murder and the offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm are "serious violence offence[s]" as defined in s 5A of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006. The Court is obliged by s 25C of that Act to advise you of the existence of that legislation and of its application to the offence you have committed.

88. Alexander Villaluna, for the offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm upon Jovi Pilapil you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 years. Pursuant to s 44(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 the Court sets a non-parole period of 9 years commencing on 30 March 2016, and an additional term of 3 years commencing 30 March 2025 and ending on 29 March 2028.

89. Alexander Villaluna, for the murder of Keith Collins you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 34 years. Pursuant to ss 44(1) and (2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 the Court sets a non-parole period of 24 years commencing on 30 March 2022, and an additional term of 10 years commencing on 30 March 2046 and ending on 29 March 2056.

85. The overall sentence is 40 years’ imprisonment, comprising a non-parole period of 30 years and an additional term of 10 years. The sentence is taken to have commenced on 30 March 2016. The offender will be eligible for release on parole on 30 March 2046 and his last sentence will expire on 29 March 2056.

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Endnotes

Decision last updated: 12 October 2017