R v Tasker (No 2)
[2015] NSWSC 467
•16 April 2015
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New South Wales |
Case Name: | R v Tasker (No 2) |
Medium Neutral Citation: | [2015] NSWSC 467 |
Hearing Date(s): | 15 - 16 April 2015 |
Decision Date: | 16 April 2015 |
Jurisdiction: | Common Law |
Before: | Button J |
Decision: | Bail is refused. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – bail – “show cause” offence – strong Crown case – plea of guilty entered – effects of plea of guilty upon bail application – bail refused |
Legislation Cited: | Bail Act 2013 (NSW) |
Category: | Procedural and other rulings |
Parties: | Glenn Tasker (Applicant) |
Representation: | Solicitors: |
File Number(s): | 2015/77763 |
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
Yesterday I indicated that I was prepared to grant bail to the applicant. That was despite the powerful prosecution case that he had committed a very serious offence, with regard to which he is required to “show cause” pursuant to the Bail Act 2013 (NSW). Reference should be made to my now otiose reasons of yesterday, which have been taken out and will remain on the court file, along with some of the transcript of the proceedings.
I based that indication upon the practical absence of a criminal record of the applicant; the very sound community ties available to him; the appreciation shown by his family of the underlying causes of the alleged offence; the stringency of the proposed bail conditions; and a very substantial cash surety.
Regrettably, due to a logistical oversight, when I gave that indication yesterday I was not aware of the steps that had just been taken with regard to his substantive matters in another court on that very day.
It is now clear that the applicant pleaded guilty yesterday to possession of an air rifle at the scene of the cultivation, and was sentenced to imprisonment for three months for that offence.
Separately, it is also clear that yesterday he pleaded guilty to two counts to do with the cultivation of cannabis. One was of cultivating prohibited plants simpliciter, and the other was of cultivating a commercial quantity of prohibited plants.
Once it was made clear to me after lunch that there had been unknown substantial forensic developments in the matter elsewhere, I immediately revoked bail for abundant caution, even despite not having proceeded to impose conditions. The matter was stood over until today so that what occurred in the other court yesterday could be thoroughly checked; so that no further errors could take place; and so that the parties could have a chance to reflect and make further submissions without being under undue pressure.
To my mind, the pleas of guilty entered yesterday by the applicant to the offences, in particular to the offence of cultivating a commercial quantity of prohibited plants, change the position very markedly.
First, the applicant is no longer entitled to the presumption of innocence. That principle remains an important matter to be taken into account in any bail application in which a plea of not guilty is extant.
Secondly, any weaknesses or gaps in the Crown case have become irrelevant.
Thirdly, there is no prospect of the applicant being acquitted. Although that was always unlikely, it was possible that he could have, for example, relied upon the “defence” of duress. It was also possible (though admittedly most unlikely) that, by way of some negotiations between the parties founded upon favourable conduct of the applicant, the proceedings could have been “no-billed” entirely.
Fourthly, there is no longer, with regard to the most serious offence, any prospect of the applicant being convicted of a less serious alternative offence.
Fifthly, although a substantial period of imprisonment being imposed was always very likely, I consider that it is now inevitable, despite the very favourable subjective features of the matter.
The position of the solicitor for the Crown today may be summarised as being that the circumstances have moved significantly and bail is opposed.
The solicitor for the applicant accepts that there have been significant changes. Nevertheless, he made the following submissions in support of the proposition that I should maintain my previous indication.
First, the matter will take quite some time to resolve, and there is a need for a number of psychological and possibly psychiatric reports. It is very unlikely, he submitted, that the matter will be resolved on its sentence date in the District Court of 11 May 2015. In truth, it is far more likely that it will take quite some months to resolve.
Secondly, it will be easier, if the applicant is on bail, for his proceedings on sentence to be properly prepared.
Thirdly, any psychological assistance available to the applicant in custody will not be optimal.
Fourthly, his family support remains unchanged.
Fifthly, there was and is an awareness on the part of the applicant and his family that it is very likely that a custodial sentence will be imposed.
Sixthly, in light of the pleas of guilty there is no question of the applicant having any motive to contact prosecution witnesses.
I respectfully consider that there is force in all of those submissions. But to my mind, in light of all of the significant circumstances that have changed since my understanding yesterday, the applicant is no longer in a position to show cause why his detention, bail refused, is not justified. The result is that bail must be refused.
Finally, I express my regret to the applicant and his family at this turn of events occasioned by logistical error, and which no doubt will occasion great disappointment to all of them.
My formal order is: bail is refused.
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