R v Spiteri-Ahern

[2018] NSWSC 1072

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Spiteri-Ahern [2018] NSWSC 1072

Hearing dates:

25 May 2018, 6 July 2018

Date of orders:

13 July 2018

Decision date:

13 July 2018

Jurisdiction:

Common Law - Criminal

Before:

Rothman J

Decision:

(1)   Conviction recorded;

 

(2)   Sentence imposed of a non-parole period of 18 years' imprisonment commencing 22 June 2015 and concluding 21 June 2033 and a remainder of term of a further 12 years, concluding 21 June 2045.

 (3)   First eligible for parole on 21 June 2033.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – murder – assessment of objective seriousness – analysis of facts, following judge-alone trial – sentence imposed

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, s 3A
Evidence Act 1995, s 4(2)(a)

Cases Cited:

R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67
R v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228
R v Spiteri-Ahern; R v Barber; R v Zraika (No 11) [2017] NSWSC 1820
Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1998) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

Regina (Crown)
Louise Catherine Spiteri-Ahern (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
D Patch (Crown)
J Trevallion (Offender)

  Solicitors:
Office of the Director Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Archbold Legal Solutions (Offender)

File Number(s):

2014/00180060

Publication restriction:

Orders made on 19/09/2017:NON PUBLICATION ORDER that the address given for the accused Ms Spiteri-Ahern and her family in the evidence of Constable Daniel Greentree not be published outside of the Court room. Orders made on 14/09/2017:SUPPRESSION ORDER made that Reference to the allegation of sexual abuse adduced in evidence on 14/09/17, including any information that could identify the victim, is not to be published. Orders made 31/08/2017:SUPPRESSION ORDER made in relation to the true identity of the proposed Crown witness, together with any evidence, submission discussion, document or information that might disclose the identity of said witness. The publication of any reference to the witness be by way of the pseudonym name Tom Jones.

REMARKS ON SENTENCE

1. HIS HONOUR: On 21 December 2017, the Court determined that the offender, Ms Louise Spiteri-Ahern was guilty of the murder of Mr Raymond Pasnin. Because of delays in obtaining certain evidence required for the sentencing proceedings, the sentence hearing did not occur until last Friday, 6 July 2018. The Court must sentence the offender.

2. The trial for murder occurred by judge-alone and the Reasons for Judgment (R v Spiteri-Ahern; R v Barber; R v Zraika (No 11) [2017] NSWSC 1820) (“the verdict”) address the nature of the charges against the offender and two alleged co-offenders; the basis of the finding of guilt of the offender; and the circumstances of the murder.

3. A full description of the circumstances of the murder and the evidence that satisfies the Court of the guilt of the offender are recited in the verdict. It is unnecessary to recite or repeat that evidence or those findings. It is, however, necessary to summarise briefly the circumstances of the murder for which the offender has been found guilty.

Facts

4. At about midnight on the night of 30 October 2013, Mr Daniel Haile, shot and killed the deceased, Mr Raymond Pasnin. The assault on Mr Pasnin was organised by the offender, Ms Spiteri-Ahern.

5. Ms Spiteri-Ahern was previously in a relationship with the deceased and arranged, through Ms April Barber, for the deceased to be at a particular place, where, ultimately, he was shot. The offender paid Mr Haile an amount, although the extent of the payment is not absolutely clear. We know that at least $4,000 was paid to Mr Haile.

6. On the evidence before the Court, the motive for the organisation of the assault on Mr Pasnin was one wholly held by Ms Spiteri-Ahern. The motive, however, is not absolutely clear. It is certainly a reaction to the perceived treatment of Ms Spiteri-Ahern by Mr Pasnin, but the nature of that treatment and the details of the “revenge” have some doubt.

7. On one version of events, the deceased stabbed Ms Spiteri-Ahern some significant time before the murder occurred. On another view of the evidence, Ms Spiteri-Ahern organised Mr Haile because of the deceased's attitude to Ms Spiteri-Ahern’s pregnancy, during their relationship and the demand or request by Mr Pasnin for the offender to terminate the pregnancy. This occurred at a point in time when, shortly after, the deceased entered into a relationship with another. On another view again, the motive was the deceit perpetrated by Mr Pasnin (and his family) on Ms Spiteri-Ahern as to his feelings for her, so that she would withdraw the allegations of the knife attack by him that was then before the courts.

