R v Stuart-Jones

[1998] QCA 72

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1998] QCA 072
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 384 of 1997

Brisbane

[R v. Stuart-Jones]

THE QUEEN

v.

SHIREEN JOY CHLORIS STUART-JONES

Appellant

Pincus J.A.
McPherson J.A.

Moynihan J.

Judgment delivered 28 April 1998

Joint reasons for judgment of McPherson and Pincus JJ.A.; separate reasons of

Moynihan J. concurring as to the order made.

APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION DISMISSED

CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW - appeal against conviction for drug offence - whether appellant was knowingly concerned in the importation of cocaine - whether a conviction for importation was inconsistent with an acquittal for possession - whether jury was invited to speculate as to matters not covered in evidence - failure to object to redirection - meaning of “knowingly concerned” Crimes Act 1914, s.5(1) - Customs Act, s.233B.
Counsel:	Mr G. Wendler with him Mr H. Walters for the appellant. Mr B. Martin Q.C. with him Mr G. Davey for the respondent.
Solicitors:	John D. Weller & Associates for the appellant. Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent.
Hearing Date:	10 February 1998.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 384 of 1997

Brisbane

Before Pincus J.A.
McPherson J.A.
Moynihan J.

[R. v. Stuart-Jones]

T H E Q U E E N

v.

SHIREEN JOY CHLORIS STUART-JONES Appellant

JOINT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - McPHERSON & PINCUS JJ.A.

Judgment delivered 28 April 1998

At about 1.30 p.m. on Friday 20 September 1996, Federal agents knocked on the door of the room occupied by the appellant at the Reef Casino Hotel in Cairns. The door was opened from inside by the appellant and the agents went in. In addition to the appellant, they saw a man named Michael Boyd in the room. He was standing near the bed and had his shirt off. There was a black bag on the bed with an air travel baggage ticket marked QF 59 and his name on it. Also on the bed was a garment variously described as a corset, or a body vest and thigh pads, containing packets of white powder, which on analysis proved to include some 2.7 kilograms of pure cocaine. He also had in his possession $3,000 in U.S. dollars, and was about to depart for Sydney using a ticket issued in the false name A. Simpson. Boyd later pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for being in possession of cocaine.

The appellant herself was brought to trial in the Supreme Court in Cairns in September 1997, when she pleaded not guilty to two charges, one of being, under s.5(1) of the Crimes Act 1914, knowingly concerned between 1 and 18 December 1996 in the importation of cocaine into Australia contrary to s.233B of the Customs Act, and a second of being in possession of cocaine at Cairns on 20 December 1996. After a trial occupying some nine days, the jury returned verdicts of Guilty to the importation charge (count 1) and Not guilty to the charge of possession (count 2). This is her appeal against her conviction on count 1.

Among the many witnesses called by the prosecution at the trial, one who gave evidence was Michael Boyd. He testified that on 17 December 1996 he had arrived at Cairns from Sydney on Qantas Flight 59 and booked into the Country Comfort Outrigger Hotel under the name Roberts. At the hotel he gave his address as St. Kilda, although in fact he lived as a boarder in the appellant’s house at 468 Bronte Road, Bronte. He had with him the black travel bag, or one like it, later found in the appellant’s hotel room on 20 December 1996. He took the bag with him when he flew to Brisbane on 18 December but returned to Cairns on the same day. At the appellant’s trial, Boyd proved to be a hostile witness, and counsel for the prosecution was permitted to cross-examine him. In essence, what he said was that he had been recruited by the appellant and a Mr Martinez (who is her husband) to act as a courier by taking something with him to Sydney, for which he was paid $3,000. He received it on 19 December 1996 and, on one version of his evidence, was “horrified” to discover what it was. He kept it overnight but resolved to take no further part in the affair and, on the following day, was in the process of returning the cocaine to the appellant in her hotel room when the Federal agents entered the room and arrested both of them.

