R v Tillman

[2025] NSWDC 127

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Tillman [2025] NSWDC 127

Hearing dates:

11 April 2025

Date of orders:

11 April 2025

Decision date:

11 April 2025

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Before:

Abadee DCJ

Decision:

See paragraphs [94]–[97]

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – firearms offences – significance of good character – whether it is material that late plea of guilty delayed because of earlier legal advice

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 25D

Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) s 51D

Cases Cited:

Athos v R (2013) 83 NSWLR 224

Doyle v R [2022] NSWCCA 81

Gurin v R [2022] NSWCCA 193

Mack v R [2009] NSWCCA 216

R v Mahmud [2010] NSWCCA 219

R v Quatami (2001) 127 A Crim R 369

Taylorv R [2018] NSWCCA 50

Texts Cited:

Nil.

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Rex (Crown)
Mr Troy Tillman (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
G Chegwidden (Offender)
S Foggo (solicitor advocate) (Crown)

Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)

File Number(s):

2023/00345985

Publication restriction:

Nil.

Ex TEMPORE REMARKS ON SENTENCE

(Revised from the transcript)

Background

1. On 17 March 2025 Mr Troy Tillman was arraigned on a charge, contrary to s 51D(2) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), that on 30 October 2023, at Marulan, he possessed more than three unregistered firearms (being four firearms) that were not registered and that one of them (a 22 Long Rifle calibre Gevarm model A6 self-loading rifle) was a prohibited firearm, when he was not authorised (by license or permit) to possess the firearms. On the same day, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The Crown accepted this plea in full satisfaction of his liability.

2. Mr Tillman, who I will henceforth refer to as to the offender, is now before the Court for sentencing. He adhered to his guilty plea at today’s sentencing hearing.

3. The maximum penalty for this offence is 20 years’ imprisonment. The standard non-parole period is 10 years’ imprisonment.

4. What sets apart the aggravated form of the offence under s 51D(2) from the offence under s 51D(1) of the Firearms Act, is that any one of the three or more unregistered firearms in his possession were a pistol or ‘prohibited firearm’.

The facts

5. These were the subject of written agreement, signed by the offender, and his lawyer, on 17 March 2025.

6. In the lead up to the offending, the offender had been in a relationship with Ms Kylie Butcher and her son Jacob. Ms Butcher resided at premises in Goulburn Street, Marulan (the ‘Marulan premises’) and the offender resided with them. The offender stored his belongings in an unregistered caravan parked on the front lawn of the Marulan premises. Occasionally, he slept in that caravan.

7. At approximately 6pm on 30 October 2023, police received a report from Ms Butcher of a domestic violence incident at the Marulan premises. Police attended those premises and in the course of that attendance, Ms Butcher informed police that the offender had multiple unregistered firearms in the caravan which she had observed in that vehicle. She referred to a shotgun and two rifles.

8. In front of the caravan, police noticed a large camping swag. Underneath this police located a green hessian bag that contained a pillowcase and 4 firearms. The firearms comprised:

1. a 22 long rifle calibre Gevarm model;

2. a Ruger M77 Rifle;

3. a Stirling rifle; and

4. a double-barrel shotgun.

9. Each of these weapons was forensically examined.

10. The Gevarm model was a self-loading rimfire rifle which satisfied the definition of a ‘prohibited firearm’ under cl 2 of Schedule 1 to the Firearms Act. It was in working order and was capable of propelling a projectile by means of an explosive.

11. The Ruger M77 rifle was not in working order. That was because of a missing bolt. It was still capable of propelling a projectile by explosive.

12. The Stirling rifle was also not in working order; also because of a missing bolt. It was at one time capable of propelling a projective by means of an explosive. On the contingency that it was fitted with a silencer which police also seized, it would also satisfy the definition of a ‘prohibited firearm’ under cl 2 of Schedule 1 to the Firearms Act.

13. The double-barrel gun was in working order and was capable of propelling a projective by means of an explosive

14. With the exception of the Ruger firearm, none of these firearms had ever been registered under the Firearms Act. The Ruger had been registered to a different person in 2011. As at the date of the offending, the offender did not hold any firearms licence or permit authorising his possession of firearms, or any prohibited firearm under Schedule 1 to the Firearms Act.

15. The offender had previously held a firearms licence; which had been issued on 18 June 2014, but that license had been revoked on 21 December 2018.

16. The offender understood that police were notified to his firearm possession following a fallout with his most recent partner, with whom he had cohabitated for a period of three years.