8. It may well be a combination of more than one of the foregoing or all of them. Generally, the motive neither adds to, nor subtracts from, the objective seriousness of the offence in question.

9. All murders are serious. In the range of murders that occur, this is a serious matter and the execution style of the murder, in its totality, puts it well above the mid-range. That is not necessarily the culpability of the offender, to which the Court will turn shortly.

10. The murder was a well-organised and planned offence and, as already stated, in the nature of an execution or contract killing. The assault on Mr Pasnin, the deceased, was organised by the offender over a significant period of time; was premeditated; and involved the offender arranging for an assault with at least an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, which ultimately led to his death.

11. As already stated, the offender was the organiser of the assault and paid the shooter, Mr Haile, to carry it out.

12. The Crown submits that it is a “contract killing” or a “deliberate killing for payment”, but it cannot be on the findings made by the Court, at the delivery of verdict. The Court determined instead that the Crown had proved, beyond reasonable doubt, an intention to cause grievous bodily harm. For the offence to be a “contract killing”, it would be necessary for the Crown to have proved that the offender had an intention to kill Mr Pasnin.

13. Nevertheless, it is, at least, a contracted assault with the intention of inflicting grievous bodily harm and with the distinct possibility that death could result. As a consequence of this and the other circumstance, the objective seriousness of the offence of Ms Spiteri-Ahern is above the mid-range.

14. As to the circumstances of the events, the deceased was, as the Crown submitted, shot and killed in sight of his partner, Ms Lyndal Archbold. This occurred at the residence of his mother and stepfather. His death occurred in the sight of his mother and in the arms of his then partner, Ms Archbold.

15. The murder also occurred in circumstances where a weapon was used; it was committed without regard for public safety; and, if it be different, members of the public were or could have been collaterally injured as a result of the shots that were fired.

16. While it is most unlikely that Ms Spiteri-Ahern was unaware that the assault would be by a shooting, the Crown has not excluded a reasonable possibility that the form of the assault was a matter, in their agreement, that was left with Mr Haile.

The Process of Sentencing

17. In sentencing an offender, convicted of murder (or any other serious offence), the Court is required to assess the objective seriousness of an offence within the range of conduct with which offences of that kind are concerned. Thus, even, as here, where one is speaking of murder, as the most serious offence in the criminal calendar, it is necessary to assess the conduct of the offender to determine where, in that range of seriousness, this offence fits.

18. It is only for the worst category of offences that the legislature has imposed the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Whether a particular offence is in that category is not ascertained by imagining conduct that could be worse. One can always, unfortunately, imagine a worse scenario.

19. Nevertheless, the Court must assess objectively the features of the offence and the circumstances of its commission, in order to determine whether it is in the category of a worst case, or lower down the scale of seriousness, within the notional range between the lowest level of culpability and the worst category of case.

20. The aim in sentencing any offender is to resolve what are often, if not necessarily, conflicting sentencing objectives. In serious crimes such as murder, the importance of punishment and public deterrence loom large. The purposes, however, include the protection of society; personal and public deterrence (often referred to as specific and general deterrence respectively); retribution; and reform.

21. Each of these objectives, but particularly the protection of society; specific and general deterrence; punishment; and the need for rehabilitation, must be assessed having regard to the gravity of the circumstances, viewed objectively, within the range of offending comprehended by the offence charged.

22. However, it should be stressed, that in dealing with the objective seriousness of the offence, one is concerned with the objective seriousness of the conduct of the particular offender, not the murder as a whole.

23. Last, the fact, as in this case, that Mr Haile, the shooter, intended to kill Mr Pasnin is not a factor that can be sheeted home to Ms Spiteri-Ahern, whom the Crown has proved had an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, but has not proved that she had an intention to kill.

24. Further, considerations of reform or rehabilitation of the offender may also be significantly affected by the objective circumstances of the offence, but they are more directly affected by the subjective circumstances of the offender and the capacity of the offender to be rehabilitated. The capacity for, and the likelihood, if any, of, rehabilitation, in turn, impacts upon the degree to which a sentence is fixed, which ensures the protection of society and the personal deterrence of the offender.

25. The process is one that involves what has been described as an “intuitive synthesis” or “instinctive synthesis”. It takes each of the objective circumstances of the offence and each of the subjective circumstances of the offender and synthesises them to achieve the often conflicting purposes of sentencing.