Boyd’s evidence was confused and confusing, perhaps deliberately so, and in a number of respects it lacked internal self-consistency. But it was open to the jury, after scrutiny following the appropriate warning given by the trial judge, to accept and act upon it as containing a measure of truth. They may well have accepted that he had been recruited by the appellant and her husband to act as a courier of the drugs, which he said he had received from an anonymous person on 19 December 1996; and that, having decided to withdraw from that role, he was preparing on the following day to return the drugs to the appellant when the agents intervened. On that footing, it was open to the jury to find that he was at all times in possession of the drugs on 20 December 1996 (which was the date charged in count 2) and conversely that the appellant was then not in possession. At the very least, there is evidence on which the jury may legitimately have entertained a reasonable doubt whether or not she had possession on that date. Indeed, her statement in the police interview and Boyd’s evidence at the trial were to the effect that she had gone to the toilet immediately before the agents entered her hotel room, which was the very time at which Boyd claimed to be disburdening himself of the cocaine he had had in his possession from the previous evening.

Viewed in this way, which was a logical and certainly not irrational approach to the question, there is no proper basis on which the Not guilty verdict on count 2 (possession) can be regarded as inconsistent with the Guilty verdict on count 1, which was the importation charge. As regards the latter, there was a considerable body of circumstantial evidence that the appellant had personally arranged to bring a man named Alvarez from Santiago in Chile to Cairns by aircraft travelling via Papeete, Auckland and Sydney during the period 15 to 17 December 1996. After his arrival there, she and Alvarez were seen together at Sydney airport. On leaving Sydney for Cairns, the same flight became or continued as QF 59, which she and Alvarez boarded together, and on which Boyd also travelled from Sydney to Cairns. They were all seated in the aircraft within view of each other. There was evidence to suggest that those seating arrangements had been planned by the appellant.

That evidence appeared in documents (exs. 9 to 13) which were located in the course of a search under warrant of the appellant’s home at 468 Bronte Road, Bronte, which took place in her absence on 23 December 1996. Among them were handwritten documents, bearing the appellant’s fingerprints, evidently in the nature of planning notes or aides-memoire, which listed details of places and times of departure and arrival for the flight from Santiago, the proposed seating arrangements from Sydney, and a reference to reserving accommodation for five nights at Cairns International Hotel, which is where Alvarez stayed until his departure on 19 December 1996. It was the appellant herself, but using a false name, who in Sydney on 9 December 1996 had booked the flight from Santiago with Air New Zealand. Identifying herself as Helen, she then attended the offices of American Express in Adelaide on 12 December and paid in cash a sum of $2,577.80 for the seat occupied by Alvarez on that flight. On the following day another receptionist at American Express took a telephone message from a person calling herself Helen Johnston giving details of where Alvarez was staying in Santiago. Presumably that was done to enable the airline to communicate with him there and provide him with his ticket.

Despite this evidence, which was not contested at the trial, the appellant, when asked about Alvarez in the course of the interview shortly after her arrest, denied she knew anyone by that name. She also denied having seen Boyd on the flight from Sydney, although, as already noted, they lived in the same house in Bronte. In the interview she admitted having met Boyd on one or more occasions while they were in Cairns; but she denied all knowledge of the cocaine found in his possession in her room. She herself gave no evidence at the trial, leaving it to the jury to draw inferences from the circumstantial evidence before them with respect to her involvement or otherwise in the importation of the drugs into Australia.

The prosecution invited the jury to accept the hypothesis that the cocaine had been carried by Alvarez from Chile and brought into Australia aboard QF 59. The weakness in that case was that, despite searches of the baggage and persons of Alvarez and the appellant at Cairns airport, no cocaine was located. Boyd was not searched. On the other hand, the large quantity of cocaine was, of course, later found in the appellant’s hotel room in the presence of the appellant and Boyd, who also had U.S. $3,000 in his possession. The cocaine was packaged in the body suit or vest, plainly suggesting that it had been or was to be concealed on someone’s person for the purpose either of surreptitiously bringing it to Cairns or taking it away. Cocaine, or the plant from which it is produced, grows freely in South America. According to the botanist who gave this evidence at the trial, it is also cultivated in Java for pharmaceutical purposes. It is capable of being, but is not known to be, grown in Australia. It is inherently improbable that the 2.7 kgs. of cocaine found in the appellant’s hotel room had been grown here for export to Chile or somewhere else through the medium of Mr Alvarez or Mr Boyd.

