R v Snow

The case of R v Snow involved an application to the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The respondent, Francis Hugh Snow, had been charged with attempting to trade with the enemy under the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914. At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the trial judge directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, finding that the Act was not retrospective regarding attempts to trade and that there was insufficient evidence of attempts after the Act's passage. The Crown sought to appeal this direction and the subsequent acquittal.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether it possessed the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a verdict of not guilty in a criminal trial, particularly when that verdict was directed by the judge. This involved determining the scope of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction under section 73 of the Constitution and whether it extended to setting aside an acquittal and ordering a new trial, even if the acquittal was based on an alleged error of law by the trial judge. A related issue was whether the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 had retrospective effect concerning attempts to trade with the enemy.

The Court ultimately refused special leave to appeal. The majority reasoned that while section 73 of the Constitution grants the High Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments of State Supreme Courts, this jurisdiction does not extend to setting aside a verdict of not guilty in a criminal trial. This principle is rooted in the common law, which provides an acquittal with absolute protection, and the Constitution, particularly section 80, which enshrines trial by jury, was not intended to abrogate this fundamental protection. The Court held that a judge's direction to a jury to acquit, even if erroneous, does not constitute an "interlocutory judgment" in the sense that it is appealable as such, and that the High Court cannot create new grounds for appeal or grant a new trial where the law of the relevant State does not permit it.

Consequently, the application for special leave to appeal was dismissed. The Court found that granting leave would be futile as it lacked the power to set aside the acquittal and order a new trial. The Court also noted that even if it had the power, the circumstances would not warrant the exercise of discretion to grant a new trial.