17. The offender was arrested on 31 October 2023. He participated in an ERISP interview.

Explanation for offending

18. The offender partly relied upon the report of Mr Sam Borenstein, a clinical psychologist, dated 20 March 2025 for multiple purposes; one of which was an explanation for his offending. The psychologist interviewed the offender by way of AVL.

19. The offender told Mr Borenstein that he had the firearms the subject of the offences from since about 2018 when, he said, he had been assaulted. It appeared from Mr Borenstein’s report that the offender indicated to him that some, although apparently not all, of his firearms were seized by police with the balance being stored appropriately. However, in his legal representative’s submissions, it appears that the offender told the lawyer that all the firearms had been surrendered to police.

20. In one of the health records relied upon, the offender was recorded as saying that he was aware of having two weapons but was unaware where the others had come from. He suspected that they may have come from his ex-partner’s father although nothing was added to substantiate or explain the basis for that suspicion. This evidence would appear to controvert the guilty plea; and I reject it.

21. There is some inconsistency between these accounts. What the offender told Mr Borenstein does not reflect well on the offender’s general credibility. At any rate, by his plea of guilty, he admitted to four firearms (at least one of which was a prohibited firearm) being in his possession at the time he committed the offending.

22. He told Mr Borenstein that had always lived in rural settings (at the time of the index offending he lived 30 kilometres out of town) and relied upon firearms to kill vermin and, if need be, euthanise animals; as well as pursuing hunting as a hobby. Hunting, he explained, helped him clear his mind. He said that one of the firearms was given to him and enabled him to kill dogs that were killing sheep.

23. There is nothing in this explanation to Mr Borenstein to indicate that the offender had any concerns for his personal safety (such as his getting them to protect himself after he said he was assaulted) which might explain his retention of the firearms, or any association with criminal elements. He confirmed to the psychologist that the firearms found in his possession were not registered and even indicated – quite brazenly it seemed to me – a hope that he could hold onto them until he reapplied for his firearms licence next year.

24. A general difficulty in evaluating the weight that can be given to explanations and other evidence given by the offender was that, according to Mr Borenstein, he was a ‘vague and tangential historian’. I have already noted inconsistencies in what he has said to different people, and in different circumstances.

25. In the offender’s written submissions the firearms were in a safe when he last saw them. He also insinuated that someone had interfered with the storage arrangement by the time the firearms were detected. He clarified that he was not suggesting that it was police who did so (even though he said during the hearing that he was feared police). He did not dispute that the firearms were located outside that safe.

26. The offender elected to give evidence at the sentencing hearing, in which he elaborated that he thought that the firearms were in a safe in the shed at the back of the property he was staying at. He had joint access to that safe with his former partner. He was challenged on his evidence that he might have been mistaken in thinking that they were back in the safe. However, in the record of interview, it became clear that he admitted to police that he was aware that the firearms were in the swag in his caravan. It did not, in that sense, really matter how they got into the bag.

27. There is, in other words, nothing in the offender’s various explanations that materially mitigates his culpability.

The objective gravity of the offending

Statutory principles and objects and general principles

28. The index offence must be considered against the general statutory principles and objects of s 3 of the Firearms Act. The underlying principles include the following:

“(a) to confirm firearm possession and use as being a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety, and

(b) to improve public safety:

(i) by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of firearms, and

(ii) by promoting the safe and responsible storage and use of firearms …”

29. The underlying objects relevantly include:

“(a) to prohibit the possession and use of all automatic and self-loading rifles and shotguns except in special circumstances,

….

(c) to require each person who possesses or uses a firearm under the authority of a licence to prove a genuine reason for possessing or using the firearm,

(d) to provide strict requirements that must be satisfied in relation to licensing of firearms and the acquisition and supply of firearms,

(e) to ensure that firearms are stored and conveyed in a safe and secure manner …”

30. In Taylorv R [2018] NSWCCA 50 Johnson J (Hoeben CJ at CL and Price J agreeing) observed (at [59], omitting citations) that:

“The purpose of s 51D is not limited to the punishment of criminals who warehouse and harbor illegal firearms. The purpose of the prohibition is broader. It extends to the stockpiling of weapons by persons without any further criminal intent …. This is because of the risk that a stockpile, if vulnerable, may inadvertently feed the market in the illegal supply of firearms: …”

31. Sentences imposed for such offences must reflect the legislative intention expressed in the Act, which is to eliminate firearms from the community unless their possession is expressly authorised, and “operate as real disincentives to those otherwise attracted to the illegal possession of firearms”: R v Mahmud [2010] NSWCCA 219 at [71].