In this state of evidence, it was open to the jury to conclude that the cocaine discovered in the appellant’s hotel room on 20 December 1996 had been imported into Australia. The most likely explanation was that it had been brought from Chile by Alvarez on QF 59, which arrived in Sydney at 8.10 a.m. on 17 December 1996 (where the appellant and Boyd boarded it), and reached Cairns at about 11.15 a.m. on the same day. The appellant’s false denial that she knew anyone by the name of Alvarez would have entitled the jury to infer that she was involved with him in some illegal transaction which did not bear scrutiny. The presence together of the appellant, Boyd, the sum of U.S. $3,000, and the large quantity of cocaine found in her hotel room only three days after the arrival of Alvarez afforded confirmation of Boyd’s evidence that he had been asked by her to carry the drug back to Sydney with him.

It was a further step, although not a long one, to draw the inference that the arrangement was for Alvarez to bring the cocaine from Chile, and that it had succeeded. Why else would the appellant have gone to so much trouble and expense in arranging to pay for him to come to Australia and to travel to and stay in Cairns, where she and Boyd had also arranged to stay? According to one of the handwritten memoranda found in her house, Cairns was thought to be “better than Brisbane”. If there was an innocent explanation for her conduct, the appellant never advanced it. In the interview, she said that the purpose of her own trip to Cairns was to make arrangements for an art display; but her statement to that effect fails to account for her connection with Alvarez, or the reason for his flight from Chile to meet her in Australia, or the repeated use of false names by Boyd. The jury were, in our opinion, justified in reaching the conclusion that the only rational explanation of the circumstantial evidence was that the appellant was knowingly concerned in the importation of the cocaine found in her hotel room. If she was as innocent of the matter as she claimed to be, it is astonishing that Boyd was prepared to risk divesting himself of so large a quantity of cocaine in the room of the hotel which she was occupying at a time when she was there. It would have been almost impossible for him to be sure that she would not see the drugs which he was in the act of exposing to view when the agents entered her hotel room.

What has been said so far is sufficient to dispose of ground 1 (inconsistency of verdicts) in the notice of appeal, together with ground 3, which complains of the admission of the evidence concerning Alvarez. The evidence about Alvarez was plainly admissible as being capable of presenting to the jury a rational hypothesis as to the source of the cocaine and the means by which it may have been imported into Australia.

Ground 2 complains that the trial judge redirected the jury that they could find a verdict of guilty on count 1 if they were satisfied the cocaine was imported by air even if not on Qantas flight QF 59. The redirection arose out of an inquiry by the jury about proof of the importation, and in particular whether it applied “to the drugs or the flight”. His Honour said he understood the jury to be asking whether they had to be “satisfied that the cocaine was imported on QF 59 and the other flights to Australia, or not”. He asked counsel whether they wished to say anything about that. Defence counsel said that his understanding of the authorities was that they would have to acquit if it was another importation in which his client the appellant was not knowingly concerned. The learned judge said that he would tell the jury that they did not have to be satisfied that it was imported in any particular way, or on any particular flight; to which defence counsel again responded in effect that the jury should or would then have to entertain a reasonable doubt about his client’s involvement in the importation. After further discussion the learned judge said:

“Now from that, the Crown asks them to infer that it either came on her flight or came to Australia in circumstances which were associated with the movement of those persons ... Alvarez and/or Boyd; and that unless they were satisfied from that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that it was imported, they could not convict her because of that element, but if they were satisfied it was, they would still have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that she was knowingly concerned in it.”

To that, defence counsel responded by saying:

“Yes, I couldn’t argue with that proposition, no.”

The jury were then brought back into the courtroom, and his Honour proceeded

to re-direct them as follows:

“Thank you members of the jury. I have your request. Let me just complete what I am about to tell you on the subject. Now, the question as I understand it, relates to count 1 and the issue of importation, the element of importation and you wish to know whether you have to be satisfied that the drugs came in on that very flight or whether it would be sufficient if you were satisfied it came in otherwise.

Well what I have to tell you about that is this: what that element requires is that you be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were imported into Australia from outside Australia in one way or another, but it is the Crown case and the only evidence before you is based upon first of all, the evidence of the botanist, which is general evidence in a sense about where cocaine - where the genus which is capable of producing cocaine is by and large found or confined to - although you’ve heard the other evidence about the possibility it may grow elsewhere and the evidence about Java.

