R v Southee; Ex Parte

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Serial No 52/1991
List "A"

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:              R v Southee; ex parte Motor Accidents Insurance Board [1991] TASSC 71; A52/1991

PARTIES:  R
  v
  SOUTHEE, Richard Carter
  MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD; ex parte

FILE NO/S:  M353/1990
DELIVERED ON:  5 July 1991
JUDGMENT OF:  Zeeman J

Judgment Number:  A52/1991
Number of paragraphs:  13

Serial No 52/1991
List "A"
File No M353/1990

THE QUEEN v RICHARD CARTER SOUTHEE;
Ex Parte MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  ZEEMAN J

5 July 1991

  1. This is the return of an order nisi made on 13 December 1990 calling upon the respondent, in his capacity as chairman of the Motor Accidents Compensation Tribunal, to show cause why a Writ of Certiorari should not issue for the purpose of having brought before the court to be examined as to its correctness, a determination made by the Tribunal, constituted by the respondent, on 25 July 1990, upon a reference to it by Philomena Maureen Simpson ("the claimant") on the ground that that part of the Tribunal's determination, which ordered that the prosecutor could not terminate the payment of a disability allowance to the claimant unless a medical certificate, as defined in the determination, was furnished to the prosecutor or without further determination of the Tribunal, was wrong in law, in excess of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and manifestly unreasonable.

  1. The evidence discloses that on about 11 March 1990 the prosecutor received an application for the payment of a disability allowance from the claimant. In that application she stated that she had been injured in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 27 February 1987 on Piper's River Road when a Tasmanian registered vehicle being driven by her came into collision with another vehicle. Those facts established that the claimant suffered bodily injury as a result of an accident arising out of the use in the State of a motor vehicle registered in the State so that there became payable by the prosecutor prescribed benefits pursuant to the provisions of s23(1) of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 ("the Act"). The relevant benefits are prescribed by reg12A of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Regulations 1980, and in particular Part V of Schedule 2 to those Regulations. The application disclosed that the claimant was employed as a teacher at a Launceston private school. Such employment qualified her for the payment of a disability allowance by way of an employed person's allowance under Part V by reason of para2(1)(a) of that Part. The period during which such an allowance is payable is prescribed by para2(3) of that Part, which is in the following terms:

"(3)An employed person's allowance is payable –

(a)for such periods, falling within the period of 104 weeks beginning on the day of the accident, during which the injured person is wholly disabled from engaging in his usual employment or occupation as a consequence of the injury; and

(b)for such other periods, falling within the prescribed period, during…

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Details
Case
[1991] TASSC 71
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the Motor Accidents Insurance Board sought a writ of certiorari against Richard Carter Southee, the chairman of the Motor Accidents Compensation Tribunal, to challenge a determination made by the Tribunal. The Tribunal had ordered that the prosecutor could not terminate the payment of a disability allowance to Philomena Maureen Simpson unless a medical certificate was provided or without further determination by the Tribunal. The Board argued that this part of the Tribunal's determination was wrong in law, beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and manifestly unreasonable.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had the authority to make an order that would require the prosecutor to continue paying the disability allowance to the claimant unless a medical certificate was furnished or without further determination by the Tribunal. The court needed to determine if such an order was within the Tribunal's jurisdiction and whether it was consistent with the statutory and regulatory requirements for the payment of disability allowances.

The court found that the Tribunal did not have the authority to make the order in question. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to declare an ongoing right for the claimant to receive a disability allowance indefinitely. The Tribunal's order was akin to an injunction, which the Tribunal did not have the power to grant. The court held that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction and that the order was manifestly unreasonable. Consequently, the court granted the writ of certiorari and quashed the Tribunal's determination.

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