32. Matters which are relevant to assessing the objective seriousness of this offence include:

1. the number of firearms and the number of them which are prohibited or pistols,

2. the nature and type of the firearms,

3. the purpose for their possession,

4. whether there is evidence showing any relationship between the possession of the firearms with the drug industry, and

5. the location of the property and the security under which the firearms are kept (Mack v R [2009] NSWCCA 216 (“Mack”) at [40]).

Application

33. Within the limits of not having seen all the evidence that the offender relied upon, the Crown’s submissions addressed each of the above factors identified in Mack, in terms that I accept:

1. There were four firearms – the minimum number to establish the offence.

2. One of the firearms (the .22 calibre Stirling model) was a prohibited firearm if fitted with a seized silencer. This satisfied the minimum threshold to establish the offence.

3. Of the three rifles and single shotgun, the .22 Gevarm model A6 and the 12-gauge BITO double barrel under over shotgun were in working order. None of the firearms were shortened.

4. The Crown later clarified that two of the firearms (the prohibited firearm – the Gevarm model – and the 12-gauge shotgun) were in working order. The other two firearms were not in working order.

5. At the time of the Crown’s written submissions, his purpose for possession of the firearms was unknown. Nor had any explanation been ventured for why the firearms had not been surrendered to police;

6. There was no relationship to other criminal activity, such as within the drug industry.

7. Contrary to the requirements concerning the safe storage of firearms – which the offender ought to have known given his earlier holding of a licence (up to 2018) – in this case the firearms were left in a hessian bag under a large camping swag in a caravan on the front lawn of a residential property.

34. The offender’s legal representative did not cavil with the correctness of any of these submissions; although, as noted, the offender did say something about the level of storage of the firearms. I have previously addressed that submission.

35. Rejecting that submission advanced by the offender, I accept in particular, the Crown’s submission that what makes the offending more serious than what otherwise might have been the case is the looseness of arrangement for storage of the firearms. This is a matter specifically adverted to in the statutory objects. The stated purpose of the retention was not that serious, relative to other cases of this kind. But although it cannot be said that he intended to use the firearms to engage in separate criminal activity, his criminality remains significant, given the risk that such firearms create for the safety of the community should the firearms fall into the wrong hands. The firearms were in the caravan in a residential area. Also telling is the offender’s awareness of the illegality of his behaviour He was not shown to be associated with criminal elements nor otherwise sought to profit, in a financial sense, from them. There was not found with the firearms vast quantities of ammunition.

36. Although it is unnecessary to resort to labels on the scale of offending, even for an offence carrying a standard non-parole period, I agree with the Crown that the offending fell below the mid-range, though not at the lowest end of the range of offences of this kind.

37. The Crown did not cite any statutory aggravating factors.

The offender’s subjective case

Age and background

38. The offender was 48 years of age at the date of offending.

39. Most of Mr Borenstein’s report was directed to the offender’s subjective case. I note that the psychologist had been supplied with a statement of agreed facts. Conspicuously, the psychologist had not been supplied with his criminal histories.

40. The Crown was critical about the report on the basis of the nature of the information that the offender supplied to the psychologist, regarding the extent of his past criminal history; which, in turn, had knock-on effects for the expert’s assessment of his rehabilitation prospects. I will return to considering that criticism later in these remarks.

41. I will first address the offender’s background, as that had been conveyed to the psychologist.

42. The offender does not look fondly upon his family members or his relationships with them. He was very young (4-5) when his biological parents separated and divorced. He has a slightly younger brother. The biological father is deceased (he died when the offender was about 30) and his mother is elderly; although still alive. She remarried and her partner is also deceased. He speaks unflatteringly about his younger brother, indicating he was single, unemployed and in receipt of a pension for mental issues; although elsewhere in the report there are references to the brother being a successful rugby league player until late childhood.

43. He has had no contact with his mother for two years. He considered he had a good relationship with his biological father until the latter died; even if he did not see him much. He also said he had a good relationship with his stepfather whilst the latter was alive.

44. He asserted that his mother was psychologically and physically abusive towards him in his childhood. I note in other health records indicating that abuse might also have been perpetrated by her previous boyfriend.

45. By his solicitor’s written submissions prepared on his behalf, the offender indicated that the male figures in his life were his maternal grandfather and maternal uncle. Both men liked their guns.