In addition to that, the evidence of arrangements made for the travel of Alvarez from South America and the movements of Alvarez and Boyd and the accused. Now, it is the Crown case that the cocaine came into Australia either on that very flight or if not that flight, then its importation occurred, whether by air or otherwise, in circumstances which were linked with those arrangements and those movements.

If you are to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the cocaine was imported, it would be necessary for that evidence to satisfy you, because that is the only evidence and I repeat it’s the evidence of the botanist, taken with the evidence of the arrangements made for Alvarez to come from South America to Australia in the way that was done, with the alleged involvement of the accused in that and then the movements once Alvarez is in Australia of Alvarez and/or Boyd and/or the accused, to Cairns and of course the presence of the drugs here not long after that.

So that, as I repeat it, is the Crown case that either on that very flight or in circumstances with which the movements of those people and the arrangements that were made in relation to those movements was associated, the drugs were imported.

Now, if of course the evidence did not satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the cocaine was imported, then that would be the end of count 1. If, on the other hand, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the cocaine was imported, you would then have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was knowingly concerned in that importation.”

The jury then retired and, in their absence, counsel were asked if there was anything they wished to say about that, to which each of them replied, No.

It is evident from these transcript extracts that the judge directed the jury in accordance with the law, and also that the prosecution case, in the form in which it was put to them in redirection, had the express assent of both counsel who appeared at the trial. When given the opportunity, none of the matters now specified in ground 2 were raised by defence counsel as objections to that form of redirection, and it is futile now to complain that in some way it constituted the presentation by the prosecution to the jury of an entirely new case at the last moment of the trial. Counsel who appeared at the trial were plainly in the best position to know what the real issues at the trial were and they were plainly satisfied with the redirection that was given. In those circumstances, it would be a rare occasion indeed on which a verdict would be set aside on appeal on the ground that the prosecution case that was left to the jury was different from what everyone at the trial had understood it to be.

The only other matter raised on the appeal was his Honour’s direction to the jury on the meaning of the expression “knowingly concerned in”. It was the subject of an additional ground of appeal lodged with the Court late last year. In essence it is that, early in the summing up, his Honour had explained that, in the context of importing drugs, the expression in question meant that the person accused “must play a role or be involved in the importation, with the knowledge that what he or she was involved in, or playing a role in, was the importation of drugs”. He then went on to explain that the involvement might take one or more of a number of forms, such as “organising travel, for example, for someone to bring the drugs into Australia”; or being involved in “the actual physical movement of the drugs, either by carrying them into Australia or, when they arrive, taking delivery of them; or it might take the form of accompanying the person who actually had the drugs on them”.

It is apparent that, in saying this, his Honour was equating the meaning of the expression “play a role in” with the meaning of “be involved in” the importation of drugs. It is also plain that he prefaced these remarks by emphasising the requirement that the role or involvement must be accompanied by knowledge that what was being done was the importation of drugs. It is in the context of that emphasis that he went on to refer to “any role involved in the facilitation of the importation of drugs”. It is, in our opinion, impossible to regard that expression as an invitation to the jury to find a verdict of guilty in respect of count 1 if they were satisfied of no more than that the appellant had done acts of the kind exemplified by his Honour but without knowing that the importation of drugs was being facilitated. Again, the impression of those taking part in the trial is revealed by the absence of any application for redirections by either counsel, and of any request by the jury for further instruction on the matter. Quite apart from those considerations, his Honour’s summing up on that issue was in law plainly adequate, and not subject to the deficiency that is now urged on this appeal.

Other grounds in the notice of appeal were not pursued at the hearing before us. In our opinion, it was on the evidence reasonably open to the jury to return the

verdicts which they did. In arriving at those verdicts, there was no miscarriage of justice
at the trial of the appellant. It follows that the appeal should be dismissed.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND	C.A. No. 384 of 1997
Brisbane
Before	Pincus J.A. McPherson J.A. Moynihan J.

[R v. Stuart-Jones]

THE QUEEN

v.

SHIREEN JOY CHLORIS STUART-JONES

Appellant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - MOYNIHAN J.

