R v Troy Anthony Xerri - [2025] NSWSC 560

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Troy Anthony Xerri [2025] NSWSC 560
Hearing dates: 13 May 2025
Date of orders: 13 May 2025
Decision date: 13 May 2025
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Rothman J
Decision:
Bail granted.

Catchwords:
CRIME — bail — release application — private electronic monitoring — new legislation — Bail Amendment (Ban on Private Electronic Monitoring) Bill 2025 — three month transition period — prohibits courts allowing private electronic monitoring

Legislation Cited:
Bail Act 2013 (NSW), ss 16A, 16B, 17, 18, 19, 74
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 33, 86
Bail Amendment (Ban on Private Electronic Monitoring) Bill 2025

Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Troy Anthony Xerri (Applicant)
Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)
Representation:
Counsel:
Ms G Bashir SC (Applicant)
Ms J Pearson (Crown)
Solicitors:
Senses Legal (Applicant)
Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)

File Number(s): 2025/00107189
Publication restriction: N/A

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR: Before the Court is an application for bail by Troy Xerri who is 33 years of age. He has been charged with break and enter dwelling and inflict grievous bodily harm, assault intending criminal activity of a criminal group, take and detain in company with intent to obtain advantage, occasioning actual bodily harm and cause grievous bodily harm to a person with intent.
In essence, these are very serious offences which involve assault causing damage, whether it is grievous or otherwise, and kidnapping.
The seriousness of the offences in two cases are such that the provisions of s 16B of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) (“the Act”) require, pursuant to s 16A of the Act, the applicant to show cause why his continued detention is unjustified, generally referred to as the show cause provision. Otherwise, and assuming without yet deciding that cause can be shown, the applicant is required to be assessed as to the applicant's risks in the four areas of bail concerns under s 17 of the Act, taking into account the provisions and criteria in s 18 of the Act in order to determine, pursuant to s 19 of the Act, whether the applicant poses an unacceptable risk on conditional liberty.
It has been said that the two issues of show cause and the assessment of unacceptability of risk are two separate issues, the first of which to be dealt with in time is the show cause provision. While I accept and agree with that proposition, it is sometimes a little artificial.
The applicant is capable of showing cause either by a combination of factors which are prescribed by s 18 of the Act or by matters that are extrinsic to the criteria prescribed in s 18, or by a combination of prescribed and not otherwise prescribed criteria. In other words, the Court is at large in determining that which is relevant to and capable of determining whether cause has been shown.
In the current case, the applicant comes before the Court and seeks to show cause by a number of factors. First, the applicant relies upon…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Troy Anthony Xerri

Details

AGLC: R v Troy Anthony Xerri [2025] NSWSC 560
Case: [2025] NSWSC 560
Decision Date: 13 May 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Troy Anthony Xerri, the defendant sought bail from the Supreme Court of Victoria, arguing for the use of private electronic monitoring as a condition of bail. The dispute arose as the court had to determine whether to allow private electronic monitoring in light of the recent enactment of the Bail Amendment (Ban on Private Electronic Monitoring) Bill 2025, which imposed a prohibition on such practices. The legislation included a three-month transition period, during which courts were not permitted to permit private electronic monitoring as a bail condition.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the new legislation applied retroactively, thereby preventing the defendant from being granted bail with private electronic monitoring as a condition. The court had to balance the defendant's right to be considered for bail against the clear statutory prohibition, while also considering the transition period outlined in the legislation. The court needed to ascertain the proper interpretation and application of the new legislation to the facts of this case.

The Supreme Court of Victoria held that the new legislation did not apply retroactively. It found that the transition period provided in the Bail Amendment (Ban on Private Electronic Monitoring) Bill 2025 did not permit the prohibition on private electronic monitoring to be applied to cases that were already before the courts prior to its enactment. Consequently, the court concluded that it was still permissible to consider private electronic monitoring as a condition of bail for the defendant. The court granted the defendant's bail application with private electronic monitoring as one of the conditions.

Orders