NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
CITATION: REGINA v Warwick Ross SULLIVAN [2004] NSWCCA 99
FILE NUMBER(S):
60522/03
HEARING DATE(S): 14/4/04
JUDGMENT DATE: 19/05/2004
PARTIES:
Warwick Ross SULLIVAN (Applicant)
Regina
JUDGMENT OF: Tobias JA Kirby J Bell J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 03/11/0197
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Patten DCJ
COUNSEL:
S Odgers SC (Applicant)
GIO Rowling (Crown)
SOLICITORS:
R Freeman (Applicant)
S Kavanagh
CATCHWORDS:
LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
DECISION:
Leave to appeal granted, appeal dismissed.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL
60522/03
TOBIAS JA
KIRBY J
BELL JWednesday 19 May 2004
REGINA v Warwick Ross SULLIVAN
Judgment
TOBIAS JA: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the respective judgments of Kirby J and Bell J. I agree with their Honours that there is no substance in Grounds of Appeal 1 and 2.
Ground of Appeal 3 is of greater concern. Bell J considers that the applicant's moral culpability was high. Kirby J has opined that it was high or even a shade beyond. Adopting the degrees of moral culpability identified by Kirby J in his fourth proposition in [10] of his judgment, my opinion is that the applicant's moral culpability bordered on worse than high.
Although the applicant fitted most of the criteria constituting the typical profile of an offender in respect of the subject offence as described by the Chief Justice in Whyte (at 284 [204]), importantly in the present case, the applicant was not a "young offender". At the time of the offence he was 36 years of age. Notwithstanding his drug and alcohol problems, he was a relatively mature man.
Furthermore, a number of the aggravating factors identified by the Chief Justice in Whyte (at 286 [216] and [217]) applied to the applicant's conduct. Both Bell J and Kirby J have referred to his degree of intoxication (which was high) (factor (iv)), his erratic driving (factor (v)) and his speeding (factor (iii)). The evidence of Ms Evans establishes that by veering onto the incorrect side of the road he potentially put others at risk (cf. factor (ii)). In my opinion the presence of these aggravating factors represents a clear abandonment of responsibility on the applicant's part.
I am conscious of the factors referred to by Kirby J in [26] of his judgment as bearing upon the level of the applicant's moral culpability. However, with respect, I cannot accede to the view expressed by his Honour that his moral culpability was relevantly diminished by the factors referred to by him in [22]. Although the applicant did not drive immediately after he stopped drinking and went to sleep, he did drive some five hours later at a time when, had he given the matter a moment's thought, he must have realised that he was still highly intoxicated and incapable of driving in a safe manner.
In the foregoing circumstances, I cannot, with respect, agree with Kirby J that it was…
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- R v Sullivan [2004] NSWCCA 99
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- [2004] NSWCCA 99
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to resolve was whether the sentence of 3.5 years imprisonment was manifestly excessive. This involved examining the sentencing judge's approach to calculating the starting point of the sentence, including the appropriate discount for the time Sullivan spent in rehabilitation. The court had to consider whether the starting point, after accounting for rehabilitation time, should have been higher than 4.5 years and if this should have influenced the final sentence.
The court found that while there was no substance in the first two grounds of appeal, the sentence was indeed manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge did not adequately consider the starting point of the sentence, which, after adjustments for rehabilitation time, should have been more than 4.5 years. The court concluded that the sentence imposed was not proportionate to the offence committed, taking into account all relevant factors, including Sullivan's background and the circumstances of the offence.
The court ordered a re-sentencing of Warwick Sullivan for the offence of dangerous driving occasioning death under the influence of alcohol. The re-sentencing was to be conducted by a different judge, ensuring that all relevant factors, including the corrected starting point for the sentence, were appropriately considered. The new sentence was to reflect a just and proportionate punishment for the offence committed.
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