Judgment delivered 28 April 1998

The appellant was convicted of being knowingly concerned in the importation into Australia between 1 and 18 December 1996 of cocaine in not less than a commercial quantity. She was acquitted of a charge that on or about 20 December 1996 at Cairns she had possession of cocaine in excess of the specified quantity.

A number of the grounds of appeal were abandoned or not pursued and the
appeal was argued on the basis of four grounds to which reference will be subsequently
made. Before turning to them it is necessary to provide some background information.
The prosecution case essentially was that the appellant was implicated in
arrangements whereby a man called Alvarez brought cocaine from Chile which was
transferred to a man called Boyd at some stage while he, the appellant and Alvarez
were in transit or on a Qantas flight to Cairns. The appellant and Boyd were arrested
together in Boyd’s room at the Reef Casino Hotel and the cocaine was found there
packed in three body bags.

The case against the appellant was essentially circumstantial. The circumstances included the following. On 2 December 1996 the appellant had travelled to New Zealand. When interviewed by the police as to the purpose of the trip, the applicant said it was for the purpose of “meeting with some people re T-shirts and clothing designs”. Using false names and paying in cash, the appellant made a booking for travel from San Diego in Chile to Cairns in the name of Alvarez, and later paid for it. When she paid for the ticket in Adelaide, she informed the travel consultant that she was to pay “for an airline ticket that Linda, the niece of Alvarez, had booked for him in Melbourne”. Later that day and pursuant to an arrangement made with the travel consultant from whom the ticket was obtained, a message was left for the consultant that “Helen Johnston had advised Alvarez was staying at the Sheraton San Diego, Chile” and gave a phone number. Documents connecting the appellant with these activities were found concealed in the appellant’s residence. These included notes;

“Cairns is better than Brisbane”, “no South American stickers..NZ - looking things...”

and particulars of flights from Chile.

Using a number of connecting flights from San Diego, Alvarez arrived in Sydney on a Qantas flight at approximately 8.10 a.m. on 17 December 1996, and that aircraft, under a different flight number, became a flight from Sydney to Cairns arriving in Cairns at about 11.15 a.m. The appellant and Alvarez were observed in each other’s company at Sydney airport prior to the departure of the flight. The appellant and Boyd, who lived in the same house, sat in the business class compartment of the aircraft, but not together, and Alvarez sat in the economy class immediately behind the business class, in a seat which gave him a view of the business class seating arrangements.

There was evidence that international passengers in Alvarez’ position were not cleared through immigration and customs until they arrived at Cairns, that domestic passengers (as the appellant and Boyd were) on such a flight were clearly identified as such on their tickets, and in the normal course of events were not liable to the immigration and customs scrutiny to which international passengers were subjected. The appellant and Alvarez were searched by customs officers at Cairns; Boyd was not. The searches were negative. Each of them booked into separate hotels in Cairns. Boyd engaged in a number of activities, which it is unnecessary to detail, using a number of false names; they included travelling to Brisbane and placing a suitcase (containing clothing) in a locker in Brisbane before returning to Cairns. In his evidence in the prosecution case, Boyd claimed that this activity was carried out at the appellant’s instructions to see whether he was under surveillance. The participants were in fact under surveillance and a number of contacts between the appellant and Boyd were observed.

Boyd gave evidence that on the evening of 19 December, by arrangement with the appellant, the cocaine the subject of the charge was dropped off at his hotel room by an unknown male. Alvarez, who had been booked into his hotel for the period from 17 to 22 December, checked out on the 19th and has not been found. The appellant did not give evidence, but an extensive record of an interview with her was in evidence. She denied any knowledge of or connection with Alvarez.

On the morning of the 20th, Boyd booked out of his hotel but left his sports bag containing the drug there. He met the appellant at her hotel, and they engaged in various activities before Boyd collected the bag containing the drug and they travelled to the appellant’s hotel.

There was evidence that, when the appellant and Boyd entered the hotel room, she immediately diverted to the separate bathroom while Boyd continued into the bedroom. Soon after, Federal police agents arrived. The appellant moved from the bathroom and met them at the front door and she and the agents entered the bedroom. Boyd was standing beside the bed. He had removed his shirt and was pushing a white coloured garment towards the sports bag. A body vest and thigh pads containing the drug were on the bed. Boyd’s evidence was that he had gone to the appellant’s room for the purpose of withdrawing from the plan for him to transport the drug to Brisbane. The appellant said she was not aware Boyd had drugs with him.

