R v Taib; ex parte - [1998] QCA 307

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1998] QCA 307
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 219 of 1998

Brisbane

[R. v. Taib; ex parte Cth DPP]

THE QUEEN

MUHAMMAD BIN MUHAMMAD TAIB

REFERENCE BY COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

PURSUANT TO SECTION 669A OF THE CRIMINAL CODE

Pincus J.A.
Thomas J.A.
Ambrose J.

Judgment delivered 13 October 1998

Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court; each concurring as to the orders made.

THE REFERENCE TO BE ANSWERED AS FOLLOWS:

1.          THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS CORRECT IN HIS RULING THAT IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE KNOWLEDGE OR MENS REA FOR AN OFFENCE AGAINST S.15(1) OF THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTION REPORTS ACT 1988 (CTH) THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE ELEMENTS -

(I) THAT HE (THE ACCUSED) KNEW THAT HE HAD IN HIS
POSSESSION $5,000 OR MORE;
(II) THAT HE KNEW THAT HE HAD TRANSFERRED THE CASH OUT OF
AUSTRALIA;
(III) THAT HE KNEW THAT HE HAD NOT REPORTED THAT TRANSFER.
2.          THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT CORRECT IN HIS RULING THAT IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE KNOWLEDGE OR MENS REA FOR AN OFFENCE AGAINST S.15(1) OF THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTION REPORTS ACT THE PROSECUTION MUST ALSO PROVE -

(I) THAT THE ACCUSED KNEW THAT THERE WAS AN OBLIGATION
TO REPORT SUCH TRANSFER OF $5,000 OR MORE.
3.          IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED KNEW THAT THERE WAS ANY OBLIGATION WHETHER IMPOSED BY THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTION REPORTS ACT OR OTHERWISE, TO REPORT SUCH TRANSFER OF $5,000.

CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW - Attorney-General’s reference - extent of mens rea in s.15(1) of the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) - prosecutorial onus with respect to s. 15(1) of the Financial Transaction Reports Act - what constituted actus reus of the offence under s.15(1) of the Financial Transaction Reports Act - transfer of currency - ignorance of the law is no excuse - guilty knowledge.
*Financial Transaction Reports Act* 1988(Cth) *Criminal Code (Qld)* *Judiciary Act* 1903 (Cth)
*The Crown v. Barronet & Allain* (1852) Dears. 51; 169 E.R. 633 P (1986) 21 A.Crim. R. 186 *He Kaw Teh v. The Queen* (1985) 157 C.L.R. 523 *Walden v. Hensler* (1987) 163 C.L.R. 561 *Jiminez v. The Queen* (1992) 173 C.L.R. 572 *R. v. Turnbull* (1943) 44 S.R. (N.S.W.) 108 *Reg. v. Churchill* [1967] 2 A.C. 224 *R. v. Clayton* (1949) 33 Cr. App. R. 113 *R. v. Jacobs* [1944] K.B. 417 *R. v. Sorsky* [1944] 2 All E.R. 333 *R. v. Wheat & Stocks* [1921] 2 K.B. 119 *Johnson v. Youden* [1950] 1 K.B. 544 *R. v. Cook ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth)* [1996] 2 Qd.R. 283 *Leask v The Commonwealth of Australia* (1996) 187 C.L.R. 579 *Re Question of Law Reserved* (No. 2) of 1998 - Court of Criminal Appeal South Australia *The Director of Public Prosecutions v Morgan* [1976] A.C. 182 *Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1995)* [1996] 1 W.L.R. 970 *R. v. Esop* [1836] 7 C.A.R. et P. 457; 173…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Taib; ex parte

Details

AGLC: R v Taib; ex parte [1998] QCA 307
Case: [1998] QCA 307
Decision Date: 13/10/1998

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Taib; ex parte involved an application for an Attorney-General’s reference concerning the interpretation and application of section 15(1) of the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth). The dispute centred on the requisite mens rea for the offence of failing to report a financial transaction as required by the Act, as well as the prosecutorial onus in proving this offence. The case was heard and determined in the relevant Australian court.

The legal issues before the court were whether the prosecution needed to prove a specific level of knowledge or intent for the offence under section 15(1) and whether ignorance of the law could serve as a defence to this offence. Additionally, the court needed to clarify what constituted the actus reus of the offence, particularly in relation to the transfer of currency, and whether there were any circumstances under which a person could be held liable despite a lack of knowledge about the reporting requirements.

The court ruled that the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the transaction and the reporting requirement for the offence under section 15(1) of the Financial Transaction Reports Act to be established. The court held that ignorance of the law is not a defence, and that the actus reus of the offence was the transfer of currency itself. The court emphasised that the requisite mens rea was a knowing failure to report, and that this knowledge could be implied from the circumstances of the transaction and the accused’s actions. The court also clarified that the prosecution bore the onus of proving the accused’s knowledge of the reporting requirement.

The final orders of the court included a detailed interpretation of section 15(1) of the Financial Transaction Reports Act, confirming that the prosecution must prove the accused’s knowledge of the reporting requirement for the offence to be established. The court further ruled that ignorance of the law is not a defence and that the actus reus was the transfer of currency itself. These findings provided clarity on the prosecutorial onus and the nature of the mens rea required for the offence under section 15(1) of the Act.

Orders