R v Tasmanian Industrial Commission; ex parte Farrell

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[2002] TASSC 28

CITATION:          R v Tasmanian Industrial Commission; ex parte Farrell [2002] TASSC 28

PARTIES:  R
  v
  TASMANIAN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

FARRELL, Kenneth James; ex parte

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  M305/2001
DELIVERED ON:  14 May 2002
DELIVERED AT:  Launceston
HEARING DATES:  12 April 2002
JUDGMENT OF:  Crawford J

CATCHWORDS:

Industrial Law - Other jurisdictions - Tasmania - Tasmanian Industrial Commission - Jurisdiction and powers - Application by former employee for severance pay under a term of the employment contract following termination of employment - Termination not a result of redundancy - Whether former employee had right to apply. 

Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas), ss19(1) and 29(1) and (1A).

New Town Timber & Hardware Pty Ltd v Gurr (1995) 5 Tas R 71, referred to.

Aust Dig Industrial Law [424]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  In person
             State of Tasmania:  P Turner
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  In person
             State of Tasmania:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number:  [2002] TASSC 28
Number of Paragraphs:  31

Serial No 28/2002
File No M305/2001

THE QUEEN v TASMANIAN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION;
ex parte KENNETH JAMES FARRELL

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  CRAWFORD J

14 May 2002

  1. Although the order obtained by Mr Farrell on 22 October 2001 was expressed as an order that a writ of mandamus issue to the Tasmanian Industrial Commission, it is common ground that at that time he was only entitled to an order nisi under the Industrial Relations Act 1984 ("the Act"), s72(2), and the order was treated as such at the hearing before me.

  1. Mr Farrell was appointed to the office of Economic Adviser, Office of Premier. The instrument of appointment expressed it to be for a term expiring on 31 May 2000 or on the resignation or other termination of the Government, whichever should first occur. The first in point of time was in fact the resignation of the Government following loss of an election on or about 14 September 1998. By cl 5(b) of the instrument, it was provided that should the appointment be terminated by expiration of the term, he should receive the entitlements set out in Sch4.

  1. Schedule 4, cl 1, provided for a severance payment calculated on the basis of (inter alia) 12 weeks' pay if he had five years, but less than ten years, service in a Ministerial service.  He was in fact paid 12 weeks' severance pay following the termination of his appointment.  

  1. The present dispute concerns the amount of the payment. He claimed that it was based only on his annual salary as specified in Sch4, cl 1 of the instrument of appointment, whereas it ought to have included (the employer's) superannuation contributions calculated on the severance pay at a rate equivalent to 13.75 per cent, which were required to be paid to the trustees of a private complying superannuation fund that satisfied the requirements of the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth) nominated by Mr Farrell. He also claimed an amount representing private telephone costs and the…

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Case
[2002] TASSC 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of Tasmania considered the matter of the Queen versus the Tasmanian Industrial Commission, ex parte Kenneth James Farrell. Farrell, a former employee, sought severance pay under a term of his employment contract following the termination of his employment. The Tasmanian Industrial Commission dismissed his application, finding that his employment was not terminated as a result of redundancy, and thus, he did not have a right to severance pay. Farrell appealed the decision, but the appeal was also dismissed. He then sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to compel the Commission to hear his application for severance pay. The court was required to determine whether Farrell had the right to apply to the Commission for severance pay and if the Commission had jurisdiction to hear his application. The court considered the Industrial Relations Act 1984 and the Tasmanian Industrial Commission's jurisdiction. The court found that the Commission's jurisdiction was limited to specific matters as outlined in the Act, and former employees were confined to applying for the matters specified in section 29(1A). The court concluded that Farrell's employment was not terminated as a result of redundancy, and thus, he did not have a right to seek severance pay before the Commission. The court discharged the order of 22 October 2001, which had granted Farrell a writ of mandamus to compel the Commission to hear his application for severance pay. Farrell was left to pursue his claim in the form of an action for money due under a term of his contract of employment in a court.

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