26. Every murder is serious. Every murder involves the taking of human life by a person who has a state of mind that elevates the seriousness of the offence to that which is the most serious of offences in the criminal calendar. As already stated, the maximum sentence for murder is life imprisonment, which is imposed in the worst category of murder. Further, there is a standard non-parole period of 20 years’ imprisonment. The maximum sentence and standard non-parole period each act as a guidepost in the determination of an appropriate sentence.

27. In order to determine the objective seriousness of this offence, amongst those perceived as the most serious, because of society's respect for the sanctity of human life, it is necessary to have regard to the conduct of the offender in organising and procuring that which caused the fatal injuries from which Mr Pasnin died.

28. The purposes of sentencing are prescribed by s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 and include: adequate punishment for the offence; deterrence, both specific and general; protection of the community; the promotion of rehabilitation; the rendering of the offender as accountable for her actions; the denunciation of the conduct; and the recognition of the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.

29. Those statutorily prescribed purposes reflect the purposes, already described by the Court earlier in these reasons, that have been laid down by the common law: see Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1998) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14. After describing the purposes as protection of society; deterrence of the offender and of others who might be tempted to offend; retribution; and reform, the High Court described their interaction (and necessarily the process of intuitive synthesis) in the following way:

“The purposes overlap and none of them can be considered in isolation from the others when determining what is an appropriate sentence in a particular case. They are guideposts to the appropriate sentence but sometimes they point in different directions.”

Subjective Circumstances

30. The offender was 23 years of age at the time that the offence was committed and is now 27 years of age, turning 28 later in the year. She has a criminal record that includes stalking and intimidating intending fear of physical harm; use of false documents to influence exercise of public duty; and some driving offences, more serious than mere regulatory breaches. Nevertheless, none of her prior offending involves the infliction of violence.

31. Prior to this offence being committed and prior to her arrest for this offence, the offender had not spent any time in prison. However, after her arrest and the grant of bail, the offender was sentenced to a term of imprisonment relating to offences of dishonesty, being the previously mentioned use of false documents.

32. The co-offender, Mr Haile, was sentenced by RS Hume AJ to a non-parole period of 24 years’ imprisonment as part of a head sentence of 32 years' imprisonment for his part in the joint enterprise, which, as earlier stated, included the shooting of Mr Pasnin.

33. There are two psychiatric reports that deal with the state of mind, or alleged state of mind, of Ms Spiteri-Ahern. The Crown has tendered a report by Dr Olav Nielssen, who described the examination process and Ms Spiteri-Ahern’s attitude in the following manner:

“Ms Spiteri-Ahern presented as a woman of part Mediterranean heritage, dressed in prison clothes with her hair tied back and tattoos visible on a finger and her forearm. She looked to be of normal weight and I noted that she is 172 cm tall. She did not appear pervasively depressed, and mood was assessed to be appropriate to her circumstances and the topics being discussed, as she was moved to tears on several occasions but was able to smile in response to wry humour of her own making. She was initially reluctant to proceed with an interview conducted by audiovisual link, as she said that she felt the officers were observing the interview and that it might be recorded, but after some general discussion she relented and answered the questions put to her. Her responses were fluent and articulate, with no abnormal patterns of speech suggesting communication disorder from brain injury or underlying or emerging psychotic illness, including bipolar disorder.

Ms Spiteri-Ahern was alert and her concentration was assessed to be unimpaired. Her registration and retrieval of information was also assessed to be unimpaired, from her prompt and appropriate responses to most questions and the historical information she was able to provide. Her intelligence was estimated to be in the higher part of the normal range, from her demonstrated literacy and her educational and occupational attainment in light of the adversity she faced growing up.”

34. As a consequence of his examination, Dr Nielssen formed the opinion that Ms Spiteri-Ahern suffers depressive illness, in partial remission; complex post-traumatic stress disorder; and, also, substance use disorder, also in remission.

35. At least in part, the diagnosis is based, as one would expect, on Ms Spiteri-Ahern’s account of her history. It is also based on a number of notes and reports to which Dr Nielssen had access. He described, Ms Spiteri-Ahern’s state of mind at the time of the offence, in the following way:

“Based largely on the entries in the Jarrah House notes, it seems likely that at the time of the offence Ms Spiteri-Ahern was affected by symptoms of depression and also that she felt anxious because of Mr Pasnin’s imminent release from prison.”