The first ground of appeal argued was that the verdict was unreasonable, unsafe and unsatisfactory because, having acquitted the appellant on the possession charge, it necessarily followed that the jury must have had a reasonable doubt about the importation charge.

During the trial, particulars were given of the possession charge. They were that the offence occurred on 20 December in the appellant’s hotel room. It will be apparent from what was said earlier that the jury’s verdict is consistent with the drugs being in Boyd’s possession at the relevant time and the jury not being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that they were then in the appellant’s possession either separately or jointly with Boyd and that that outcome was open on the evidence.

The second ground of appeal arose out of a redirection. The jury asked whether the need to prove importation applied to “the drug or the flight”. The trial judge construed this as raising a question whether the jury had to be satisfied the drugs came in “on that very flight”, or whether it was sufficient if they were satisfied “it came in other ways”. This appreciation of the jury’s concerns seems from the record to have been correct; it is pertinent to recall that Alvarez had been on a number of flights before the Qantas flight to Cairns.

The judge dealt with the redirection by telling the jury that proof of the importation element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt meant proof that the drugs were imported into Australia “from outside Australia in one way or another”. He went on however to remind the jury that the only evidence before them was, first, some general botanical evidence which, put shortly, was capable of founding an inference that cocaine was commonly of South American origin, with a possibility of its being grown in some other places where its cultivation was lawful for medical purposes. The judge went on to refer to the evidence of Alvarez’s travel arrangements, in which the appellant was implicated in the ways outlined earlier, and to the evidence of the activities of the appellant, Alvarez and Boyd after Alvarez had arrived in this country. He reminded them that the Crown case was that the drug was imported either on “that very flight”, or that its importation occurred “whether by air or otherwise, in circumstances which were linked with those arrangements and those movements”. The redirection does not, as was submitted, invite the jury to speculate. Rather it directs their attention to the evidence relied on by the prosecution which was capable of founding an inference to the exclusion of others that the cocaine found on the 20th had been imported into Australia and that the appellant was a party to the importation. Having redirected the jury the trial judge invited trial counsel to make any comment they wished in respect of it and each indicated that they had nothing that they wished to say. There is no substance in this ground of appeal.

The third ground of appeal relates to the admission of evidence “concerning the

person
Alvarez”. At the commencement of the trial, counsel for the appellant unsuccessfully
sought to have this evidence excluded as irrelevant. In support of the ground of appeal,
it is submitted that the evidence goes no further than that the appellant was associated
with the making of arrangements to facilitate Alvarez’ travel to Australia and that there
was no evidence that Alvarez was carrying cocaine at any time.

This submission has to be taken in light of facts, such as that the appellant in her record of interview denied any knowledge of Alvarez or any connection with him and that she had sought to conceal her involvement in Alvarez’s travel arrangements, some aspects of which, together with other relevant evidence, were addressed earlier. As has been said, the case was a circumstantial one but there was evidence from which the jury was entitled to infer that there was a connection between the appellant, Alvarez and the unlawful importation of cocaine.

The final ground of appeal argued was that the trial judge made an error of law when he instructed the jury that “knowingly concerned” meant having “any role” in the facilitation of the importation of drugs. It was said this was too wide, its deficiency being exemplified by the fact that mere knowledge of an importation was not sufficient to support a conviction. The use of the words “any role”, which is said to be fatal, must be looked at in context. The trial judge commenced the passage by telling the jury that

“knowingly concerned” meant that the person “must play a role or be involved in the

importation, with knowledge that what he or she was involved in - or was playing a role in - was the importation of drugs. He went on to tell the jury that involvement could take one or more number of forms. He said it might encompass organising the travel of someone to bring the drugs; being involved in the physical movement of the drugs by carrying or accepting delivery of them; and gave other examples. He went on to emphasise that “role” was a role in the facilitation of the importation of the drugs. There is no substance in this ground of appeal. The appeal should be dismissed.