46. The offender did not disclose much to Mr Borenstein about his schooling other than to say that he finished at about Year 10 to pre-empt expulsion. From the age of 16 he became a jackaroo and worked on a property at Nyngan for three years. It was in this period that he became comfortable with firearms and rifles. He separately noted to the psychologist that by the age of 12, he was part of a rifle club and had won awards.

47. After his period as a jackaroo was over, he worked with his father over in Western Australia for two years in the construction industry.

48. The offender was plainly athletic. He was still playing rugby league into his 20s and considered that he excelled in other sports.

49. Outside his family, his relationships have not been very successful. The longest one he said he had lasted for 5 years. He indicated to the psychologist that he did not take well to being told what to do. Since 2023, he has not had any relationships and is distrustful of women.

50. Although he has never married, he has three sons (aged 14, 19 and 22). He has had no contact with them for 2 years.

51. Mr Borenstein did not discern any mental illness or impairment in the offender. The psychologist ruled out any indication of a serious psychiatric disorder. There was no suggestion of any self-harm, suicidal ideation or harm to others.

52. Mr Borenstein did however, comment that the offender was a man of limited intelligence (generally) and limited emotional intelligence (in particular). But he did not suggest any neurocognitive disorder or intellectual deficits in a way that was suggestive of any mental or cognitive impairment.

53. The offender drinks to help him sleep but said that sometimes he did not drink at all. He has been prescribed cannabis for medicinal purposes, but does not take illicit drugs. He is a heavy smoker and takes medication for hypertension. He does not gamble.

54. The psychologist considered that there were some aspects of the offender’s life – notably his mother’s treatment of him – that created in him emotional vulnerabilities. There is force in that observation, but the psychologist stopped short of suggesting that they contributed to his offending in any way.

Current health conditions

55. Separate to Mr Borenstein’s report, the offender relied upon certain health records which came into existence in 2024 or 2025, after the offending. He came to the attention of Dr Nishanka Mohotti to whom it was reported that the offender had hypertension, hyperlipidaemia, and anxiety or depression.

56. Dr Mohotti referred the offender to Goulburn Hospital, where the offender was admitted to prior to his discharge in September 2024. Dr Bvirakare, a medical practitioner at the hospital, confirmed that the offender had Essential hypertension. He is on certain medications.

Antecedents

57. The offender’s criminal histories (in New South Wales and Western Australia) were before the Court. In New South Wales, he committed a range of old offences going back to the last century and last decade. One prior offence of some significance is that in May 2018, over 5 years before the index offending, the offender failed to notify firearm safekeeping arrangements at a new address. For this he received a conditional release order without conviction He also committed drug offences in 2013 and 2023 as well as committing a property damage offence in 2020. In respect to the driving offence in 2017 (driving with a mid-range PCA), he received a suspended sentence of imprisonment. One week before the index offending, on 24 October 2023, he committed an offence of stalking or intimidation for which he was fined. It appears this offence was committed against his now former partner. He has not previously been incarcerated.

57. In Western Australia, he committed other personal violence offences, and traffic-related offences for which he was dealt with in the last century.

58. The offender’s legal representative submits that although his past criminal history is serious, it is not so serious as to ‘affect’ the penalty to be imposed on him.

59. I reject that submission. Whilst I accept that some of his earlier offences were stale, some of them are very recent, and virtually contemporaneous or at least proximate to the index offending. The offender’s record, overall, disentitles him to leniency that would be given to a person of prior good character and engages the consideration of specific deterrence. It is also relevant to assessment of his rehabilitation prospects and likelihood of his re-offending.

Character

61. The offender supplied the Court with a large number of references. Some of these were prepared in 2023. Some attest to his work ethic. Others to his being a good friend. But there was no clear distinction: many of the friends were those with whom the offender had worked. In one reference, it was noted that the offender assisted the community during the fire season.

62. The significance of ‘good character’ in the context of this offending was considered in Athos v R (2013) 83 NSWLR 224. It was clarified (at [44]-[45]) in paraphrase, that a sentencing court is not precluded from weighing this matter only because of the nature of the offence.

63. Even if there is a criminal record, this does not necessarily preclude a finding of good character if the earlier convictions were relatively minor or stale.