36. However, in answer to a question relating to the relationship between Ms Spiteri-Ahern’s mental state and her offending behaviour, Dr Nielssen said:

“Any comment regarding Ms Spiteri-Ahern’s state of mind at the time of the offence is largely speculative. However, from the limited information that is available, it seems likely that she was affected by the negative view of her situation that usually accompanies chronic depression, as well as anxiety for her safety and a degree of anger towards Mr Pasnin arising from the effects of physical abuse in the relationship. Hence, the relationship between Ms Spiteri-Ahern’s mental state and urging Mr Haile to kill Mr Pasnin is likely to have been a combination of a negative perception of her situation, anxiety about her own safety and anger at her past treatment.

. . .

There is also very limited information regarding the long term course of complex PTSD or borderline personality disorder, if that is the preferred construct for Ms Spiteri-Ahern’s constellation of symptoms, or how the experience of long term imprisonment influences the course of mood symptoms, personality traits and future behaviour.

. . .

Ms Spiteri-Ahern is likely to require long term treatment for depression, under the occasional supervision of a psychiatrist. She is likely to derive some benefit from supportive counselling as required, participation in the therapeutic and rehabilitative programs that are available in prison, and also from self directed learning to improve her self awareness and management of her own mood states and maladaptive behaviours.”

37. A further report by Dr Kerri Eagle was tendered by the offender and is Exhibit 1 on sentence. Dr Eagle recounts the personal history provided to her by Ms Spiteri-Ahern.

38. Ms Spiteri-Ahern was raised by her grandparents. Her parents were never married and her relationship with her father was one in which she had spoken to him five or six times in her lifetime, but described the relationship as “good”. Her mother was violent towards Ms Spiteri-Ahern, having hit Ms Spiteri-Ahern with a belt, commencing from about four or five years of age. Her maternal grandfather committed suicide, seemingly, as a result of being the victim of an extortion by Ms Spiteri-Ahern’s mother.

39. Ms Spiteri-Ahern left home at 13 years of age to stay with her grandparents. Her grandfather, according to that which Ms Spiteri-Ahern told Dr Eagle, sexually assaulted her. She informed her grandmother, at the time, who initially supported her, but subsequently asked her to leave and accused her of “seducing her grandfather”. She was homeless for a while, lived on the streets, in refuges and at friends' homes. Notwithstanding her homelessness, she found a place to live near her school and completed Year 12.

40. Ms Spiteri-Ahern described herself as having an attitude problem during school years, but she was never suspended or expelled. After school, she attended TAFE and completed a Diploma in Communication and Media. According to Ms Spiteri-Ahern, until a serious assault by the deceased, she was employed consistently. After the assault, she was required to wear a neck brace and was forced to stop work.

41. She returned to work after her neck improved, but only for a short period of time, according to Ms Spiteri-Ahern, and then was required to take leave because, she says, the deceased stabbed her. She returned to work just prior to the occurrence of the murder but ceased work following the charges and her arrest.

42. A relative (or former relative) corroborated much of the early history described by Ms Spiteri-Ahern, particularly as to the mental illness of her mother and the mother’s violence and the fact that the offender’s grandparents raised her. The relative was aware of the report of sexual abuse by a family member.

43. The relative confirmed that Ms Spiteri-Ahern left her grandparents shortly after the allegation of abuse, and lived with the relative, until she found accommodation that was more convenient for school.

44. The report of Dr Eagle describes Ms Spiteri-Ahern as appropriately groomed, maintaining eye contact during the interview and not displaying signs of psychomotor agitation or retardation. Ms Spiteri-Ahern was cooperative.

37. Dr Eagle describes Ms Spiteri-Ahern's mood in the following way:

“Ms Spiteri-Ahern was reactive in affect (external manifestation of mood). She was teary at times particularly when discussing her relationship with the deceased and the deceased's death. She described her mood as generally positive. She did not display any abnormality of speech or thought process. She was logical and coherent throughout the interview.”

46. Dr Eagle also came to the view that Ms Spiteri-Ahern described signs and symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depressive episodes. Dr Eagle described Ms Spiteri-Ahern's vulnerability to the development of mood and mental disorders as a result of her childhood experiences, but expressed the view that the PTSD, in particular, primarily arose as a result of Ms Spiteri-Ahern's exposure to trauma, during the relationship with the deceased.

47. Dr Eagle expressed the opinion that Ms Spiteri-Ahern had a low to moderate loading of historical factors associated with the risk of violent reoffending and expressed the view that her history of violence and substance use occurred in the aftermath of an abusive relationship and in the context of legal proceedings. Ms Spiteri-Ahern has demonstrated the capacity to maintain stable intimate and non-intimate relationships, according to Dr Eagle.

