R v Solomon

Link copied
Case Copied 5 min read

[1997] QCA 286

COURT OF APPEAL
PINCUS JA
McPHERSON JA

WILLIAMS J

CA No 136 of 1997
THE QUEEN
v.

JASON HESTON SOLOMON Appellant

BRISBANE
..DATE 22/07/97
220797 T16-17/RB28 M/T COA154/97
PINCUS JA: The appellant was convicted of murder in the Supreme
Court before Cullinane J. on 12 March last. There was no
dispute that he killed the deceased by stabbing her repeatedly
with a knife. The question is whether at that time he had the
intention set out in section 302(1)(a) of the Criminal Code,
that is, the intention to cause her death or to do her some
grievous bodily harm. There is an appeal on the ground that the
conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory and this relates solely
to the question that there was such evidence of intoxication as
to preclude the conviction of murder.

There seems no reason to doubt that the appellant was affected by liquor when he stabbed the victim, who was his de facto wife.

But as Mr Justice Gibbs said in Viro (1987) 141 C.L.R. 88 AT 112 "... evidence that the accused was intoxicated will not in itself entitle him to an acquittal because a person when intoxicated may form the necessary intent".

I emphasise that the only issue before the jury was one of intent.

Cullinane J. directed the jury in terms of section 28 of the Code and also along the lines of the statement in Viro which I have mentioned. His Honour also told them that if they entertained a reasonable doubt that the appellant had the relevant intention he would not be guilty of murder. No complaint is made about these directions, but I should remark in passing that His Honour did not direct the jury in accordance with what is said in Crozier [1965] Qd.R. 133 at 134 to be the correct direction in such a case. It is my respectful opinion 220797 T16-17/RB28 M/T COA154/97

that, either through an error in printing or otherwise, the Crozier direction is in truth wrong in so far as it uses the expression "if you are not satisfied ... that through intoxication the prisoner was capable of forming an intent ... then it is your duty to acquit of wilful murder and murder".

In the present case some evidence of intention is to be found in statements attributed by witnesses to the appellant. A G Baird, had been drinking alcohol with the appellant on the day of the killing, heard the appellant and the woman whom he killed, Lynell Hudson, having an argument and heard the appellant say that he was going to kill "Nellie", apparently a reference to Ms Hudson. About five minutes later he heard girls screaming and went to the room where the appellant and Ms Hudson were; the appellant had a knife and was about to strike Ms Hudson; A G Baird intervened, tackled the appellant and pushed him back; Ms Hudson fled, although she at that stage had received the wounds which caused her death.…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read R v Solomon and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1997] QCA 286
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Court of Appeal of Queensland, the appellant, Jason Heston Solomon, was appealing against his conviction of murder in the Supreme Court. Solomon had stabbed his de facto wife, Lynell Hudson, to death, and the central issue was whether he had the requisite intention to cause her death or grievous bodily harm at the time of the stabbing. The appeal focused on whether the evidence of Solomon's intoxication was sufficient to prevent a conviction for murder. The primary legal issue before the court was whether intoxication could negate the requisite intent for murder, even if the accused was capable of forming such intent while intoxicated.

The court considered the well-established principle that being intoxicated does not automatically absolve an individual of criminal liability if they had the capacity to form the necessary intent. The court referenced the statement from Viro, which emphasised that a person, even when intoxicated, could still form the necessary intent. The trial judge had correctly directed the jury on the issue of intent and had emphasised that if there was reasonable doubt about the appellant's intent, he would not be guilty of murder. However, the court noted a discrepancy in the direction regarding the role of intoxication in forming intent, which was not correctly articulated in the cited case of Crozier. The court found that the trial judge’s direction was substantially correct, and the jury was adequately informed of the relevant principles.

Given the evidence of Solomon’s statements and actions before and during the stabbing, the jury had sufficient basis to conclude that he had the requisite intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. The jury was also presented with evidence of Solomon's intoxication and was directed properly on how to consider this in relation to intent. The court found that the jury’s conclusion on the presence of intent, despite Solomon’s intoxication, was supported by the evidence. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction for murder was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.