SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v TRAN
[2017] SASCFC 168
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Parker)
19 December 2017
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE - APPEAL DISMISSED
Appeal against conviction.
The appellant was convicted of two counts of trafficking in heroin contrary to s 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA). The heroin was found by police in the appellant’s bedroom, namely hidden inside a printer and a hollowed out candle. The appellant and her former partner, Mr Nguyen, were in the house at the time of the police raid. The appellant had spent the previous night at her sister’s house to allow Mr Nguyen access to their child. The prosecution case was that the appellant hid the heroin in her bedroom acting alone. The prosecution did not rely on the appellant exercising possession jointly with Mr Nguyen.
The appellant appeals on the grounds that the trial Judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the elements of possession and that the verdicts are unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
Held, by Kourakis CJ (Stanley and Parker JJ agreeing), dismissing the appeal:
1. Although the trial Judge’s directions were brief and lacked any elaboration, they were sufficient to properly direct the jury on the forensic issues in this case.
2. The way in which the prosecution ran its case rendered it unnecessary for the trial Judge to give a direction that mere acquiescence in the hiding of the heroin in the appellant’s bedroom did not itself constitute possession.
3. The verdict was not unreasonable. The places in which the heroin was hidden in the appellant’s bedroom supported an inference that it was hidden by the person who permanently resided in it and not by an overnight visitor.
Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32, referred to.
R v GNN (2000) 78 SASR 293; R v Neal (2017) 128 SASR 20; R v Saleh [2017] SASCFC 75; R v Wood [2017] SASCFC 100, considered.
R v TRAN
[2017] SASCFC 168Court of Criminal Appeal: Kourakis CJ, Stanley and Parker JJ
KOURAKIS CJ: The appellant, Thi My Dieu Tran, appeals against her conviction on two counts of trafficking in heroin contrary to s 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) (the CSA). Ms Tran appeals on the ground that the trial Judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the elements of possession, and on the ground that the verdicts are unreasonable. Ms Tran was given permission to appeal on the first ground and the second ground was referred to this Court for its consideration.
The heroin was found by police hidden in two locations in Ms Tran’s bedroom. Among others, Ms Tran and her…
Continue reading R v Tran
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- R v Tran [2017] SASCFC 168
- Case
- [2017] SASCFC 168
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge had misdirected the jury regarding the elements of possession, and whether the verdict was unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence. Specifically, the appellant argued that the jury should have been directed on the distinction between mere acquiescence and actual possession, particularly in circumstances where another person was present and had access to the bedroom. The court was also asked to consider if the evidence was sufficient to establish the appellant's exclusive possession of the heroin, or if a reasonable doubt existed.
The Full Court dismissed the appeal on the first ground, finding that the trial judge's directions, while brief, were sufficient for the forensic issues in the case. The court reasoned that the prosecution's case was based on the appellant having personally placed and concealed the heroin for her exclusive use, rather than on a scenario of joint possession or acquiescence. Therefore, a direction on mere acquiescence was deemed unnecessary. Regarding the second ground, the court refused permission to appeal, concluding that the concealment of the heroin in the printer and candle, coupled with personal items belonging to the appellant found in the bedroom, constituted strong circumstantial evidence of her possession. The court found it improbable that Mr Nguyen, given his temporary and disabled status, would have used such elaborate hiding places, and therefore the jury's inference of the appellant's exclusive control was properly drawn.
Consequently, the appeal on the first ground was dismissed, and permission to appeal on the second ground was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It will be observed that the reference to intending to ‘exclude anyone else’ in that direction goes a little further than the address of defence counsel in the passage reproduced above. I accept that the Judge’s elaboration on the defence submission is more apt to a case in which there is an issue as to mere acquiescence in, or joint possession with another. However, that was not the forensic issue in this case. I accept that if it were, the collateral reference to the concept by reminding the jury of defence counsel’s submission would not have been an adequate direction. Moreover, as will be seen, in a case where mere acquiescence or joint possession is a forensic issue, greater elaboration is generally necessary to guard against a miscarriage.Consideration I observe at the outset that possession is a sufficient but not a necessary element of trafficking in a controlled drug. The definition of trafficking in s 4 of the CSA includes ‘take part in the process of sale of the drug’. The forensic purpose of the prosecution, in relying on possession as the relevant form of participation in trafficking, is to engage the presumption of commerciality in s 32(5) of the CSA which applies when possession of the prescribed quantity is proved. It is of course possible for a prosecution case to rely on other evidence of a commercial purpose, and on a form of participation other than possession to constitute the objective element of the offence of trafficking. It is also possible for the prosecution to, in such a case, rely on the possession and the presumption as an alternative basis on which to prove the commercial purpose. However, in most cases at least, to do so would unnecessarily complicate the case and the directions which would have to be given. In R v GNN[1] (GNN) this Court considered the elements of possession in the context of charges of trafficking contrary to s 32 of the CSA. In GNN a police search discovered heroin in a house when there were a number of persons present, including some visitors who had just arrived from interstate. Ms GNN was convicted of trafficking in heroin found concealed in two different locations in the kitchen but not guilty of heroin found in a bedroom which she was temporarily sharing with Mr THN, a man with whom she was in a relationship. Mr THN had arrived from Sydney on the day before the police search. The heroin in the bedroom was hidden between the mattress and the base of the bed. That heroin was not related chemically to any other heroin found in the house. Heroin was also found in the car in which the visitors from Sydney had arrived. Ms GNN denied any knowledge of the heroin. Chief Justice Doyle commenced his consideration of the adequacy of the directions on possession as follows:[2][20]First, it was important to explain to the jury that, in the circumstances, knowledge of the presence of the heroin was not enough. For example, satisfaction on the jury's part that Ms GNN knew that one of the men had concealed the heroin in the house was not sufficient to establish that she was in possession of the heroin. Another matter which called for particular attention was to explain to the jury that before finding Ms GNN guilty they had to be satisfied that the heroin was not in the exclusive possession of one of the men who were at the house that night. Thirdly, it was necessary to emphasise the requirement to prove physical control over the heroin and an intention to exercise control over it. It was necessary to relate these matters to the facts, in a practical way, to avoid the risk of the jury convicting on an unreliable basis. It was necessary to give directions that dealt adequately with the possibility that the heroin was in the possession of one of the men found in the house.[1] (2000) 78 SASR 293.[2] R v GNN (2000) 78 SASR 293 at 296, [20].