48. Further, Dr Eagle, after discussing the factors associated with the risk of violent reoffending, expressed the opinion that Ms Spiteri-Ahern had demonstrated a number of protective factors, including the capacity for work and financial management. She was described as intelligent, which largely depended on the history given by the earlier mentioned relative, and as having demonstrated motivation for treatment, the capacity for empathy and to have had a supportive family network.

49. Ultimately, Dr Eagle suggested that these protective factors together, with her premorbid high level of function, would make her prospects for rehabilitation “optimistic” and her risk of reoffending reduced, provided she were to engage in the recommended treatment and management plans. Dr Eagle described a treatment and management plan that would assist.

50. Dr Eagle also reported that Ms Spiteri-Ahern had told her matters that demonstrated an awareness of the consequences of her actions, particularly in relation to the family of the deceased, had accepted responsibility for her involvement in the murder, and displayed regret regarding the death of the deceased.

51. The Crown urges that the Court disregard some, at least, of the statements made by Ms Spiteri-Ahern to the psychiatrists, as they are not the subject of sworn evidence in the proceedings, nor direct evidence from Ms Spiteri-Ahern on sentence. I treat the comments with some caution, but do not wholly disregard them. The Court is not bound by the rules of evidence in this process: s 4(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995.

52. The lack of a criminal history involving significant violence, the lack of previous custodial sentences to the offending and the consensus view as to the existence of PTSD and depression, disclose factors that require a sentence which allows a longer period under supervision in the community, so as to facilitate treatment and rehabilitation.

53. The effect of mental illness varies depending upon the nature of the illness and the consequences of the illness in terms of the offending and in terms of the punishment. There are a number of factors:

1. Where the mental illness has contributed to the commission of an offence in a material way, the offender’s moral culpability may be reduced;

2. In the case of persons who suffer a mental illness, there is not the same call for denunciation and punishment;

3. Mental illness may render the offender an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence and ameliorate the effect of such a consideration;

4. A custodial sentence may weigh more heavily on a mentally ill person: see R v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228 at [33].

54. As was made clear in R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67, some mental illnesses point to factors that do not ameliorate any sentence that may be imposed. In those circumstances, the mental illness may call for either a higher level of specific deterrence (for example those with executive functioning disorder, who need to learn consequences and conduct that is wrong) or those that present a danger to the public in general, because of their mental illness. Those factors do not arise in the case of Ms Spiteri-Ahern.

55. The consensus of view before the Court is, as already stated, that Ms Spiteri-Ahern suffers post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. Certainly that would make her incarceration more burdensome and needs to be a factor considered in the determination of an appropriate sentence. Further, whether the post-traumatic stress disorder has been caused by an assault by the deceased, or whether it was caused by earlier sexual abuse, does not seem to matter very much.

56. As a consequence of the disorder, Ms Spiteri-Ahern perceived danger to herself to a far greater degree than a person who is not suffering PTSD from an earlier assault. Further, that reaction was, at least in part, related to the offending to which this sentence relates.

57. As a consequence of the fact that the only appropriate sentence is one of full time custody, the offender will be separated from her daughter for a significant period, which will exacerbate the onerousness of the prison sentence on someone suffering a mental illness or disorder.

58. The Crown submits that Ms Spiteri-Ahern, being the organiser of the events that resulted in Mr Pasnin’s death is, in objective terms, more culpable than Mr Haile who carried it out. Ordinarily, in a contract killing, the person who organises and/or procures the murder is relatively more culpable than the person who carries it out. In this case, such a comparison is not appropriate.

59. The evidence before the Court on the motivation, if any, of Mr Haile to participate in the murder is less than satisfactory. The evidence suggests that Mr Haile was paid $4,000. There is no evidence as to whether that was the total amount paid to him for his conduct.

60. Nevertheless, the evidence is that Mr Haile was involved heavily in drug offences and an amount of $4,000 does not seem to reflect the commission of such a serious offence and conduct of this kind.

61. On one view, it may be that other payments were made. On another view, Mr Haile may have had his own motives, unknown to the Court, for the offence in question. Such independent motive would explain the shooting, being a number of shots, and, plainly, an intention to kill, against the failure of the Crown to prove that Ms Spiteri-Ahern had the same intention.