64. There is very little, if any acknowledgement in the references of the extent of the offender’s criminal history, even if some of the earlier offences could be regarded as being stale. It cannot be accepted, as Mr Lawler said for example, that his offending here was a “one off event”. There were recent offences, some of which were serious and in the circumstances I place relatively little weight upon them. I am not persuaded, on balance, that the offender was of prior good character.

Remorse/contrition

65. I have already noted the offender’s guilty plea. Given its relative lateness (notwithstanding the offender’s explanation to the contrary) and other matters I am about to refer to, I do not regard this particular circumstance as an indication of remorse.

66. The offender spoke to his psychologist about the ‘police business’ which he described as ‘hassling’ him and putting him under stress. He referred to the circumstance of his offending being revealed. As indicated, he believed that this occurred following a fallout with his girlfriend and made the curious comment to Mr Borenstein that she and her mother ‘loved a true crime novel’. I take this to imply that in his mind, his former partner and mother exaggerated the seriousness of what he had done.

67. In his evidence at the sentencing hearing, the offender said that at least in respect to 3 of the 4 firearms, which he obtained from others, he was happy to receive them into his possession. He did not think to advise the persons from whom he received these firearms to surrender them to police. This, to me, indicated a strong lack of insight.

68. He also indicated that, when asked about requirements to obtain a license, he felt overwhelmed with paperwork.

69. On the basis of what he told his psychologist the offender seems to regard his offending as trivial. Indeed, more than that, he appears to perceive himself as a victim of police harassment. There has been no acceptance of responsibility, otherwise than accepted by the plea of guilty. There has been no apology.

70. There has no indication even in the character references, as is sometimes the case, of out of court statements of remorse by the offender.

71. To my mind, what the offender has said to others indicates a lack of insight into his offending. This extends to the unsafe storage of the firearms. He did not profess ignorance of the need for licensing or the typical conditions or requirements by which licensing or authorisation can be obtained. His behaviour evinced scant regard for legal requirements associated with the ownership of firearms.

72. I do not accept that he is remorseful.

Guilty plea

73. In the circumstances in which he entered his guilty plea, the Crown submitted that the offender is entitled to a 10% discount on penalty.

74. There appeared to be some dispute about this, at least through the written submissions. The offender’s legal representative gave hearsay evidence that the offender did not understand advice received from a previous solicitor. It was only after he came into it that the offender readily entered a plea at the first opportunity. The implication is that he would have pleaded guilty earlier than he did if he had received proper legal advice earlier from his former lawyer.

75. Section 25D of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act1999 (NSW) (‘CSP Act’) has been described as establishing inflexible temporal limits governing the degree of discount available at specified procedural intervals in the committal and trial process, and imposes graduated discounts based on the timing of the entry or indication of a guilty plea: Gurin v R [2022] NSWCCA 193 at [24], [26]. Such discounts are made solely “for the utilitarian value of a guilty plea”: Doyle v R [2022] NSWCCA 81 at [18]. The offender’s complaint, expressed through his solicitor’s written submissions two days prior to the sentencing hearing, does not fall within any of the statutory exceptions.

76. Mr Chegwidden, who appeared for the offender did not suggest that they did.

77. Even if it was open to me to enlarge the discount, that would not be appropriate. His position, at the point when the matter was in the Local Court, was that he was in possession of only two firearms (and he was willing to plead to any offence that was limited to that number of firearms). He belatedly came to agree, in this Court, that he was in possession of four of them. Whatever was the scope of the advice he received from his former lawyer as to whether he should plead guilty, there was no explanation as to why he changed his mind as to how many firearms were in his possession.

78. The discount on the guilty plea is 10%.

Rehabilitation prospects & likelihood of reoffending

79. I have referred to difficulties that the offender has had with personal relationships, with family members, girlfriends and even his own children, to the extent that these are reflected in a lack of connection. He told his psychologist that he has a few good friends who he said check in on him. He did not indicate activities that he shared with them; although it appears from the written references that he likes going to a local pub and provides humorous company.

80. Nevertheless, it was also commented in health records that he had a history of isolation; including going to the bush to hunt for days on his own. This suggests to me a certain level of superficiality in the friendships that he has.

81. Mr Borenstein observed that he ‘did not display antisocial qualities’ although noted that he was resistant to authority.

82. I accept the Crown’s argument that if, by the reference to the offender’s ‘antisocial qualities’, Mr Borenstein is referring to aberrant or unlawful behaviour, his view reflects a distorted perspective and that arises from the circumstance that the offender’s criminal histories were not brought to the psychologist’s attention. Mr Borenstein appeared unaware that about a week before the index offending, the offender had committed the offence of stalking and intimidation. The offender had informed him that he did not take illicit drugs, yet on the same day that he committed the index offences, he committed drug offences featuring possession of a prohibited drug and drug cultivation. These offences manifest anti-social behaviour.

