R v TANNER

Case [2006] SASC 320


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v TANNER

[2006] SASC 320

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice David)

18 October 2006

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVING MISCARRIAGE - IMPROPER ADMISSION OR REJECTION OF EVIDENCE

Appeal against conviction - appellant was charged with aggravated serious criminal trespass in a non-residential building, theft and using a motor vehicle without consent, contrary to ss 169(2), 134 and 86A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) respectively - appellant was charged with two other accused with whom he was said to have participated in a joint criminal enterprise - appellant was tried alone - appellant and co-accused were said to have stolen a truck which they used in the course of the theft - appellant's case was that he was asleep in the truck at the time of the offending as a consequence of drug and alcohol consumption and was not aware of the offending of the other two accused - no questions put to the appellant in cross-examination in relation to his state of sobriety or tiredness at the time of his arrest or during police questioning shortly after the offences occurred - prosecution sought to call evidence in rebuttal and trial Judge allowed prosecution to re-open case - held, although prosecution could not have anticipated issues which arose in appellant's testimony, the correct course for the prosecution to take would be to cross-examine the appellant, seeking an adjournment if necessary, and then applying to call further evidence if necessary - whether trial Judge erred in permitting the prosecution to call rebuttal evidence and, if so, whether miscarriage of justice arose - held, although trial Judge did not follow the proper course, this did not cause a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of the case - whether Judge erred in refusing to order a mistrial - held, trial Judge was correct in refusing to order mistrial - whether Judge erred in failing to withdraw from the jury those issues on which the appellant had not been cross-examined - held, failure to cross-examine was not a reason to withdraw rebuttal evidence about appellant's sobriety from the jury - whether suggestion put by prosecutor to jury that was not part of prosecution case caused miscarriage of justice - held, matter was not important in summing up and defence case was fairly left to jury - whether trial Judge erred in directions to jury about failure of prosecution to cross-examine appellant - held, direction was based on flawed procedure, but no miscarriage of justice resulted - appeal dismissed.

Criminal Law Consolidation Act (1935) SA, referred to.
Wilde v The Queen (1987) 164 CLR 365, applied.
R v Chinn (1985) 157 CLR 671; Killick v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 565; R v Soma (2003) 196…

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R v TANNER [2006] SASC 320
Case
[2006] SASC 320
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of R v Tanner, the appellant was convicted of aggravated serious criminal trespass in a non-residential building, theft, and using a motor vehicle without consent. The case involved three accused, one of whom was the appellant, who were alleged to have participated in a joint criminal enterprise. The appellant was tried separately and claimed to have been asleep in the stolen vehicle at the time of the offences due to drug and alcohol consumption. The trial judge allowed the prosecution to call rebuttal evidence after the appellant testified, which was not anticipated during the trial. This decision was challenged on appeal.

The appeal raised several legal issues, including whether the trial judge erred in permitting the prosecution to call rebuttal evidence, whether this led to a miscarriage of justice, and whether the trial judge was correct in refusing to order a mistrial. Another issue was whether the judge should have withdrawn certain issues from the jury, particularly those related to the appellant's sobriety, which had not been cross-examined during the trial. Additionally, the appeal questioned whether a suggestion made by the prosecutor during the summing up, which was not part of the prosecution's case, caused a miscarriage of justice.

The court held that while the trial judge did not follow the correct procedure by allowing rebuttal evidence, this did not result in a miscarriage of justice. The judge's decision to refuse a mistrial was also upheld. The court found that the failure to cross-examine the appellant about his sobriety did not necessitate the withdrawal of the rebuttal evidence. Furthermore, the suggestion made by the prosecutor during the summing up was deemed not significant enough to affect the outcome of the trial. The court also noted that the direction given to the jury regarding the prosecution's failure to cross-examine the appellant was flawed, but no miscarriage of justice resulted from it.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and the convictions were upheld. The court found that the trial judge's errors, while procedural, did not lead to a miscarriage of justice and did not impact the fairness or outcome of the trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Finally, counsel submitted that the directions that were given in respect of intoxication were unnecessary, as there was no issue of involuntariness.Evidence in rebuttal The principles relating to rebuttal evidence have been discussed and developed by the High Court in R v Chinn;[1] Killick v The Queen;[2] Shaw v The Queen;[3] and R v Soma.[4] In Killick, the High Court considered the circumstances in which it is appropriate to permit evidence in rebuttal in order to negative alibi evidence. Gibbs CJ, Murphy and Aickin JJ in a joint judgment discussed the principles that govern the admission of evidence adduced by the Crown in rebuttal. The Court referred to the statement of Dixon, McTiernan, Webb and Kitto JJ in Shaw v The Queen[5] as an authoritative statement of the principles. In that case, the members of the Court said:Clearly the principle is that the prosecution must present its case completely before the prisoner’s answer is made. There are issues the proof of which do not lie upon the prosecution and in such cases it may have a rebutting case, as when the defence is insanity. When the prisoner seeks to prove good character evidence may be allowed in reply. But the prosecution may not split its case on any issue. … It seems to us unsafe to adopt a rigid formula in view of the almost infinite variety of difficulties that may arise at a criminal trial. It is probably enough to say that the occasion must be very special or exceptional to warrant a departure from the principle that the prosecution must offer all its proofs during the progress of the Crown case and before the prisoner is called upon for his defence … Further … the English cases make it plain enough that generally speaking an occasion will not suffice for allowing an exceptional course if it ought reasonably to have been foreseen. Again, it may be pointed out that even an unexpected occasion may be of such a nature that it would have been covered, had the Crown case been fully and strictly proved.[6][1] (1985) 157 CLR 671.[2] (1981) 147 CLR 565.[3] (1952) 85 CLR 365.[4] (2003) 196 ALR 421.[5] (1952) 85 CLR 365.[6] (1952) 85 CLR 365, 379-380. The majority in Killick observed that evidence tendered by the prosecution after the defence has closed its case has the potential to assume inflated importance in the eyes of the jury, and may tilt the case in favour of the prosecution. That is one of the reasons why evidence in rebuttal should only be permitted when there are special or exceptional reasons for so doing. In R v Chinn,[7] Gibbs CJ and Wilson J confirmed that the circumstances in which rebuttal evidence should be permitted to be called are very special or exceptional, and if the occasion for calling of further evidence ought reasonably to have been foreseen, then generally it should not be permitted.[7] (1985) 157 CLR 671, 676-677. In the end, the rules as to rebuttal evidence are based on fairness. In Chinn,[8] Dawson J said:The relevant principle is essentially one of fairness. The accused is entitled to know the case which he has to meet so that he may have adequate opportunity to determine what questions he may wish to ask in cross-examination, what evidence, if any, he may wish to call and what objections, if any, he may wish to raise in the case against him. Ordinarily the depositions upon which he is committed for trial will provide him with this information in advance and if the prosecution intends to call additional evidence it is required to give notice of its intention to do so. The whole procedure would be undermined if the prosecution were permitted, save in exceptional circumstances, to call evidence in support of its case after the close of the case for the defence.[9][8] (1985) 157 CLR 671.[9] (1985) 157 CLR 671, 685-6.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DUGGAN J DAVID J (dissent)

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DUGGAN J,

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