62. As stated, the Court has found that the Crown has proved that Ms Spiteri-Ahern had an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, but has failed to prove an intention to kill.

63. All other things being equal, ordinarily, a murder that is committed as a result of an intention to cause grievous bodily harm is less serious than the same offence committed with an intention to kill. Of course, that it will be less serious is not universal. Some murders effected with an intention to cause grievous bodily harm are so heinous that an intention to kill would add little to the culpability of the offender or the objective seriousness of the offence.

64. A sentence needs to be imposed that does not create disparity with Mr Haile. However, there are rational bases for a difference in the sentence to be imposed.

65. First, there is the requisite intention, which differs as between the two offenders. Secondly, there is the criminal history, which, in the case of Mr Haile, is of serious concern and included the possession of an unauthorised firearm and ammunition. Mr Haile presented a continuing danger to the public, requiring specific deterrence in large measure.

66. Further, in relation to Ms Spiteri-Ahern, there is the existence of the subjective factors to which I have referred and the necessity to ensure a lengthier period of supervision in the community, than might otherwise be the case, to facilitate any rehabilitation.

67. Nevertheless, the Court must ensure that any non-parole period imposed on Ms Spiteri-Ahern reflects the minimum necessary to give effect to the purposes of sentencing. Whether Ms Spiteri-Ahern is granted parole is not a matter for the Court. It is a matter for the offender to undertake the courses and conduct which satisfies the relevant parole authority of the appropriateness of parole.

68. I have remarked that it is for the Crown to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, all that it relies upon in the sentence proceedings. I should note that it is for the offender to prove, on the balance of probabilities, the factors on which she relies in these sentencing proceedings.

69. Notwithstanding all of the foregoing and the subjective circumstances to which I have referred, the offence is a very serious one. Its effect on the family of the deceased is immeasurable. I have heard the victim impact statements. It is a parent’s worst nightmare for their child to die by an act of violence. For it to occur essentially in their presence and for Mr Pasnin to die in, essentially, the arms of his mother and his partner, must be horrendous.

70. Murder, as previously stated, is the most serious offence in the criminal calendar, because of the view we take of the sanctity of human life and the knowledge that some person’s future has been, deliberately, cut short. As a consequence, murder requires a sentence that is appropriate to its seriousness. That includes, in this case, full time custody of a significant duration.

71. There are two other aspects with which the Court is required to deal. As earlier made clear, I find special circumstances. I do so because of the need for a lengthier period on parole to seek to facilitate rehabilitation. Whether that opportunity for parole is taken is a matter ultimately for the offender.

72. Lastly, I deal with the issue of time already served. Ms Spiteri-Ahern was arrested on 17 June 2014 and was granted bail on 13 November 2014. On 18 November 2015, Ms Spiteri-Ahern was arrested for breach of bail. The breach of bail occurred, partly, because of the requirement to be of good behaviour, because the offender was charged with another serious offence. Ultimately, Ms Spiteri-Ahern was sentenced, for those dishonesty offences, to a non-parole period of 1 year and 10 months, which results in those other offences concluding, in relation to their mandatory imprisonment period, on 17 September 2017.

73. There are issues of totality. The 1 year and 10 months’ mandatory imprisonment period should be taken into account in terms of the totality of the sentence to be imposed for all of the offences with which Ms Spiteri-Ahern is to be sentenced. The Crown now submits that all of that period should be taken into account.

74. I take into account all of the period between 18 November 2015 and 17 September 2017. As a consequence, Ms Spiteri-Ahern has spent a period, prior to 18 November 2015, of 4 days less than 5 complete months imprisoned, that the Court takes into account in backdating the commencement date of the sentence for this offence. On that calculation, the commencement date of the sentence will be 22 June 2015.

Conclusion

75. As a consequence of the foregoing, and bearing in mind the seriousness of the offence, the Court will impose a head sentence of 30 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 years' imprisonment.

76. Louise Spiteri-Ahern, please rise,

1. You are convicted that on 30 October 2013 at Pendle Hill in the State of New South Wales, you did murder Raymond Pasnin;

2. For that offence, you are sentenced to a non-parole period of 18 years' imprisonment commencing 22 June 2015 and concluding 21 June 2033 and a remainder of term of a further 12 years, concluding 21 June 2045.

3. You are first eligible for parole on 21 June 2033.

**********

Amendments

13 April 2023 - Publication restriction lifted.

Decision last updated: 13 April 2023