83. On the other hand, there is force in the psychologist’s view that he is ‘free-spirited’ if by that it is suggested that he places high value upon his independence and also the psychologist’s impression that he ‘did not always comply with the rules’. This bespeaks a libertarian mindset indifferent to societal constraints, including legal rules, unless it accords with his beliefs or personal convenience. Mr Borenstein’s observation does not assist the offender. It is a prominent feature of the index offending.

84. Mr Chegwidden recorded his client’s instructions that he has worked and lived in Marulan for a number of years. His work is on call and on average he works two to three days a week; earning $300 per day.

85. As he did when recently applying (successfully) for a variation of bail conditions on 17 March 2025, the offender relied upon an unsigned letter from the director of KOM Excavations. This letter indicated employment opportunity for the offender to work in the construction of a petrol station in Marulan.

86. Mr Borenstein’s report did not refer to anything that might enable the Court to find a favourable view of the offender’s rehabilitation prospects beyond a strong work ethic.

87. The offender also relied upon a letter from Mr Anthony King. Mr King is a counsellor who describes himself both as a Mental Health Practitioner and Community Arts and Culture Collaborator. He is affiliated with the Community Links Wellbeing Ltd. Mr King says he has been counselling the offender since November 2024 to help him to address ‘substance use challenges and medical needs’ along with regulating his emotional and mood challenges. Mr King did not purport to express any view as to how the offender’s condition(s) contributed to the offending.

88. I do not doubt Mr King’s sincerity, but I am more inclined to place weight upon Mr Borenstein’s views as to the offender’s mental state. With respect, as Counsel for the offender submitted, it was not not known what Mr King’s ‘mental health’ qualifications actually are. Mr Chegwidden said that to the extent he relied upon expert opinion, that was only upon Mr Borenstein’s opinion.

89. I am not persuaded that he has good prospects of rehabilitation and cannot say that he is unlikely to reoffend.

Instinctive synthesis

90. I have already noted the legislative guideposts of the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period. Both guideposts, respectively, indicate just how serious the offending is. I have also noted the statutory principles and objects.

91. I take into account the various sentencing purposes in s 3A of the CSP Act. The authorities I cited earlier in these remarks emphasise the significance of general deterrence. I find that there is a need for specific deterrence having regard to an earlier firearm offence and other matters. The offender appears to me to have stubborn views about rights to gun ownership thoroughly out of kilter with community standards. He evinces an entitlement to them as if the legal restrictions do not apply to him. The circumstance that he might, as a young man, have been exposed to influential men in his life using guns for recreational purposes does not assist him. It is approaching thirty years since the Port Arthur massacre and the subsequent enactment of firearm laws. He was a middle-aged man at the time of his offending and whatever ‘limitations’ there were in his general or emotional intelligence, the offender well knew of the laws and the restrictions upon firearm possession. The attitudes expressed through the course of this sentencing proceeding invite a measure of denunciation. His other criminal history, including personal violence offences, and drug and domestic violence offences committed virtually contemporaneously with the offending indicates that there are real risks to community safety by his being allowed to have unrestrained access to firearms. Offences of this kind are, inherently, intended to be protective of the community. I have indicated that the view I take of his rehabilitation prospects, which is not favourable to him.

92. I find that the s 5(1) threshold is crossed. This was conceded by the offender’s legal representative.

93. I repeat that I have taken into account the offender’s guilty plea. By the length of the term, it will be apparent that the offender will not qualify for the custodial sentence to be served by intensive correction.

94. This is the first time he will be incarcerated. In view of a very limited subjective case, there is not much else to sustain a finding of special circumstances, although I think that another reason in favour of such a finding is the offender’s health condition, which features hypertension and would make full-time custody especially hard for someone with that condition. I make a finding of special circumstances.

95. Mr Tillman, would you please stand.

96. You are convicted of the offence of possessing more than 3 firearms including a pistol or prohibited firearm.

97. Taking your guilty plea into account, I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 2 years and one month commencing on 11 April 2025 and expiring on 10 May 2027. The non-parole period is 1 year and 4 months’ imprisonment expiring on 10 August 2026 after which you will be eligible for release on parole.

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Decision last updated: 15 April 2025