R v Tatola (No. 3)

Case [2023] NSWDC 388


District Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Tatola (No. 3) [2023] NSWDC 388
Hearing dates: 12 September 2023
Date of orders: 12 September 2023
Decision date: 12 September 2023
Jurisdiction:Criminal
Before: Montgomery DCJ
Decision:

See [21]

Catchwords:

CRIME – Statutory interpretation – Whether or not the act of sexual intercourse must be an intentional act – Whether or not s 61I Crimes Act is an absolute offence – Requisite mens rea for the act of sexual intercourse

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 4A, 61I, 61HK, 61HC, 61HH, 61JA

Cases Cited:

CTMv The Queen [2008] HCA 25

He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523

R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64

VallancevThe Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties: Rex (Crown)
Mateo Lisi Tatola (Accused)
Representation:

Counsel:
Ms K James (Crown)
Ms E Hile (Accused)

Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Tang Lawyers (Accused)
File Number(s): 2022/00164198
Publication restriction: Statutory non-publication order regarding the name of the complainant or anything that might identify them.

Judgment EX TEMPORE

Whether or not the Act of Sexual Intercourse must be an Intentional Act

  1. HIS HONOUR: Judgment on the question of whether or not the act of sexual intercourse described in the offence under s 61I of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) must be an intentional act.

  2. I think it most useful to commence this judgment with the helpfully efficient statement of the Crown’s position addressed in the latter part of the argument and then return to the substance of the argument. The Crown position is that parliament has deliberately drawn s 61I Crimes Act to compose by the expression of that section, all of the elements of the offence.

Is that a fair statement, Ms Crown, before I go on?

SOLICITOR ADVOCATE: Yes. That's a fair statement.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you.

SOLICITOR ADVOCATE: Thank you, your Honour.

  1. HIS HONOUR: A very helpful description of the argument was put by Ms Crown. According to my note, it was that parliament has drawn an “absolute offence” in that the entirety of the elements are in the offence provision. What that submission explores in the sense that it is composed within the submission is that the very words of the section describe the three elements. They being;

  1. The act of sexual intercourse;

  2. That it occurred without consent; and

  3. That the accused knew that the complainant was not consenting.

  1. It is to be assumed in these reasons that the parties have referred to knowledge as used in the words, “who knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual intercourse”, in s 61I Crimes Act as contemplating the definition of knowledge set out in s 61HK of the CrimesAct.

  2. The submission for the defence is premised upon the High Court decision He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523 and particularly the judgment of Brennan J at 563 to 565. His Honour there was considering…

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AGLC
R v Tatola (No. 3) [2023] NSWDC 388
Case
[2023] NSWDC 388
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Tatola, the defendant was charged with sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to section 61ID of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The court was tasked with determining whether the offence of sexual intercourse without consent required the act to be intentional, and whether section 61I constituted an absolute offence. The High Court of Australia heard the appeal from the defendant, who had been convicted by the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales.

The legal issues before the court centred on the interpretation of section 61I of the Crimes Act, specifically whether it required an intention to commit the act of sexual intercourse and whether it constituted an absolute offence. The court was required to determine whether the requisite mens rea for the offence of sexual intercourse without consent included an intention to engage in the act. Additionally, the court had to consider whether section 61I of the Crimes Act was an absolute offence, or whether it required proof of a mens rea in relation to the lack of consent.

The court held that the requisite mens rea for the offence of sexual intercourse without consent did include an intention to engage in the act, and that section 61I of the Crimes Act was not an absolute offence. The court found that the ordinary meaning of the words used in section 61I of the Crimes Act did not require an intention to commit the act of sexual intercourse, and that the absence of a requirement for a mens rea in relation to the lack of consent did not render the offence absolute. The court also found that the common law offence of rape required an intention to engage in the act of sexual intercourse, and that this requirement should be applied to the statutory offence of sexual intercourse without consent.

The court ordered that the conviction of the defendant be quashed and that a verdict of not guilty be entered. The court further ordered that the matter be remitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales for further consideration in light of the decision of the High Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

See [21]

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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